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Introduction
Holger Mölder, Vladimir Sazonov
The region of the Middle East has been called the cradle of mankind 
where the first human civilizations were born (Ancient Mesopotamia, 
Anatolia, Egypt, the Levant). It became home to numerous cultures, 
religions and ethnicities with long experience of living together in a 
multicultural environment. At the same time, we are currently living 
in the midst of turmoil with crises full of enmity and rivalry the roots 
of which extend back to Ancient times. Historical, cultural, religious, 
social and political legacies often play a central role in obstructing 
intercultural dialogue in the Middle East. A comprehensive and multi-
faceted approach is therefore immediately required to solve the numerous 
problems in the region. The initial idea for the publication “Cultural 
Crossroads in the Middle East – The Historical, Cultural and Political 
Legacy of Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict from the Ancient Near 
East to the Present Day” came in April 2016 and some chapters are based 
on presentations given at the Baltic Alliance for Asian Studies (BAAS) 
conference in Tartu, with several scholars from various European and 
Middle Eastern countries also agreeing to contribute to this volume. 
This is an intermittent and interdisciplinary publication that focuses on 
multiple topics related to the Middle East and the areas of study included 
in this particular volume encompass ancient history, the religion and 
mythology of the Ancient Near Eastern regions (Sumer, Akkad, Iran, 
etc.), Arabic and Islamic studies, Persian, Turkish and Arab literature, 
among others, as well as modern Middle Eastern issues related to 
politics, security, society and the economy. Its authors hail from the 
Baltic Sea countries of Estonia, Latvia and Poland, and from the farther-
flung lands of Israel and Azerbaijan. 
This interdisciplinary volume begins with an introductory chapter by 
Holger Mölder and Vladimir Sazonov which analyzes the perspective 
of intercultural dialogue in the region throughout history. The Sumerian 
civilization has been widely accepted as the earliest in human history, 
dated between 4500/4000 and 2000/1900 B.C., and in his chapter 
Introduction 8
Peeter Espak examines the origins of the Sumerian myths, concluding 
that mythological motives, textual parallels and ideological aspects all 
indicate that the myths of Enki and the World Order, Enki’s Journey to 
Nippur, and Enki and Inanna most probably belong to the period of the 
Isin Dynasty which reigned from 1953 B.C. 
Krzyztof Ulanowski focuses on the role of divination in the Meso - 
po tamian civilization which was in many ways a natural and common 
phenomenon in the Ancient world. The mutual interreligious influence 
of the god Mithra in Zoroastrianism and of Mihryazd in the Manichaean 
religion is analyzed by Jaan Lahe, followed by his chapter in collaboration 
with Vladimir Sazonov (this article is published in German) in which 
they link the role of god (Mithra) with the important treaty between 
the Hittite king Šuppiluliuma I (1380–1340 BC) and the Mitanni king 
Šatiwaza from 14th century B.C. 
In the next chapter Amar Annus provides an overview of the aca- 
demic heritage of well-known Estonian-American Orientalist and Syrio- 
logist Arthur Vööbus (1909–1988). Lidia Leontjeva introduces us to 
the early Persian manuscripts held in the University of Tartu Library, 
most of which were donated in the 19th century. Aynura Mahmudova 
studies the texts of Turkish-Azerbaijani poet and thinker Fuzuli (1483–
1556) and his literary school. The Lebanese American (Maronite) 
writer Ameen Rihani (1876–1940) was also an early theorist of Arab 
nationalism and in the next chapter Ingrida Kleinhofa analyzes his 
literary heritage along with Western and Arab influences on his works. 
There exist approximately three million Alawites in Syria and one 
million in Turkey. The Alawite identity has received a lot of attention in 
the recent Syrian civil war, which started in 2011, due to their support of 
President Assad against Sunni-led opposition. Alawites identify them- 
selves as a separate ethnoreligious group which is distinctive from main-
stream Islam while remaining related to its Shia branch. In his chapter 
Üllar Peterson focuses on Alawite positions on Islam. Next, Tanja Di-
bou examines how the Alawite youth in modern Syria distinguish them-
selves from other young Muslims during the ongoing civil war in Syria. 
Kobi Michael and Yoel Guzansky in their chapter examine the phe-
nomenon of the failed state in the Middle East and its impact upon Arab 
statehood. Saudi Arabia is another regional power which characterizes 
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emerging rivalry in the Middle East and its power relies on vast oil re-
sources. 
Yossi Mann therefore focuses on Saudi Arabia’s fluctuating impact 
on the world oil market in his contribution. The appearance of the State 
of Israel on the Middle Eastern political landscape covers a significant 
part of the recent history of Middle Eastern conflicts. Itamar Rick-
over takes a look at Israeli strategic culture based on three indicators: 
symbols and images; militarism; and a system of norms, traditions and 
procedures that regulate the rules of conduct between the military and 
political echelons. Limor Nobel-Konig in her chapter analyzes the suc-
cess and failure of terrorist organizations that recently became part of 
the Middle Eastern image by emphasizing five key strategic compo-
nents: recruiting activists/supporters; creating provocation; eliminating 
opponents; instilling fear; and media activity. Holger Mölder is study-
ing the influence of new types of actors such as the Islamic State on 
the contemporary security environment. Sandra Peets focuses on the 
strategic narratives adopted by Āyatollā Ḫomeynī (leader of Iran 1979–
1989) and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn (leader of Iraq 1979–2003) in the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980–1988).
Viljar Veebel, Yurii Punda and Vitalii Shevchuk examine the roots 
of large-scale immigration flows into the European Union over the last 
decade and investigate the potential link between immigration and the 
Kremlin’s hybrid warfare operations in Syria and Ukraine. Finally, Il-
limar Ploom, Vladimir Sazonov and Viljar Veebel discuss Russia’s 
growing ambitions in the Middle East, and its strategies and methods. 
This study explores the background, strategies and methods of Russia’s 
pursuits in the region.
The Failure of Intercultural Dialogue in the 
Middle East – the Impact of War Theology to 
Contemporary Ideological-Religious Conflicts1
Holger Mölder, Vladimir Sazonov
Abstract This article analyses opportunities for the development 
of intercultural dialogue in the Middle East, home to several world 
religions. The spread of numerous ethnic, religious and cultural con-
flicts in this region has promoted the emergence of various radical 
movements there. The goal of this study is to determine the condi-
tions under which it might be possible to achieve a breakthrough in 
the development of regional peace for these multicultural religions. 
This paper examines the impact of historical, religious and political 
processes on intercultural communication in the region and focuses 
on processes which have led to the development of the current situa-
tion in the Middle East with its escalation of extremism.
Keywords Middle East, intercultural dialogue, war theology, Islam
Introduction
The Middle East is a clear example of protracted imminent conflict 
formation which also possesses some distinctive cultural features.2 
Ongoing processes in the Middle East are related to the spread of religious 
and political extremism which may end up creating nondemocratic 
regimes and/or continuous ethnic/religious conflicts, a very frequent 
phenomenon in the Middle Eastern political landscape. The primary 
goal of this study is to analyse the influence of historical legacy on 
social and political processes in the region including the tradition of 
war theo logy, the persistence of authoritarianism, and the formation of 
1 This article was written with the financial support of grant PFLKU15910 “Conflicts in-
side Islam in the Middle East and their Historical and Cultural Roots on Examples of Syrian 
and Iraq Civil Wars.”
2 Buzan & Waever 2003: 187–218.
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a multicultural environment in the Middle East. Multiculturalism may 
emphasise intercultural dialogues but it is also able to produce various 
violent responses to it (i.e., ethnic and religious conflicts, extremist 
movements, social revolutions).3 The authors argue that many of the 
regional processes we witness today (e.g., the Arab Spring, the civil 
war in Syria, the Iraqi conflict, the Israeli-Palestine conflict, the rise 
of religious extremism) have their beginnings in early history, but these 
long-term developments are now tied to building a modern identity. 
Therefore, historical processes continuously influence the success of 
intercultural dialogue and produce obstacles to stable regional peace. 
The present-day Middle Eastern cultural, political and security en-
vironment is a result of processes which started a long time ago. In the 
Ancient Near East, religion and politics were even more closely related 
to each other than nowadays and they have always played a very sig-
nificant, even central, role in the functioning of the state, the legitimisa-
tion of power and the justification of war).4 The Middle Eastern political 
landscape significantly changed during the 20th century and a number of 
new states had to start their identity- and state-building processes using 
contrasting ethnic and religious identities which had survived from ear-
lier times. The last two decades of the 20th century shifted focus towards 
the growth of religious self-consciousness accompanied by the increas-
ing trend of religious extremism. The present study looks for sources 
which might explain the emergence of religious, nationalist and political 
extremism by taking a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach. 
Building an intercultural dialogue
The purpose of intercultural dialogue between distinct identity groups 
is not always to achieve the benefits of common goals, it can also be to 
value and respect the role of another culture, religion or ethnic iden-
tity. Distinct identities can be developed as a dynamic process without 
denouncing other identities as worthless; indeed, learning and becom-
ing aware of each other can be a central value. Dialogue is an impor-
tant source of contextualisation where religions and cultures contribute 
to identities with rites, symbols, beliefs, norms, traditions, events and 
3 Martin & Barzegar 2010; Perkinson 2002; Rubin 2009.
4 Oded 1992.
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mythologies that make up culturally distinctive communities with their 
own particular historical and cultural memories. These memories are 
interpreted on an individual and collective level. Intercultural dialogue 
has to adjust a self-constructed picture of other cultures or religions 
according to the self-determination of others, which in turn may lead to 
a change in its own image.5 
Rationalist theories have often marginalised questions of percep-
tion, belief and identity.6 The cultural theory of international rela-
tions, introduced by constructivist scholar Richard Ned Lebow) in 
his book7, emphasizes interconnections between society, actors and 
their identities, all closely related with claims for status and recogni-
tion.8 Emotions can affect international relations and world politics 
in different ways. According to Plato and Aris totle, there are three 
fundamental drives – appetite, spirit and reason – which can influ-
ence the decision-making process. Besides these basic paradigms, 
there are also many other influential drives like fear, resentment, ha-
tred, sympathy, and others, that can direct the behaviour of interna-
tional actors. Whatever perceptions people might have about each 
other, these are often constructed imaginations about possible future 
action which manifest in conflicting identities – Self and Others – but 
the motives for these constructions often serve powerful emotions based 
on sentiment rather than rational calculation.9
Emotional narratives may impact the establishment of unstable 
security environments. Fear is a fundamental drive which has significantly 
shaped the security environment in the Middle East since Ancient 
times. Fear-based worlds may produce constructed security narratives 
justifying a permanent state of war that keeps mutual misperceptions 
alive. In the construction of security dilemmas, cultural misperceptions 
are important elements).10 Aristotle described fear as an imagined pain 
5 Prentice & Miller 1999; Ringmar 1996.
6 Williams 2007: 44.
7 Lebow 2008a.
8 see also Bleiker & Hutchinson 2008; Lebow 2008b; Lindemann & Ringmar 2012; Mercer 
2006; Renshon & Lerner 2012; Ringmar 1996; Ross 2006; Sasley 2011.
9 Wendt 2004.
10 Booth & Wheeler 2008; Bleiker & Hutchinson 2008.
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or disturbance that prepares a mindset for an evil future.11 Elias12 implied 
that fear is one of the most important mechanisms through which 
structures would be transmitted to individual psychological functions. 
The present-day image of the Middle East is built on maintaining constant 
fear between actors based on historical, ethnic, religious and social 
origins.13 In a conflict-prone security environment fear can be developed 
into a culture of fear, which has proved itself an important force in 
international politics, justifying the activities of actors and producing 
enmities and polarisations within the international environment, among 
others. 
Cultural origins are the most powerful incentives in promoting con-
flicts in culturally divided environments.14 Managing ethnic and reli-
gious conflict is no simple task. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary15 
identified eight distinctive macro-methods of ethnic conflict regulation, 
some of which eliminate differences and some of which manage dif-
ferences. The eliminating methods (genocide, forced mass-population 
transfers, secession, assimilation) can often intensify conflict, while 
the managing methods (hegemonic control, arbitration, federalisation, 
power-sharing) can strengthen cooperation between different identities. 
However, this is not a hard and fast rule. If conflict management brings 
in winners and losers, revanchist moods may strengthen again in the 
long run. The current international order does not favour the eliminat-
ing methods. If the managing methods do not produce comprehensive 
results, secession would be favourable in some cases. Certainly, it would 
be preferable to the continuation of armed conflict. 
The Middle East has often been regarded as having become a re-
gion that is exceptionally resistant to democratisation and whose liberal 
regimes will initially end up with durable authoritarianism).16 Schwarz 
and de Corral17 conclude that most Middle Eastern states are strong in 
the area of security but weak in the area of representation and politi-
cal legitimacy. Historical, ethnic, religious, and social incentives may 
11 Lebow 2008a.
12 Elias 1982.
13 Fattah & Fierke 2009; Löwenheim & Heimann 2008.
14 Prentice & Miller 1999; Lebow 2010.
15 McGarry & O’Leary 1993: 4.
16 Hinnebusch 2006: 373.
17 Schwarz & de Corral 2011: 210.
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produce emotional narratives emerging from interactions between 
political elites and public expectations which feed extremist movements. 
An interdisciplinary approach would help examine the origins of 
such narratives. So far, relatively little research has been focused on 
comparative analysis including different periods of history and it would 
be beneficial to take into account the different ideological and religious 
systems that emerged in the Middle Eastern area throughout history, 
while analysing contemporary conflicts. 
Ancient Near East and its holy wars
Even today, in the post-modern and high-tech world of the 21st century, 
radical political-religious movements and organizations have become 
extremely influential. Religiously motivated extremist and fundamen-
talist political movements have emerged especially from within Islam 
as we see from the example of the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda and their 
affiliates, making the security environment in the region permanently 
un stable and explosive. Religion is still very closely related to politics to 
such an extent that they often cannot be separated from each other and 
theology is even used by religious fundamentalists and extremists to 
justify violent methods like war, terror, or genocide, towards which they 
often turn to achieve their political goals.18 In the Ancient Near East, 
theology was a very influential and powerful political weapon for rul-
ing elites, traces of which we observe in contemporary regional political 
culture. 
Numerous examples of Ancient influences on modern wars and 
conflicts can be found in the Middle East. Holy or divine wars were 
strongly related to the theology of war and the state ideology of Ancient 
Mesopotamia.19 The first documented wars against other religious or 
ethnic groups were justified by theology.20 The tradition of henotheism 
or monotheism in the Ancient Near East21, the rising importance of god-
creator in Ancient Mesopotamia22, and the development of monotheism 
in Israel are all related to elements that can be regarded as the possible 
18 Martin & Barzegar 2010; Selengut 2003.
19 Kang 1989; Mayer 2001; Fales 2000; Bahrani 2008.
20 Espak 2010, 2011; Schmitt 2011.
21 Parpola 2000.
22 Espak 2015.
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roots of modern Middle Eastern radicalism, as well the politics of terror 
by Assyrian or Babylonian kings against ethnic groups).23 Besides, the 
theology of war very often served political goals in the Old Testament, 
which later carried over into Christian ideologies.24 
Examples of despotic ruling systems, regarded in some cases as 
“early totalitarian systems”25, can help contemporary scholars under-
stand the roots of modern extremist movements and the nature of Mid-
dle Eastern dictatorships. The system of government in Ancient Iran 
was strongly influenced by Assyrian and Babylonian ideological and 
religious systems. These systems have been maintained in the Ancient 
Near East, having a great number of similarities with subsequent sys-
tems. Some of them were unique and constituted local phenomena, typi-
cal for a given region. Methods and techniques for the legitimisation of 
power and kingship in Ancient Persia during the Teispid-Achaemenid 
period and later in Sassanid Persia, share many similarities with Ancient 
Mesopotamian royal ideological systems. Zoroastrianism was the first 
monotheistic religion in the world, which was dominant in Iran until 651 
AD and had a strong influence on Judaism, Christianity and Islam.26 In 
the Sassanid Empire kings considered themselves the legitimate suc-
cessors of the Teispid-Achaemenids)27, which shows how Persian kings 
legitimise their power through Zoroastrian theology. 
In written sources and iconography we can find evidence for the jus-
tification of wars in Mesopotamia since Early Dynastic Sumer. From the 
reign of Ur-Nanshe (ca. 2500 BC), ruler of Pre-Sargonic Sumerian city-
state Lagash, more than 50 royal inscriptions have been found – almost 
all of which describe the building or rebuilding of temples for important 
gods of Lagash such as Ninğirsu or Nanshe.28 Among the inscriptions of 
Ur-Nanse there is only one fragment (Ur-Nanshe E1.9.6b) which is prob-
ably the earliest known longer description of an historical event in Meso-
potamian history and belongs to the first written records of warfare.29 
All the previous texts from Pre-Sargonic Sumer (2800–2335 BCE) were 
23 Oded 1979; Röllig 1996; Sazonov 2012.
24 Põldsam 2009/2010: 85–90.
25 Kulmar 2008.
26 Boyce 1979; Stausberg 2004.
27 Shahbazi 2001.
28 Selz 1990; Espak 2011.
29 Espak 2011: 118–120; see more on theology of war Espak 2019; Sazonov 2015.
The Failure of Intercultural Dialogue in the Middle East 16
only very short statements about building temples or sometimes digging 
canals, or simply named the ruler at the time, or sometimes his titulary 
was added.
It is commonly believed that the theology of war was developed 
c. 2400 BC. E-anatum, another ruler of Lagash, tried to justify his mili-
tary campaigns using theology, divine forces and gods.30 In a description 
of wars between E-anatum and the leader of Umma, the former used 
theological justification for his aggressive politics and war, using the 
gods Enlil, Ninğirsu and others to lend legitimacy to his wars. E-anatum 
shows in his inscriptions that he was led by Enlil or Ninğirsu; he was the 
chief or commander of the army of Lagash but was always supported or 
commanded by great gods. He “subjugates the foreign lands for the god 
Ninğirsu”.31 
If we look at texts from the Sargonic period of the kingdom of Akkad 
(2334–2154 BC) when the first centralized territorial state was founded, 
then the justification of wars with the help and support of gods becomes 
clearer and the theology of war seems to be better formulated. Sargonic 
kings such as Sargon, Rimush or Narām-Sîn used different ways to jus-
tify their wars and the king was a warlike hero, supported by the gods. 
Sargonic kings Sargon and Narām-Sîn became archetypal rulers in 
the Ancient Near East for a very long time and influenced the ruling 
ideologies across whole epochs of the history of Ancient Mesopotamia 
and the Ancient Near East. Building upon their legacy, the first Roman 
emperors Julius Caesar and Octavianus Augustus became archetypes 
for successive Roman emperors and, likewise, for all rulers of the whole 
of Western Civilization right from the fall of the Roman Empire up to 
modern times
The city-state Assur had become more or less sovereign after the fall 
of the Neo-Sumerian rulers of the Third Dynasty of Ur (2112–2004 BC). 
Only the god Assur was regarded as almighty Lord of all Assyrian peo-
ple and the ruler of state was simply his vice-regent.32 This idea is com-
parable to the Islamic creed lā ʾilāha ʾillā-llāh, muḥammadun rasūlu-
llāh – there is no god but God. Muhammad is the messenger of God. 
30 Winter 1986: 205–12.
31 RIME 1: E-anatum E1.9.3.4, lines i 9–10, p. 144.
32 Parpola 2000: 168–73.
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In the Succession Treaties of king Esarhaddon (681–669 BC)33, we find 
a similar passage concerning his son and crown prince Assurbanipal 
and god Assur: “in future and for eternity must Assur be your god and 
Assurbanipal must be your Lord”.34 However it seems that this idea is 
older; in the longest inscription of the ruler of Assur, Erishum I (20th 
century BC), we read the following: “Assur is king, Erishum is (his) 
appointee.”35 
Simo Parpola36 pointed out: “As rulers of the universe, the ‘great 
gods’ were similar in role and function to the Gnostic archons (liter-
ary, ‘rulers’), who were in turn essentially equivalents of the Jewish and 
Christian ‘archangels’.” The god Assur was always seen by Assyrians 
as the real sovereign and owner of the Land of Assur, and the ruler of 
Assur was only his vice-regent.37 Only the god Assur was regarded as 
the almighty Lord of all the Assyrian people, which is similar to the 
position of Allah later adopted by Muslims. 
The growth of power, expansion of the Neo-Assyrian Empire and 
the creation of Pax Assyrica in the 8th–7th centuries BC were directly 
connected to the new political-ideological programs of very ambitious 
Neo-Assyrian kings such as Tiglath-Pileser III, Sargon II, Sennacherib, 
Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal.38 This growth also led to the success-
ful development of Assyrian warfare, innovations and reforms in the 
Assyrian army. The aim of these Assyrian kings’ geopolitical ambitions 
was splendidly reflected in their royal inscriptions that listed successful 
military campaigns, among other feats, which they tried to justify with 
the support of theology and the gods. Theological justification played a 
very significant role in supporting royal legacy.39 
Back in Early Dynastic Sumer we have many instances where kings 
tried to justify and legitimise their rule with support from the gods. The 
rulers of Mesopotamia started to use theological justifications for mili-
tary campaigns and wars. It is a very long tradition that began in III 
millennia BC and continued for thousands of years; it was also very 
33 Wiseman 1958.
34 Parpola 2000: 167.
35 RIMA 1: Erishum I, A.0.33.1, 21, lines 35–36.
36 Parpola 2000: 180.
37 Holloway 2002.
38 Fales 2008: 17–35; Mayer 2013.
39 Garelli 1982: 16–29; Barjamovic 2012: 43–59.
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popular in the Neo-Assyrian period, and even much later. Zainab Bah-
rani40 noted: “The Assyrians are perhaps thought of in relation to war 
and violence more often than most other ancient cultures, especially in 
the first millennium BC.”
The translation of ancient heritage contributes to a deeper under-
standing of the roots of contemporary Middle Eastern religious funda-
mentalism and provides a clearer picture of social processes that have 
recently taken place in the region. The development and functioning of 
cultural patterns over various historical periods, the rule of different 
ideologies, and their mutual influence would help to build bridges for 
intercultural dialogue, which would ideally help a move towards a stable 
peace in the region.
Islamic war theology and its pre-Islamic sources
The year 622 AD has been widely accepted as the beginning of Muslim 
world, a time at which Islam took a big step towards becoming the domi-
nant religion for the Middle East. The new Islamic period included many 
traditions from the pre-Islamic period following Assyrian, Babylonian, 
and Ancient Persian traditions, among others, which was especially 
strongly reflected by the administrative system, governing principles, 
state ideology, methods of propaganda, rhetoric, and the ruler’s cult of 
personality, etc. Examining the cultural context of earlier periods helps 
us to understand the current situation.
The Quran, just as in many sacred texts, contains many controversial 
verses referring to war and peace. The introduction of the Quran into the 
political context often relies on patterns already practised by the earliest 
rulers of the Ancient Near East. Hundreds of pieces of evidence from 
Ancient Mesopotamia indicate that rulers used similar theological justi-
fications for their military campaigns or invasions which later appear in 
the Quran. Similarities to earlier pre-Islamic tradition which emphasizes 
the role of war against those who do not belong to Our ranks in their 
fight against Others can be seen
40 Bahrani 2008: 14.
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If we compare Quran-based war theology with pre-Islamic Persian 
tradition, Teispids-Achaemenids, Sassanids and other evidence, we can 
find analogous expressions in Behistun inscription of Darius I41:
31. (2.64–70.) Darius the King says: Thereafter I went away from Babylon 
(and) arrived in Media. When I arrived in Media, a town named Kunduru, 
in Media – there this Phraortes who called himself king in Media came with 
an army against me to join battle. Thereafter we joined battle. Ahuramazda 
bore me aid; by the favor of Ahuramazda that army of Phraortes I smote 
exceedingly; of the month Adukanaisha 25 days were past, then we fought 
the battle.
32. (2.70–8.) Darius the King says: Thereafter this Phraortes with a few 
horsemen fled; a district named Raga, in Media – along there he went off. 
Thereafter I sent an army in pursuit; Phraortes, seized, was led to me. I cut 
off his nose and ears and tongue, and put out one eye; he was kept bound at 
my palace entrance, all the people saw him.
Quran (9:14) – “Fight against them so that Allah will punish them by your 
hands and disgrace them and give you victory over them and heal the 
breasts of a believing people.
Quran (5:33) – “The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and 
His messenger and strive to make mischief in the land is only this, that they 
should be murdered or crucified or their hands and their feet should be cut 
off on opposite sides or they should be imprisoned; this shall be as a dis-
grace for them in this world, and in the hereafter they shall have a grievous 
chastisement.”
From Neo-Assyrian times, Esarhaddon caught the king of Sidon and 
cut off his head by command of the god Assur, applying for the wish of 
the main god of Assyria. Therefore, this act of violence was justified by 
using theology. Extremist Islamic movements throughout history have 
used similar justifications.
Esarhaddon: By command of the god Assur, my lord, I caught him like a fish 
from the midst of the sea and cut off his head.42 
41 Corpus of Old Persian Texts – AVESTA – Zoroastrian Archives.
42 RINAP 4: Esarhaddon 1, 16.
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Quran (8:12) – “I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. 
Therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them.” 
Contemporary Islamic extremism (i.e., war theology revealed by the 
Islamic State) often turns to controversial sources from the Quran which 
were probably borrowed from the earliest kingships in the Ancient Near 
East. The Quran does not use the word “jihad” for warfare or fighting 
but for serving the purposes of God on the Earth (El Fadl 2002, 37).43 
Therefore, the concept of “holy war” as used by Islamic extremists can 
hardly be called Islamic, but it rather expresses a tradition of war theol-
ogy that seeks to justify the violent behavior of rulers in achieving their 
political goals. Indeed, in certain contexts the Quran tells its followers 
that disbelievers have to be killed. However, this does not mean that 
the religion itself need necessarily be violent and repressive, but it does 
convey the political tradition of using religion to bolster the legacy of 
Islamic rulers. We can also find similar descriptions in the Christian 
Bible and other contemporary sacred texts. 
Khaled Abou El Fadl44 writes: “The real challenge that confronts 
Muslim intellectuals is that political interests have come to dominate the 
public discourse, and to a large extent, moral discourses have become 
marginalized in modern Islam.” The Quran does not have as chronologi-
cal a structure as, for example, the Bible, which makes the abrogation 
of earlier texts with later texts a debatable issue among Islamic scholars. 
David Bukay45 (2007) mentions that the text of the Quran contradicts 
itself and that earlier verses revealed by Muhammad in Mecca tend to 
be more peaceful than the later verses revealed in Medina which tend to 
become progressively more violent as Muhammad’s strength as a politi-
cal leader of the Islamic community grew. It is important to acknow-
ledge the difference between that which the majority of Islamic scholars 
believe and that which extreme Muslims believe, the latter having clear 
motivation to incite just wars to politicize the religion. Religious extrem-
ism, state dictatorship and ethnic conflict are frequent manifestations 
in the Middle Eastern political landscape. The roots of fundamentalist 
ideologies are strongly related to the history of the region which has 
43 El Fadl 2002: 37.
44 Ibid.: 36.
45 Bukay 2007.
21 Holger Mölder, Vladimir Sazonov
been rich in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes since the early days of 
human civilization born in the Middle East. The modern traditions and 
customs of the Islamic Middle East follow at least to some extent early 
medieval Islamic traditions.
Fundamentalist Salafi movements idealize the early Muslim world 
and have taken on a return to the early Muslim world as their credo. 
The Prophet Mohammad’s life, his words and deeds, are the basis for 
determining the significance of Islamic law, religious dogma and piety. 
Spokesmen of fundamentalist Salafi movements emphasise their desire 
to go back in history and restore the situation that existed in the 7th cen-
tury AD. Salafists of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf states, along 
with the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, seek to establish a direct 
link with the activities of Mohammad and his time. The most wide-
spread term al-Wahhābiyya is derived from Islamic preacher and scholar 
Moḥammad bin Aʿbd al-Wahhāb from Nejd and was originally used 
by his opponents to denounce his doctrine as mere personal opinion. 
Muḥammad bin Aʿbd al-Wahhāb and his followers called themselves 
al-Muwaḥḥidūn – “those who profess the unity of God”.46 In the 20th 
century the term was also used by followers and sympathisers of the 
Salafi movement, like Sulaymān bin Saḥmān. A neo-orthodox brand of 
Islamic reformism from the late 19th century aimed to regenerate Islam 
by returning to the traditions represented by the “pious forefathers” of 
the primitive faith.47 
The term “Salafism” can be defined as “a school of thought which 
surfaced in the second half of the 19th century as a reaction to the spread 
of European ideas,” which “sought to expose the roots of modernity 
within Muslim civilization”.48 Salafism is not one uniform, extremist 
power as depicted in the image promulgated by the media after the 
terrorist attack against the United States in 2001, the Madrid and 
London bombings and the recent Paris shootings, but instead one can 
identify at least three to five distinct branches within this movement. 
First, the non-violent Purist branch has sought to promote mainly 
religious goals and Islamic education. The Madkhalist branch, close to 
the Purists and followers of Saudi Arabian Islamic scholar Rabee’ Ibn 
46 Pink 2010.
47 Süld 2014.
48 Kepel 2006. 
The Failure of Intercultural Dialogue in the Middle East 22
Haadee ‘Umayr al-Madkhalee, supports secular state-building in Arab 
states and justifies it by claiming secular leaders have a divine right to 
rule their countries. The outnumbered branch of the Salafi movement is 
mainstream Salafism or political Salafism which condemns violence, 
but differently from the Purists and Madkhalists; they are actively 
engaged in the political processes of their home countries. The most 
infamous, but less supported branch of Salafism is Jihadism. Salafi 
Jihadism strengthened in the mid-1990s and practises armed insurgency, 
including terrorism, against secular and non-Muslim regimes. 
Qutbism, which influenced the ideological stances of the al-Qaeda 
organization, is the most extreme branch of the Salafi movement. It was 
named by its founder, Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), one 
of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1950s and 60s. 
According to Qutb, Islam is a comprehensive system of morality, law, 
and management governed by Shariah principles which should ensure 
the equitable development of state and society. Sayyid Qutb’s main work 
was the 30-volume edition of the Quran In the Shade of the Qur’an.49 
The previously secular and progressive scholar Qutb turned to funda-
mentalist Islamism during his studies in the United States. In 1952, Qutb 
welcomed the “Free Officers” movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser 
and their coup to overthrow the king of Egypt Farouk, but soon got into 
conflict with the new authorities and spent ten years (1954–1964) in 
prison where he completed his political manifesto of Islamism “Mile-
stones” (Ma’alim fi-l -Tariq). Sayyid Qutb was hanged in 1966 by the 
Egyptian authorities but his younger brother Muhammad (1919–2014) 
went to Saudi Arabia and taught Islamic studies in Mecca and Jedda. 
His students included future al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and 
Ayman al-Zawahiri. Muhammad Qutbi’s work Islam: A Misunderstood 
Religion (Shubuhāt Hawla al-Islam) is considered one indicator of the 
fundamentalist path of Islamism that promotes Islamic moral superior-
ity over the West.50
49 al-Qur‘an Zilal Fi.
50 Mölder 2014: 123–125; Sazonov & Mölder 2015: 144–145.
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Contemporary war theology in the Middle East 
and premises for intercultural dialogue
The main problem causing obstacles for intercultural dialogue in Middle 
Eastern countries is limited democratic experience within their socie-
ties. The divine rights perpetuated by contrasting religions, ideologies 
and rules still play an important role in the political landscape of the 
contemporary Middle East, just as they did in the Ancient Middle East. 
Contemporary Islamic societies often practise war theology which pro-
motes conflict between the legacy of fundamentalist Sharia and secular 
states that rely on Western models of statehood. Moreover, with only 
a few exceptions Middle Eastern secular states are rarely democratic 
states and autocratic traditions have maintained the prominent role they 
played thousands of years ago. Israel and Tunisia, and to some extent 
Turkey, Kuwait, Lebanon and Morocco, notably qualify as free coun-
tries practising political rights and civil liberties, according to the US-
based non-governmental study Freedom in the World.51 
Many states in the region are under internal pressure from weak 
economies, a high birth rate and resulting boom in the young popula-
tion, deficient education, and repressive authoritarian regimes, while 
the United States is busy making friends with hated and uncompromis-
ing Israel, autocratic and fundamentalist Saudi Arabia and corrupt and 
undemocratic Egypt.52 In Iraq and Afghanistan the West interfered in 
the name of global security but found itself confronted with a number 
of internal conflicts that had not been immediately apparent under the 
previous dictatorships led by Saddam Hussein and the Taliban regime. 
For the West, political gains have always downplayed value-based policy 
in the region. There was no significant public pressure to invade Iraq in 
2003 but the United States chose to act decisively in order to send a clear 
message to diverse Middle Eastern audiences and also to portray itself 
as sole hegemon of the world.53 
Conflict between the West and Islamic civilization does not repre-
sent a fight for global dominance but more likely stems from the inter-
nal problems of the Middle East. It is also notable that many extremists 
51 Freedom House 2015.
52 Buzan 2003: 202–203.
53 Lebow 2008a: 441.
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sustained by Middle Eastern autocratic regimes have since fled to the 
Western world which practises freedom of speech. 
Past experience has had an influence on the shape of the present-
day political landscape and without studying the multiple ideologies that 
have emerged in the region throughout its time-proof history it would be 
impossible to establish reliable models that stimulate intercultural dia-
logue between Middle Eastern nations. Clement M. Henry54 claims that, 
although the Middle East is predominantly Muslim and predominantly 
Arab, its most distinctive characteristic is neither religion nor language 
nor culture but rather its peculiar colonial legacy. After World War I, 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire had a tremendous impact on 
the region; the Middle East became a subject of Western colonialism in 
which its religious and ethnic composition and the patterns of former 
governance were ignored. The Aliyah process started at the end of 19th 
century, brought waves of Jewish immigration into the Palestine area. 
This process resulted in Israeli statehood and launched the most compli-
cated Israeli-Palestine conflict, a phenomenon which consequently had 
a big impact on extremist challenges in the region. 
In 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran led to rising Shia political ac-
tivity in several parts of the region and the Soviet invasion to Afghani-
stan helped to consolidate supporters of Sunni extremism.55 Khomeini, 
the leader of the Iranian Islamic revolution, focused on two particular 
areas above all: Palestine and Lebanon and regarded the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as being primarily religious, although only a few Palestinians 
were Shiites.56 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 
helped to consolidate Sunni extremists. Many extremist movements 
were born during the civil war in Afghanistan when Western-supported 
Islamists fought with the Soviet-backed secular government. Later the 
first Sunni-based theocratic regime in the Middle-East established by 
the Taliban movement also contributed to the spread of religious extrem-
ism in and around the whole region. The Iraqi intervention of 2003 
and the Arab Spring revolutionary wave produced a further spread of 
Islamic extremism in the region. 
54 Henry 2005: 108.
55 Mölder 2011: 256.
56 Caryl 2014: 197.
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It is notable that religious extremist movements in the Middle East, 
the only exception to which being Iran, are not led by theocratic hier-
archy. In some cases they may be clerics by profession or education, 
like caliph Ibrahim in the case of Islamic State, but they are often just 
politically-motivated religious seculars without any connection to the 
Islamic clergy. Religious extremism in Middle-Eastern societies is 
multi faceted. The Salafi movement itself is not homogeneous and is cer-
tainly not necessarily always an extremist ideology; different kinds of 
political activism with various goals and ambitions may manifest within 
it. The Taliban practises militant insurgency and intends to create a the-
ocratic regime in Afghanistan – and perhaps in Pakistan – but so far it 
has not expressed any global ambitions. Al-Qaeda is oriented towards 
fighting Western civilization, although some its offshoots actively fight 
for power in Yemen (AQAP), Somalia (al-Shabaab) and Syria (Jabhat al 
Nusra, since 2016 Jabhat Fatah al-Sham).
The Islamic State calls for interventionism and the implementation 
of an Islamic caliphate along the lines of early Arab conquests. The war 
theology practiced by the Islamic State has many incredible parallels 
with the Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian kings of Ancient times. 
The other Salafi political icon, the Muslim Brotherhood, represents a 
political kind of Salafism which aspires to milder forms of Islamic state 
while maintaining a parliamentary democracy. Despite its ideological 
similarity to the leadership of the Gulf states, the Muslim Brotherhood 
has been officially declared a terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.57 The organization was also ex-
pelled from Qatar in September 2014. Nevertheless Qatar had become 
a prominent donor country to Salafi movements, which caused a diplo-
matic crisis in 2017.58 One positive example of the Middle-Eastern peace 
process can be found in the upheaval of the Israel-Palestine relationship 
of the 1990s which established the preconditions for a peace settlement, 
being the implementation of UN resolution 181(II) of 1947.59 However, 
57 Also in Syria, Egypt and Russia and by the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
58 Several Islamic countries led by Saudia Arabia cut their diplomatic ties with Qatar. This 
act was followed by the blockage of Qatar’s airspace and sea routes and land crossing by 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. 
59 The resolution established a partition plan for Palestine and recommended the creation 
of independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of 
Jerusalem. The UN General Assembly adopted it on 29 November 1947. 
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more extremist challenges later emerged in Palestine when a Salafist 
Hamas won the parliamentary elections in 2006 and Benjamin Netan-
yahu’s government in Israel adopted a more fundamentalist stance, 
bringing the Oslo Peace Process60 between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority to a dead end. However, the Oslo Peace Process remains one 
of the few positive outcomes of national reconciliations in the Middle 
East. Emmanuel Adler61 suggests that regional identity-building would 
have a chance of establishing regional peace in the Middle East. Such 
an initiative would produce new narratives and myths supported by vol-
untary civil-society networks and civic beliefs instead of by blood or 
religion.
The Middle Eastern political environment has some difficult is-
sues as a product of its historical legacy. Scholars often measure the 
impact of changes through the status of the elites who hold power in 
a particular society.62 The elimination of political extremism from the 
Middle Eastern societies is another important requirement for region-
al peace. Extrem ism can easily spread if different ethnic and religious 
groups start to intervene in the power struggles for dominant positions 
in multinational societies. Political experience and the failure of many 
past peace processes indicate that the reformation of such societies must 
begin at grass-root level. The examples of the Palestinian parliamentary 
elections in 2006, won by Hamas, and the parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections in Egypt in 2011–2012, won by Mohammed Morsi and the 
Freedom and Justice Party, a political offshoot of the Muslim Brother-
hood, prove that Salafi movements can indeed be successful in demo-
cratic elections.63 Building bridges between cultures and stimulating 
inter cultural dialogue for national reconciliation may reduce the influ-
ence of extremist movements within their societies. 
Henry notes that “countries lack the domestic political space in 
which to negotiate compromises between the putative globaliers and 
the reluctant moralisers, whether Islamist or nationalist, within their 
60 Oslo Peace Process includes a set of agreements signed by the govern ment of Israel and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993 and in 1995 (Oslo II).
61 Adler 2005: 236–7.
62 Caryl 2014: 289.
63 The Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi were removed from office by the military 
in 2013.
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respective communities.”64 The social revolutions of the Arab Spring 
did not produce the expected “westernisation” of the Middle East. 
Moreover, the Arab Spring saw an increase in the influence of Islamist 
extremism in different Arab societies, particularly in Egypt and Syria. 
After chal lenges to secular dictatorships, Jihadism strengthened its 
positions in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen, which were caught up in 
endless civil wars. The Sunni-Shia conflict is manifested in struggles 
in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen with a significant number of Shias, 
but also in Saudi Arabia, which has a large Shia minority in its Eastern 
Province, and Lebanon which is home to the powerful militant Shia 
movement Hezbollah. Besides the two-state solution for Palestine, the 
Kurdish problem has remained unresolved for centuries despite the fact 
that Kurdish armed groups seem to be the only effective force against 
the rising extremism of the Islamic State. The Kurds comprise an ethnic 
minority in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, but their identity rights are often 
rejected by Turkish, Persian and Arab rulers in their native countries.
The continuation of the Oslo Peace Process is the only productive 
policy right now for managing the Israel-Palestine conflict. The birth of 
the State of Palestine, recognised both internationally and by the State 
of Israel, is an inevitable result for any Middle-Eastern peace process, 
a result which will have a deep impact on peace-building in the region. 
Besides, the status of Jewish settlers in Palestinian territory and the sta-
tus of the holy city of Jerusalem require a comprehensive agreement be-
tween both parties of the conflict. The implementation of the UN resolu-
tion, adopted on November 29, 1947, is a good roadmap for a two-state 
solution that also confers special status upon Jerusalem, the key issue in 
the Israel-Palestine peace process. The Kurdish problem has two pos-
sible solutions: the eliminating way of secession and the establishment 
of a Kurdish state, or the managing way of broad autonomy for Kurd-
ish minorities in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria.65 The involvement of the 
Kurdish people through comprehensive discussion and the subsequent 
period of transition must however be followed by some concrete politi-
cal decisions.
64 Henry 2005: 112.
65 An independence referendum for Iraqi Kurdistan was held in 2017, where 93.25% of 
voters supported independent statehood, but it was rejected by thre Iraqi federal government.
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Conclusions
The successful implementation of intercultural dialogue demands a re-
duction of the influence of extremist movements and the establishment 
of identities that follow civic-oriented narratives which will not give pri-
ority to any of the competing ideologies. The invocation of ethnic or 
religious identities in pursuit of political goals has always undermined 
the establishment of stable peace. The Middle Eastern security environ-
ment is full of various polarities, most of which have become stronger 
since the 1980s. Sunni-Shia conflict can be identified in the civil wars 
of Iraq, Syria and Yemen, but also in political fights in Bahrain, a Shia-
dominated nation ruled by a Sunni dynasty and government. There are 
obvious intentions from Saudi Arabia, challenged by Qatar, to establish 
itself as leader of the Sunni community. Iran is widely recognised as 
leader of the Shia community, but with the rare exceptions of Iraq, Syria 
and Yemen suffering under civil wars, Iran does not enjoy much sup-
port across the Arab countries. There is most likely no single solution 
for encouraging intercultural dialogue between all the Middle-Eastern 
societies; each conflict-prone situation requires an individual approach 
for uniting ethnic and religious communities in the pursuit of common 
goals.
The Middle East offers multiple pieces of evidence confirming that 
historical processes and traditions continuously produce obstacles to the 
establishment of stable regional peace, while also having an influence on 
the success of intercultural dialogue in the region. First, historical Sunni- 
Shia conflict destabilises the societies of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, 
and Lebanon. Second, the future of Palestine is a source not only of 
ethnic conflict between Jews and Arabs but also of religious conflict be-
tween Judaism and Islam. Third, the unresolved Kurdish problem influ-
ences the societies of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Besides these main-
stream conflicts, the situation of smaller ethnic and religious minorities 
living in the Middle East such as Assyrians, Armenians, Christians, 
Druzes, Jezids, and others, also produces tensions in the Middle East. 
War theology by which conflicts are justified through religious exhorta-
tion has had an impact on the regional security environment since An-
cient times and is often simply a manifestation of the regional leaders’ 
political ambitions, while contrasting identities are used as tools to en-
hance one group’s national or religious interests at the expense of others.
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The promotion of intercultural dialogue in the conflict-prone 
Middle-East has to start with the implementation of a peace-oriented 
environment enabling ethnic and religious communities to continue 
with their practices. The region must overcome its past history to en-
courage dialogue between all religions prevalent in the region. If states 
were able to negotiate for a stable security environment this would sup-
port the management of interstate ethnic and religious conflicts. The 
lack of democratic traditions and the ubiquity of weak civil societies 
in the region feed the sources of extremism. However, the evidence of 
peace settlements having been hammered out between Israel and Egypt, 
Israel and Jordan, and Israel and Palestine proves that intercultural dia-
logue and the dominance of non-sectarian interests over ethnic or reli-
gious identities would be at least theoretically negotiable for achieving 
regional peace.
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On the Time of Composition of the 
Hitherto Undated Sumerian Myths1
Peeter Espak
Abstract The paper points out several similarities in the myths Enki 
and the World Order, Enki’s Journey to Nippur and Enki and Inanna, 
which seem to reflect the material or ideology also present in the 
Isin era royal poetry and inscriptions. The objective is not to claim 
that all the mythological ideas present in the analysed texts had to be 
created during the Isin period. Large part of the mythological motifs 
used in these myths probably have their origins going back already 
to the mythology of the Early Dynastic period. The major Sumer-
ian myths are all full of ancient mythological motifs which were 
accessible through written records as well as by their presence in 
oral folklore or story-telling. However, in addition to the almost pre-
cisely datable city-laments, several Sumerian myths also might have 
originated from the mythological thinking of the Isin period. Mytho-
logical motifs and sometimes almost identical textual parallels and 
ideological aspects lead to the conclusion that the myths Enki and 
the World Order, Enki’s Journey to Nippur and Enki and Inanna are 
most probably Isin time compositions reflecting the ideology and 
ideological needs of that dynasty and its priests and officials.
Keywords Sumerian mythology, Enki, Inanna, Ancient Near East-
ern religion, Enki and the World Order, Enki’s Journey to Nippur, 
Enki and Inanna, Isin Dynasty
The chronology of historical Mesopotamian texts is relatively easy to 
determine since the royal inscriptions and royal hymns, as well as many 
other literary and official texts, often also mention the name of the ruler 
1 The paper has been supported by Estonian Science Council grant PUT 500 “Vana 
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who commissioned or composed them. While a number of historical 
chronicles and royal hymns have survived in the form of much later 
transcripts or copies, in most cases there is still reason to assume that 
the original content dates from the lifetime of the ruler mentioned in the 
text. However, the dating of mythological texts is much more problem-
atic, since texts about the adventures of gods and different heroes and the 
creation and nature of the world do not contain names of rulers or other 
officials that could be placed in a particular era. Therefore, determin-
ing the approximate time when these texts were composed calls for the 
use of comparative material from accurately dated texts with identified 
chronology. Yet, the great Sumerian myths about the exploits of the gods 
Enki, Enlil, Inanna, Ninurta etc. are some of the most important sources 
of Sumerian literature and mythology and simultaneously some of the 
earliest examples of “fiction” texts in the world. Without ascertaining 
the chronology, if only approximate, of the significant Sumerian myths 
it is impossible to achieve a clear understanding of the religion, history 
of the literature or ideological developments of the Near East as a whole.
The hymns from the time of Išme-Dagan (reigned 1953–1935), king 
of Isin, and also the laments probably originating from the same pe-
riod, contain genealogies and titles of gods not present in previous royal 
hymns and inscriptions. For instance, the god Enki is titled “the first-
born son of holy An” (dumu-sag an kù-ga), and the goddess Uraš is re-
ferred to as his mother. An and Uraš are also named as the parents of 
several other important gods. Enki is also called “junior Enlil” who has 
received his enlil-ness from the great Sumerian gods (Enlil and An) as a 
gift or a duty. He has also received the me-s – the holy rules that deter-
mine the Sumerian world order – from the important Anunna gods and 
from An and Enlil.2 
Enki and the World Order
One of the main reasons for dating Enki and the World Order into the 
period of Isin is Enki’s title in the myth – Son of An. In earlier texts 
dated to Ur III period Enki was never titled this way. However, the myth 
also contains titles already in use in Ur III texsts such as “elder brother 
of gods” and Enlil-banda – “the younger Enlil” or “the junior Enlil.
2 See: Espak 2015: 95ff and Espak 2015a for similar reasoning.
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Enki and the World Order 68:3
a zi am-gal-e ri-a me-en dumu-sag an-na me-en
I am the good seed inseminated by the wild bull, I am the first-born son of 
An!
Enki and the World Order 80: 
ù-tu-da dumu-sag an kù-ga-me-en
I am the one born as the first son of holy An!
Enki and the World Order 71:
šeš gal digir-re-e-ne me-en hé-gál šu du7 me-en
I am the eldest brother of the gods, I am the handler of abundance!
The similarities between king Ur-Ninurta hymn B and the myth Enki and 
the World Order also led the Russian Assyriologist Vladimir Emelia nov 
to conclude that the entire myth could have been written down during 
the reign of Ur-Ninurta (1923–1896).4 However, since the myth also has 
many similarities with several other hymns of Isin rulers it might not 
be wise to attribute the composing of the text to any specific ruler with 
any certainty but to settle instead for a slightly wider possible time pe-
riod. Both Enki and the World Order and the hymns of king Išme-Dagan 
(1953–1935) describe Enki as the one who ensures fertility and prosper-
ity, and especially as a god who “brings forth the seed:” 
Enki and the World Order 52–54:
[a-a] [d]en-ki ùg numun-a è-ni numun zi hé-i-i
dnu-dím-mud u8 zi gá è-ni sila4 zi hé-ù-tu 
áb numun-a è-ni amar zi hé-ù-tu
When father Enki goes forth to meet the inseminated people, let good off-
spring come out! 
3 The edition of the myth here and after: Benito 1969 and ETCSL 1.1.3.
4 Emelianov 2009: 298–299, table 17: Enki and the World Order 62–67 / 251–254 corres-
ponding to Ur-Ninurta B hymn lines 6–12, 13–15, 25–26. 
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Nudimmud goes forth to meet the good pregnant ewes, let good lambs be 
born! 
(Enki) goes forth to meet the inseminated cows, let good calves be born!
Išme-Dagan X, 7:5
en numun i nam du10-bi tu-tu ús dab5-bi pà-pà 
Lord who makes the seed to come forth, who creates good destiny for it, 
who finds the right path for it!
Similarly to the royal hymns of the Isin period, in the myth Enki and 
the World Order Enki receives his authority to be the organiser and the 
judge of the world from the god Enlil. As Herman Vanstiphout con-
cludes: “Enki did what he was ordered to do”6 and is described acting on 
behalf of his slightly more important companion or brother Enlil (Enki 
and the World Order 75–76):
den-líl-da kur-ra igi gál-la-ka nam tar-ra-me-en 
nam tar-ra ki u4 è-a-ke4 šu-gá mu-un-gál
Alongside Enlil setting the sight upon the lands, I am the determiner of 
destinies!
The determining of destinies he has placed into my hands in the place 
where the sun rises!
Enki and the World Order also includes a relatively detailed description 
of Enki’s Abzu temple in Eridu. His temple is located in a marshy area 
(see lines 96 and 168) where fish swim in the reeds (line 98) and puri-
fication rites are carried out in the temple (105–106). These motifs are 
similar, for example, to the Hymn to Enki for Išme-Dagan (lines 1–4)7 
and Išme-Dagan D Hymn (B 8)8. There is a passage in Enki and the 
World Order that describes the duties assigned to the mother-goddess by 
Enki. The goddess Aruru has been equated with the goddess Nintu and 
the description concerns the mother goddess’s instruments for cutting 
5 Sjöberg 1973: 40–48; ETCSL 2.5.4.24.
6 Vanstiphout 1997: 120.
7 Tinney 1996: 71; ETCSL 2.5.4.b.
8 Sjöberg 1977: 29–32; 1973: 13–16; ETCSL 2.5.4.04.
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sig4 tu-tu kù nam-en-na-ni šu hé-em-ma-an-[ti] 
gi-dur-ku5 im-ma-an ga-raš
sar-a-ni hé-em-ma-da-a[n-r]i
Aruru, the sister of Enlil 
Nintu, the lady of giving birth 
The holy brick of birth of en-ship shall be her assignment 
Her reed-stick for cutting the umbilical cord, the imman-stone and leeks 
shall be under her direction.
Another hymn of Išme-Dagan has an almost similar description of the 
duties of Nintu/Aruru assisting at the birth, cutting the umbilical cord 
and also granting the lordship or greatness to the new-born (Išme-Dagan 
Hymn A+V, lines 44–45):10
[d]nin-tu tu-tu-a ha-ma-ni-in-gub 
gi-dur-ku5-rá-gá [...] nam-en ha-ma-ni-in-gar
Nintu stood by assisting at my birth 
When my umbilical cord was cut [...] she established the status of rulership 
for me
Enki and the World Order also contains a long description of the nature 
and role of the goddess Ninisina (meaning “Lady of Isin”)11 (lines 402–
404). It is claimed that she stands with the sky god An and can speak 
with An whenever she wishes. Ninisina F Hymn’s lines 6–15 mention 
that it was Enki who determined Ninisina’s fate and Ninisina herself 
has been titled “holy daughter of An.” According to the hymn, Ninisina 
came from the temple of Enlil in Nippur and reached Enki in Eridu. Enki 
receives Ninisina and sets out to take care of his guest:
Ninisina F, 8–10:12
9 See: Stol 2000: 111.
10 Ludwig 1990: 161–225; Frayne 1998: 8–19; Römer 1965: 39–55; ETCSL 2.5.4.01.
11 See: Edzard 1998–2001: 387–388.
12 Sjöberg 1982: 67–69; ETCSL 4.22.6.
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èš-e a[bz]u-a dúr ba-ni-in-gar 
a-a-ni den-ki-ke4 du10-ba nam-mi-in-tuš 
[dnin]-in-si-na-ra mí-zi na-mu-un-e 
She took her seat in Abzu shrine 
Her father Enki seated her on his knees 
He cherished Ninisina truly
Ninisina F, 13–15:
gada babbar-ra hi-li im-ma-an-[te]
dumu an kù-ga-ra bar-ra hé-em-mi-in-du[l] 
en dnu-dím-mud-e nam-[e-e]š m[u-ni-in-tar]
When she became attracted to the fine white garment 
He (Enki) dressed the daughter of An in it 
Lord Nudimmud determined her fate 
Ninisina A describes the roles and functions of the goddess Ninisina in 
detail and claims that Enki in his Abzu temple assigned to her the duties 
of an incantation priestess (line 30: nam-išib). The hymn also describes 
the birth of Ninisina, who is conceived by the sky god An and given 
birth to by the goddess Uraš – the goddess of earth and fertility, wor-
shipped in Uruk since ancient times. The text also describes the sexual 
intercourse between An and Uraš (Ninisina A, lines 85–88):13
a-a-gu10 an lugal sipa digir-re-e-ne 
kalam-e barag kù-ga ba-e-tuš 
ama-gu10 
duraš nin digir-re-e-ne 
an-da ki-nú kù-ga šà kúš-ù e-ne sù-ud gal ba-e-du11
My father is An, the king and shepherd of the gods 
He put me to sit on the holy throne in the land 
My mother is Uraš, the lady of the gods 
With An in the holy bedchamber she was interacting, for a long time and 
greatly was playing
Ninisina D and Ninisina E Hymns both describe Ninisina as sky god 
An’s beloved daughter, given birth to by the goddess Uraš. She is also 
called the advisor of her father An – as in the myth Enki and the World 
13 Römer 1969: 279–305; ETCSL 4.22.1.
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Order. It is highly likely that the hymns of Ninisina were written down 
during the period of Isin and their ideology and mythological motifs 
also concur well with other texts of that period. Enki and the World 
Order places Ninisina at a level with the most important mother god-
desses of the Sumero-Akkadian pantheon and she is occasionally de-
picted as equal with ancient important Sumerian fertility and mother 
goddesses such as Nintu, but also Nisaba and Nanše. The exaltation and 
praise of Ninisina could have been one of the main purposes of compos-
ing the myth Enki and the World Order.
Enki’s Journey to Nippur
The royal hymns of Isin do not make it clear who could be considered 
the creator of mankind. An, Enki, the mother goddesses and Enlil all 
seem to be involved in the process. However, the god Enki is celebrated 
most as the one who is responsible for humanity’s well-being. The myth 
Enki’s Journey to Nippur and the hymn Ur-Ninurta B both seem to at-
tribute the processes of humanity’s emergence or “creation” to the god 
An. 
Enki’s Journey to Nippur 1–3:14
u4 re-a nam ba-tar-ra-ba 
mu hé-gál an ú-tu-da 
ùg-e ú-šim-gen7 ki in-dar-ra-ba
In those days when destinies were determined 
In the year when abundance was given birth by An 
People broke out through the earth just like plants
Ur-Ninurta B, 6:15
a-a-zu an lugal en numun i-i ùg ki gar-gar-ra 
Your father is An, the king and the lord who made the seed (of mankind) 
to come forth, who placed the people on earth
14 Cecarelli 2012: 90–118; Al-Fouadi 1969; ETCSL 1.1.4.
15 Falkenstein 1950: 112–117: ETCSL 2.5.6.2.
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Enki’s Journey to Nippur and Ur-Ninurta B Hymn both describe the city 
of Eridu as “a heavy cloud in the heaven spreading fear and awe” with 
striking textual similarities.
Enki’s Journey to Nippur 53–55:
eriduki gissu-zu ab-šà-ga lá-a 
a-ab-ba zi-ga gaba-šu-gar nu-tuku 
i7 mah ní-gál-la su kalam-ma zi-zi 
Eridu, your shadow reaches/hangs (until) the middle of the sea! 
Rising sea having no rival! 
Great awe-inspiring river frightening the land!
Ur-Ninurta B, 29–31:
gissu-bi u4 è-ta u4 šu-uš kur-kur-ra ši-im-dul
ní me-lem4 muru9 dugud-da-gen7 an kù-ge íb-ús 
é-kur ki-tuš kù an den-líl-lá su-zi im-du8-du8 
Its shadow covers all the lands from east to west 
Its fear and terrifying splendour like a heavy cloud follows the holy heav-
ens (god An) 
It spreads fear/respect to E-kur temple – the holy dwelling place of An and 
Enlil
Also Nisaba Hymn A contains several passages similar to the myth of 
Enki’s Journey to Nippur. Both texts mention abgal creatures known to 
be closely related to the mythology of Enki. Unfortunately, it is not pos-
sible to accurately determine the time of writing of the Nisaba hymn, but 
the two passages are certainly interdependent:
Enki’s Journey to Nippur 48:
abgal-zu siki bar-ra bí-in-du8
Your Abgal, the hair spreading (loose) on the back
Nisaba A, 44:16
16 Hallo: 116–134; ETCSL 4.16.1.
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abgal siki bar-ra du8-a-ni 
Abgal, his hair spreading (loose) on the back.
Inanna and Enki
The themes of the myth Inanna and Enki are closely related to the ones 
of Enki and the World Order where, in the end of the text, Inanna com-
plains to Enki that Enki has not assigned to her any important duties in 
the world (lines 421ff.). In the story of Enki and the World Order, Enki 
hands Inanna her duties voluntarily. However, the myth Enki and Inan-
na17 explains how Enki, after having had too much to drink, hands over 
his me-s – the divine norms organising the world – to Inanna by mistake, 
under the influence of alcohol. Hymn A of the Isin king Iddin-Daggan 
(1974–1954) assumably also describes how Enki handed the me-s to 
Inanna voluntarily (Iddin-Dagan A, 22–24):18
abzu eriduki-ga me šu ba-ni-in-ti
a-a-ni den-ki-ke4 sag-e-eš mu-ni-in-rig7 
nam-en nam-lugal-la šu-ni-šè mu-u8-gar 
In Abzu of Eridu, me-s were given to her 
Her father Enki placed them upon her head 
Lordship and kingship to her hands he gave
Hymn Ur-Ninurta D also describes the me-s received or brought by 
Inanna. As Gertrud Farber-Flügge claims,19 the two texts – Inanna and 
Enki and Ur-Ninurta D – must have certainly been in literary depend-
ence and one was partially quoting the other (Ur-Ninurta D, line 8):20
me-zu u4 silim-ma-bi ba-e-de6 nì-nam la-ba-e-da-šub
You have brought the me-s on a fine day, none of them has been lost
Descriptions of cultic journeys to the city of Eridu are already present 
in Early Dynastic Sumerian literature and the later epic Enmerkar and 
the Lord of Aratta, for example, mentions that king Enmerkar goes to 
the city of Eridu to get the me-s (line 58: [er]iduki-ta me de6-a-gu10-ne). 
17 Edition of the myth Enki and Inanna: Farber-Flügge 1973.
18 Reisman 1969: 147–211; Reisman 1973: 185–202.
19 Farber-Flügge 1973: 6.
20 Falkenstein 1957: 56–75; ETCSL 2.5.6.4.
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It is difficult to say whether the text of the myth Enki and Inanna could 
be associated with some ancient cultic festivals, but it seems possible.21
In addition to the examples above, the similarities include parallels 
between the myths Enki and Inanna and Enki’s Journey to Nippur. The 
drinking parties taking place in different contexts in the two stories are 
described by using relatively similar motifs. Beer is drunk from the ves-
sels of the mother goddess Uraš and the party itself is called a “competi-
tion” (a-da-mìn):
Enki’s Journey to Nippur 112:
zabar-e duraš-e a-da-mìn mu-un-di-ne
They started a competition, (drinking from) the bronze vessels of Uraš
Inanna and Enki, I ii 30:
[za]bar duraš-a a-da-mìn mu-un-a[ka-ne]
They started a competition, (drinking from) the bronze vessels of Uraš
The fact that Enki’s Journey to Nippur and Inanna and Enki myths have 
common motifs and stylistic features, of course, does not prove that they 
must have been written down during the same period or the Isin period. 
It only proves that taking into the consideration the larger picture and 
other similarities and parallels, the dating to Isin period seems relatively 
possible, if not obvious. 
In addition to the three myths discussed above, it could be hypothe-
sized that Inanna’s Descent to the Netherworld could also originate from 
the Isin era. The titles of the kings of Isin always listed the following as 
the most important cities always done in the specific order of: Nippur, 
Ur, Eridu, Uruk.22 In Inanna’s Descent to the Netherworld the goddess’s 
journey is also described in the order Nippur, Ur, Eridu (lines 37–67, 
182–216, 322–324): é-kur-re é dmu-ul-líl-lá-šè / úriki-ma é dnanna-šè / 
úru-zé-ebki é dam-an-ki-ká-šè.23
21 See: Mittermayer 2009: 80. 
22 See: Espak 2015: 72 ff and Espak 2016: 99–101 for the specific order of listing the cities 
in royal ideology of Ur III and Isin Dynasty. 
23 Kramer 1980: 299–310; ETCSL 1.4.1.
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Analysing the different myths and analogous passages of texts from 
the royal hymns that can be dated based on the chronology of rulers it 
seems impossible to indicate with absolute certainty that any particu-
lar myth was written down or commissioned during the reign of any 
particular ruler. However, many motfs in these myths are first used in 
a similar form precisely in the hymns of the Isin kings. Although there 
is no direct evidence to show that several of the myths analysed above 
must be composed during the Isin era, the indirect evidence and the 
analysis of the general context strongly point toward that conclusion. 
This makes the current author to conclude that the myths Enki and the 
World Order, Enki’s Journey to Nippur and Enki and Inanna are most 
probably Isin time compositions reflecting the ideology and ideological 
needs of that dynasty and its priests and officials. This does not exclude 
the fact that most of the mythological ideas and most certainly also sev-
eral written passages had much older predecessors. 
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Communication with Gods. The Role of 
Divination in Mesopotamian Civilization
Krzysztof Ulanowski
Abstract Divination is given special attention as the main topic of 
this article, although it was long treated in the scientific world as a 
simple superstition that was trivial, outdated and not really deserv-
ing of attention.1 Although the topic was considered to be unworthy 
of scientific research, we have many definitions of this term. Some 
of them were crystallized in antiquity, and others relate to contem-
porary studies. There are different forms of divination, and many 
of them are carefully studied and explained by the contemporary 
scholars.2 The main questions related to the definition and realm of 
divination and the role of the diviner in Mesopotamian civilization 
have to do with communication between gods and kings.
Keywords divination, Mesopotamia, civilization, ancient, Sha-
mash, king
Divination – ancient and modern definitions
Divination3 appears to have been natural and common in the ancient 
world.4 Generally, the art of divination provides answers to questions 
post hoc ergo proper hoc.5 Because of that, divination should be future-
oriented, not necessarily in the sense of foretelling future events, but as 
a method of tackling anxiety about the insecurity of life and coping with 
risks brought about by human ignorance. The future as crystallized in 
1 Bottéro 1992: 126.
2 Maul 2013; Beerden 2013; Annus 2010; Flower 2008; Johnston 2005; Koch 2011; Koch 
2015; Lenzi 2008; Stoneman 2011; Nissinen 2003: Rochberg 2004; Rochberg 2010; Jeyes 
2000.
3 See Black & Green 2004: 68–9. On the complex subject of Mesopotamian divination, a 
proper place to start is: Oppenheim 1977: 206–27. Less detailed introductory discussions are 
Bottéro 1992: 125–37; Bottéro 2001: 170–202; Flower 2008: 104–31.
4 Rutz 2013: 301.
5 Geller 2008: 308.
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the present was not considered by the Babylonians as having been cre-
ated solely by gods, but it was seen as as the result of a dialogue between 
man and god.6 Therefore, divination is based on the idea that to some 
extent the future is pre-determined, but the gods, especially Shamash 
and Adad, have made available to man certain indications of the future 
(omens and portents) in the world around him, which can be interpreted 
(divined) by experts with specialist knowledge. The role of the diviner is 
essentially that of an intermediary between the human and super human 
worlds. Divination is rational in the sense that a necessary amount of 
divine knowledge in a special case is available to humans, especially to 
those acknowledged by the society as diviners by virtue of their back-
ground, education, or behavior.7 The diviners should find the gods’ an-
swers in their interpretations of animal entrails.8 In the literate periods 
of ancient Mesopotamian history, titles like ‘diviner’ appear in virtually 
every major type of cuneiform text, including lexical and literary texts, 
practical documents, and scribal colophons.9 
All of the activities connected with divination are treated as irration-
al in today’s world, but for Mesopotamian civilization they were entirely 
rational (in the modern sense of the word). In other words, omens were a 
sign of divinity and thus carried a guarantee of unfailing accuracy. 
The first and basic assumption of Mesopotamian civilization is that 
the gods communicate their intentions through signs, and that the uni-
verse works according to certain principles that only require knowledge 
and expertise to decode them. Mesopotamians believed that the gods 
encoded information into the universe, and that is why the world could 
be read by those who were properly educated. Divination looks for traces 
of such signs, and specially-trained priests were responsible for this. In 
Akkadian, pašāru is a multilayered reading or decipherment of texts 
connected with barûtu. The epithet of Shamash, who as sun god could 
see all from above, was “divine seer of the land” (barû ša mati).10 Many 
6 Nissinen 2010: 341.
7 Maul 2008: 362.
8 Nadali 2010: 137.
9 Rutz 2013: 17.
10 Bahrani 2008: 63–5.
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Babylonian oracle questions begin: “Shamash, lord of the judgment, 
Adad, lord of the inspection”.11 
Mesopotamian scholars believed that the gods left signs on the exta 
of sacrificial animals, in the life of plants, the behavior of animals, the 
movement of heavenly bodies, and in dreams. These signs reminded 
them in many respects of the symbols of the cu neiform writing system. 
The scholars regarded nature as a book, or rather a tablet, that could be 
read by those who knew the underlying code. Haruspices occasionally 
called the liver a ‘tablet of the gods’ and claimed that the signs they were 
able to detect on it were ‘written’ by the god Shamash. Celestial diviners 
spoke of the ‘writing of the firmament’ when referring to the sky from 
which they took their forecasts. There are cases in the Mesopotamian 
textual record in which the starting point for a divinatory quest was 
the observation on objects of various types of writing in its most literal 
sense, that is, of individual or multiple cuneiform signs.12 Roaf and Zgoll 
note that Sumerian word mul, ‘star’ (or mul-an, ‘heavenly star’), “can 
refer both to a star in the sky and to a cuneiform sign on a tablet”.13 Thus, 
in celestial divination and extispicy, the constellations and the liver were 
considered to be carriers of divine writing, conveying information re-
garding human life and cosmic truth (kittu). 
As noted above, scholars referred to celestial phenomena as “heav-
enly writing” (šiṭir šamê) or “writing of the firmament” (šiṭir burūmê) 
and described the liver as the “tablet of the gods” (uppi ša ilī).14 
A Babylonian Diviner’s Manual says:
(41) A sign that portends evil in the sky is (also) evil on earth, 
(42) one that portends evil on earth is evil in the sky.15
Based on the reasons mentioned above, Burkert says that divination is an 
attempt to extend the realm of ratio into misty zones from which normal 
knowledge and experience is absent.16 According to him, divination 
11 Charpin 2013: 78; Starr 1983: 30, 44–6; Lambert 2007: 62, no. 4b, i. This concerns a 
campaign of a Babylonian king against the Lullubû.
12 Frahm 2010: 98. 
13 Roaf & Zgoll 2001: 289 and no. 68.
14 Pongratz-Leisten 2014: 39.
15 Oppenheim 1974: 204.
16 Burkert 2005: 30.
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serves as a mediator or buffer between the human and nonhuman realms, 
articulating the separation between them even as it attempts to bridge 
them. Divination plays the same role as sacrifice, an act with which 
divination was inextricably bound in antiquity. Together, sacrifice and 
divination delineate mortal existence even as they strive to reach beyond 
it.17 Also according to Oppenheim, “divination represents a technique of 
communication with the supernatural forces that are supposed to shape 
the history of the individual as well as that of the group. It presupposes the 
belief that these powers are able and, at times, willing to communicate 
their intentions... and that if evil is predicted or threatened, it can be 
averted through appropriate means”.18 Rochberg emphasizes the same 
purpose of divination: “A central relation to the world is the attention 
to the divine and the assumption of the possibility of a connection and 
communication between divine and human. In the specific case of 
celestial divination, that form of communication connected humans not 
only to gods but to the heavens wherein the gods were thought to make 
themselves manifest and produce signs for humankind”.19 According 
to Beerden, “Divination is the human action of production – by 
means of evocation or observation and recognition – and subsequent 
interpretation of signs attributed to the supernatural”.20 In Tedlock’s 
opinion, “Divination is a way of explor ing the unknown in order to elicit 
answers (that is, oracles) to questions beyond the range of ordinary 
human understanding”.21
Mesopotamian sources
There is overwhelming evidence that portents played an important role 
in all ways of life in the ancient world.22 Divination was a salient charac-
teristic of Mesopotamian civilization.23 Out of 3594 Babylonian literary 
and scientific texts in the library of Ashurbanipal (kept in the British 
17 Johnston 2005: 11.
18 Oppenheim 1977: 207; Rutz 2013: 219–59.
19 Rochberg 2003: 185.
20 Beerden 2013: 20.
21 Tedlock 2001: 189, see Koch 2010: 44; Nissinen 2010: 341.
22 Cic. De Div., see Pritchett 1979: 142.
23 Michałowski 2006: 247; see Maul 2003–5: 45–88; Bottéro 1974: 70–197; Oppenheim 
1977: 206–27.
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Museum), 270 cannot be classified, 1085 are “archival texts” and 645 
are “divination reports”. Of the other 1594 texts – i.e., the “library texts” 
– 746 are divinatory (46.8%).24 Even allowing for some inaccuracies in 
this calculation, the number of divinatory texts is significant. Oppen-
heim estimated that fully 40 percent of those scholarly texts are related 
to the art of divination.25 Taking this into account, Maul emphasizes 
that it is surprising that there is no Sumerian or Akkadian equivalent for 
the terms ‘oracle’, or ‘omen’.26 The Mesopotamian terms for divinatory 
signs are as follows: ittu is a general word for sign, tamītu can mean a 
question asked of the supernatural at an oracle, but also the answer – a 
sign. The word têrtu can also be translated as a sign, used in general 
sense and particularly during the extispicy.27
The Babylonian oracle questions (i.e., tamitu) and ikribu28 concern a 
course of action to which the supplicant wants the gods to give the stamp 
of approval (e.g., a military action). The question comprises most the 
text. It may be divided into three parts, the last two of which are marked 
by a re-introduction of the person for whom the diviner is inquiring. 
The first part describes the potential preparations and attack of an en-
emy army. The second describes what the enemy may potentially harm 
among that which the concerned person is guarding, and the third part 
describes how the person for whom the diviner is inquiring might be 
affected by the enemy’s potential actions.29 Therefore, within this per-
formative juridi cal context, all means of connecting protases to apodos-
es constitute vehicles for demonstrating and justifying divine judgment. 
The diviners use the word purussû ‘legal decision’ or ‘verdict’ to refer 
to an omen’s prediction. Divinatory texts also share with legal codes 
the formula if x, then y.30 The omen books work with a simple structure 
of ‘if – then:’. The answer, that is, the decision of the gods, is provided 
via extispicy. The answers are not recorded with the tamitus. We have 
24 Fincke 2003–4: 130; Schaper 2013: 231.
25 Oppenheim 1977: 15–17.
26 Maul 2008: 361.
27 Beerden 2013: 110–11.
28 Tamītus, see Lenzi 2011: 49–53; 465–74, an OB Ikribu-Like Prayer to Shamash and Adad 
– 85–104; Steinkeller 2005: 13; Koch 2011: 447–69.
29 Lenzi 2011: 465.
30 Noegel 2010: 147–8.
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tablets on which diviners report the results of their extispicy rituals for 
delivery to the person concerned, often the king.31 
Between god and humanity. The role of the diviner
Divination is a way to get access to divine knowledge and knowledge 
about the gods’ decisions.32 The gods preferred clearly to take a ‘me-
dium’ to communicate their secrets. This is mantic, direct discourse – 
from ‘mouth to ear’ – an inspired divination. In the second way, the 
indirect one, deductive divination was based on the model of written 
discourse, and the gods encoded the signs graphically.33 The diviners 
may have manipulated some of the results of the extispicies, but not the 
fact stated in the queries placed before the god of justice.34 A divine sign 
must be interpreted infallibly. Seen in this way, the act of interpreta-
tion – like the act of naming – constitutes a performative act of power: 
hence the importance of well-trained professionals and of secrecy in the 
transmission of texts of ritual power.35 
As was said, the Mesopotamians tended to view all aspects of the 
world as potential signs of divine activity or as signs conveying signifi-
cant information about the future. The diviners in Mesopotamia viewed 
themselves as integral links in a chain of transmission going back to the 
gods. A privileged place for the occurrence of such signs was the entrails 
and livers of sacrificial animals, for it was believed that the gods placed 
such signs there. Knowledge about the will of the gods was believed 
to be gained by consulting a diviner (bārûm).36 The diviner is depicted 
as enthroned in the presence of divinity, ready to pronounce the final 
verdict.37 In Mesopotamia, the people believed in fate (šīmtu),38 mean-
ing “that which is determined by (divine) decree”.39 Tupšarrû and bārû 
mediated the will of the gods to the king and made judgments about the 
31 See, e.g., SAA 4: 262–315 for examples of NA divination reports, see Veldhuis 2010: 
487–97, here 487, no. 2 for OB divination reports.
32 See Streck 1916: 48f., 95ff.
33 Bottéro 1992: 106.
34 SAA 4: 14.
35 Noegel 2010: 147.
36 Launderville 2003: 214, 216.
37 Ibid., 57. See Zimmern 1901: 105, no. 1–20, ll. 122–5.
38 See Lawson 1994.
39 Rochberg 2004: 196.
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congruity between the divine will and the king’s plans.40 The predic-
tions given for the signs were even sometimes termed purussû ‘divine 
decisions’.41 Not only a cosmo logical cable (i.e. markasu) and temple, 
but first of all writing was a linking device that permitted the diviner to 
connect and communicate with the gods.42 
Divination and the king
We know from Mari, in the Old-Babylonian and Neo-Assyrian sources, 
that kings consulted the omens, especially via extispicy, before making 
important decisions.43 In everyday life and for (inter)national issues as 
well, the Neo-Assyrian kings were obligatorily motivated to hear or read 
their scholars’ reports and interpretations of omens. The royal letters 
and archives found at Nineveh give us an idea about the Sargonid rul-
ers’ need to look for signs and understand their diviners’ interpretations 
about matters of great importance.44 Divination is not so much a shared 
characteristic of the royal secret council and the divine assembly as it 
is the point of contact for the two bodies via the person of the diviner, 
for within the personnel of the royal council, only the diviner had the 
authority to set the king’s plans before the gods via an extispicy and to 
read the judgment of the gods from the liver and other exta of the animal:
Being (now) clean, to the assembly of the gods I shall draw near for judg-
ment.
O Shamash, lord of judgment! O Adad, lord of ritual acts and of divination!
In the ritual act I prepare, in the extispicy I perform put your truth!45
Increasingly complex political structures forced the kings to submit their 
relationship to the gods as a form of permanent scrutiny.46 As was said, 
divination is the human observation of perceived divine signs and the 
response to them.47 Such a practice would be able to diagnose and soothe 
40 SAA 19, 77.
41 Rochberg 2004: 59.
42 Noegel 2010: 144.
43 SAA 19: 41.
44 Jean 2010: 267.
45 SAA 19: 55.
46 See Pongratz-Leisten 1999. 
47 W. Burkert “Divination: Mantik in Griechenland” in: ThesCRA 3, 2005: 1.
Communication with Gods. The Role of Divination in Mesopotamian Civilization 56
any enflamed divine wrath before it could unleash its destructive potential 
to destabilize a dynasty or a whole kingdom. Until one deciphers omens, 
they represent unbridled forms of divine power. While their meanings 
and consequences are unknown, they remain potentially dangerous. The 
act of interpreting a sign seeks to limit that power by restricting the 
parameters of a sign’s interpretation.48 The aims of divination, according 
to Veldhuis, is to tell the future, to shape the future, to protect the king, 
to collect and to speculate.49 On the one hand, divination is a form of 
ritual, a kind of formal procedure that trained practitioners perform to 
provide clients with advice or help for solving a problem. This ritual 
aspect of divination places emphasis on the traditional nature of what the 
seer says and does. On the other hand, divination not only was a form of 
ritual; it was also a ‘pure’ performance.50 
The faith of the society in the legitimacy of signs was so strong that 
their utterance had the authority of official statements. Esarhaddon’s 
Succession Treaty states that any improper word heard from the mouth 
of a prophet, of an ecstatic, or of an inquirer of oracles should not be 
concealed from the king.51 
The seriousness with which divination was treated is presented in the 
Legend of Naram-Sin (Naram-Sin and the Enemy Hordes)52 about the 
king Naram-Sin (2254–2218 BC), who did not comply with divine words 
heard during extispicy.53 Before going on campaign, he inquired of the 
gods by means of extispicy, but when the omens were unfavorable, he 
decided to ignore them and attacked, bringing fatal results.54 His act of 
disobedience gave rise to a series of military defeats and was detrimen-
tal to the entire kingdom. The legend mentions the reign of Enmerkar of 
Uruk who also “committed a shameful act” and did not hear the gods’ 
decisions. For his disloyalty, Shamash punished: 
48 Maul 2008: 364.
49 Veldhuis 2006: 487–97.
50 Flower 2008: 189.
51 Jean 2010: 270.
52 Naram-Sin and the Enemy Hordes in: Westenholz 1997: 263–368. 
53 Alexander the Great behaves similarly, although victorious in battle, but after the battle 
falls heavily from health: Arr. An. 4.4. 
54 Naram-Sin and the Enemy Hordes: Cuthean Legend SB Recension 79–81 in: Westenholz 
1997: 317.
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… his ghost, the ghosts of [...], 
the ghost(s) of his family, the ghost(s) of his offspring, the ghost(s) of his 
offspring’s offspring”.55 
Protecting his shameful decision Naram-Sin explains:
Thus, I said to my heart (i.e., to myself), there were my words:
What lion (ever) performed extispicy?
What wolf (ever) consulted a dream-interpreter?56
This refusal of divine verdicts brings disastrous results, and only a 
second consultation of the omens and adherence to these, along with the 
help of the goddess Ishtar, makes the situation become favorable.57 
The epic Legend of Naram-Sin provides evidence of the belief that 
disaster falls upon those who ignore omens. According to Flower, this 
legend “was the classic propagator of extispicy, which it presented as 
totally secure act of studying the divine will, and as a necessary pre-
requisite for any important undertaking”.58 
Even the Hebrew Bible contains a similar idea; the king Saul is de-
feated and killed because he started the battle with the Philistines with-
out favorable omens, being unable to obtain them through any of the 
means available to him: dreams, the Urim (a type of dice),59 prophets,60 
or even necromancy.61 
55 Naram-Sin and the Enemy Hordes: Cuthean Legend SB Recension 24–27 in: Westenholz 
1997: 306–7; Legend of Naram-Sin, 22–24 in: Foster 1995: 174.
56 Naram-Sin and the Enemy Hordes: Cuthean Legend SB Recension 79–81 in: Westenholz 
1997: 317.
57 Naram-Sin and the Enemy Hordes: Cuthean Legend SB Recension in: Westenholz 1997: 323.
58 Flower 2008: 120.
59 Urim and Thummim (translated in the Septuagint as deloi, ‘conspicuous [stones]’), see 
Stoneman 2011: 113, 133–5; 1 Sam 14.41, 28.6. Josephus in his Antiquities of the Jews (3.215–
18) gives more detail, explaining that the twelve stones, stitched into what Josephus calls 
the essen, would foreshadow victory to those on the eve of battle. Assyrian texts of the 7th 
century refer to ‘incantation for oracular decisions with alabaster and haematite.’
60 Noort 1999: 109–16, and the interesting parallel between the Assyrian and Hebrew 
tradition, see Horowitz 1992: 95–115.
61 1 Sam 28–31.
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Conclusion
Study on divination enriches many aspects our understanding of ancient 
Mesopotamia. In conclusion, I want to stress that divination was im-
portant for the functioning of Mesopotamian civilization. In this tradi-
tion, divination was treated as entailing professional knowledge that was 
highly esteemed in society, and the diviner was seen as a mouthpiece of 
the gods. A throne as his attribute was highly impressive and unequi-
vocal in meaning. In sum, the definitions of divination have changed 
through the ages, but the importance of divination is related to its poten-
tial for communication between gods and humanity.
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The Deity Mihryazd in Manichaeism and His 
Relations with God Mithra in Zoroastrianism
Jaan Lahe
Abstract In Manichaean literature written in the Middle Persian, 
Parthian, and Sogdian languages, which was discovered in Cent-
ral Asia (then Chinese Turkestan) at the end of 19th century and 
beginning of 20th century, a mythological figure called Mihryazd 
(“god Mihr” (=Mithra)”) is found. He is identified with two different 
figures from Manichean mythology: in texts written in the Middle 
Persian language (including Mani’s work Šābuhragān) with Living 
Spirit (Latin spiritus vivens), while in texts written in Parthian and 
Sogdian with The Third Messenger (Latin tertius legatus). The arti-
cle explores how the figure of Mihryazd influenced pre-Manichaean 
Iranian religious traditions and concludes that although the figure of 
Mihryazd is not borrowed from Zoroastrianism, but is instead a new 
creation of Manichaeism, the creation of his figure has been influ-
enced by the figure of Mithra (Mihr in the Middle Persian language) 
in Zoroastrianism. From the latter, he has taken over both the link 
with order in the universe as well as with the sun and light, military 
characteristics, and his role as a fighter against evil (demons). How-
ever, in Manichaeism, the different functions of the god Mithra have 
been divided between two different gods, following the language-
regional principle. 
Keywords Iran, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, Middle Persian and 
Parthian languages, Mihryazd / Miši βaγi, Living Spirit, Third Mes-
senger
Among the various religions that have influenced the formation and 
development of Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism plays an outstanding 
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role.1 Although the Sasanian Empire, in which Manichaeism emerged 
and spread, was multicultural and multireligious,2 Zoroastrianism was 
the ruling religion in the empire.3 According to the tradition, Mani 
(216–276/77 CE) himself was Persian.4 Although Mani grew up in the 
Jewish-Christian group of Elcesaites,5 his ancestors were very likely 
Zoroastrians. He preached at the court of Sassanid, who promoted Zoro-
astrianism.6 Therefore, it is no wonder that we find in Manichaeism 
many terms, concepts, and ideas that originate from Zoroastrianism.7 
We find influences of Zoroastrianism in different spheres – in cosmo-
logy and cosmogony,8 in eschatology9 and in ethics.10
Manichaeism in Iran11 and in Central Asia,12 have a number of myth-
ological beings whose names are borrowed from Iranian mytho logy.13 
Among them is the divinity (in Middle Persian and Parthian yaz(a)d, in 
Sogdian βaγi)14 who is called in both Middle Persian and Parthian Mihr 
(myhr), in Sogdian Miši (myšyy). Both are forms of the Middle Persian 
god’s name Mihr (=Old Persian Mithra). Thus, Manicheans adopted the 
name of a Zoroastrian god and used it to designate one of their own 
deities.15 
The title of this deity in Middle Persian and Parthian Manichean 
texts is invariably yazad, which differs from the Old Persian convention 
1 On the role of the different religions to the development of the Manichaeism see Widen-
gren 1977: X–XXIX; Böhlig 1989 a: 457–481; Böhlig 1989 b: 482–519; Hutter 2010: 19–26; 
Lahe 2016: 73–91.
2 On the religions in the Sasanian Empire see Böhlig 1981: 436; Widengren 1965: 274–283.
3 On the position of Zoroastrianism in the Sasanian Empire see Widengren 1965: 243–245; 
274–283.
4 Boyce 1979: 111; Böhlig 1981: 437; Gnoli 1987 a: 158.
5 Böhlig 2007: 22; Rudolph 2005: 355; Tröger 2001: 175; Hutter 2010: 8; Hutter 1996: 264–
266; on Elchasai see also Luttikhuizen 1985.
6 On the Sassanids as promoter of Zoroastrianism see Boyce 1979: 101–117; Stausberg 
2001: 206–234.
7 See Hutter 2015: 477–489.
8 See Böhlig 1989 a: 468–472; Hutter 1989: 153–236; Rudolph 1991: 307–321; Sundermann 
1997: 343–360; Gnoli 1987: 163; Sundermann 1993. 
9 See Widengren 1965: 306; Henning 1977: 180–181; Hutter 2015: 24.
10 See Hutter 2015: 483.
11 On the History of the Zoroastrianism in Iran see Foltz 2013.
12 On the History of the Zoroastrianism in Central Asia see Foltz 2010; Lieu 1998.
13 See Sundermann 1979 a: 93–133; Colditz 2005: 20–21.
14 On the terminology see Sundermann 2002.
15 Ibid.
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that regarded Mithra as a baga-, if a title was given to him at all. But it 
is in perfect agreement with the Avestan way of addressing Mithra (Av 
Miθra) as yazata- (only once called baγa). In Manichean Sogdian, how-
ever, the name and title of Mihr are regularly Miši βaγi, conforming to 
the Old Persian convention.16 
Is this Manichean deity connected with the Zoroastrian tradition 
only by the same name or do the Manichaean and Zoroastrian divini-
ties have common features? Why have the Manichaeans included this 
divinity into their pantheon? The aim of this article is to answer these 
questions. To answer this, we must first observe the deity Mihryazd in 
Manichaeism, then the god Mithra (Mihr) in Zoroastrianism and finally, 
to compare these two gods to each other. 
The deity Mihryazd in the Manichaeism
The Manichaeism deity, called Mihr yazd / Miši βaγi takes two differ-
ent roles or functions. In Mani’s Šābuhragān and in all later Middle 
Persian texts, he is the Living Spirit (Lat. Spiritus vivens). In Parthian 
and Sogdian texts he is the Third Messenger (Lat. Tertius legatus). As 
such, are these two different beings and both have their own place in the 
Manichaean system.17
The Living Spirit is a hypostasis of the highest God, created for the 
liberation of the First Man. It comes from the Great architect, who ema-
nates from the Friend of the Lights.18 As the First Man had five sons,19 
the Living Spirit also has five sons,20 who acted as his companions. After 
the liberation of the First Man, the Living Spirit instructs his five sons to 
kill the demons in order to save the light, which remained in the hands 
of the demons. His five sons kill the demons, and the Living Spirit cre-
ates the material world from the bodies of the dead demons.21 From the 
16 Ibid.
17 On the Manichean system see for example Böhlig 1995: 27–36; Rudolph 2005: 362–365; 
Hutter 2010: 16–19.
18 Böhlig 2007: 31; Rudolph 2005: 363. 
19 Their names are “Intelligence”, “Science”, ““Thought”, “Reflection”, and “Conscience”. 
On the five sons of First Man see Böhlig 2007: 30; Rudolph 2005: 362; Gnoli 1987: 167.
20 On the five sons of Living Spirit see Böhlig 2007: 62.
21 See Böhlig 2007: 32; Alexander of Lycopolis (3rd century B.C.) has designated the Living 
Spirit as δημιουργός (see Brinkmann 1895: 6:8).
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bodies arise the skies, the mountains, the soil, and finally, from a first bit 
of liberated light, the sun, moon, and stars.22 The world is designed as a 
machine, and its task is to clean the divine Light from Matter (darkness). 
The sun and the moon are the elevators which elevate the light from the 
earth to the divine world of light.23 To keep the cosmic order, the five 
sons of the Living Spirit enter into action now, each guarding a part of 
the cosmos.24 They are the gods who guide the world and keep it in gear. 
It is remarkable that in the Middle Persian writings the five sons of the 
First Man are called Amerahspand (= Ameša Spentas in the Avesta). 
Ameša Spentas (“Holy Immortals”) are already in the Avesta, the gods 
that protect different parts of the cosmos.25
The creature of the Living Spirit (= of Gods Mihr) is described in 
detail in many texts. For example, this passage translated from a Persian 
text:
“Und als (Gott) Mihr jene vier Schichten, das Gefängnis der Dämonen, und 
vier Erden mit Säulen und Anordnungen und Toren und Mauern und Gräben 
und Höllen und den Kanälen, die im Inneren der Erde sind, und Bergen und 
Tälern und Quellen, Flüssen und Meeren, und zehn Himmel mit Weltteilen 
und Thronen, Schwellen, Umdrehungen und Doppelstunden und Mauern, 
und ein Himmelsrund mit Zodiakus und Sternen, und zwei Waagen, der 
der Sonne und der des Mondes, mit Häusern und Thronen und Toren und 
Torwächterführern, und den Gefängnisherren und der Grenzwächtern, den 
Hausherrn, den Dorfherrn, den Stammesherren und Landesherren, und 
aller Art Dinge des Gesamtkosmos gemacht und wohlgeordnet hatte, da 
wurden dieser Botschafter- und der Kundenbringer-Gott, welcher von Gott 
Mihr und der weiblich gestalteten (Gottheit), die des Gottes Ohrmizd Mut-
ter (ist), über sie - - - , dort vor den (Gott) hingestellt, der über jenem Him-
mel steht und den Kopf jener Götter hält.”26
After the creation of the universe, God Mihr entered in to paradise and 
came in front of its ruler. The ruler ordered the God Mihr to descend 
again, in order to divide the circulation and protection of the sun and the 
22 Gnoli 1987: 164.
23 See Böhlig 2007: 33.
24 See Rudolph 2005: 363–364; Böhlig 2007: 32.
25 On Ameša Spentas see Puhvel 1996: 105; Stausberg 2001: 95–99.
26 M 7983 (=T III 260e II); see Böhlig 2007: 108–109.
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moon, and to prepare the way for the wind, the water, and the fire.27 His 
new task is to set the cosmos in motion for the final redemption of the 
light parts.
Mihr’s fight against demons continues after the creation of the world. 
In a Middle Persian fragment, one tells how the plants originated from 
the seed of demons. A part of this seed fell into the sea, creating an ugly 
and terrible monster that staggered from the sea and began to spread sin 
in the world. Mihr sent against him one of his five sons (“five gods”), 
the light-Adamas.28 This is not mentioned here, but we know from the 
other sources, that the Light-Adamas defeated and killed this monster.29
In texts describing the events of the end-time, we encounter Mihr as 
a leader in the fight against demons. In a fragment from Mani’s work 
Šābuhragān30 it is reported how darkness covered heaven and earth. 
Then the god Mihr climbed down into the material world in a solar char-
iot and produced a call. After that, the gods who ruled over the different 
parts of the universe began to attack and defeat the opposing beings Az,31 
Ahrmen, and other demons. After the victory, the divine beings went to 
paradise with their “friends” (probably with the liberated lights). The 
material world collapsed, and the destruction of evil reached its comple-
tion.
In fragment M 3845, which is part of a Manichaean hymn, this event 
is described in the following:
“And also the Dark
ἐνθύμησις, the producer
of every sin,
(who, by way) of that (terrib)le(?)




28 M 7981 I (= T III 260 b I): see Böhlig 110.
29 See Rudolph 2005: 364.
30 M 472; see Müller 1904: 17–19.
31 The personification of concupiscence.
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And they will throw her
into that furnace and prison,
and into eternal bonds,
which are made by the Light
Architect in the rea(lm)
of the (Light) Nou(s),
i.e. the New
Para(dise), the resting-place
of the warlike powers.
And Mihr-yazd will bind her
with those fast
bonds.”32
Mihr, who drives the solar chariot, in Middle Persian texts, so does 
Mihr/Miši in Parthian and Sogdian texts associated to the sun. However, 
he is identified with the Third Messenger. Although his name may be 
translated as “the sun god”, Mihryazd is not identical with the sun, but 
resides there – the sun is his living place.33 As the sun god, he is praised 
for his illuminative, light-giving deeds, for his expulsion of darkness, 
for his regular and reliable revolution in the sky, etc. As the Third Mes-
senger he is a helper and redeemer of mankind, very much like Jesus the 
Splendor.34 So is said in a Parthian hymn:
“(a) Oh gerechter und gütiger Gott (bay), vorausschauende Gottheit (yazd), 
hilf mir und sei mir stets Helfer.
Sei gesegnet, erhellender Sonnengott (mihr-yazd), großes Licht. 
(b) Der Glanz bist Du und die Helligkeit der sieben Gegenden der Welt, 
Dein Licht strahlt in alle Reiche und Gebiete.”35
In the Iranian cultural history, the Third Messenger is equated with the 
Zoroastristian messenger Nairyosanha36 and thus bears the name Nar-
isah (Middle Persian) or Narisaf (Parthian),37 but is also described as 
similar to Mihr-yazd. As written in another Parthian hymn:
32 Sundermann 1978: 487–489.
33 See Geshevtisch 1975: 68–89.
34 Sundermann 2002 b.
35 Translated by Walter Bruno Henning; Klimkeit 1989: 91.
36 On Nairyosanha in the Iranian Mythology see Widengren 1965: 305.
37 On Narisah in the Manichaeism see ibid.
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“Deinem Licht (rōšn) will ich Lobpreis darbringen,
(b) Zweite Größe, Gott Narisaf,
(g) Schöne Gestalt (didan), Glanz (bām), ...
(d) Richter und Zeuge aller ...
(h) Tausendäugiges Licht…”38
Like Mihr yazd, the god Narisaf also resides on the sun and is called 
“Rošnšahryazd” (“god, whose kingdom is the Light”).39 
The God Mithra in the Zoroastrianism
The God Mithra (Av. Miθra, Old Persian Mithra, Middle Persian Mihr) 
has played an important role throughout the history of Iran.40 We en-
counter him not only in Persia, but throughout the Iranian cultural his-
tory, which extended from Asia Minor and Armenia to India. We meet 
him in the Avesta,41 in Achaemenid inscriptions,42 in the reports of the 
Greco-Roman authors (Herodotus, Xenophon, Strabon, Plutarch, Cur-
tius Rufus),43 on the reliefs in the Hellenistic Kingdom of Commagene,44 
on the coins of the Kushans,45 on a Sassanian rock relief in Taq i Bostan,46 
on the coins and seals of the Sassanids47 and in Pahlavi literature.48 These 
sources span a long period of time and are discovered in various areas 
of Iranian culture. Sources confirm that the figure of Mithras changed 
over the course of time and also was adapted to meet local differences.
The name Mithras comes from a root mei- (which implies the idea 
of exchange), accompanied by an instrumental suffix. It was therefore 
a means of exchange, the “contract” which rules human relations and 
38 Translated by Hans-Joachim Klimkeit; Klimkeit 1989: 93. 
39 Böhlig 2007: 59.
40 See Frye 1978: 62–67.
41 See Thieme 1975: 501–510; Jafarey 1975: 54–61.
42 See Lecoq 1997; Schmidt 2007.
43 See Lahe & Kalda 2016: 130–131; 142–143.
44 See Wagner 2012.
45 See Humbach 1975: 135–141; MacDowall 1978: 305–316; MacDowall 1975; 142–150; 
Grenet 2006; Adrych et al. 2017: 106–128.
46 See Frye 1978: 205–2011; Grenet 2006; Adrych et al. 2017: 81–104.
47 Grenet 2006; Adrych et al. 2017: 81–104.
48 See Lahe & Kalda 2016: 130; 141.
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forms the basis of social life.49 The name of god Mithra is synonymous 
with the word mithra, meaning “contract, covenant”.50 As a god, Avesta 
Mithra turns up frequently – according to A. A. Jafarey no fewer than 
170 times.51 In the first line Mithra is the Avesta, the defender and the 
guardian of asha, truth and order – the fundamental principle of earlier 
Indo-Iranian religion, as well as of Zoroastrianism.52 Mithra watches 
over contracts and treaties – he blesses those who do not betray their 
contractual word and he punishes those who do betray it (miθradruj-), 
who fight against their treaty-partners (auuimiθri-) and do not acknowl-
edge the sacredness of solemn vows (auruuaθa-).53 For those who do 
not betray their contractual word, he gives herds of cattle and men (sons 
and/or servants), progeny, swift horses, and “broad cattle pastures”.54 
Through him the waters rush down (from the mountains and the skies); 
through him the plants grow.55 He is a divinity who ensures rain and 
prosperity and who protects cattle by providing it ample pasturage.56
Though Miθra is closely associated with the sun in the Avesta,57 he 
is not the sun. The identity of the Avestan Miθra with the sun was ar-
gued by Ch. Bartholomae,58 L. Gray59 and H. Lommel,60 but refuted by I. 
Gershevitch,61 M. Boyce62 and M. Stausberg.63 Boyce and Stausberg em-
phasize that in the Avesta Miθra and the sun are two different gods. The 
sun is called Hvar in Avesta and is almost always called together with the 
moon (Mah). The identification of Miθra with the sun is first explicitly 
49 Turcan 1996: 197. On the etymology of Names see also Baliley 1975: 15–16; Thieme 
1975: 21–33; Schmidt 1978: 345–394; Puhvel 1978: 47–57; Bonfante 1978: 47–57; Mayerhofer 
1978: 317–325.
50 Meillet 1907: 143.
51 Jafarey 1975: 55.
52 Gnoli 1987: 579.
53 Thieme 1978: 502.
54 Ibid. Mithra bears in the Avesta title of vourugaoyaoiti – “having wide pastures”, or 
grasslands. 
55 Ibid.
56 Gnoli 1987: 579.
57 See 10. Yasht, 13; 128; 136. 
58 Bartholomae 1904: 1183.
59 Gray 1929: 96 pp.
60 Lommel 1962: 360–373.
61 Gershevitsch 1975: 68–89.
62 Boyce 1979: 41.
63 Stausberg 2001: 111.
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stated in a Greek source. Strabo (first century B.C.) states that in their 
worship the Persians call the sun Mithres (Geographica 15.13.732). Such 
an identification may also be reflected in the sacrifice of bulls to Zeus 
and horses to the Sun reported by Xenophon (Cyropaedia 8.3.11–12), 
Zeus standing for Auramazdā and the Sun for Miθra. How ever, Curtius 
Rufus (Historia Alexandri 4.13.12) has Darius III invoke the Sun, Miθra, 
and the Fire before the battle. It appears that in Achaemenid times there 
was no consistent identification of Miθra with the sun.64 
The Xthe Yasht, which is dedicated to Miθra, invokes him as “a god 
of fighters”. He is a “warrior with white horses and swift arrows”. Miθra 
is also a “warrior god”, who fight against those who violate a contract, 
but also against the demons and witches (Yasht 10, 26). In Vendīdād 
19,27 pp. ist Miθra (together with Zurwan and Wohu Manah) a judge of 
the soul after the death of man.65
In the Achaemenidic inscriptions, Mithra has a new role – he be-
comes the protector of the king and the kingship.66 As Strabo and the 
reliefs and inscriptions from Commagene confirm,67 Mithra is equated 
with the sun in the 1st century BC. In the era of the Sassandides, in 
which Manichaeism arose, Mithra was firstly the sun god and fighter 
against demons,68 but, as the rock relief from Taq i Bostan shows, he 
was at the same time, protector of the king and royal power.69 In the 
Kushan Empire, Mithra (Miiro) was also the sun-god and a protector of 
the king.70
The comparison and conclusions
It is not difficult to see that the two divinities in Manichaeism have com-
mon traits with the god Mithra in Zoroastrianism. Like Mithra, they are 
associated with the sun. That they are not identical with the sun is not 
64 Schmidt 2006.
65 See also Shaked 1980.
66 See for exampel inscriptions A2Hb and A 3Pa 24–26. 
67 See the inscriptions on Nemrud Dagi (“Apollon-Mithra-Helios-Hermes” (CIMRM, 
Vol. 1, Nr. 32 II A)) and in Arsameia (“Mithra-Helios-Apollon-Hermes” (Dörner 1978: 31; 
Waldmann 1973).
68 See Bahman yašt 7, 31–36; Jamasp Namag 77.
69 See Adrych et al. 2017: 81–104.
70 Ibid., 106–125.
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in accordance with the faith in the time of the Sassanids, but it is in ac-
cordance with the Avesta. In the Avesta we also encounter the motive 
of the sun chariot. Like Mithra in the Avesta,71 so the god Narisaf, who 
has equated with Mithra, has a thousand ears. Like Mithra in Avesta 
and Pahlavi literature, both Manichaean deities are the fighters against 
demons. 
To this day, there is no convincing explanation why the Manichaeans 
formed two divine beings from the Zoroastrian deity Mithra. The differ-
ence in terminology between the Middle Persian and the Parthian Mani-
chean theology has been explained in different ways. W. B. Henning 
maintained that the Zoroastrian Mithra in 3rd-century Persia had so few 
elements in common with the contemporary Parthian or Sogdian Mithra 
that identifications with different Manichean deities seemed inevitable. 
M. Boyce’s explanation leads to the same conclusion: It was among the 
Parthian Manicheans that Mithra as a sun god surpassed the impor-
tance of Narisaf as the common Iranian image of the Third Messenger. 
The Manichean missionaries to Parthia consequently “abandoned” the 
earlier identification of the Living Spirit with Mithra.72 The theory that 
Parthian and Sogdian Manicheans, in contrast to the Persians, called 
the Third Messenger Mithra, simply because their Mithra was already a 
solar deity, has been disputed by Ilya Gershevitch, who pointed out that 
in Sogdian, the sun god is called Mithra only and exclusively in Mani-
chean texts.73 Therefore, the different identification of Mithra in Middle 
Persian on the one hand and in Parthian and Sogdian on the other, was 
simply the result of a different interpretation of the nature of the Mani-
chean gods, that is of the Living Spirit and the Third Messenger, by Mani 
on the one hand and by his missionaries to Parthia on the other.74 But one 
thing is certain – it is no accident that the Manichaeans incorporated 
the Zoroastrian god’s name Mithra into their pantheon. As the godhead, 
who was associated with the sun and who fought against demons, he 
fit well with “light” beings, who fight against darkness. Although the 
Zoroastrian Mithra and Manichaean Mihryazd are two different mythical 
71 See 10. Yasht, 7.
72 Sundermann 2002 b.
73 See Gerschevitsch 1975: 68–89.
74 Sundermann 2002 b.
73 Jaan Lahe
beings,75 it is certain that Mithra had been the prototype of Mihryazd. 
But it is also no accident that the deity Mihryazd is documented in Mani-
chaeism only in Iranian cultural literature. For the missionary reasons, 
the Manichaeans have always emphasized the similarities between their 
teachings and the local religions, whose adherents they wished to gain 
for their doctrine.76 Therefore, in the regions where Zoroastrianism was 
the dominant religion, they used the concepts, ideas, and mythological 
figures, borrowed from Zoroastrianism. The Manichaeans have thor-
oughly redesigned these materials and made them usable for solely for 
their purposes.
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Luigi Cirillo, Alois Van Tongerloom (eds.), Atti del terzo congresso 
internationale di studi “Manicheismo e oriente cristiano antico.” 
Louvain: Brepols, pp. 343–360.
Sundermann, Werner (2002a) “Manichaeism ii. The Manichaean Pan-
theon.” Encyclopaedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ 
manicheism-ii-the-manichean-pantheon (01.01.2019).
Sundermann, Werner (2002) “Mithra iii. in Manichaeism.” Encyclo-
paedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/mithra-in- 
manicheism-1 (01.01.2019).
Sundermann, Werner (2009) “Manichaeism iv. Missionary activity 
and technique.” Encyclopaedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.
org/articles/manicheism-iv-missionary-activity-and-technique- 
(01.01.2019).
Thieme, Paul (1978) “Mithra in the Avesta.” In J. Duchesne-Guillemin 
(ed.), Études Mithriaques. Actes du 2e Congrès International Téhé-
ran, du 1er au 8 septembre 1975 (Acta Iranica, 17). Teheran & Liège: 
Bibliothèque Pahlavi, pp. 501–510.
Tröger, Karl-Wolfgang (2001) Die Gnosis. Heislehre und Ketzerglaube. 
Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder.
Turcan, Robert (1996) Cults of the Roman Empire. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wagner, Jörg (ed.) (2012) Gottkönige am Eufrat. Neue Ausgrabungen 
und Forschungen in Kommagene. Darmstadt/Mainz: Philipp von 
Zabern.
Waldmann, Helmut (1973) Die kommagenischen Kultreformen unter 
König Mithradates I. Kallinikos und seinem Sohne Antiochos I. Lei-
den: Brill.
Widengren, Geo (1965) Die Religionen Irans (Die Religionen der 
Menschheit, 14). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
79 Jaan Lahe
Widengren, Geo (1977) “Einleitung.” In Geo Widengren (ed.), Der 
Manichäismus (Wege der Forschung, CLXVIII). Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, IX–XXXVI.
Mitras Erstbenennung in der Indoarischen 
Götterliste im Vertrag von Hattuša?
Jaan Lahe, Vladimir Sazonov
Abstract In 1907, a treaty was found in the Hittite royal archive in 
Boğazköy. It was forged between the Hittite king Šuppiluliuma I and 
the Mitanni king Šatiwaza. Among the deities named in this con-
tract is DINGIR.MEŠ Mi-it-ra-aš-ši-il. This is usually understood to 
refer to the god Mitra. However, the authors of this article draw at-
tention to the fact that the name occurs in the plural form; the divine 
classifier DINGIR (god” before Mitra’s name) is written in the plural 
form DINGIR.MEŠ, meaning “gods” They are of the opinion that it 
should not be understood as a proper name but as a denomination of 
a group of deities that one could translate as “gods of the treaties”.
Keywords gods of treaties, Hittites, Indo-Europeans, Mitra, state of 
Mitanni, Šattiwaza, treaty, Šuppiluliuma I
Als im Jahre 1907 in Hattuša (heute Boğazköy in der Türkei) das könig-
liche Archiv der Hethiter entdeckt wurde, wurde neben anderen Texten 
auch ein Vertragstext gefunden, der heute als CTH 51 bekannt ist1 und 
jetzt im British Museum in London liegt. Dieser Vertrag wurde zwi-
schen dem hethitischen König Šuppiluliuma I (regierte etwa 1355–1320 
v. Chr) und dem Mitanni-Herrscher Šatiwaza2 geschlossen. Unab hängig 
von den genauen Regierungsjahren des Königs Šuppiluliuma wurde 
dieser Vertrag nach übereinstimmender Ansicht der Forscher ins 14. 
Jahrhundert v. Chr. Datiert.3 Im Vertrag verspricht Šuppiluliuma dem 
1 S. Text: Wilhelm 2005: 113–121. Zu dem geschichtlichen Hintergrund des Vertrages s. 
Wilhelm 2005: 113–114; Thieme 1960: 301–317; Mayerhofer 1974; Wilhelm 1982; der Ver-
tragstext wurde sowohl in der akkadischen als auch in der hethitischen Sprache abgefasst. 
Die akkadische Fassung ist besser erhalten – Beckman 1999: 41.
2 Früher hat man seinen Namen auch als Matiwaza oder Kurtiwaza gelesen.
3 Thieme 1960: 301; Vermaseren 1965: 9; Merkelbach 1994: 4; Clauss 2012: 14; Schw-
ertheim 1979: 8; Turcan 1981: 7; Turcan 1996: 196; Gordon 2012: 287; Duchesne-Guillemin 
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Mitanni-König, der bei ihm Zuflucht gefunden hatte, ihn auf den Thron 
seines Vaters zurückzuführen und gibt ihm als Unterpfand dieses Ver-
sprechens seine Tochter zur Frau. Als Zeugen werden am Ende des Ver-
trages eine Reihe von Göttern angerufen.
Während die Gottheiten, die im Vertag genannt werden, meistens 
hethitischer und mesopotamischer (assyrisch, babylonisch, hurritisch) 
oder syrischer Herkunft sind, ragen die vier Namen dadurch hervor, 
dass sie deutlich indoiranischer Herkunft sind. Da diese Namen unter-
schiedlich transkribiert wurden, werden hier sechs unterschiedliche und 
divergierende Transkriptionen dargeboten:
Kuzmina: Mitraššil, Uruwanaššil, Indara, Našatianna;4
Oldenberg: Mi-it-ra, U-ru-w-na, In-dar, Na-sa-at-ti-ia;5
Thieme: mi-it-ra, u-ru-ua-na, in-dar, na-ša-a(t-ti-ia);6
Dumézil: mi-id-ra-aš-šil, u-ru-wa-na-as-ši-el;7
Beckman: the Mitra-gods, the Varuna-gods, Indra, the Nasatya-gods;8
Wilhelm: Mitraššil-Götter, Uruwanaššil-Götter, Indar, Našatijanna-Götter.9
Die Forscher haben die Aufmerksamkeit darauf gelenkt, da die oben 
genannten Namen in den Veden Äquivalente haben: Mitra-, Varuna-, 
Indra- und Nasatya-10. Diese Tatsache ist an und für sich genommen 
keine Überraschung, wenn wir aus der Hypothese herausgehen, dass 
das Mitanni-Reich von Königen geherrscht wurde, die indoiranischer 
Herkunft waren. Diese Hypothese stützen die folgenden Argumente: 
Manche Herrschernamen der Mitanni (wie z.B. Artatama, Tušratta), 
Fachterminologien der Pferdezucht in Texten aus dem Mitanni-Reich 
und die Bezeichnung mairya-, die man dort für Mitglieder der kriegeri-
schen Aristokratie benutzt hat, sind indoiranischer Herkunft.11 Sie wer-
1979: 187; Witschel 2012: 201; Vollkommer 1992: 583.
4 Kuzmina 2007: 133.
5 Oldenberg 1983: 24.
6 Thieme 1960: 303.
7 Dumézil 1988: 66.
8 Beckman 1999: 47; 53.
9 Wilhelm 2005: 120.
10 Thieme 1960: 303; Puhvel 1996: 49; Vannuci 2011: 42; Nissen 2012: 111; Wilhelm 2005: 
120, Anmerkung 45.
11 Nissen 2012: 110–111; Kalda 1999: VI–VII; Thieme 1960: 301; Puhvel 1996: 49; Kalda 
1999: VIII; Widengren 1965: 23.
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den von den Historikern als “Para-Inder” oder “Proto-Arier” bezeich-
net.12 Die Philologen bezeichnen sie als Stämme, die indoarische oder 
proto-arische Sprachen gesprochen haben.13 Die oben genannten Göt-
ternamen hat man als die älteste Götterliste der frühen indoiranischen 
Stämme charakterisiert.
Seit dem “Vater” der neuzeitlichen Mithras-Forschung, Franz Cu-
mont, herrscht unter den Forschern der Konsens, dass der Vertrag zwi-
schen Šuppiluliuma I. mit Šatiwaza von Mitanni die älteste Quelle ist, 
die den Gott Mitra erwähnt14. Schwertheim meint, dass das Vorhanden-
sein von Mitra im Vertragstext kein Zufall sei, sondern mit der Bedeu-
tung seines Namens (das altindische Appellativum “mitram” bedeutet 
als Neutrum “Vertrag” oder “Freundschaft”, als Maskulinum “mitrah” 
“Vertragspartner” oder “Freund”) in Einklang stehe.15 Auch Rainer 
Vollkommer meint, dass man das Vorhandensein von Mitra im Vertrag 
dadurch erklären kann, dass er “Gott des Bundes” war.16 Für Stephan 
Schlensog, der sich auf die Theorie von Georges Dumézil beruft, die 
sich auf eine Dreiteilung der indogermanischen Gesellschaft und eine 
“dreiteilige Ideologie” (“idéologie tripartite”) der Indoeuropäer beruft,17 
stehen die im Vertrag genannten indoarischen Gottheiten mit einer 
funktio nalen Dreiteilung des indoeuropäischen Pantheons im Einklang. 
Es sei für das indoeuropäische Weltbild charakteristisch, dass man hier 
drei unterschiedliche Göttertypen vertreten finden kann: die Götter mit 
der Funktion der magischen und juristischen Herrschaft; die Götter mit 
der Funktion der kriegerischen Kraft und die Götter der Fruchtbarkeit 
und des wirtschaftlichen Gedeihens. Danach vertreten Varuna und Mitra 
die magische und richterliche Herrschaft, Indra die kriegerische Macht 
und die Nasatyas die nährende Funktion.18 Allerdings kommen nach 
12 Thieme 1960: 301.
13 Thieme 1960: 301; Puhvel 1996: 49.
14 Cumont 1975: 2–3; Vermaseren 1965: 9; Schwertheim 1979: 8; Merkelbach 1994: 4; 
Clauss 2012: 14; Turcan 1996: 196; Vollkommer 1992: 583; Gordon 2012: 966; Hensen 2013: 
7; Vannucci 2011: 42–43; Witschel 2012: 201.
15 Schwertheim 1979: 8.
16 Vollkommer 1992: 583.
17 S. dazu: Dumézil 1988: 13–14; Dumézil 2001.
18 Schlensog 2006: 30. Auch Widengren meint, dass “Mitra und Varuna die Herrschermacht 
vertreten, wobei Varuna die magische zukommt, Mitra die juristisch-priesterliche Tätigkeit 
vertritt” (Widengren 1954: 23). Dem kann man aber nicht zustimmen, weil beide Götter die 
Inhaber des Maya (magische Kraft) sind (s. z.B. RV III,61,7; V, 63,3, 4 u. 7.
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Meinung von Christensen die vorher genannten Gottheiten im Vertrag 
nicht als jene Gottheiten vor, die mit den unterschiedlichen Bereichen, 
die im Vertragstext behandelt wurden, in Verbindung stehen, sondern 
einfach als die Hauptgötter der “Parainder” im Mitanni-Reich.19 
Doch gibt es eine Tatsache, auf die bisher kein Forscher aufmerksam 
gemacht hat: alle Forscher reden vom Vorhandensein des Gottesnamens 
in der Singularform “Mitra”, aber tatsächlich findet sich der Name im 
Text in der Form des Plurals, den nur die Übersetzung Wilhelms und 
Beckmans wiedergegeben hat (“Mitraššil-Götter/the Mitra-gods”). Die 
Name des Gottes ist im akkadischsprachigem Vertragstext aus vier 
Komponenten zusammengestellt: 1) Determinativ DINGIR (“Gott”, 
“Gottheit”); 2) der Pluralendung MEŠ; 3) dem nichtakkadischen Wort 
“Mitra” und 4) der hethitischen Namensendung –šil. Doch selbst Wil-
helm hat das in seinem Kommentar nicht erklärt, sondern verweist nur 
auf den Gottesnamen “Mitra” (im Singular). Die Namensform “Mitra” 
im Vertrag ist also eigentlich ein philologisches Rätsel, das noch nicht 
gelöst ist, aber einer Erklärung bedarf. “Die Mitraššil-Götter” oder “the 
Mitra-gods” sind sicherlich eine Göttergruppe. Ohne hier einen Über-
blick zur Etymologie des Gottesnamens Mitra und ihre unterschiedli-
chen Übersetzungsmöglichkeiten zu bieten,20 bieten die Autoren des 
vorliegenden Aufsatzes eine neue Übersetzung und Erklärung des akka-
dischen Ausdrucks DINGIR.MEŠ Mi-it-ra-aš-ši-il. Sie gehen davon aus, 
dass das Wort Mitra sowohl in der vedischen als auch in der awestischen 
Sprache ”Vertrag” oder ”Bund” bedeutet. Sie schlagen vor, dass der 
Ausdruck DINGIR.MEŠ Mi-it-ra-aš-ši-il nicht als Eigenname, sondern 
als ”Vertragsgötter” zu übersetzen ist. In diesem Fall wäre das Ausdruck 
nicht die Erstbenennung des Gottes Mitra, sondern ein Hinweis auf eine 
Gruppe der unbekannten Götter, deren Funktion die Beschützung der 
Verträge oder der Bünde war.
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The Syriologist Arthur Vööbus – 
a Perspective from Tartu
Amar Annus
Abstract The Syriologist Arthur Vööbus began his academic stud-
ies at the theological faculty of the University of Tartu in 1928. He 
defended his doctoral dissertation in 1943 and in the following year 
left Estonia before Soviet occupation. From 1948 to 1977 he served 
as professor at the Lutheran School of Theology in Chicago. Dur-
ing that period he made 34 research expeditions to Middle East and 
photographed 695 unique manuscripts, which contained previously 
unknown or otherwise important material. The Vööbus collection of 
Syriac manuscripts on film contains approximately 60 000 unique 
photos, or approximately 120 000 pages of manuscripts. At present 
the collection is hosted by the Hill Museum & Manuscript Library in 
Collegeville, Minnesota, which organization is dedicated to digitally 
preserving ancient manuscripts around the world.
Keywords Arthur Vööbus, Syriac manuscripts, Theological Faculty 
of the University of Tartu, Lutheran School of Theology in Chicago, 
Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, Professor Arthur 
Vööbus Collection of Syriac Manuscipts on Film, Hill Museum & 
Manuscript Library in Collegeville
Introduction
The Estonian scholar Arthur Vööbus was born in a village in Vara coun-
ty near Tartu in 1909, and died in Chicago, 1988.1 Vööbus became a 
world-renowned expert of New Testament textual criticism and of Chris-
tian Syria. Vööbus is the most notable alumnus of the pre-war theologi-
cal faculty of the University of Tartu. In the forewords of his scholarly 
1 A. Vööbus’ name is written Võõbus in the original Estonian (o with tilde on it). This is 
a letter unique for the Estonian alphabet, corresponding in sound to Turkish ı or Russian ы. 
However, the traditional ortography is retained in this paper for the sake of convenience.
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books, Vööbus frequently speaks of the inspiring scholarly milieu at the 
theological faculty of the University of Tartu. It was “happy and blissful 
scholarly atmosphere” that he felt characterized the faculty before the 
Second World War. One quote from the Preface to his first volume on 
the history of asceticism in Syria exemplifies his sentiments: 
“I think with deep gratitude of my teachers and colleagues, of all the deep 
and rich spiritual atmosphere at the University of Tartu, which I was privi-
leged to inhale. This atmosphere instilled in me the courage to lay plans for 
a long-range work like this and the will to bring them to realization. The 
inspiration of my Alma Mater has had a lasting impact on my life. It has 
instilled something in me that has remained with me on all roads which I 
have had to wander”.2
Vööbus began his studies at the faculty of theology in 1928, and in 1934 
he completed a magister artium with a thesis on Søren Kierkegaard’s 
views of Christianity. During the early thirties, he started his studies of 
the Syriac language and Eastern Christianity with the aim of writing a 
doctoral thesis on the Syrian asceticism. The classes of Syriac language 
were given by his fellow scholar Uku Masing (1909–1985), and were 
regularly attended by 2–3 students.3 Vööbus remembers that his work on 
Syrian asceticism began in June 1932. After some studies in the history 
and expansion of Christianity in Syria the importance of the subject in-
creasingly began to impress itself upon him. He recounts his moment of 
illumination: “I still remember – so vividly – that early morning hour, so 
full of excitement and illumination, when the perspectives for research 
in this terra incognita opened themselves to my eyes. I then devoted my-
self to the pursuit of this project”.4 The sense of excitement characterized 
Vööbus’ scholarship through all ages. Moreover, he was able to convey 
this sense also to others and win more souls for the field of Syriology.5
2 Vööbus 1958: ii.
3 Kasemaa 2007: 147.
4 Vööbus 1958: i
5 See Brock 1989.
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Vööbus’s work in Tartu
The dissertation on asceticism in the ancient Mesopotamia and Syria 
was originally written in Estonian, and was defended in Tartu, January 
23th, 1943. Some substantial parts of his original dissertation in Esto-
nian were recently published in a book.6 This work served as a prelimi-
nary basis for two voluminous monographs in English, History of the 
Asceticism in the Syrian Orient I–II.7 The third volume was published 
posthumously in 1988, but the whole series was planned to consist of 
five volumes. The publication of the work optimistically started “with 
the hope that the edition of the complete work will not be extended to 
a long period”.8 Part of the reason, why the last two volumes never ma-
terialized was the sense of commitment that Vööbus felt towards his 
Estonian past (see below).
Already during his Tartu period, Vööbus began extensive studies of 
the Syriac Bible, especially of the gospel texts. He became interested in 
the earliest layers of Syriac translation of the Bible, the so-called Vetus 
Syra. For that purpose, he also started to make preparations for the con-
cordance of Syriac gospels.9 Since 1933 he made extensive studies in the 
Syriac patristic literature, which led him repeatedly to vestiges of the 
Old Syriac gospel versions quoted in it. Two years later he decided to ex-
tend his investigations into the area of gospel manuscripts themselves.10 
He started to make research plans for decades, conceiving projects not 
only for his own manifold undertakings, but also for such grand plans, 
which realization demanded team work. Forty years later he recollected:
“… as a very young scholar in my youthful enthusiasm I conceived the idea 
of founding a Syriac Institute at the University of Tartu in order to foster 
research in this area. Indeed, this was conceived in the spirit of exuberant 
enthusiasm when my research very early had led me to exciting discover-
ies which opened up new vistas, novel avenues and virgin terrains. These 
results were so overwhelming that they determined the course of my entire 
scholarly life”.11
6 Vööbus 2009.
7 Vööbus 1958; 1960.
8 Vööbus 1958: xiv.
9 Vööbus 1962: 55.
10 Ibid.: 51.
11 Vööbus 1982a: 54.
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This hypothetical institute was envisioned to carry out the Vetus Syra 
project as well as many other related Syriological projects. He describes 
his erstwhile idea as follows:
“Particularly with regard to the Vetus Syra project, it was clear to me that 
such an undertaking required nothing less than the organization of research 
through an institution provided with a staff for the collation of materials 
and facilities that could handle the enormous problem of utilizing manu-
script treasures abroad. This vision inspired me and gave me the strength 
to continue preparing the ground for a foundation upon which such an or-
ganized and coordinated undertaking could be established. In my youthful 
enthusiasm I decided to make the scope of this planned institute as wide as 
possible”.12
It might be interesting to speculate, how Vööbus’ plan materialized, if 
Estonia could escape the Soviet occupation like Finland after the Sec-
ond World War. Even in a hypothetically non-Soviet and independent 
Estonia, Vööbus would have encountered enormous problems with the 
funding of this kind of institute. The University of Tartu and its theologi-
cal faculty can be famous for some of their bright individual professors 
and researchers, but have never stood out as wealthy research centers. It 
is difficult to see, how Vööbus could have raised funds from the public 
sources or private donors for his humanistic undertaking in Estonia. 
As a citizen of Estonia, Arthur Vööbus’ destiny as a scholar depend-
ed much on his choices he made in his personal life. It seems that his 
foresight for what Soviet occupation would mean for the biblical scholar-
ship was more accurate than that of many of his colleagues. He was able 
to escape the Soviet occupations of Estonia two times, the first in 1941 
and the second in 1944. His second escape proved to be the final one, for 
Vööbus never visited his homeland again. By making a difficult deci-
sion at the right time, Vööbus avoided the shackles of the Soviet regime, 
which many of his fellow scholars at the theological faculty failed to do. 
For example, in his book on the Department of Theology at the Univer-
sity of Tartu (1963), Vööbus writes about his last encounter with one of 
his teachers, Siegfried Aaslava (1899–1957). Aaslava was the professor 
of New Testament studies at the University of Tartu, who elected in 1944 
12 Vööbus 1962: 52.
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to remain in occupied Estonia. A quote from the book gives a vivid de-
scription of the situation, one in which very difficult decisions must be 
made within a very limited time.
“I saw my colleague for the last time on September 21, 1944, the very last 
day of freedom for Tallinn, the Estonian capital, for the following morning 
Soviet tanks captured the city. Our conversation was short but heartrending. 
The imminent threat of the Soviet advance and the expectation of the worst 
had broken his usual alertness and alacrity. He, like many others during 
these hours of despair, was like one paralyzed. He asked me what I planned 
to do. I told him that, in any case, I would risk death rather than annihilation 
or misuse at the hands of the Soviets. I urged him to do the same – to go 
along the shore towards Haapsalu or to the islands to seek for some boats. 
He told me that he could not leave his scholarly materials and books. I knew 
too well the depth of this pain. I replied by saying that staying would in any 
event, mean death or prison in Russia and that, without our scholarly mate-
rials and books. Further, if despite the risks, a way was opened to the West, 
we might be able to restore the losses of our scholarly research and gain new 
books. But I could not persuade him. So we parted. It was very sad to leave 
a colleague who just could not make this painfully risky decision”.13
Professor Aaslava, who was only ten years older than Vööbus, died in 
1957, after spending several years in Soviet prison camps of Siberia. 
Vööbus, however, succeeded to flee to Germany in a flight that com-
pletely changed his destiny as a scholar. Although he had to leave his 
personal library including card files and other collected materials, he 
could take with him some of his work that was in manuscript.14 Vööbus’ 
personal library resurfaced about 20 years later in Tartu, when a person 
accidentally found a collection of books in the attic room of a house on 
Roosi street. No other materials were reported about. These few remain-
ing books are now part of the University of Tartu library.
Vööbus’ work in Germany and the United States
During 1944–1948 Vööbus served as a professor of the Baltic Univer-
sity in Hamburg, which was later transferred to Pinneberg, Germany. 
This university was a cooperative effort of professors from former Baltic 
13 Vööbus 1963: 104.
14 Vööbus 1962: 52; 1963: 97–98.
The Syriologist Arthur Vööbus – a Perspective from Tartu 92
universities but was eventually liquidated by the British authorities.15 At 
a conference in Germany during that period, Vööbus met professor The-
odore Bachmann from Chicago Lutheran Seminary, who persuaded the 
academic council of his home institution to choose Vööbus as his suc-
cessor when he retired in 1948.16 Vööbus served as the Professor of New 
Testament and Early Church History at Lutheran School of Theo logy in 
Chicago until 1977. For six years after that he was the visiting professor 
of Syriac at the University of Chicago. 
Professor Vööbus was a very productive scholar: he published more 
than 80 books and hundreds of scholarly papers. People who person-
ally knew him have said that Vööbus did not have a notion of ‘spare 
time’; he was committed to work incessantly.17 His most enduring pas-
sion was devoted to the study of Syriac manuscripts. Vööbus became 
first acquainted with the Syriac manuscripts during his visit to Berlin’s 
Staatbibliothek in 1935. While working there and in other European col-
lections, he became increasingly aware that the Syriac manuscripts that 
were located in the libraries of Europe were only a part of the total ex-
tant works that could be made available for scholarship. As Vööbus later 
commented, no one in the West besides himself “had conceived the idea 
of the need of an exploration for new manuscripts in the Syrian Orient”.18
After relocating to the United States, Vööbus made 34 research ex-
peditions to Middle East. He sought in various places of learning for 
Syriac manuscripts previously unknown to western scholars. He did 
not intend to buy the manuscripts, but only to photograph the portions 
of them that contained previously unknown or otherwise important 
sources. The Professor Arthur Vööbus Collection of Syriac Manuscipts 
on Film is the legacy of these very remarkable research expeditions. In 
1979 the Institute of Syriac Manuscript Studies was founded at the Lu-
theran School of Theology in Vööbus’ honour, but after his death in 
1988 work at the institute virtually ceased. In 2005 the Lutheran School 
of Theology entered into an agreement with the Oriental Institute of 
the University of Chicago in which the latter assumed responsibility for 
the long-term preservation and use of the collection. Under the terms 
15 Vööbus 1963: 98–99.
16 Hollerich 1989.
17 Kasemaa 2007: 147–148.
18 Vööbus 1982.
93 Amar Annus
of the contract, the Oriental Institute acquired all rights to this archive, 
including rights to access, reproduction, and publication, but not actual 
ownership, which was retained by the Lutheran School of Theology. In 
return for these rights, the Oriental Institute agreed to take on two prin-
cipal responsibilities: (1) scanning the archive, thereby reproducing the 
images in a digital format, which will make them easier to preserve over 
time, and (2) cataloging the archive, thereby making it accessible for the 
first time to scholars throughout the world.19
The Oriental Institute launched the Syriac Manuscript Project, which 
was tasked with digitizing the images and cataloging the collection. Two 
research associates of the Oriental Institute, Dr. Stuart Creason and Dr. 
Abdul-Massih Saadi were in charge of this project. The director of the 
Oriental Institute, Gil J. Stein described the project as one of priority 
among text-based research in this academic institution: “By making 
digital scans of the images on the decaying emulsion film of the photo-
graphic archive, we will be able to preserve this extraordinary heritage 
and make it available to both scholars and to modern Syriac-speaking 
communities around the world”.20 However, the articles describing the 
progress of the project ceased to appear in the Oriental Institute Annual 
Reports since 2010.
Thanks to this project conducted by the Oriental Institute in Chicago, 
some more important information is known about this collection. Alto-
gether Vööbus photographed 695 different manuscripts from 23 differ-
ent locations in the countries of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, India, and 
Israel. The entire collection of images contains approximately 60 000 
unique photos, or approximately 120 000 pages of Syriac manuscripts 
(Creason 2009). The Vööbus collection remains almost entirely unpub-
lished and contains between 5000 and 10000 photographs of manu-
scripts that have since been destroyed (Creason 2005). In the assessment 
of Dr. Stuart Creason given in 2008:
“the collection needs organizing and cataloging, and about 60% of the films 
need to be rephotographed. It is a painstaking and time-consuming task, but 
once completed, it will be an invaluable resource for the study of Syriac and 
Eastern Churches. When the necessary work has been accomplished – and 
19 Creason 2005.
20 Stein 2007: 7.
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more than $300,000 is still needed for its completion – the collection will be 
located at the Antiochian Village Museum and Library, and inter-net access 
will make it available to scholars all over the the world”.21
The value of Vööbus collection has enormously increased after the in-
ception of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. It is to be expected that many 
more of the original manuscripts that Vööbus photographed in Middle 
East have been lost forever during the civil war and due to prolonged 
ISIS domination in parts of the Middle East. According to most recent 
information communicated to the author of this paper by Stuart Creason 
the Vööbus collection was relocated to a new host institution in 2016. 
This is the Hill Museum & Manuscript Library, which is a non-profit 
organization dedicated to digitally preserving ancient manuscripts 
around the world. In the electronic mail sent to me on October 2nd 2017, 
Stuart Creason described the history of Vööbus collection since 2010 as 
follows: 
The Syriac Manuscript Project made slow progress over the years since 
2010, finishing the physical inventory of the film, digitizing 7000 images, 
and cataloging 1000 of those images. However, the proposed partnership 
with the Antiochan Village Museum and Library never came about. In the 
fall of 2016, the agreement between the Oriental Institute and the Lutheran 
School of Theology was terminated with all rights to the film reverting 
the Lutheran School. Shortly after that the Lutheran School gave all the 
film, the supporting materials prepared by the Oriental Institute, and the 
digitized images to the Hill Museum & Manuscript Library in Collegeville, 
Minnesota. It is currently being stored there in a climate-controlled facility, 
but no work has begun yet.
During his lifetime, Vööbus could publish only the most exciting parts 
of his manuscript discoveries. The scope of these discoveries is quite 
remarkable. Vööbus made a lasting contribution to the text history of the 
Hebrew Bible and New Testament. His very significant contributions to 
the study of Vetus Syra as the oldest layer of the Bible in Syriac were 
accomplished in several monographs. He was convinced that the recon-
structable parts of the Vetus Syra versions of the New Testament still 
contained the Aramaic language as spoken during the first Christian 
21 Dalack 2008: 10.
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centuries in Palestine.22 Professor Vööbus was a member of the inter-
national editorial committee of Knut Aland’s Greek New Testament 
from 1955 to 1966. 
Vööbus contributed significantly to Septuagint research. In the sec-
ond century AD Alexandria, Origenes and his team of scholars com-
posed a great critical work on the text of the Bible in six columns, called 
Hexapla. Each column held a different version, and the fifth one con-
tained the text of Septuagint, as it was known during that time. The 
entire work was lost, but the fifth column remained extant in the transla-
tion from Greek into Syriac made by Paul of Tella in about 615 AD. This 
Syriac translation of the early Septuagint is called the Syro-Hexapla ver-
sion. However, the text of Syro-Hexapla was poorly known before the 
discoveries made by Vööbus during his research expeditions. In Midyat, 
Iraq, he found a manuscript containing the full Pentateuch in Syro-
Hexapla version.23 In Saint Mark monastery of Jerusalem he found the 
book of Isaiah in this version.24 From Mardin in Turkey he discovered 
two lectionaries containing numerous passages from the Syro-Hexapla 
text form.25 All these manuscripts and many others were published in 
facsimile editions by the series Corpus scriptorum Christianorum Ori-
entalium in Leuven.
Professor Vööbus also discovered many historical sources of pri-
mary importance. Among them stands out the unique manuscript that 
Vööbus discovered in Damascus, which contains conciliar acts of the 
West Syrian Church as well as a big collection of previously unknown 
documents.26 Among other findings are the new manuscripts of the cel-
ebrated Syro-Roman law book, text editions of the Didascalia Apostolo-
rum in Syriac, and many legislative documents related to asceticism in 
the Syrian Orient.27




26 See Vööbus 1975–1976.
27 See Vööbus 1982–1983; Vööbus 1979.
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Conclusion
During his work in Germany and United States, Vööbus wanted to be 
a voice for his occupied homeland and its suffering people. Some years 
after his relocation to the United States, Vööbus published a popular 
book The Communist Menace, the Present Chaos, and our Christian 
Responsibility, in which he stated that the articulated disapproval of the 
crimes of the communist regimes is a Christian responsibility.28 Arthur 
Vööbus, who had first-hand experiences of the communist terror, 
felt personal responsibility to write the comprehensive history of the 
Estonian people, and to publicize the atrocities committed by the Soviet 
regime. According to his accurate view, irreversible damage was being 
done to the Estonian people and culture during the Soviet occupation. 
Therefore he dedicated much of his valuable time to writing the history 
of the Estonian people, a study which was published in altogether 16 vol-
umes in English. This commitment forced him to postpone many impor-
tant Syriological works, including e.g. The History of Syriac Literature, 
which was planned in three volumes as well as many other publications. 
Two years before his death he explained:
“Unlike so many of my colleagues who have been allowed to conduct their 
research at will, I have felt myself bound to discharge heavy ethical obliga-
tions, which have weighed on my heart like heavy stones, obligations hav-
ing to do with the fate visited upon my native land. Out of compassion for 
the people of my homeland and out of suffering over the tragedy which has 
been visited upon my country whose life and culture have been profoundly 
affected and stand in perilous danger, I have felt it mandatory for me to do 
what I could about it. Since I had been a pastor in the martyr church of my 
nation, I became a voice for the voiceless. … Having received so much from 
my own country, I considered it requisite to salvage what could be salvaged 
from the ruins and to write a comprehensive history of my people, a task 
which turned out to be as taxing as it was arduous”.29
What Vööbus could not foresee was the collapse and disintegration of 
the Soviet Union only a few years after his death. If he had luck to live 
some more years, he could have witnessed the beginning of the new 
era of the Biblical scholarship in Estonia. The theological faculty of the 
28 Vööbus 1955.
29 Vööbus 1987: v–vi.
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University of Tartu was reopened in 1991, and the excellence of Vööbus 
scholarship is much appreciated in this academic institution. 
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Some Details on the Composition of the 
Persian Manuscripts Collection at the 
Library of the University of Tartu
Lidia Leontjeva
Abstract The Department of Manuscripts and Rare Books of the 
Library of the University of Tartu in Estonia holds collections of 
Persian manuscripts that are modest in size but significant, the 
oldest of which dates back to the 15th century. Along with a number 
of Arabic and Turkish manuscripts, there are eleven manuscripts 
altogether which are fully or partially written in Persian and which 
can be regarded as Persian manuscripts. Most of the manuscripts 
were donated in the 19th century as a result of the re-establish-
ment of higher education at the University of Tartu (Universitas 
Dorpatensis) in 1802. The donation provided a strong impulse for 
Oriental studies in Estonia. Most of the contributors were remark-
able persons of historical importance belonging to Baltic German 
noble families. The important role of the manuscript donators in 
19th century society gives additional historical importance to the 
study of the process of compiling the current manuscripts collec-
tion. In this article, I will focus on how the collection was assem-
bled, taking into account the significant role of contributors’ per-
sonalities, and including a brief overview of the collection and its 
constituent manuscripts.
Keywords Persian manuscripts, University of Tartu, manuscript 
donators.
According to Al-Fourqan Islamic Heritage Foundation data1, which con-
tains the most comprehensive worldwide data on Islamic manuscript 
collections worldwide, the Department of Manuscripts and Rare Books 
1 Al-Fourqan 2018.
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of the Tartu University Library holds a collection of forty nine manu-
scripts in total, which is the largest collection of Islamic manuscripts in 
the Baltic States. There is a small collection of seven Arabic manuscripts 
in the Latvian National Library, but they have not been examined by 
specialists and their contents are unknown. Only the handwritten in-
ventory is currently available. According to the Al-Fourqan data, there 
are no Islamic manuscript collections in Lithuania. The collection at the 
University of Helsinki contains the largest number of Islamic manu-
scripts in Finland. They were mainly purchased by the Finnish arabist 
Georg August Wallin (1811–1852) in Egypt during the 1840s, and sup-
plemented by later acquisitions by Stefan Baranowksi, Dr. Hybennet and 
other donators. There are 18th and 19th century copies of the Qur aʾn as 
well as works on jurisprudence, grammar and lexicography, history and 
geography. There are 17 manuscripts in total in Persian, all of which are 
described by Jussi Aro2 and Harry Halen.3 There are also some smaller 
collections of manuscripts in Finland.4
According to an alphabetical card catalogue composed by librar-
ian Leili Punga in 1994, the Tartu collection contains eleven manu-
scripts which are registered in the general inventory book. After precise 
examination it was concluded that the alphabetical card catalogue con-
tains mistakes. Under number Mscr 304 we have a lithograph, not a 
manuscript. In addition, Mscr 175 is a lithographic booklet, and Mscr 
176 is a letter. Both documents could be dated to the second half of the 
19th century. Mscr 59 is a short document of firman. Mscr 98, listed in 
the alpahabetical card catalogue, in fact is an Arabic manuscript. Mscr 
80, not mentioned in the alphabetical card catalogue, contains Diwan 
of Saadi Shirazi. It is possible to conclude that the total number of Per-
sian manuscripts is nine. There is a possibility that some of the Arabic 
or Ottoman manuscripts may be partially written in Persian, but, al-
though the catalogue of Arabic manuscripts composed by D. Jermakoff 
is available5, Ottoman manuscripts remain uncatalogued. Thematically, 
it is reasonable to divide the Persian manuscripts in the Tartu University 
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(six manuscripts), vocabularies (one manuscript) and two non-fictional 
written evidences.
In the first half of the 19th century, oriental studies were concentrated 
into the Faculty of Theology of the University of Tartu, where theolo-
gians were engaged in studying oriental languages, religions, history, 
and philosophy. One of the first professors, Johann Wihelm Friederich 
Hezel (1754–1824), taught occasional courses on the Persian language in 
1810, 1813 and 1814, although they were not regular, as most attention 
belonged to Arabic, Hebrew and Aramaic. Professors Samuel Gottleib 
Rudolf Henzi (1784–1829) and Adolph Friedrich Kleinert (1802–1834) 
were not teaching Persian, despite being familiar with the language. At 
that time, Persian teaching flourished at Helsinki University as a result 
of professor Gabriel Getlin’s (1804–1871) devoted work and research.6 
Instruction in Persian at the University of Tartu was organized by pro-
fessor Johann Christoph Wilhelm Volck (1835–1904) during the period 
of 1861–1866, but attention was later drawn again to Semitic languages. 
We can conclude that there were no systematic Persian language courses 
organized at the University of Tartu in the 19th century, and only some 
occasional courses were held. An explanation for the dominance of the 
Semitic languages can be found in the general interest in Old Testament 
studies, to which Semitic languages are more applicable. This also re-
flected the difference in manuscript numbers; there are only nine Per-
sian manuscripts, but the number of Arabic manuscripts is twenty-seven 
in total. There is no evidence of any research at the University of Tartu 
in the beginning of 19th century that was specifically devoted to Persian 
studies.
In the beginning of 19th century, the growth of the University of 
Tartu was accompanied by the systematic development of astounding 
library holdings. Wealthy individuals invested their private fortunes into 
the book collections, and manuscripts were valued as exotic artefacts 
that deserved to be stored in library collections. All of the nine Per-
sian Manuscripts entered the Tartu University Library in 19th century. 
The oldest layer of this collection was established in 1801, soon after re- 
establishment of the University of Tartu.
6 Aalto 1971.
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One of the first contributors was Friedrich von Adelund (1768–1843), 
a linguist, historian and bibliographer best known for his works in 
Sanskrit grammar. Born in 1768 in Stettin, Germany, he was an honor-
ary professor at the University of Tartu (Universitas Dorpatensis) and a 
patron of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Foreign Ministry of the 
Russian Imperium, which was the first college in Europe at that time 
to teach Persian and Turkish languages. He was also a famous collec-
tor of manuscripts and coins. His son, Karl von Adelung (1803–1829), 
joined the Russian diplomatic service and was killed together with 
Alexander Gryboedov. Friedrich von Adelung never visited Persia him-
self. It is supposed that Adelung gifted this manuscript along with an-
other as a sign of respect to the University upon refusing an offered 
professorship.7 His donation in 1807 was a Persian-Turkish rhyme 
vocabulary with examples of Persian and Arabic poetry.8 
Professor of Theology Johann Wihelm Friederich Hezel, mentioned 
above, donated an Arabic-Persian vocabulary (Mscr 4) to the University. 
This manuscript was purchased by J.W. Hezel at an auction from Profes-
sor Johann Ernst Neubaueur, and the origin of this manuscript can be 
traced to its first owner in Europe, famous German orientalist and theo-
logian Christian Ravis (1613–1677). Ravis spent some time in Smyrna 
and Constantinople assembling manuscripts on his own account, and 
he returned to England in 1641. The manuscript was bought by J.W.Fr. 
Hezel for a relatively high price, and he stressed its value due to the large 
and old vocabulary it contains. It is possible to conclude that his main 
reason for obtaining this manuscript was its importance as a source of 
Arabic vocabulary. In 1807 the University contracted to buy some ori-
ental manuscripts, most of which were copies of the Qur’an. No Persian 
manuscripts were bought at that time9. Mscr 59 was donated in 1818 by 
Philippo Paulucci (1779–1841), an Italian marquis who was in the Rus-
sian army and later became Governor General of Georgia (1812), Livo-
nia (1812–1830) and Estonia (1819–1830). He participated in the Russo-
Turkish wars and campaigns against the Persians (1806–1812). Mscr 59 
is a permission letter, called a firman, from a tribal leader.
7 Rand 2002: 341.
8 Mscr 6.
9 Rand 2002: 344.
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According to the content of this firman, we can conclude that it was 
acquired by the marquis during his campaign against Persia. There are 
no facts that can prove any particular interest of Paulucci in oriental 
studies, but, as Governor General, he was involved in University of Tar-
tu activities; for example, he granted scholarships to some departments. 
It is hard to determine his reason for donating this firman to the Uni-
versity, as Pulucci did not contribute with any other manuscripts, either 
Arabic or Ottoman. Precise examination of the content of the firman 
may provide an answer.
One of the key contributors to the collection of oriental artefacts was 
Otto Friedrich von Richter (1791–1816), an orientalist and traveler who 
died of disease in Izmir in the Ottoman Empire at a young age. His col-
lection of manuscripts and various artefacts was donated to the library 
by his father, Otto Magnus Johann von Richter, in 1819. It is reasonable 
to compare Richter’s activity to that of Georg August Wallin, despite 
the fact that Wallin was born 19 years later.10 Both travelled to the East 
and explored it with their own eyes. Richter contributed only three Per-
sian manuscripts of poetry: Mscr 80, Mscr 99, Mscr 100, all of which 
were obtained by Richter at auctions in Western Europe. It is known that 
Richter never visited Persia, and his main interest was mostly in Egypt 
or Turkey, from which he brought back numerous artefacts. 
There is also one manuscript donated by Faddei Bulgarin (1789–
1859), a famous Russian journalist and writer. In 1833, he donated Mscr 
177, which contains a Djami poem of Haft-awrang. It is known from 
the dedicatory inscription that this manuscript was originally gifted to 
Russian diplomat and writer Alexander Griboyedov by Khosrow Mirza 
(1810–1883), a Persian prince of the Qajar dynasty. Alexander Gryboe-
dov was familiar with the Perisan language and also served as a dip-
lomat in Persia. Due to his wide contacts with Persians, he received 
numerous gifts from them. F. Bulgarin and A. Gryboedov remained 
close friends during their lifetimes, so we can conclude that later the 
manuscript was likely gifted to Bulgarin. In 1828, Bulgarin bought 
Karlova Manor near Tartu and was the owner of this manor until his 
death. Persian manuscript was donated by F. Bulgarin to the Univer-
sity of Tartu in 1833 along with a number of other manuscripts and 
10 Aalto 1971.
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documents of significance. Despite the fact that the relationship between 
F. Bulgarin and the University was complicated, as described in the 
Boris Veizenen’s article “Faddey Bulgarin and the Baltic Germans”, the 
same source confirms that Bulgarin was interested in University ac-
tivities.11 This gift may to some extent reflect his interest and wish to 
have closer connections with the University as the centre of intellectual 
activities in Tartu.
The last manuscript of Persian poetry to be donated is registered un-
der Mscr188 by Magnus Gabriel Bernhard Von Brevern (Rus. Magnus 
Ivanovich Brevern) (1825–1878). He was descended from the De Lagardi 
noble family on his mother’s side and received military education in St. 
Petersburg. As a major-general in the Russian Empire, he participated in 
several Russian Empire military campaigns, including the Russo-Turk-
ish War in 1877–1878. The donation date is recorded by the library as 
1837, which is hardly possible. Given that he was born in Alu, Harjumaa 
county, his connection with Estonia is obvious, and it is probable that the 
manuscript was somehow obtained during war and not as a result of any 
special research interest.
Conclusion
To conclude, it is possible to say that the collected Persian manuscripts 
were valued mostly as artefacts of oriental culture as well as pieces of 
art. Manuscripts are considered suitable for museum collections, and 
this is especially true of Persian manuscripts, which have more illumina-
tions and less theological importance than those in Arabic. The collec-
tion process was rather chaotic. Given that most of the contributors were 
not familiar with the Persian language, we can conclude that the content 
of any particular manuscript was not the key factor for initially obtain-
ing the manuscript. There are two main sources through which the man-
uscripts were obtained by the donators: auctions in Western Europe and 
war campaigns in Turkey or Persia. The fate of these manuscripts once 
in the University collections shows us that Persian manuscripts were 
not regarded at that time as sources for research, study, or translation. 
Nevertheless, Persian manuscripts were carefully registered, stored, and 
sometimes repaired and re-foliated. 
11 Veizenen 2013.
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The Role of the Interpretation of Fuzuli’s 
Texts in the Formation and Development 
of the Literary School of Fuzuli
Aynura Mahmudova
Abstract In Azerbaijani literary studies the role of Fuzuli’s texts 
in the formation and development of the literary school of Fuzuli is 
one of the issues yet to be studied. The resonance and traces left by 
Fuzuli’s works in the history of literature and in the reader’s mind 
can be pointed out as one of the reasons for the longevity of the liter-
ary school of Fuzuli. Fuzuli’s literary texts have been understood 
differently in different periods by different groups of readers and 
these texts have made their impact accordingly. The reader’s way of 
thinking, sometimes not coinciding with the poet’s primary goal and 
sometimes approaching it too closely, has provided a multiplicity of 
interpretations of Fuzuli’s texts. Hence, the existence of different 
interpretations of Fuzuli’s texts. 
Keywords text, interpretation, reader, literary school, intention
Attitudes to Fuzuli’s works are closely interrelated with the existence of 
the literary school of Fuzuli. Since the formation and dissemination of 
Fuzuli’s works, the literary school of Fuzuli has been exposed to a spe-
cial approach, a special attitude. Consequently, it has been distinguished 
by its specific features at each stage. Just as each period demonstrates 
a different attitude to Fuzuli’s works that remain peculiar to it, Fuzuli’s 
proponents have likewise followed the flow of time. The single main-
stream of each period has generated distinct stages in the literary school 
of Fuzuli. Thus, there is a need to clarify readers’ attitudes to Fuzuli’s 
works and how they exemplify those of the time. 
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“Each period makes a judgement about the writer accordingly, accepts the 
literary essentials close to it in his works. The historical presence of literary 
events is distinguished by great complexity”1 
In the 16th–19th centuries the functionality of Fuzuli’s texts was espe-
cially attractive. 
“Since, like any other text, the literary text is not confined to the frames of 
the provided reality either: the potential bearer of meaning is visible in the 
literary text, and the conditions necessary for the formation of “the area of 
existence” of the text is called the actualization of this meaning in the mind 
of the subject who receives the text”2 
In other words, the text can express more things than are apparent at 
first sight, and in the discovery of this feature the role of the person, the 
reader who understands and receives the text, is undeniable.
In reviewing the works of Fuzuli’s proponents in the 16th–18th cen-
turies we see that the interpretation of Fuzuli’s texts did not yet take 
any distinct form. Fuzuli was still being interpreted and there were 
attempts to understand Fuzuli’s text, his spirit. Meanwhile, in the 19th 
century, his texts were simply varied; their interpretation took place 
in a restricted frame, being repeated, also as “an interpretation of the 
interpretation” which became a characteristic feature of the literary 
school of Fuzuli in this period. In the 16th–18th centuries Fuzuli’s texts 
still maintained their potential to demonstrate their purity and novelty 
to the reader. Each period generated a certain perspective of these texts 
through its own vision, its own attitude, and it is due to the fact that 
each period viewed Fuzuli through its own frame that different periods 
suggested different attitudes in Fuzuli’s texts. A genuine work of art, a 
masterpiece, is a timeless treasure. 
“The contact of a voluminous literary work with the esthetic idea of other 
periods generates a more complex idea, esthetic relations and attitudes. Its 
individual components, sides lose their vital, active esthetic significance, 
the others are re-assessed, and the third ones often acquire another voice. 
Most often the ideational, artistic inceptions of the work which seemed 
1 Khrapchenko 1982: 31.
2 Shchirova, Goncharova 2007: 8. 
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secondary, peripheral or unattractive to its contemporaries come to the fore-
front. On the other hand, the sides, which were accepted as very important, 
are most often backgrounded or become esthetically neutral”.3
Creativity is a complex process. Although we can see what the poet does 
in his work, we can only guess at what he intends to do. The work of art 
begins its own independent life after its departure from the creator. The 
way it will be reflected in the mind of its reader, the way it will evoke 
reactions, entail much that is unexpected. Also, one can only hypo-
thesize that a certain work will enjoy a long life in history. 
“So, in one or other cultural system only the texts with high informative 
importance can perform the function of ‘good poetry’ for it which presup-
poses the conflict, tension, struggle with the reader’s expectation, finally 
making the reader accept what is more important than the literary system 
he/she is accustomed to”.4 
When we speak about interpretations of Fuzuli’s texts we imply both the 
creative interpretations and the interpretations aimed at understanding 
him. Through its existence, each work aims to confirm something to a 
certain degree, express some vision of people, events and life in general. 
Meanwhile, nature is imitated, i.e., nature acts as a primary source. And 
for the creativity of the representatives of the literary school of Fuzuli, 
his creativity assumes the role of nature. Fuzuli’s proponents imitate the 
nature they see in the light of Fuzuli’s works, describe the world as seen 
through Fuzuli’s eyes, take the quiverings of Fuzuli’s soul as their own. 
From this point of view, we come to the conclusion that studying the 
readership’s attitude to the poet’s works, with all their different tastes 
and visions in each period, is one of the issues of great significance 
in the study of the formation and development of the literary school of 
Fuzuli.
“In order to provide an adequate historical characteristic of the writer’s 
works and his/her role in the literary process, it is necessary to study the 
3 Khrapchenko 1982: 221.
4 Lotman 1999: 130.
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acquisition of his/her works by the readers, also the peculiar features and 
tastes of his/her audience”.5
Fuzuli’s proponents have attempted to understand, interpret, variegate, 
sometimes negate him and argue with him. Here, such poets try to ex-
press themselves based on Fuzuli’s text, and through Fuzuli they ap-
prove themselves and instil in the reader their world outlooks in Fuzuli’s 
style. 
“It is owing to their historical stability and the maintenance of their core of 
meaning, resisting attempts to interpret them differently, that the works of 
the classical authors continue to live in the memory of generations. Due to 
the lack of endless flexibility of its meaning and not being plastic enough 
to let in the other’s creative will-power and a different conception of reality, 
the classical work allows the creation of a new work when addressed by a 
creative individual”.6
When dealing with the attitude of representatives of the literary school 
of Fuzuli to Fuzuli’s texts, we should point out that Fuzuli’s proponents 
are also his readers. However, we should not forget Fuzuli’s ordinary 
readers either, i.e., people not involved in literary activities. These read-
ers make up the majority and have a role to play in the formation of 
some ideas related to Fuzuli’s works and the literary school of Fuzuli. 
Readers’ attitudes to Fuzuli’s texts and their understanding of him have 
varied. This attitude lies at the bases of literary creativity, comes forth 
from its characteristics. 
“Literary creativity is as ‘inaccurate’ as is required for the creative compat-
ibility of the reader, audience or listener. Any artistic creativity contains 
the basis for the potential compatibility of creative activities. Therefore, 
deviations are necessary for the reader or listener to restore or animate the 
rhythm creatively in his/her vision. Deviations from the style are important 
for the creative acquisition of the style. The inaccuracy of the character 
is necessary for the creative accomplishment of this character through the 
reader or listener’s creative acquisition of it”.7 
5 Reitblat 2001: 98.
6 Esin 1991: 128.
7 Likhachev 1976: 17.
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Fuzuli’s works have created such an opportunity for his readers and 
provided understanding of the texts in a different way for each period. 
Readers, who have obtained from Fuzuli’s works what they desired, 
what they needed, have accepted them as religious texts, lyrical pieces 
glorifying the feelings of love, couplets capable of matching the satirical 
content, and as art that advocates realistic or idealistic views. In the last 
few centuries readers of Fuzuli have also somewhat acted as “authors” 
in the understanding of Fuzuli’s works.
By their very nature, Fuzuli’s works generate favourable conditions 
for the reader to be a co-author – more precisely, for the reader to “find” 
and understand Fuzuli’s mission by discovering him. Hence, there 
appear different explanations and interpretations of Fuzuli. Although 
the scientific research has guided public opinion related to Fuzuli in 
one direction, there have always been subjective attitudes, subjective 
approaches and views. Thus, we are of the opinion that each period has 
its own Fuzuli and each reader his/her own Fuzuli. 
“The facts of art history, above all the history of world literature, demon-
strate most often considerable inadequacy in the impact of the poet’s mission 
and his works on his contemporaries, let alone on subsequent generations”.8 
Fuzuli’s text was both very familiar as well as unknown to its readers. 
Fuzuli’s works, whose traditionalism did not evoke negativity, revolt, 
protest, struggle or tension in readers, and which was appropriate to the 
poetic taste to which readers were accustomed and did not “distort” it, 
could have earned the respect of the medieval reader just through it. 
However, through his works Fuzuli managed to remain unknown to his 
future readers. He was able to address not only his contemporary read-
ers, but also his other readers who were just a cycle of this tradition 
lasting for centuries.
In conclusion we can state that a literary work is not an exclusive, 
extraordinary object divorced from relations and contacts. Although 
it continues its own life separately, it interacts with other works and 
ideas, is exposed to some relations according to the era, and can both be 
enriched insightfully and influence public and literary views in different 
ways in different periods. 
8 Khrapchenko 1981: 217. 
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“Through the process of their social existence great literary works not only 
lose something but also generously demonstrate their internal richness. 
That is why it is hardly fair to think that a literary work is always under-
stood more profoundly by its contemporaries. Each coming generation is 
ready to protest this stance and, above all, the following generations have 
serious grounds for that”.9 
In light of the diverse requirements of each period, Fuzuli’s works are 
reviewed each time, articulated with the labels of the new period, and 
undergo some questioning about their urgency. Despite all the testing 
of Fuzuli’s texts, facing the challenges of the period, we can speak of 
Fuzuli’s works and the literary school of Fuzuli in the early 21st century 
as well. For, Fuzuli has also lived in several centuries following the 16th 
century, contacted his readers, maintained urgency and reached our time 
not only in writings and books but also as a living monument.
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Between the Orient and the Occident: Visions 
of Arab Emigration Writer Ameen Rihani
Ingrida Kleinhofa
Abstract Ameen Rihani, nowadays mainly known as the forerun-
ner of Kahlil Gibran, was the first Arab emigration writer who 
wrote in English, starting the tradition of Arab American literature 
with his novel, The Book of Khalid (1911). At the same time, Rihani 
was well known in the Arab world as a leading writer and thinker 
of Al-Nahda, or the Arab Renaissance. It is thought that his most 
significant contribution to Arabic literature was the introduction of 
prose poetry that transformed the established tradition and deeply 
influenced modern Arabic literature. It is much less known today, 
however, that he was a traveller and a politician as well as the author 
of many works discussing religion, culture, politics, and philosophy. 
In particular, Rihani explored the influence of various ideologies, 
including Pan-Arabism, Wahhabism, Bolshevism, and Western ma-
terialism on potential leaders, their followers, and the wider society. 
He focused on the mentality, motivation, and methods of extrem-
ists, at the same time proposing peaceful solutions to actual prob-
lems mainly by the establishment of mutual understanding, cultural 
exchange, and, finally, by hybridization of antagonistic cultures. 
A forerunner of Edward Said in some sense, Rihani counteracted 
widespread preconceptions about the Orient at a time when Anglo-
phone audiences were not quite ready to hear any criticism of these 
ready opinions. In this study, Rihani’s views presented in The Book 
of Khalid (1911), The Descent of Bolshevism (1920), and The Path 
of Vision (1921) are discussed in the context of the background and 
environment that shaped the writer’s beliefs. 
Keywords Arab Mahjar, The Pen League, Arab Renaissance, Arab 
diaspora in the U.S.A., cultural hybridization, unification of reli-
gions, multiculturalism, globalization
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Life and work of Ameen Rihani1
Ameen Rihani2 (1876–1940), the eldest son of a raw silk manufacturer, 
Maronite Christian Faris Rihani, was born in Freike, a village in Mount 
Lebanon near Beirut. In this picturesque valley, he spent a quiet child-
hood and attended a French school.3 In 1888, together with his paternal 
uncle and his teacher Naoum Mukarzel,4 Rihani travelled to the U.S.A., 
where he rather fast adapted to the foreign culture.5 The family rented 
a modest flat in a basement in Lower Manhattan, and Rihani attended 
American public schools6 for two years; after that, he started work as 
a “chief clerk, salesman and interpreter in his father’s and uncle’s mer-
chandise business.”7 Before long, the young Rihani “found this occu-
pation tedious”8 and decided to continue his education independently, 
focusing on literature, history, and philosophy; his favorite authors were 
“Shakespeare, Victor Hugo, Rousseau, Washington Irving and Car-
lyle.” 9 Emerson and Thoreau inspired him to write essays, Whitman 
moved him to express his feelings in prose poetry, while Ibn Jubayr, Ibn 
Battuta, Lawrence, and Thesiger served as examples in writing travel 
literature.10 Nineteen years old, Rihani developed a passion for theater 
and joined a travelling troupe for about a year; two of his favorite roles 
were Hamlet and Macbeth.11 After that, determined to pursue a profes-
sional career, Rihani returned to New York and entered the New York 
Law School; however, he was not able to continue studies because of a 
1 Discussed in detail in Arabic: Dı̄b 1941
.transliterated as Amīn ar-Rīḥānī or ar-Rayḥānī –أمين الريحاني 2
3 More about the family and childhood of Ameen Rihani is available in the publication of 
Institute of Lebanese Thought “The Biography of Ameen Rihani and His Most Important 
Literary Works” (in Arabic), Sīra Amı̄n ar-Riḥānı̄ wa abraz munǧizātuh. http://www.ndu.edu.
lb/Library/Assets/Micro/Files/ILTMicrosite/AmeenRihani/Biography.pdf [05.04.2018]. 
alternatively transliterated as Naʿ –  نعوم مكرزل 4 ūm Mukarzil. 
5 Bushrui 1999.
6 Kaufman 2004: 209.






lung infection and was sent to recover at his home in Mount Lebanon 
in 1898.12
During the two years in Lebanon, Ameen Rihani relearned Arabic 
and re-discovered Arab history and literature with which he was barely 
familiar, for, as the writer explained in his Introduction to Arab Kings,13
As a child, I knew little about the Arabs, and what little I knew was derived 
from what mothers tell their children about the Bedouin in an attempt to 
frighten them into behaving properly (‘Shush, the Bedouin is here’). Conse-
quently, when I arrived in America I had nothing but fear for those whose 
language I speak and whose blood runs in my veins. The only other culture 
I knew anything about was the French, and this only superficially, my infor-
mation being derived from the French school I attended in Lebanon which 
taught me that France was the greatest nation in the world…14
According to Suheil Bushrui, Rihani’s interest in Arab culture para-
doxically originated from his wide reading in American literature, for, 
namely, “it was an American, Ralph Waldo Emerson, who more than 
anyone was responsible for encouraging Rihani’s interest in English lit-
erature, and introduced him to the nineteenth-century English writer 
Thomas Carlyle,”15 whose writings, in turn, “instilled in Rihani a desire 
to know more about Muhammad” and, consequently, “to find out more 
about his own people and their cultural background.”16 Furthermore, 
fascinated by the tales in Washington Irving’s The Alhambra (1832), 
“Rihani began to dream of the glory of his past, his Arab cultural herit-
age, and to find in it sustenance for his life in the present.”17 
Despite Rihani’s interest in Anglophone literature, his first publi-
cations were in Arabic; for that reason, in the beginning of his liter-
ary career, he gained renown as an Arab writer.18 As early as 1898, Ri-
hani’s articles appeared in the emigrant newspaper Al-Huda,19 founded by 
12 “Ameen Rihani.” https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ameen-Rihani#accordion-
article-history 
13 ar-Riḥānı̄ 1987, 
14 Quoted in Bushrui 1999. 
15 In particular: Carlyle (1899). 
16 Bushrui 1999. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Waïl S. Hassan 2011: 38.
19 Translated from Arabic as The Guidance. 
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Rihani’s teacher, Naoum Mukarzel,20 “to serve the cause of a Christian, 
Maronite-dominated Lebanese nation under French tutelage, independ-
ent of the Ottoman Empire.”21 However, having observed Arab society 
in both Mount Lebanon and the U.S.A., Rihani started criticizing Arab 
traditions and the state of affairs in politics, religion, and philosophy in 
the Arab world, which, in his opinion, suffered from stagnation, bigotry, 
and corruption.22 After his return to New York in 1900, Rihani start-
ed a period of fervent literary activity, publishing rather controversial 
short stories and articles in various journals in New York and Beirut.23 
Furthermore, Rihani’s “hard-hitting speech” on religious tolerance at a 
meeting of the Maronite Society in New York caused a “considerable 
stir,” which brought him popularity and attracted many supporters.24 
The rebellious articles and speeches were followed by several contro-
versial books, the first of which was A Treatise on the French Revo-
lution (1902, Nubḏa ʿan-i- ṯawrat al-faransīya).25 His next work, The 
Triple Alliance in the Animal Kingdom (1903, al-Muḥālafa aṯ-ṯulāṯı̄ya f ī 
al-mamlaka al-ḥayawānı̄ya) contained such bitter criticism of religious 
authorities that the book was burned, and the writer was excommuni-
cated by the Maronite Church. 26 
 Nevertheless, Rihani continued his literary activity and became 
one of the leading Arab Renaissance thinkers and writers27 whose work 
helped to shape modern Arabic literature.28 His collected Arabic works 
fill twelve volumes and include poetry, short stories, philosophical 
essays, literary criticism, and travel memoirs as well as several books on 
the history of Arabs.29 According to Schumann, Rihani’s ideas on a wide 
range of topics were disseminated via Arabic magazines and newspapers 
issued in Cairo and New York, which, in the beginning of the twentieth 
20 Hajjar 2010: 23. 
21 See Hassan 2011: 40.
22 Bushrui 1999.
23 Kaufman 2004: 209; also, Sīra...: 3
24 Bushrui 1999. 
25 Available in Arabic in: ar-Riḥānı̄ 1981.
26 Bushrui 1999.
27 The contribution of Ameen Rihani to Arab literature is thoroughly discussed in Iman-
gulieva 2009. 
28 See also Hajjar 2010: xiv.
29 Hassan 2011: 38.
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century, bound together the “imagined intellectual community”30 and 
helped the new Arab intellectuals to build their reputations as writers 
and thinkers. With the help of these media, Arabic “became the lingua 
franca for intellectual debates and modern poetry exchanged between 
the Arab homelands, in particular Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, and the 
Syrian colonies in France, Brazil, Argentina, and the United States.”31 
The main restrictions on this communication, however, were posed by 
the strong religious and political affiliations of most Arabic papers32 and, 
as Schumann argues, their “low intellectual standards” as well as the 
tendency to engage in gossip, slander, and sectarian strife.33
Ameen Rihani spent much effort trying to bring about a reform of 
Arabic poetry; in particular, his essays in literary criticism discussed the 
role of the poet and the nature of poetry in “the age of iron and electric-
ity.” 34 For instance, he tried to revive the role of poet-prophet35 which 
was “long forgotten” in Arabic culture,36 but which was also paralleled 
and reinforced by the Romantic notion 37 of the poet as a link between 
ignorant common people and God as the source of sublime knowledge – 
the poet functions as a spiritual leader, prophet, philosopher, and priest 
with a great mission.38 However, Rihani urged poets to avoid thoughtless 
emulation of classical poems; in particular, he advised against overusing 
clichés and overly emotional images such as “pools and lakes of tears” at 
the thought of the lost love.39 Furthermore, he attempted to introduce new 
rhythms and themes in the most conservative form of Arabic literature 
by composing an entirely new kind of poetry himself. Rihani’s first Ara-
bic prose poem in in the free, lyrical style of Walt Whitman was printed 
30 Schumann 2016: 275.
31 Schumann 2016: 275.
32 See, for instance, Hassan 2011: 40.
33 Schumann 2016: 275.
34 ar-Riḥānı̄ 2013: 8.. 
35 Nuʿ ayma 1991: 73–74. Nuaima defined the poet’s role as “a prophet, philosopher, molder, 
musician, and soothsayer.”
36 Moreh 1976: 83.
37 Discussed in detail: “Ameen Rihani and His Role in the Formation of Arab Romanticism” 
in Imangulieva 2009: 85–108.
38 Badawi 1975: 186. 
39 “Poet’s Tears,” in: You Poets: 35
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in 1905; with it, he earned the title of “the father of prose poetry.”40 One 
of the ways in which Arabic prose poetry was popularized was Rihani’s 
travels in Arab world, during which he recited excerpts from his poems 
in his speeches.41 
At the same time,42 Rihani started the anglophone Arab American 
literary tradition43 with the first ever poetry collection, Myrtle and 
Myrrh (1905), the first novel, The Book of Khalid (1911), and the first 
play, Wajdah (1909), written by an Arab immigrant in English.44 For that 
reason, Rihani is also known as the “pioneer Arab-American author”45 
and “father of Arab American literature.”46 According to Alice Birney, 
Rihani was the first American of Arab heritage to devote himself to writ-
ing literature … and the first Arab author to write English essays, poetry, 
novels, short stories, art critiques and travel chronicles. He was the author 
of 29 volumes in English. His early writings in English mark the beginning 
of a body of literature that is Arab in its interest, culture and characteristics, 
English in language and American in spirit.47
Since then, “Arab-American literature has emerged as a literature in its 
own right”48 and is regarded not only as an important part of American 
ethnic or multicultural literature49 but also as a part of the English liter-
ary canon along with other literary works written in English by non-
native English speakers.50
In addition, Ameen Rihani was the first Arab who translated Arabic 
poetry into English.51 He started with the works of his favorite poet, 
philosopher, and freethinker, the blind Syrian Abu’l-Ala Al-Maar-
ri (973–1057), whom he described as “the Lucretius of Al-Islam, the 
40 Boullata 1976: 27. However, Badawi: 1975 (pp. 226–227) mentions several other Arab 
poets who experimented with prose poetry as well.
41 Moreh 1976: 297. 
42 Dı̄b 1941.
43 Darraj 2005: 180.




48 Majaj, 2008. 
49 Abinader 2000. 
50 Kachru 2001: 519–523.
51 Hassan 2016: 369. 
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Diogenes of Arabia and the Voltaire of the East,”52 and, as Rihani argued, 
the forerunner of Omar Khayyam.53 The Quatrains of Abu’l-Ala were 
published in 1903 and followed by The Luzumiyat of Abul-’Ala in 1918. 
A characteristic example of Al-Maarri’s poetry that resounds in Rihani’s 
works and thought is the quatrain, 
A church, a temple, or a Kāba Stone,  
Koran or Bible or a martyr’s bone – 
All these and more my heart can tolerate 
Since my religion now is love alone.54
Furthermore, Rihani inspired and supported the foundation of a liter-
ary society dedicated to the renewal of Arabic literature, Al-Rabita al-
Qalamiyya (the Pen League or the Bond of the Pen).55 Both Arab and 
American critics agree that the main part of Mahjar56 literature, or Arab 
emigrant literature in the Americas, which emerged by the end of the 
19th century and flourished in the beginning of the 20th century,57 was 
produced by writers related to this “group of prominent Arab American 
literary figures during the 1910 to 1930s” in the U.S.58 However, Rihani 
gradually shifted his attention to Arab politics rather than literature, so 
he would mainly “serve as a supporter and occasional advisor to the 
group.”59 Most important, Rihani for a long time was the “teacher”60 and 
role model of Kahlil Gibran, whom he met in Paris in 1910 for the first 
time, and who later became one of the main activists of the Pen League. 
At that time, Rihani was already a well-known traveler in Arab and 
Western lands and an established writer in English and Arabic, just hav-
ing completed his book of philosophical essays in Arabic, al-Rihaniyyat 
(1910) and preparing for publication the first Arab emigrant novel in 
English, The Book of Khalid (1911), the first edition of which was il-
lustrated by Gibran. Furthermore, in June 1910, Kahlil Gibran visited 
52 Rihani 1903: vi (“Preface”). 
53 Ibid.: xviii–xix. 
54 Rihani 1903: 42. 
55 See Badawi 1975:182 on Rihani’s role in al-Rabita al-Qalamiyya.
56 In Arabic, the word mahǧar (َمهَجر )  means ‘the place of exile or emigration’.
57 Badawi 1975: 179–180. See also Nijland 1998: 492.
58 “Mahjar”. In: Cortés & Sloan 2013: 1396.
59 Bushrui 2010: 175–191. 
60 On Rihani’s role in Gibran’s life see Bushrui & Jenkins 1998. 
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London with Ameen Rihani and Yusuf Huwayyik and actively partici-
pated in their discussions about literature, art, politics, religion, and phi-
losophy, experimenting with ideas that shaped his later work.61 As Bush-
rui and Jenkins explain, in London, “the three men laid plans for nothing 
less than the cultural renaissance of the Arab world,” mainly based on 
stopping religious strife and promoting universal values. 62
In addition to his being a well-known writer, literary critic, transla-
tor, philosopher, and traveler, Rihani was a charismatic political activ-
ist63 who dedicated his life to promoting peace, tolerance, and cultural 
exchange both within and between the two worlds to which he belonged 
equally.64 Rihani’s greatest ambitions were, first, reconciliation between 
the East and the West by the means of cultural translation, and, second, 
liberation and unification of the Arab world.65 His writings show deep 
insights into the nature of Middle Eastern politics, problems, the future 
of Arabs as a nation, and the potential rise of Islamic fundamentalism, 
for instance, in The Kings of Arabs (Mulūk al-̒ Arab, 1924), The Disas-
ters (An-nakabāt, 8291), and The Modern History of Najd (Ta’rı̄ḫ Naǧd 
al-ḥadı̄ṯ, 8291). Rihani explored the origins and potential of globali-
zation as well as cultural and religious hybridization both in the West 
and in the Arab world. His ideas, adapted for Anglophone readers, are 
expressed mainly in the novel The Book of Khalid (1911) and in two 
little collections of essays written in English, The Descent of Bolshevism 
(1920) and The Path of Vision: Pocket Essays of East and West (1921), 
which are discussed in detail further in this paper. According to Suheil 
Bushrui, Kahlil Gibran Chair for Values and Peace at the University of 
Maryland, “Had [Rihani’s] voice been listened to more attentively, the 
political and social tragedies in the region over the past 50 years would 
have been diminished and might even have been averted altogether.” 66 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Bushrui 1999. 
64 Hajjar 2010: xi. 
65 Hassan 2011: 39. 
66 Bushrui 1999. 
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The Book of Khalid (1911) as Rihani’s spiritual autobiography
The Book of Khalid (1911) appears to be a largely autobiographical work, 
paralleling many events of Rihani’s life and reflecting, often ironic ally, 
his thoughts, aspirations, and failures. The central character of the novel 
is an immigrant of Syrian origin67 in New York named Khalid68 who 
has written a manuscript on philosophy, religion, and politics in a rather 
elated manner, proposing solutions to all the ailments of the East and 
West. He starts with the formulation of a new, hybrid world religion; 
next, he condemns the dishonesty of the Christian church, criticizes the 
spiritual decline of the West, depicts corruption in both the East and the 
West, outlines the mission of America as the new source of guidance to 
the world, and concludes with a failed attempt to reform Islam and re-
vive the great Arab Caliphate by “Wahhabism, pure and simple.”69 The 
story of Khalid is composed by some unnamed Editor from fragments of 
Khalid’s manuscript and the Histoire Intime, memoirs of Khalid’s com-
panion Shakib, also a Syrian immigrant in New York and a poet who 
(just like Ameen Rihani himself) composes poetry in Whitman’s style70 
and “intersperses his Arabic with fancy French.”71 Khalid, Shakib, and 
the Editor might be considered different aspects of Rihani’s personal-
ity, where Khalid is the idealistic, enthusiastic, emotional, and reckless 
dreamer; Shakib is the hardworking, systematic, and practical writer; 
and, finally, the Editor is the critical, mature voice of self-reflection. 
From this point of view, the novel might be regarded as Rihani’s retro-
spection on his own naivety, illusions, and daydreams of youth, which he 
developed into remarkable achievements in politics and literature later 
in life. 
Khalid as the central character of the novel is described as a suf-
ferer for the truth in the mock-heroic style, using combined allusions 
to both Christian and Islamic beliefs about the coming of a prophet or 
a savior and redemption of the sins of the world. First of all, the enthu-
siastic, impractical dreamer Khalid, in reality, is sarcastically called by 
67 In the 19th century, Mount Lebanon was a part of the Syrian Province of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
.(Ḫālid) – “the eternal one” (Arabic) خالد 68
69 Rihani 1911: 321.
70 Ibid.: 49–50. 
71 Ibid.: 9.
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some dwellers of a “hasheesh-den” of the Red Quarter of Cairo “the 
new Muhdi” 72 and “Our Prophet.”73 In this case, it appears that “Muh-
di”  is an alternative spelling of the name “Mahdi,”74 ‘the Messiah of 
Islam,’ the long-awaited Savior, who, according to some Islamic tradi-
tions, will bring knowledge, peace, and justice worldwide together with 
Jesus Christ. 75 Furthermore, the remark that Khalid had “lived in a cave 
in the wilderness of New York for five years”76 refers to the medita-
tions of the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, before revelation in a cave in 
the mountainous wilderness near Mecca. Khalid’s voyage to America is 
called “the Via Dolorosa of the emigrant,”77 and his adventures “In the 
Exchange” might remind readers of the famous moneychangers men-
tioned in the Bible, 78 in particular, taking into account the “World-Tem-
ple” described in the first paragraph of the chapter: 
Look up, therefore, and behold this World-Temple, which, to us, shall be 
a resting-place, and not a goal. On the border-line of the Orient and Occi-
dent it is built, on the mountain-heights overlooking both. No false gods 
are worshipped in it, – no philosophic, theologic, or anthropomorphic gods. 
Yea, and the god of the priests and prophets is buried beneath the Fountain, 
which is the altar of the Temple, and from which flows the eternal spirit of 
our Maker...79
Thus, not unlike Bunyan’s Pilgrim80, Khalid travels through allegorical 
places; indeed, he characterizes his manuscript as “a book of travels in 
72 Ibid.: 8. 
73 Ibid.
74 With a possibility that Rihani indeed meant the Arabic word Muhdi (ُمهدي) – “the one who 
gives a present” (cf. https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/مهدي). 
75 See, for example, Sonn 2004: 208–210. More on the Shiite view: Nasr 1989: 19.
76 Rihani 1911: 8.
77 “The voyage to America is the Via Dolorosa of the emigrant; and the Port of Beirut, the 
verminous hostelries of Marseilles, the Island of Ellis in New York, are the three stations 
thereof. And if your hopes are not crucified at the third and last station, you pass into the 
Paradise of your dreams.” Rihani 1911: 28–29.
78 “And Jesus went into the temple of God, and cast out all them that sold and bought in the 
temple, and overthrew the tables of the moneychangers, and the seats of them that sold doves, 
And said unto them, It is written, My house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have 
made it a den of thieves.” Matthew 21: 12–13, KJV. 
79 Rihani 1911: 5.
80 The Pilgrim’s Progress from This World to That Which Is to Come; Delivered under the 
Similitude of a Dream (1678) is a Christian allegory by John Bunyan, a Puritan preacher. 
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an impalpable country, an enchanted country, from which we have all 
risen, and towards which we are still rising … the chart and history of 
one little kingdom of the Soul.”81 Plagued like the majority of people by 
a multitude of unreliable “social and political guides, moral and religious 
dragomans,”82 Khalid attempts to become a guide of humanity and re-
vive the world through the union of Eastern and Western thought83 in 
religion, culture, and politics. However, his efforts are futile, his ideas 
are scorned, and his proposals incite only anger, which seems a natural 
ending to the quest of a martyr-like figure. 
The Book of Khalid deals with serious problems in a seemingly jocu-
lar manner that does not expose the author to attack for his professed 
views; however, this is perfectly explicable by Rihani’s bitter experience 
with publishing critical pamphlets about the Church and politics.84 Pos-
sibly, using as a source of inspiration The Praise of Folly by Erasmus of 
Rotterdam who faced a similar situation and successfully presented his 
critique in then-fashionable form of fool’s literature,85 Rihani chooses 
for his novel a style that reminds of the famous essay and, at the same 
time, resembles Rudyard Kipling’s writing, in particular, Kim (1901).86 
Fascinating to intellectuals who savor ‘Oriental exotics,’ intricate inter-
textuality, black humor, and indirect discussion of tabooed matters, 
Rihani’s novel contains sarcastic banter in a mix of languages, demon-
strating the writer’s wide reading and comprehensive knowledge of both 
cultures. At first glance, it is a thrilling story about the adventures of two 
Syrian emigrants, peddlers in Lower Manhattan, who struggle to adapt 
in the U.S.A. and return to their homeland just after the Young Turk 
Revolution. However, detailed description of the daily routines, feelings, 
and impressions of emigrant life, starting with childhood and ending 
with a return to the homeland, are interwoven with allusions to politi-
cal and intellectual actualities of the day and decorated with a bounty 
of Oriental motifs, allusions, and quotations. In this ostensibly playful 
81 Rihani 1911: iii.
82 Ibid.: vii.
83 Ibid.: 245. 
84 Such as the already mentioned A Treatise on the French Revolution (1902, نبذة عن الثورة  
 and ,(المحالفة الثالثية في المملكة الحيوانية ,The Triple Alliance in the Animal Kingdom (1903 ,(الفرنسية
other works published by Rihani in this period. 
85 Allen 1913: i–iv.
86 Rihani was familiar with Kipling’s works; see, for instance, Hassan 2011: 43–44.
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way, the author discusses provocative topics such as corruption in poli-
tics and in the church, the spiritual crisis of the West and the East, and 
liberation of the Middle East from Ottoman rule. The Editor hints at the 
nature of the novel, saying that “the Author of the Khedivial Library 
Manuscript can make his Genius dance the dance of the seven veils, if 
you but knew,” and “when his Genius is not dancing the dance of the 
seven veils, she is either flirting with the monks of the Lebanon hills or 
setting fire to something in New York.”87 The discrepancy between the 
style and the content is directly explained in the beginning of the novel, 
as the Editor gives a piece of his mind to the reader about the manner in 
which significant matters should be discussed “nowadays,” in particular, 
the “most Important in the history of nations and individuals” as well as 
“time-honoured truths and moralities”88:
… no matter how important or trivial these, he who would give utterance to 
them must do so in cap and bells, if he would be heard nowadays. Indeed, 
the play is always the thing; the frivolous is the most essential, if only as 
a disguise. – For look you, are we not too prosperous to consider seriously 
your ponderous preachment?89
Rihani’s manner sometimes borders on blasphemy, for instance, starting 
the book with “Al-Fatihah” or “the opening chapter” which in the novel 
is “the Opening Word of Khalid himself”90 recalls Surah al-Fatihah of 
the Quran, which, in turn, is defined in Islam as the direct speech of 
God. However, presented in such a context, radical opinions on science, 
religion, and politics could not be unequivocally understood as the au-
thor’s stance, but rather perceived either as controversial ideas ridiculed 
or exposed in the novel or as disputable matters presented to the audi-
ence for re-evaluation and further discussion. Nevertheless, the dedica-
tion of Khalid’s manuscript “to my Brother Man, my Mother Nature, 
and my Maker God”91 points to the serious intent of the writer, and the 
role of the book is defined as “a propylon through which my race and 
those above and below my race, are invited to pass to that higher Temple 
87 Rihani 1911: 6–7. 
88 Ibid.: 5.




of mind and spirit.”92 The publication of similar ideas ten years later 
in Rihani’s The Descent of Bolshevism (1920) and The Path of Vision: 
Pocket Essays of East and West (1921) might serve as a proof that the 
author tested the reception of such ideas by the Anglophone audience, 
first presenting them in an outwardly humorous fashion.
Ameen Rihani and the imaginary ‘exotic’ Orient 
Being an immigrant of Syrian origin in American society in the early 
20th century meant continuous fighting against prejudice. Arabs were 
thought to be racially inferior, “not quite white” 93 people who would be 
considered to be roughly of equal standing with the Anglophone major-
ity only if of noble birth, great wealth, or notable talent.94 At the same 
time, Orientals aroused interest, as they represented the imaginary Ori-
ent constructed by Western culture, a mythical, enigmatic, charming, 
exotic place teeming with sages, disguised princes, supernatural beings, 
and mystics.95 For that reason, there were few possible respectable roles 
for Orientals in Western society, such as Eastern sage, prophet, or noble-
man. As Kathleen Raine explains, by the end of the 19th century, there 
were already two well-formed tendencies of Western civilization: the 
first was “the final triumph of rational materialism based on natural sci-
ence as the accepted orthodoxy of the Western and Westernized world” 
combined with conservative Christianity; and the other, “a powerful 
counter-current,” that was “flowing … as if some collective spiritual 
power found agents where it could” towards different versions of East-
ern mysticism that was either found in new teachings such as the Baha’i 
Faith or fused with traditional religions. For instance, 
In India there were … men equal to any teachers of her golden age – Rama-
krishna, Vivekananda, Ramana Maharshi, Sri Aurobindo, and Mahatma 
Gandhi’s inspired faith in the power of non-violence to change the world; 
92 Ibid.: “Al-Fatihah.”
93 Arab Americans were considered racially inferior. See, for instance, the publication of 
Arab American Institute, “Not Quite White: Race Classification and the Arab American 
Experience,” 2010.
94 A vivid description of the place of “not quite white” people in American society of the 
time might be found in “Aloha Oe” (1908), a short story by Jack London. 
95 Kathleen Raine’s Foreword, in: S. Bushrui & J. Jenkins, 1998: i–vi. Cf. Orientalism: 
20–32. 
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Yeats’ friend Æ’s vision of a world where the “politics of time” would be 
conducted according to the “politics of eternity”; ... Gibran, revisioning 
Christianity in the light of Islamic (Sufi) mysticism, is of this group...96
Fascination with Eastern religions was further stirred by F. Nietzsche’s 
Thus Spake Zarathustra (1892), as it was based on the legends of Zoro-
astrianism and designed for those disappointed in Christianity.97 Fur-
thermore, the Baha’i Faith, brought to the U.S.A. by the end of the 19th 
century from Persia, united the great religions, Christianity, Buddhism, 
Islam, Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism. At the same time, Theosophy, 
with The Secret Doctrine, the Synthesis of Science, Religion and Philos-
ophy by Helena Blavatsky published in 1888, revived interest in esoteri-
cism and popularized Buddhism and Hinduism as well as the practice 
of expecting wisdom from Eastern teachers, prophets, and reincarnated 
gods.98 What is more, Blavatsky’s follower, Annie Besant,99 adopted a 
Brahmin child, Jiddu Krishnamurti, as she believed that he was destined 
to become a World Teacher, an incarnation of Lord Maitreya.100 It is not 
surprising in such a context that Americans saw in Gibran, then just a 
teenager from Boston ghettoes, some “peculiar power” and “peculiar 
beauty” of a potential prophet, and that they believed legends about his 
noble birth and aristocratic life in exotic lands.101 This might largely ex-
plain the success of The Book of Khalid (1911) as well as the popular-
ity and influence of Gibran’s The Prophet (1923), which continues the 
tradition.
Thus, “the first generation of Arab-American writers” adapted 
roles that were possible for Orientals within the pre-existing ideologi-
cal framework. As Evelyn Shakir explains, they “dressed carefully for 
their encounter for the American public, putting on the guise of prophet, 
preacher, or man of letters. They could not hide their foreignness, but 
they could make it respectable.”102 According to Wail S. Hassan, 
96 Ibid.
97 Stack 1983: 80–84
98 Godwin 2013: 17–20.
99 Jayakar 1986: 22. 
100 Ibid.: 30–59.
101 Bushrui & Jenkins 1998: 3.
102 Shakir, Evelyn. “Pretending to Be Arab: Role-Playing in Vance Bourjaily’s ‘The Frac-
tional Man.’” MELUS 9:1 (Spring 1982), 6, quoted. in Hassan 2011: 41.
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Some of the roles (such as Gibran’s posture as a mystic or Oriental sage) 
are, of course, among the stereotypes circulating within the Orientalism’s 
regime of truth, while others (Rihani as man of letters and Abraham Rih-
bany as a Protestant minister) were carefully calculated to challenge aspects 
of it, in an effort not only to “make foreignness respectable,” but also to 
redefine the relationship between “East” and “West.” The implied message 
was, “Here we are, we can produce literature that draws upon the most dis-
tinguished Western writers … but we, too, are Orientals.”103
Hence, the role of an Oriental sage was at the time one of the most ap-
propriate for an Arab intellectual in the West, as there was a great inter-
est in Eastern spiritual teachings. In this context, it appears that Rihani 
learned to exploit these preconceptions to negotiate his own position 
in American literary and artistic circles; in particular, he made good 
use of the stock image of a spiritual teacher from the East. In The Book 
of Khalid (1911), for instance, the main character, Khalid, “the new 
Muhdi,”104 his disciple poet Shakib, and the narrator of the book speak 
words of wisdom in a rather sarcastic way, interspersed with Oriental 
anecdotes and scenes overflowing with exotic and historical detail.105 
Furthermore, in The Book of Khalid, Rihani uses his own Oriental back-
ground to expose widespread Western clichés about the mystical East, 
at the time perpetuated in literature and public opinion. Leaving the 
ordinary Western reader puzzled and overwhelmed, he oversaturates the 
eclectic novel with Oriental images and expressions, understanding of 
which requires some knowledge of Arabic as well as familiarity with 
Arab culture and politics. Similarly to Kipling, Rihani casually men-
tions Oriental terms in whole series without explanation, for instance, 
“the mudir of the District,”106 “thy hammals under their burdens shall 
thank the heavens,”107 or “the mudirs and kaiemkams of the Lebanon 
make these zabties, whose duty is to serve papers, serve, too, in their 
homes.”108 Oriental scenes overflow with exotic detail such as consulting 
103 Hassan 2011: 41.
104 Rihani 1911: 8. 
105 Nevertheless, in his anglophone essay booklets published ten years later, The Path of Vi-
sion (1921) and The Descent of Bolshevism (1920), Rihani adopts the role of the sage himself 
and presents similar ideas earnestly and confidently as his own thoughts.
106 Rihani 1911: 269
107 Ibid.: 246.
108 Ibid.: 270.
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a sand-diviner in Cairo,109 visiting the Khedivial library,110 and vivid 
scenes such as the following description of an Eastern bazaar: 
In the city, life is one such picturesque languid stream. The shop-keepers sit 
on their rugs in their stalls, counting their beads, smoking their narghilahs, 
waiting indifferently for Allah’s bounties. And the hawkers shuffle along 
crying their wares in beautiful poetic illusions, – the flower-seller sing-
ing, “Reconcile your mother-in-law! Perfume your spirit! Buy a jasmine for 
your soul!” the seller of loaves, his tray on his head, his arms swinging to 
a measured step, intoning in pious thankfulness, “ O thou Eternal, O thou 
Bountiful! “ The sakka of licorice-juice, clicking his brass cups calls out to 
the thirsty one, “ Come, drink and live! Come, drink and live!”111
Often, the reader encounters lists of names and facts such as in the fol-
lowing excerpt, which strongly resembles the mock-learned style of The 
Praise of Folly,112 
… how can we interest ourselves in his fiction of history concerning Baal-
bek? What have we to do with the fact or fable that Seth the Prophet lived in 
this City; that Noah is buried in its vicinity; that Solomon built the Temple 
of the Sun for the Queen of Sheba; that this Prince and Poet used to lunch 
in Baalbek and dine at Istachre in Afghanistan; that the chariot of Nimrod 
drawn by four phoenixes from the Tower of Babel, lighted on Mt. Hermon 
to give said Nimrod a chance to rebuild the said Temple of the Sun? How can 
we bring any of these fascinating fables to bear upon our subject?113
However, the exotic world is described in a rich colloquial language that 
establishes affinity with the reader. As the Editor of the book further 
explains, “the material is of such a mixture that here and there the raw 
silk of Syria is often spun with the cotton and wool of America,” and, 
apparently, to make serious matters more entertaining, the musings 
on history, religion, and politics are interspersed with “a slabbering of 
109 Ibid.: 8.
110 Ibid.: v.
111 Ibid.: 16. 
112 See, for instance, The Praise of Folly, p. 3: “Polycrates commended the cruelty of Busiris; 
and Isocrates, who corrects him for this, did as much for the injustice of Glaucus. Favorinus 
extolled Thersites, and wrote in praise of a quartan ague. Synesius pleaded in behalf of bald-
ness; and Lucian defended a sipping fly.”
113 Rihani 1911: 20. 
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slang.”114 The opening chapter introduces the reader to this style through 
the bold claim that the “modern Arabic Manuscript” written by Khalid 
was found “in the Khedivial Library of Cairo, among the Papyri of the 
Scribe of Amen-Ra and the beautifully illuminated copies of the Koran.” 
The mentioned “enigmatic drawings” on the cover, such as “a New York 
Skyscraper in the shape of a Pyramid”115 and “a dancing group” with a 
caption, “The Stockbrokers and the Dervishes,”116 might not only mock 
the fashionable use of stylized Oriental images,117 but also suggest the 
familiarity of the author with occult symbolism and conspiracy theories 
of the day. The text also contains allusions to literary works supposedly 
well known to the reader, as, for instance, “And where, if not in the 
Lebanon hills, in which it seemed always afternoon, can he rejoin the 
Lotus-Eaters of the East?”118 In this manner, reality is juxtaposed with 
the “imaginative geography” of the Orient119 as constructed in Romantic 
literature, presenting scenes familiar to the reader and evoking feelings 
appropriate to the genre. 
In fact, The Book of Khalid undermines and ridicules the whole ar-
ray of popular stock images and stereotypes related to the Orient in 
Anglophone society, as they must have appeared absurd to Rihani as 
a person born and raised in so-called ‘exotic’ lands. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, many Westerners were fascinated with ‘the mysti-
cal Orient’; in particular, writers and artists were inspired by “the great 
poets of the West embracing the East,” mainly, “Yeats’s translation of the 
Upanishads and Eliot’s epiphany as he first read the Rubáiyát of Omar 
Khayyám.”120 This sometimes grew into an obsession; for instance, the 
artists and intellectuals of Boston “dabbled with spiritualism and orien-
talism against an ‘exotic’ backdrop of Turkish carpets, jade bowls, water 
pipes, fezzes, pointed slippers, and Maeterlinck’s Neoplatonic brood-
ings on death and preordained love.”121 A characteristic, though possibly 
114 Ibid.: i.
115 Ibid.: i. 
116 Ibid.: i. 
117 See, for instance, ibid.: 88.
118 Ibid.: 129; “Lotus-Eaters” might be a combined allusion: first, to Homer’s Odyssey, and 
second, to the famous poem by Alfred, Lord Tennyson “The Lotos-Eaters” (1832). 
119 The term coined and explained by Edward Said in Orientalism (Said 1978: 49–70).
120 Bushrui & Jenkins 1998: 1. 
121 Ibid.: 4
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exaggerated case is described in the chapter “With the Huris” of The 
Book of Khalid, where “a fair-spoken dame,” a “Medium” being “at the 
threshold of her climacteric,” a person who “dotes on the occult and 
exotic,” makes Khalid “a member of the Spiritual Household, which now 
consists of her and him, the Medium and the Dervish.”122 The lady, “in 
an effort to seem Oriental,”123 calls Khalid “the Dervish,” “My Syrian 
Rose,” “My Desert Flower,” “My Beduin Boy,” and so forth, “always 
closing her message with either a strip of Syrian sky or a camel load of 
the narcissus.”124 While her beloved “now wears his hair long and grows 
his finger nails like a Brahmin” and “is beginning to have some man-
ners,” 125 she daydreams about an imaginary East that has little relation 
to reality:
…one day we shall travel together in the Orient; we shall visit the ruins 
of vanished kingdoms and creeds. Ah, to be in Palmyra with you! Do you 
know, Child, I am destined to be a Beduin queen. The throne of Zenobia is 
mine, and yours too, if you will be good. We shall resuscitate the glory of 
the kingdom of the desert.126
As stated in the novel, Khalid “and the Medium are absorbed in the 
contemplation of the Unseen, though not, perhaps, of the Impalpable;” 
the pair “gallivant in the Parks, attend Bohemian dinners, and frequent 
the Don’t Worry Circles of Metaphysical Societies” where they “make 
long expeditions together to the Platonic North-pole and back to the tor-
rid regions of Swinburne” and “perform their zikr and drink at the same 
fountain of ecstasy and devotion.” 127 These flowery phrases hint at a 
possible sexual affair between Khalid and “the medium,” which would 
be considered scandalous in the society of the time for several reasons at 
once. Unmarried sex was taboo; in addition, the situation would be even 
more complicated due to differences in the age, social status, and race128 
of the partners. 
122 Rihani 1911: 84. 
123 Ibid.: 88.




128 “Not Quite White: Race Classification and the Arab American Experience” 2010.
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Ameen Rihani as the forerunner of Edward Said 
In fact, despite the already mentioned Romantic fascination with the 
Orient,129 this also was “an age of rampant xenophobia”130 and racial 
prejudice131 combined with persistent stereotypes that might be sup-
ported or confronted, but never ignored. It must be noted that Rihani 
was well aware of the role of propaganda in the colonization of the East 
by what he calls “Christendom,” by which he, apparently, means West-
ern civilization; therefore, he might be also considered a forerunner of 
Edward Said in some sense, as demonstrated by the following quotation 
from The Book of Khalid: 
Not to Christian Europe as represented by the State, therefore, or by the 
industrial powers of wealth, or by the alluring charms of decadence in art 
and literature, or by missionary and educational institutions, would I have 
you turn for light and guidance. No: from these plagues of civilisation pro-
tect us, Allah! No: let us have nothing to do with that practical Christianity 
which is become a sort of divine key to Colonisation; a mint, as it were, 
which continually replenishes the treasuries of Christendom. Let us have 
nothing to do with their propagandas for the propagation of supreme Fakes.132
This topic was explored frankly and in depth more than half a century 
later in Edward Said’s famous Orientalism (1978), exposing the ruling 
discourse that supported the superiority of the West and its mission civi-
lisatrice. Edward Said argued that even scholarly studies that appeared 
objective and detached compiled and analyzed bits of agreed-on factual 
or fictitious knowledge about the Orient contained in previous studies. 
Instead of systematic, objective exploration of the real Orient, Oriental-
ists constructed an unreal image of Orient in some imaginary space, 
which was transferred from work to work in consecutive citations by 
European writers and scholars.133 Facts or interpretations that disagreed 
with this image were dismissed as inappropriate or irrelevant, as they 
could undermine the official ideology that permitted Western domina-
tion and colonization worldwide. In other words, the Orientalist attitude 
129 Bushrui & Jenkins 1998: 1–4.
130 Shakir, 1996: 6., quoted in Hassan 2011: 41.
131 “Not Quite White: Race Classification and the Arab American Experience”2010.
132 Rihani 1911: 317.
133 Said 1978: 20–23.
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“shares with magic and mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing 
character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are, for 
once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can 
either dislodge or alter.”134 For that reason, as Said maintained, the study 
of the Orient in Western universities was in no way purely theoretical or 
scholarly but rather an active attempt of the West to justify colonization, 
as it promoted “the idea of European identity as a superior one in com-
parison with all the non-European peoples and cultures”135: 
Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, 
a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans against all ‘those’ non-Euro-
peans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European 
culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside 
Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with 
all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is in addition the hegem-
ony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European 
superiority over Oriental backwardness.136 
However, by the beginning of the 20th century, Orientalism in the sense 
later criticized by Said was “a powerful discourse,” yet unchallenged, 
and the Anglophone readers “had already formed their ideas about that 
distant culture.”137 In particular, in 1911, concepts like white man’s bur-
den, or the image of East and West as homogeneous, separate, oppo-
site entities for most Westerners seemed indisputable and self-evident 
as demonstrated by, for instance, Rudyard Kipling’s writings. On these 
grounds, “a white middle-class Westerner” believed that it was “his hu-
man prerogative not only to manage the non-white world but also to 
own it, just because” non-Westerners were “not quite as human” by 
definition.138 
Not able to criticize the discourse of Orientalism as Edward Said did 
in 1970s, Rihani attempted to question, expose, and subtly undermine 
its tenets in his literary works, and thus he established a whole tradition. 




137 Hassan 2011: 41.
138 Said 1978: 108.
133 Ingrida Kleinhofa
mainly within the mentioned system of stock images and prejudices, 
they also asserted that they were more qualified to speak about the Ori-
ent than Western scholars, attempting “to replace the Orientalist as in-
terpreter or translator of the Orient as a way of claiming cultural space 
and voice, countering the negativity associated with the Orient, and me-
diating between it and the West for the sake of greater cross-cultural 
understanding.”139 As Wail S. Hassan explained further, 
They accepted the Orientalist distinction between the contrasting essences 
of East and West, the former seen as passive, mystical, spiritual, traditional, 
backward, and the latter correspondingly as aggressive, rational, material-
istic, modern, progressive. What they wanted to contest was the hierarchy 
of values attached to the poles of this binary. They were angry at, and rebel-
lious against, the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Empire and highly critical 
of social and political conditions on Syria and the rest of the Arab world. 
They correspondingly admired the social, political, and technological ad-
vances of western European countries and the United States. But they were 
also very conscious and proud of a great civilization’s past history and rich 
literary heritage, to which they contributed through their Arabic prose and 
poetry, written in the United States. They could not, therefore, accept the 
idea of the East’s inferiority.140
Obviously, a characteristic example of such an approach is The Book 
of Khalid in its entirety. Unable to break out of the established ideo-
logical framework, Rihani uses his mouthpiece, Khalid, in an attempt to 
construct a more positive image of an Oriental. Necessarily, the writer 
uses elements that would feel familiar and unquestionable to the West-
ern reader. For instance, he describes “the lofty spirituality of the Ori-
ent” based in “the beautiful ancient virtues” and “the supreme truths of 
the Books of Revelation” such as “continence, purity of heart, fidelity, 
simplicity, a sense of true manhood, magnanimity of spirit” as well as 
“a healthiness of body and mind.”141 In this case, apparently, Rihani ex-
ploits the fact that both the Bible and Quran originated in the Middle 
East. Furthermore, he uses the first-person voice to persuade the reader 
that the following characteristic must be true, for instance, “we Orientals 
139 Hassan 2011: 42.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.: 290.
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differ from Europeans and Americans; we are never bribed into obe-
dience. We obey either from reverence and love, or from fear. We are 
either power-worshippers or cowards, but never, never traders.” 142 Next, 
the author argues that the perceived vices of Orientals are not worse 
than those of Westerners, similarly to the following example: “It might 
be said that the masses in the East are blind slaves, while in Europe and 
America they are become blind rebels. And which is the better part of 
valour, when one is blind – submission or revolt?”143 Furthermore, Riha-
ni does mention “loafing” as an Oriental quality,144 thus ostensibly sup-
porting the negative stereotype depicting Orientals as “the Lotus-Eaters 
of the East;”145 however, he attempts to invert it by arguing that it is not 
laziness, but rather physical inactivity that accompanies intense work of 
mind and soul – in case of Khalid, at least. The reasoning is based on 
another set of stereotypes that present the creative process of composing 
a book as hard, but honorable work: 
And Khalid once said to me, ‘In loafing here, I work as hard as did the 
masons and hod-carriers who laboured on these pyramids.’ And I believe 
him. For is not a book greater than a pyramid? ... A man who conceives and 
writes a great book, my friend, has done more work than all the helots that 
laboured on these pyramidal futilities. That is why I find no exaggeration in 
Khalid’s words. For when he loafs, he does so in good earnest. Not like the 
camel-driver there or the camel, but after the manner of the great thinkers 
and mystics: like Al-Fared and Jelal’ud-Deen Rumy, like Socrates and St. 
Francis of Assisi, Khalid loafs. 146
It must be noted that this justification provides grounds to the reader to 
think that it might be applicable to other cases of Eastern loafing as well, 
so it is a step towards building a positive generic image of an Oriental. 
Most probably, a more radical attempt to break the stereotypes would be 
rejected by the Anglophone audience of that period. 
Next, by juxtaposing references to historical events and persons of 
both the Middle East and the West, Rihani might aim to prove to the 
142 Ibid.: 112.
143 Ibid., 112.
144 Ibid.: 55: “Khalid is gradually reverting to the Oriental instinct.”
145 Ibid.: 11: “And where, if not in the Lebanon hills, “ in which it seemed always afternoon,” 
can he rejoin the Lotus-Eaters of the East?”
146 Ibid.: 10. 
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reader that (at least some) Arabs should not be considered inferior, con-
trary to the widespread prejudice of that time. A vivid example of such a 
method is the enumeration of great Arab philosophers, scientists, poets, 
and leaders together with their Western counterparts, for instance, in 
“Book the Second” of The Book of Khalid. Baalbek is described as the 
city that “gave the world many a saint and martyr along with its harlots 
and poets and philosophers,” for instance, “St. Minius, St. Cyril and 
St. Theodosius,” as well as “Al-Iman ul-Ouzaai the scholar; al-Makrizi 
the historian; Kallinichus the chemist, who invented the Greek fire,” 
and, finally, “Kosta ibn Luka, a doctor and philosopher” who “were as 
famous in their days as Ashtarout or Jupiter-Ammon.”147 Or, for instance, 
“the noted Sheikh Taleb of Damascus” is portrayed with qualities that 
the Western reader would recognize in him the eccentric wise man, or 
a hermit; Rihani compares him to Socrates, an authority to the Western 
reader:
A Muslem, like Socrates, who educates not by lesson, but by going about his 
business. He seldom deigns to write; and yet, his words are quoted by every 
writer of the day, and on every subject sacred and profane. His good is truly 
magnetic. He is a man who lives after his own mind and in his own robes; 
an Arab who prays after no Imam, but directly to Allah and his Apostle; a 
scholar who has more dryasdust knowledge on his finger ends than all the 
ulema of Cairo and Damascus; a philosopher who would not give an orange 
peel for the opinion of the world; an ascetic who flees celebrity as he would 
the plague; a sage who does not disdain to be a pedagogue; an eccentric 
withal to amuse even a Diogenes.148
In fact, Rihani’s depiction of notable Arabs as indisputably equal to 
other distinguished scholars and heroes recognized by Westerners re-
calls the concept of equality of “strong men” professed in R. Kipling’s 
famous “The Ballad of East and West” (1889) 149,
Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, 
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat; 
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, 
147 Ibid.: 19–20.
148 Ibid.: 305–306.
149 R. Kipling, in the researcher’s opinion, also attempted to break the stereotypes as much 
as it was possible in his time within the established ideological framework.
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When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends 
of the earth!150
Presented in this way, Arab scientists, philosophers, and leaders acquire 
features and qualities familiar and fully comprehensible to a Western 
reader, including the set of stock characters with their necessary attri-
butes, such as the charismatic leader, the wise recluse, the eccentric 
learned man, and others. This process is opposite to defamiliarization or 
dehumanization, and represents a characteristic case of cultural transla-
tion, in which information is modified according to the experience and 
values of the audience for the sake of peace and harmony, though based 
on quasi-understanding. In addition, this kind of cultural translation in-
cludes portrayals of symbols, images, historical events, and social roles 
in an often-inadequate way based on superficial resemblance, which 
might be the greatest danger of such a method. Even though some of 
the represented social roles seem to be roughly equivalent according to 
certain criteria, complete identity should never be assumed; for instance, 
a mullah is not a Catholic priest, and a caliph is not the King of England, 
however similar their roles might seem at first glance. Yet it appears 
that in intercultural communication, such adapted images should be pre-
ferred, as these would hide aspects considered objectionable by the other 
culture; besides, understanding and acceptance of controversial detail 
might be reached only by extensive studies of the foreign culture, which 
does not seem feasible for wider audiences. 
Ameen Rihani on ailments and riches of the West
As already explained, Rihani outwardly re-constructs the binary oppo-
sition between the generic West and the generic East, necessarily oper-
ating within the framework of Orientalist discourse and largely using 
Western truisms; however, he attempts to negotiate slightly different 
roles for both that would raise the status of the Orient and undermine 
the superiority of the Occident.151 To perform this intellectual trick, Ri-
hani lavishes naïve praise on Western science and technology, subtly 
150 Of this poem, mainly, the first line is quoted as representative of British imperialistic 
ideology, overlooking the end of the stanza that undermines it.
151 Similarly to R. Kipling. 
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relating it, however, to the Biblical city of Babylon, using as a clue the 
controversial symbolism of the Statue of Liberty.152 Definitely, such a 
connection felt natural to Christian audiences of the beginning of the 
20th century, as it was already a widespread cliché in press, literature, 
and sermons.153 The U.S.A. was usually compared to the New Babylon: 
154 rich, multicultural, but depraved, with skyscrapers seen as ziggurats155 
and Wall Street businessmen described as “the merchants of the earth … 
waxed rich through the abundance of her delicacies.” 156 
Thus, in The Book of Khalid, Rihani describes an immigrant’s 
amazement and awe at the first sight of the New York harbour: 
“And is this the gate of Paradise, “ he asks, “ or the port of some subterres-
trial city guarded by the Jinn? What a marvel of enchantment is everything 
around us! What manifestations of industrial strength, what monstrosities 
of wealth and power, are here! These vessels proudly putting to sea; these 
tenders scurrying to meet the Atlantic greyhound which is majestically 
moving up the bay; these barges loading and unloading schooners from 
every strand, distant and near; these huge lighters carrying even railroads 
over the water; these fire-boats scudding through the harbour shrilling their 
sirens; these careworn, grim, strenuous multitudes ferried across from one 
enchanted shore to another; these giant structures tickling heaven’s sides; 
152 Rihani shows his understanding of this controversial symbolism in The Book of Khalid, 
pp. 35 and 258. More on legends and superstitions related to Lady Liberty see, for example, 
McCullough, Raymond. The Whore and her Mother: 9/11, Babylon, and the Return of the 
King. Precious Oil Publications, 2011 as well as Hieronimus, Robert & Cortner, Laura E. The 
Secret Life of Lady Liberty: Goddess in the New World. Toronto, Destiny Books, 2016.
153 Wilson 2016: 69–72.
154 Ibid.
155 A hint to this cliché might be the mention in “Al-Fatihah” (The Book of Khalid, p. ii) 
drawings on the cover of Khalid’s manuscript as “curious, if not as mystical, as ancient Egyp-
tian symbols” that was “supposed to represent a New York Skyscraper in the shape of a Pyra-
mid.” Another quotation demonstrates that Rihani indeed meant Egyptian pyramids (tombs) 
rather than Mesopotamian ziggurats (temples): “And when he pulls down the pyramids to 
build American Skyscrapers with their stones, where shall we bury then our Muhdi?” (The 
Book of Khalid, p. 9; the conversation takes place in Egypt). Therefore, this might point at the 
Masonic symbolism, with which Rihani was known to be familiar (see, for instance, Shmuel 
Moreh, Modern Arabic Poetry: 1800–1970; the Development of Its Forms and Themes. Lei-
den: E.J. Brill, 1976, pp. 96–100, or one of the sources S. Moreh used, M. Naimy’s autobiog-
raphy Saba’ūn). 
156 Rev. 18:3 (KJV). 
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these cable bridges, spanning rivers, uniting cities; and this superterrestrial 
goddess, torch in hand …Salaam, this enchanted City!”157 
Furthermore, he pronounces Americans the true heirs of the spirit of 
Phoenicians, manifest in the great American accomplishments such as 
geographical discoveries, navigation, work with precious metals, and 
trade; although this spirit is facing degradation because of selfishness 
and greed: 
These dealers in tin and amber, these manufacturers of glass and purple,158 
these developers of a written language, first gave the impetus to man’s ac-
tivity and courage and intelligence. And this activity of the industry and 
will is not dead in man. It may be dead in us Syrians, but not in the Ameri-
cans. In their strenuous spirit it rises uppermost. After all, I must love the 
Americans, for they are my Phoenician ancestors incarnate … I believe that 
the spirit which moved those brave sea-daring navigators of yore, is still 
working lustily, bravely, but alas, not joyously – bitterly, rather, selfishly, 
greedily – behind the steam engine, the electric motor, the plough, and in 
the clinic and the studio as in the Stock Exchange.159
In this manner, praise of Western civilization is combined with open 
criticism of its negative sides. Khalid laments the spiritual poverty of the 
West, in particular, of the U.S.A., in words that are strongly reminiscent 
of the Book of Revelation, 160 stating that America worships “false and 
unspeakable divinities” such as “the gods of wealth, of egoism, of alco-
hol, of fornication.”161 Furthermore, he calls “lust of gain” “a plague,”162 
which also recalls the verse, “Come out of her, my people, lest you share 
in her sins, and lest you receive of her plagues.” 163 The riches corrupt 
157 Rihani 1911: 34–35. 
158 Compare with the description of riches of the Babylon in Rev. 18:3 (KJV): “And cin-
namon, and odours, and ointments, and frankincense, and wine, and oil, and fine flour, and 
wheat, and beasts, and sheep, and horses, and chariots, and slaves, and souls of men.”
159 Rihani 1911: 140.
160 “…is fallen, is fallen, and is become the habitation of devils, and the hold of every foul 
spirit, and a cage of every unclean and hateful bird. For all nations have drunk of the wine of 
the wrath of her fornication, and the kings of the earth have committed fornication with her.” 
Rev. 18:2–3 (KJV).
161 Rihani 1911: 288. 
162 Ibid.: 197. 
163 Rev. 18:4 (KJV),
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everyone who approaches the Promised Land, and America is likened 
to “Circe with her golden horns of plenty,” where “one can not as much 
as keep his blood in circulation without damning the currents of one’s 
soul?” 164 The reason is worship of success and material gain, as de-
scribed in Khalid’s manuscript, 
O Success, our lords of power to-day are thy slaves, thy helots, our kings 
of wealth. Every one grinds for thee, every one for thee lives and dies… 
Thy palaces of silver and gold are reared on the souls of men. Thy throne is 
mortised with their bones, cemented with their blood. Thou ravenous Gor-
gon, on what bankruptcies thou art fed, on what failures, on what sorrows! 
The railroads sweeping across the continents and the steamers ploughing 
through the seas, are laden with sacrifices to thee. Ay, and millions of inno-
cent children are torn from their homes and from their schools to be offered 
to thee at the sacrificial-stone of the Factories and Mills. The cultured, too, 
and the wise, are counted among thy slaves. Even the righteous surrender 
themselves to thee and are willing to undergo that hideous transformation. 
O Success, what an infernal litany thy votaries and high-priests are chant-
ing to thee … Thou ruthless Gorgon, what crimes thou art committing, and 
what crimes are being committed in thy name!”165
Greed has taken place of religion, so, as Khalid sarcastically remarks, 
Americans are “neither Pagans ... nor fetish-worshipping heathens”166 
but rather “they are all true and honest votaries of Mammon, their great 
God, their one and only God,” so “the Demiurgic Dollar should be the 
national Deity of America.” 167 Lust of gain, therefore, is epitomized in 
“the Cash Register” as “the Host of the Demiurgic Dollar,” in this con-
text understood as the Communion bread of materialistic society.168 Ri-
hani further ironizes, 
Indeed, the omnipresence and omnipotence of it are not without divine sig-
nificance. For can you not see that this Cash Register, this Pix of Trade, is 
prominently set up on the altar of every institution, political, moral, social, 
and religious? Do you not meet with it everywhere, and foremost in the 
sanctuaries of the mind and the soul? In the Societies for the Diffusion of 




168 Ibid.: 130. 
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Knowledge; in the Social Reform Propagandas; in the Don’t Worry Circles 
of Metaphysical Gymnasiums; In Alliances, Philanthropic, Educational; in 
the Board of Foreign Missions; in the Sacrarium of Vaticinatress Eddy; in 
the Church of God itself; – is not the Cash Register a divine symbol of the 
credo, the faith, or the idea?169
In addition, Europe, which has for centuries served as the intellec tual and 
spiritual basis of the Western civilization, being “high, noble, healthy, 
pure, and withal progressive” and known for “the deep and inexhaust-
ible sources of genius … of reason and wisdom and truth”170 such as “the 
divine idealism of German philosophy, the lofty purity of true French 
art, the strength and sterling worth of English freedom,”171 in Rihani’s 
opinion is deteriorating as well. It is “being de-religionised by Mate-
rial Science; disorganised by Communion and Anarchy; be fuddled by 
Alcoholism; enervated by Debauch” 172 and, therefore, has lost its role. 
Furthermore, Europe is starting to be recognized mainly by its vices, 
while its virtues are neglected and forgotten: 
But alas, what are we doing to-day? Instead of looking up to the pure and 
lofty souls of Europe for guidance, we welter in the mud with the lowest 
and most degenerate. We are beginning to know and appreciate English 
whiskey, but not English freedom; we know the French grisettes, but not 
the French sages; we guzzle German beer, but of German wisdom we taste 
not a drop.173
As a result, total confusion and chaos are imminent; Rihani vividly de-
scribes the situation as follows: 
We are pestered and plagued with guides and dragomans of every rank and 
shade; – social and political guides, moral and religious dragomans: a Tol-
stoy here, an Ibsen there, a Spencer above, a Nietzche below. And there thou 
art left in perpetual confusion and despair. Where wilt thou go? Whom wilt 
thou follow? … For Society must be redeemed, and many are the redeemers. 
The Cross, however, is out of fashion, and so is the Dona Dulcinea motive. 
...The work can be done, and speedily, if we could but choose. Wagner can 
169 Ibid.: 130. 





do it with music; Bakunin, with dynamite; Karl Marx, with the levelling 
rod; Haeckel, with an injection of protoplasmic logic; the Pope, with a pinch 
of salt and chrism; and the Packer-Kings of America, with pork and beef.174 
Ameen Rihani on pan-Arabism, extremism, 
and revival of the Caliphate
The Book of Khalid contains a bitterly sarcastic description of the failed 
attempt of Khalid to become the new Arab leader who would unite the 
nation, liberate it from Ottoman rule, and reclaim the lands of the First 
Caliphate. This extremely controversial topic is discussed in an obscure 
and ambiguous manner, so that the author’s stance is not easily discerni-
ble. It might be understood as a serious proposition, presented cautiously 
for fear of persecution, or as mockery of pan-Arabist and Islamist ideas 
with a vivid depiction of the necessary end of such enterprises in the 
Arab world.175 Besides, it seems quite possible that the mature, realistic 
Rihani laughed at his own earlier daydreams, enthusiasm, and admira-
tion of Arab glory of the past176 after reading the chapter of Carlyle’s 
Heroes and Hero Worship on “Prophet Mahomet” 177 and Washington 
Irving’s The Alhambra. However, the already discussed attempts to shift 
the perception of Orientals in the West might be discerned in these parts 
of the novel as well. The Western concept of the backward, stagnant, and 
indolent Orient, including “the gorgeous besottedness of Oriental life, 
and literature, and religion,”178 is countered by the attractive Romantic 
image of Arabs portrayed by Khalid as “a great race who has fallen on 
evil days,”179 characterized by “the barbaric grandeur, the magnanimity 
and fidelity,” 180 and just awaiting “the renaissance of Arabia; the re-
claiming of her land” as well as, finally, “the resuscitation of her glory.”181 
He believes that: 
174 Ibid.: vii–viii. 
175 Rihani’s opinion on various extremist movements may be found in his The Descent of 
Bolshevism (Rihani 1920).
176 Bushrui 1999. 
177 “Lecture II. The Hero as Prophet. Mahomet: Islam.” 
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A little will-power, a little heroism, added to those virtues I have named, the 
solid virtues of our ancestors, and the Orient will no longer be an object of 
scorn and gain to commercial Europe. We shall then stand on an equal foot-
ing with the Europeans. Ay, with the legacy of science which we shall learn 
to invest, and with our spirituality divested of its cobwebs, and purified, we 
shall stand even higher than the Americans and Europeans.182
Khalid argues that the decline of Arabs as a nation is caused by Otto-
man oppression, adding that “Indeed, nothing is duller, more stupid, 
more prosaic than a modern absolutism,”183 characterized by backward-
ness, total control,184 and corrupt officials who “can better read a gold 
piece than a passport.”185Therefore, “The Turk must go – at least out of 
Arabia,”186 and by any means. As Khalid ardently exclaims, 
We need another Saladin to-day, – a Saladin of the Idea, who will wage a 
crusade, not against Christianity or Mohammedanism, but against those 
Tataric usurpers who are now toadying to both.187
Passionately, he exclaims, “No; the Arab will never be virtually con-
quered. Nominally, maybe. And I doubt if any of the European Powers 
can do It. Why? Chiefly because Arabia has a Prophet. She produced 
one and she will produce more.”188 He proceeds, 
But out in those deserts is a race which is always young, a race that never 
withers; a strong, healthy, keen-eyed, quick-witted race; a fighting, fanatical 
race; a race that gave Europe a civilisation, that gave the world a religion; a 
race with a past as glorious as Rome’s; and with a future, too, if we had an 
Ali or a Saladin. But He who made those heroes will make others like them, 
better, too. He may have made one already, and that one may be wandering 










Khalid further characterizes this new hero as the one who would re-
peat the great deeds of the ancestors and return their lands to the right-
ful owners. His aim would be the renewal of the first Caliphate, which 
spread over the Middle East and North Africa in less than a century and 
united all nations of these lands with one language, the sacred Classi-
cal Arabic, and one ideology, that of Islam. However, this new “Sala-
din,” “the builder of a great Asiatic Empire,” should possess both ““The 
soul of the East” and “The mind of the West,” 190 that is, Oriental spir-
ituality and Western rational thinking and attitude to business, science, 
and technology. 191 Feverishly, Khalid envisions himself as a possible 
candidate,
… and why not? especially if backed with American millions and the love 
of a great woman. He is enraptured. He can neither sleep nor think: he can 
but dream. He puts on his jubbah, refills his cigarette box, and walks out of 
his room. He paces up and down the hall, crowning his dream with wreaths 
of smoke.192
As Khalid argues: 
Now think what can be done in Arabia, think what the Arabs can accom-
plish, if American arms and an up-to-date Koran are spread broadcast 
among them. With my words and your love and influence, with our powers 
united, we can build an Arab Empire, we can resuscitate the Arab Empire 
of the past. Abd‘ul-Wahhab, you know, is the Luther of Arabia; and Wah-
habism is not dead. It is only slumbering in Nejd. We will wake it; arm it; 
infuse into it the living spirit of the Idea. We will begin by building a plant 
for the manufacture of arms on the shore of the Euphrates, and a University 
in Yaman.193
Khalid believes that the combination of Wahhabism and Western science 
would lead to “the awakening of the East; of puissant Orient nations ris-
ing to glorify the Idea, to build temples to the Universal Spirit – to Art, 





194 Ibid.: 325–326. 
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pristine purity … the Islam of the first great Khalifs,”195 the real Islam, 
“free … from its degrading customs, its stupefying traditions,” 196 which 
serves as “a direct telegraph wire between mortal man and his God.”197 
In fact, Khalid supposes likeness between Luther’s ideas and subsequent 
Reformation and the reformation of Islam proposed by Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab and “the most fanatical” among “Wahhabis of Nejd.”198 
Furthermore, he awaits that “one day” the followers of Wahhabism might 
build “a great Arab Empire in the border-land of the Orient and Occi-
dent, in this very heart of the world, this Arabia, this Egypt, this Field of 
the Cloth of Gold”199 where “the Male and Female of the Spirit shall give 
birth to a unifying faith, a unifying art, a unifying truth.”200 However, 
Khalid overlooks the restrictions of ultra-conservative Wahhabism that 
would inevitably impede any introduction of Western philosophy and 
hybridization of religion, allowing as the “unifying faith” only one ver-
sion of Islam. A bright example is the situation in Saudi Arabia today, 
where proposing any change in existing traditions and religious practice, 
even as the result of profound studies of the Quran and hadiths, causes 
extreme problems,201 not speaking of any innovation in religion. 
Taking into account the current (and perpetual) turmoil in the 
Middle East, the mentioned discussion of re-establishment of the 
Caliphate feels eerily relevant to the recent events; in particular, as a text 
written more than a hundred years ago, it seems even prophetic. What 
is more, the scene of Khalid’s speech at the “grand Mosque Omayiah”202 
presents a curious image of “Arab spring”: 
The Mosque is crowded; and the press of turbans is such that if a pea were 
dropt from above it would not reach the floor. From the pulpit the great 
Mohammedan audience, with its red fezes, its green and white turbans, 
seemed to Khalid like a verdant field overgrown with daisies and poppies. 
“It is the beginning of Arabia’s Spring, the resuscitation of the glory of 
Islam,” and so forth… For as he stood in the tribune, the picture of the field 
195 Ibid.: 308.





201 See, for instance, Hubbard 2016.
202 Rihani 1911: 315.
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of daisies and poppies suggested the picture of Spring. A speaker is not 
always responsible for the frolics of his fancy. Indeed, an audience of some 
five thousand souls, all intent upon this opaque, mysterious Entity in the 
tribune, is bound to reach the very heart of it; for think what five thousand 
rays focused on a sensitive plate can do.203
The term ‘Arab Spring’ itself is rather familiar to the 21st century read-
ers after the series of revolutions in Arab countries in 2010–2011, and 
it seems a weird coincidence that Rihani uses these words in such a 
context. 
Portraying Khalid as a passionate but misguided and pathetic ideal-
ist, Rihani, as it seems, distances himself from the ideas professed by 
“the new Muhdi.” Taking into consideration the fact that Rihani was 
recently excommunicated by the Catholic Church, one might perfectly 
understand his reluctance to engage in direct religious disputes with Is-
lamic fundamentalists as well. Rihani does not directly support or criti-
cize the ideas of re-establishing the Arab Caliphate with “Wahhabism, 
pure and simple,” 204 “American millions,” 205 and “American arms;” 206 
which, as it seems, was quite common by the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury in some circles of Arab nationalists. On the contrary, the radical 
views are cautiously presented as delusions of some questionable, overly 
zealous character; the author steps back, leaving Khalid to follow his 
disastrous plans to the inevitable end. Rihani vividly depicts the fate of 
anyone who would challenge traditions and call for reforms in politics 
and religion while speaking to Middle-Eastern audiences without suf-
ficient preparation and in an improper way. The “great Mohammedan 
audience” at the “grand Mosque Omayiah”207 turns out to be absolutely 
intolerant; as Khalid touches several taboo topics, he is followed by the 
angry crowd, which throws stones at him as at ash-Shaytan ar-Rajeem,208 
the Ac cursed Satan of Islamic tradition.209 In the end, expelled by the 





208 “The one who must be killed by stoning [lapidation]” (Arabic). 
209 Rihani 1911: 330.
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Ottoman authorities and rejected by everyone, Khalid disappears into 
the desert.
However ambiguous the author’s stance might appear in the novel, 
the proof that Rihani supports neither Wahhabism nor revolutions and, 
therefore, depicts Khalid’s failed quest critically and perhaps even as a 
warning against similar attempts, can be found in his 1920 brochure, 
The Descent of Bolshevism:
The Wahhabys of today continue to rule in Hasa, maintaining their inde-
pendence even against the new King of Hijaz. And under their Moham-
medan puritanism is the smouldering fire of the Karmathians. They, too, 
once captured and sacked the Holy City of Mecca and still nourish, under 
the guise of piety and the assumption of learning, the most dangerous de-
signs against it and Islam.210
Rihani’s attention to Bolshevism and extremist movements of the 
Middle East is not surprising; as Schumann explained, the Bolshe-
vik Revolution in Russia was “the historical watershed” that strongly 
influenced the “intellectual trends in the Arab World,” including the 
Arab Renaissance.211 The immediate effect was the domination of Arab 
thought “intellectually, politically, and economically by the conflict be-
tween free-market capitalism and socialism on the global level;”212 at the 
same time, “nationalism emerged as a pronounced anticolonial move-
ment with World War I and has remained the dominant ideology in the 
region until today.”213 The success of the Bolshevik Revolution inspired 
dissidents in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, which must have been 
a concern to Rihani in 1919–1920. It must be noted that, at least in The 
Book of Khalid, he criticizes “a political revolution” that is not “pre-
ceded by a spiritual one” because, otherwise, “things will revert to their 
previous state of rottenness as sure as Allah lives”214 and the revolution 
itself turns into a farce. He illustrates his point by his bright, sarcas-
tic description of events after the proclamation of the First Ottoman 
210 Rihani 1920: 26. 





Constitution, when “the country was rioting in the saturnalia of Free-
dom and Equality”215:
I beheld my old friend the Spouter dispensing to the turbaned and tar-
boushed crowd, among which were cameleers and muleteers with their 
camels and mules, of the blessing of that triple political abracadabra of the 
France of more than a century passed. Liberty, Fraternity, Equality! … Live 
the Era of Concord and peace and love! Live the Dastur216! Hurrah for the 
Union and Progress Heroes! Come down to Beirut and do some shouting 
with your fellow citizens.217
In The Descent of Bolshevism, Rihani analyzes the origin and ideology 
of several radical movements and sects such as the Khawarij, the Kar-
mathians, and the Assassins, of which Wahhabism, in the writer’s opin-
ion, is another characteristic example. He likens these religious sects to 
the Bolsheviks, who had recently risen to power in Russia, and argues 
that even Mazdakism should be considered “the Bolshevism we meet 
with, as early as the fifth century, in Persia.”218 He explains that such 
movements have originated in “the ancient as well as the modern world,” 
and that the “only difference is in the background and the surroundings, 
which give the movements distinct local colors and strange sounding 
names.”219 They start as people rebel against injustice and reject “the 
restraints of laws and creeds,”220 following “leaders, undoubtedly sin-
cere at first” who tempt them with “the utopian dream” and declare 
“themselves the exponents of its ideals, the promised messengers of its 
blessings.” 221 Thus, “the vision of the Perfect State, which awakens a 
people from the stupor of slavery, arouses them to revolt, fires them with 
dazzling promises, and leads them to self-sacrifice, to martyrdom, to 
destruction.”222 However, soon after the revolt, a period of what Rihani 
calls “communism and red terror in the hope of realizing ultimately the 
215 Ibid.: 277.
216 “Constitution” (Arabic). 
217 Rihani 1911: 278–279.
218 Rihani 1920: 1.
219 Ibid.: xii.
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Perfect State,”223 characterized by “creative destruction,”224 is inevita-
ble, and both leaders and their followers become “apostles of violence,”225 
corrupted by power. In the end, 
The extremists, no matter how long and brilliant their temporary success, 
have gone the way of all political despots and all religious impostors. And 
their culpability is not in plunging a nation into anarchy and crime, but in 
debasing the ideals of utopia, by yoking them with the destructive agencies 
of negation in a people.226
Ameen Rihani as a cultural ambassador and mediator
Rihani proposed peaceful solutions227 to the problems of both the Orient 
and the Occident mainly by the establishment of mutual understanding 
and cultural exchange, the facilitation of which he saw as his mission in 
life, and by ensuing hybridization of the antagonistic cultures. Appar-
ently, as Rihani felt at home both in the U.S.A. and in Lebanon, his loyalty 
was divided equally between the countries, and he would not promote 
one at the expense of the other. He had a “dual Arab-American identity” 
and travelled between his two homelands frequently228 until his death at 
his house in Freike, Lebanon, in September 1940.229 Thus, with his very 
existence as a living example of the possibility of cultural hybridization, 
Rihani challenged Kipling’s statement about the opposition of East and 
West. 230 This double affiliation is expressed by Khalid as follows: 
… the West for me means ambition, the East, contentment: my heart is ever 
in the one, my soul, in the other. And I care not for the freedom which does 
not free both; I seek not the welfare of the one without the other.231 





227 Rihani 1911: 318–319.
228 Hajjar 2010: xi. 
229 Bushrui 1999.
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149 Ingrida Kleinhofa
The Orient and Occident, the male and female of the Spirit, the two great 
streams in which the body and soul of man are refreshed, invigorated, puri-
fied – of both I sing, in both I glory, to both I consecrate my life, for both I 
shall work and suffer and die.232
Obviously, Rihani’s identity and lifestyle, in particular, writing for both 
Arab and Anglophone readers, necessitated constant translation and cul-
tural interpretation that shaped his concept of “cultural ambassador and 
mediator.” 233 Besides, the idea of cultural exchange between East and 
West was familiar to Rihani since his childhood, for he, being Maronite 
Christian from Mount Lebanon, was brought up in a hybrid environ-
ment from birth.234 The idea of enriching Arab culture with elements of 
Western thought, in fact, continues the tradition of Islamic Golden Age, 
as scholars collected and translated into Arabic all available literary and 
scientific works of other civilizations. However, cultural hybridization 
as proposed by Rihani stems from the beginnings of the Arab Renais-
sance in the first decades of the 19th century, when the Khedive of Egypt 
Muhammad Ali (1769–1849), decided to send Islamic scholars to France 
to learn European science.235 Having returned to Egypt, these schol-
ars disseminated knowledge that they believed to be compatible with 
Islamic values and traditional ways of life. 236 Quite naturally, but, as it 
seems, unexpectedly for religious authorities, familiarity with European 
science lead to increased interest in European philosophy and literature 
as well, which, translated in great quantities, brought Western thought 
and lifestyles to Arab society. The subsequent cultural hybridization 
in Egypt resulted in a renewal – but also profound Westernization – 
of Arab literature and culture, the Arab Renaissance, which spread to 
the Christians of Mount Lebanon and coalesced with their pro-Western 
culture, fostered by missionaries.237 Thus, the idea of merging East and 
West promoted by Rihani appears to be as hybrid as the proposed re-
sults. Namely, it originates from the Arab Renaissance superposed upon 
Lebanese Christian culture; at the same time, it may be perceived as 
232 Ibid.: 245–246.
233 See, for instance, Bushrui 2012: xi. 
234 Bushrui 1999.
235 Hassan 2011: 39. 
236 Ibid.
237 Somel 2005: 254–269. Also, see Moreh 1976: 86. 
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some kind of an extended, reciprocal mission civilisatrice between the 
East and the West where both sides have their specific burdens of re-
sponsibility towards their ‘less developed’ brethren, in some aspects. 
Life between two cultures involved growing awareness of prejudices 
and weaknesses of each; for that reason, possibly, Rihani thought that 
these might be cured by the introduction of characteristic traits and val-
ues of the other culture.238 At first, apparently unsure about the recep-
tion of such ideas, Rihani presented them as quotations from Khalid’s 
manuscript. For instance, 
Give me, ye mighty nations of the West, the material comforts of life; and 
thou, my East, let me partake of thy spiritual heritage. Give me, America, 
thy hand; and thou, too, Asia. Thou land of origination, where Light and 
Spirit first arose, disdain not the gifts which the nations of the West bring 
thee; and thou land of organisation and power, where Science and Freedom 
reign supreme, disdain not the bounties of the sunrise. ... If the discoveries 
and attainments of Science will make the body of man cleaner, healthier, 
stronger, happier, the inexhaustible Oriental source of romantic and spir-
itual beauty will never cease to give the soul of man the restfulness and 
solacement it is ever craving. And remember, Europa, remember, Asia, that 
foreign culture is as necessary to the spirit of a nation as is foreign com-
merce to its industries. Elsewise, thy materialism, Europa, or thy spiritual-
ism, Asia, no matter how trenchant and impregnable, no matter how deep 
the foundation, how broad the superstructure thereof, is vulgar, narrow, 
mean – is nothing, in a word, but parochialism.239
As explained by the narrator of the novel, “the principal aim of Khalid” 
was “to graft the strenuosity of Europe and America upon the ease of the 
Orient, the materialism of the West upon the spirituality of the East.”240 
The fusion of the two opposites was seen by Rihani as a positive process 
both for whole nations and for individuals, as he believed that such com-
pound beings would possess the best qualities of both, while the worst 
qualities would balance each other. As Khalid argued, “My Brothers, 
the most highly developed being is neither European nor Oriental; but 
rather he who partakes of the finer qualities of both the European genius 
238 Hassan 2011: 39. 
239 Rihani 1911: 246.
240 Ibid.: 238.
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and the Asiatic prophet.”241 Responding to Nietzsche’s ideas, which were 
fashionable at that time, Rihani offered his own vision in Khalid’s manu-
script, 
Ay, in this New World, the higher Superman shall rise. And he shall not be 
of the tribe of Overmen of the present age, of the beautiful blond beast of 
Zarathustra … in this New World, I tell you, he shall be born, but he shall 
not be an American in the Democratic sense. He shall be nor of the Old 
World nor of the New; he shall be, my Brothers, of both. In him shall be 
reincarnated the Asiatic spirit of origination, of Poesy and Prophecy, and 
the European spirit of Art, and the American spirit of Invention.242 
Ten years later, in The Path of Vision, Rihani describes the process of 
cultural hybridization, claiming that “Whatever the characteristics of 
the age we live in, its principal tendency is one of exchange – exchange 
of culture as well as commodities.”243 He imagines this exchange as a 
“circling stream” that “is ever flowing between the civilized nations of 
the world” and sometimes changes not only its direction “but also its 
quality, its temper, its spirit.”244 In the past, “mighty currents” brought 
religion to Europe “from the fountain head of the soul,” the East; they 
were balanced by “counter-currents” that carried trade and “intellectual 
freedom” to the East.245 Rihani argues, “The new source to-day is Amer-
ica; and the mighty currents, which flowed from the East to the West in 
the past, are now flowing from the West to the East”246 bringing “pure 
mind” from “the fountain head of the mind,” and they are “tempered 
to-day with a counter-current of spirituality.”247As the result, “while the 
Western world is experiencing at present a spiritual revival, the East is 
going through the puerperal pains of nationalism and freedom.” 248 Fi-
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... the national spirit in its purity and vigor, is the spirit of individuals repre-
sentative of its traditions and its culture. This is so even in America ... Like 
Greece and Rome, America is developing itself from a conflux of various 
nations and antithetical elements. The Melting Pot certainly has a soul. And 
this soul will certainly have a voice. And the voice of America, it can safely 
be said without exaggerating potentialities, is destined to become the voice 
of the world. Its culture, too, its arts and its traditions, which, in spite of the 
present passion of Americanization, are being colored and shaded, impreg-
nated with alien influences, will embody the noblest expression of truth 
and beauty that the higher spirit of the Orient and the Occident combined 
is capable of conceiving. They will embody also a universal consciousness, 
multifarious, multicolor, prismatic ... Hence the cosmopolitanism of the 
American of the future. Hence too his culture, which will harmonize with, 
nay, re-inforce, the culture of every race. This may take a hundred or two 
hundred years, but it is bound to come. It is the ultimate destiny of the Melt-
ing Pot – its future soul and voice.249
Ameen Rihani on hybridization of religion 
One of the most important aspects of cultural hybridization would be, 
in Rihani’s opinion, the merging of major religions, which would stop 
sectarian strife, eradicate the corruption of religious authorities, and 
counteract the bigotry of ordinary people.250 The Book of Khalid con-
tains a severe criticism of both Christianity and Islam as interpreted by 
narrow-minded, selfish believers, priests, and mullahs; Khalid claims 
that in most religious communities, even at monasteries, there is “much 
ungodliness, much treachery.”251 He urges, “Come out of the supersti-
tions of the sheikhs and ulema; of the barren mazes of the sufis; of the 
deadly swamps of theologues and priests.”252 Khalid describes Islam as 
degraded from its initial “pristine purity” by its acquired “degrading 
customs, its stupefying traditions. Its enslaving superstitions, its imbrut-
ing cants.”253 Even on the Hadeeth, the Editor of The Book of Khalid 
scathingly remarks,
249 Ibid.: 171–172.
250 Rihani’s stance explained in The Path of Vision, which confirms that Khalid, on this 
topic, expresses the author’s own opinion. 




Ay, Shakib relates quoting al-Makrizi, who in his turn relates, quoting one 
of the octogenarian Drivellers, Muhaddetheen (these men are the chief 
sources of Arabic History) that he was told by an eye and ear witness that 
when this celebrated Muazzen was once calling the Faithful to prayer, the 
camels at the creek craned their necks to listen to the sonorous music of his 
voice. And such was their delight that they forgot they were thirsty. This, by 
the way of a specimen of the Muhaddetheen.254
However, Christianity is not spared as well; in the novel, Jesuits of 
Mount Lebanon are portrayed as petty-minded, malicious, and greedy 
people whose daily business is money extortion by any means, forg-
ing false accusations, and working as informers for security services, 
both Ottoman and foreign; furthermore, according to Khalid, “For the 
Padres, in addition to their many crafts and trades, are matrimonial bro-
kers of honourable repute. And in their meddling and making, their bait-
ing and mating, they are as serviceable as the Column Personal of an 
American newspaper.”255 Khalid detests the murky, intricate mazes of 
“ascetic theology” and “eremitic logic,” accompanied by “bigotry and 
crass superstition”256 that he discovers in a hermit. Finally, he writes, re-
nouncing mortification of the flesh and humility required by the Catho-
lic faith, 
O Monsieur Pascal,
I tried hard to hate and detest myself, as you advise, and I found that I 
could not by so doing love God. ’Tis in loving the divine in Man, in me, in 
you, that we rise to the love of our Maker. And in giving your proofs of the 
true religion, you speak of the surprising measures of the Christian Faith, 
enjoining man to acknowledge himself vile, base, abominable, and obliging 
him at the same time to aspire towards a resemblance of his Maker… Au-
revoir, Monsieur Pascal. Remember me to St. Augustine.257
At the same time, Rihani never presents atheism as a possible option; in 
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only for profit,258 and the avaricious atheists are called “not free thinkers, 
but free stinkards.”259 As described by Shakib, 
For at bottom, atheism is either a fad or a trade or a fatuity. And whether the 
one or the other, it is a sham more pernicious than the worst. To the young 
mind, it is a shibboleth of cheap culture; to the shrewd and calculating mind, 
to such orators as Khalid heard, it is a trade most remunerative; and to the 
scientists, or rather monists, it is the aliment with which they nourish the 
perversity of their preconceptions. 260
On the contrary, Khalid defends religion if it leads to the development 
of moral qualities and noble feelings; for instance, he shows the role of 
Islam in Bedouin life as follows, 
Take the lowest of the Arab tribes, for instance, and you will find in their 
truculent spirit a strain of faith sublime, though it is only evinced at times. 
The Beduins, rovers and raveners, manslayers and thieves, are in their 
house of moe-hair the kindest hosts, the noblest and most generous of men. 
They receive the wayfarer, though he be an enemy, and he eats and drinks 
and sleeps with them under the same roof, in the assurance of Allah. If a 
religion makes a savage so good, so kind, it has well served its purpose.261
Similarly, the two main characters of The Book of Khalid are described 
as people “from the land in which God has always spoken to our ances-
tors” who are “constitutionally incapable of denying God”;262 for that 
reason, they are presented as rather qualified to express opinions on reli-
gion in general. Shakib argues, juxtaposing Christian and Islamic terms, 
“I am a Christian by the grace of Allah, and my ancestors are counted 
among the martyrs of the Church. And thanks to my parents, I have been 
duly baptized and confirmed.” 263 From this position, he comments on at-








and pay a hard dollar to hear this heretical speechifier insult my parents 
and my God? ”264
Khalid glorifies religions as messages of God brought by prophets, 
and, in his opinion, “every religion is good and true, if it serves the 
high purpose of its founder. And they are false, all of them, when they 
serve the low purpose of their high priests.”265 For that reason, he de-
clares that he is “both a Camel-driver and Carpenter” and also “a Bu-
haist in a certain sense” and would “renounce falsehood, whatsoever 
be the guise it assumes” and “embrace truth, wheresoever” he would 
find it.266 Thus, the new religion would be composed from “shattered 
fragments” of various teachings so that it resembles a “beautiful parti-
colored sun-flower;”267 with the basic principle that “Everything in life 
must always resolve itself into love” because “love is the divine solvent” 
and “the splendour268 of God,”269 which reminds of the New Testament.270 
Another basic principle that he acknowledges is the innate feeling of the 
proper and the virtuous, the instinctive morality that is given from birth, 
also manifesting in pure, chaste love. As Khalid explains, “Our instincts 
… never lie. They are honest, and though they be sometimes blind.”271 
Therefore, “honesty in thought, in word, in deed” should be considered 
“the cornerstone” of Khalid’s “truth,” and “moral rectitude” should be 
placed “above all the cardinal virtues.” 272 He depicts the path of human-
ity as a journey towards “that higher Temple of mind and spirit,”273 built 
“on the border-line of the Orient and Occident it is built, on the moun-
tain-heights overlooking both. No false gods are worshipped in it, – no 
philosophic, theologic, or anthropomorphic gods.”274 Khalid recounts 




267 Ibid.: 227. 
268 An allusion to Baha’i Faith, as Baha’u’llah is literally “The Splendor of God” (Arabic/
Persian). 
269 Rihani 1911: 295. 
270 “Love does no harm to the neighbor. Therefore love is the fulfillment of the Law.” 
Romans 13:10 (New Living Translation). 
271 Rihani 1911: 67.
272 Ibid.: 67.
273 Ibid.: ii. 
274 Ibid.: 5. 
Between the Orient and the Occident: Visions of Ameen Rihani 156
In the religious systems of mankind, I sought thee, O God, in vain; in 
their machine-made dogmas and theologies, I sought thee in vain; in their 
churches and temples and mosques, I sought thee long, and long in vain; but 
in the Sacred Books of the World, what have I found? A letter of thy name, 
O God, I have deciphered in the Vedas, another in the Zend-Avesta, another 
in the Bible, another in the Koran. Ay, even in the Book of the Royal Society 
and in the Records of the Society for Psychical Research, have I found the 
diacritical signs which the infant races of this Planet Earth have not yet 
learned to apply to the consonants of thy name. The lisping infant races of 
this Earth, when will they learn to pronounce thy name entire? Who shall 
supply the Vowels which shall unite the Gutturals of the Sacred Books? 
Who shall point out the dashes which compound the opposite loadstars in 
the various regions of thy Heaven? On the veil of the eternal mystery are 
palimpsests of which every race has deciphered a consonant. And through 
the diacritical marks which the seers and paleologists of the future shall 
furnish, the various dissonances in thy name shall be reduced, for the sake 
of the infant races of the Earth, to perfect harmony.275
Twenty years later, Ameen Rihani explicitly stated that humanity needs 
a new, unified religion that would be free from dogma and corruption. 
It is obvious that many ideas about the hybridization of religions were 
first presented in The Book of Khalid as quotations from Khalid’s manu-
script, formulated in various essays and, finally, summarized in Rihani’s 
“Literary Will” (1931):
I am a believer in the unity of religion, for in its mirror I see reflected the 
images of all Prophets and Messengers: Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, So-
crates, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad and Baha’u’llah... They have all come 
from one source, and their faces merge and unite and become reflected in 
one unified face, a most holy symbol representing the face of God Himself. 
I counsel you to adhere to unity. In theoretical terms, religion is that lumi-
nous living link between man and his one and only God. In spiritual terms, 
religion is the joy derived from discovering, without mediation, the myster-
ies that lie behind this unique link. In practical terms, religion is, above all, 
the recognition of the Divine Truth spoken by whoever has taught a single 
letter from the book of love, of piety, and of charitable deeds. It is also in fol-
lowing the example of those teachers and emulating them in thought, word 
275 Ibid.: 219. 
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and deed – each of us according to his capacity; for God has burdened no 
soul with more than it can endure. 276
Solutions proposed by Ameen Rihani to global problems
It is possible to summarize the cures for the ailments of the Orient and 
the Occident proposed by Rihani in his numerous literary works. The 
first and most obvious move is a change in human mentality towards 
what Rihani calls the combined ideals of European and Eastern thought, 
embodied in hybrid culture and unified religion in concordance with 
the “theory of immanent morality,” as discussed throughout the novel.277 
No revolution can reach the idealistic goals of its leaders, and Utopia 
cannot be established as long as people stay unkind, aggressive, “one-
sided,” ignorant, and corrupt; 278 in particular, “only by reforming the 
religion on which it is based, is political reform in any way possible and 
enduring.”279 Khalid ardently argues that, “not until man develops his 
mental, spiritual and physical faculties to what Matthew Arnold calls 
‘a harmonious perfection,’ will he be able to reach the heights from 
which Idealism is waving to him.”280 He envisions the transformation as 
follows: 
I say with thee, O Goethe, ‘Light, more light!’ I say with thee, O Tolstoi, 
‘Love, more love!’ I say with thee, O Ibsen, ‘Will, more will!’ Light, Love, 
and Will – the one is as necessary as the other; the one is dangerous without 
the others. Light, Love, and Will, are the three eternal, vital sources of the 
higher, truer, purer cosmic life... Ay, in the Lakes of Light, Love, and Will, 
I would baptise all mankind. For in this alone is power and glory, O my 
European Brothers; in this alone is faith and joy, O my Brothers of Asia!281
… In thy public-squares, O my City, I would raise monuments to Nature; in 
thy theatres to Poesy and Thought; in thy bazaars to Art; in thy homes, to 
Health; in thy temples of worship, to universal Goodwill; in thy courts, to 
Power and Mercy; in thy schools, to Simplicity; in thy hospitals, to Faith; 
276 Quotation translated from Arabic and edited by S. B. Bushrui and A. Mutlak, in Bushrui 
1999.
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and in thy public-halls to Freedom and Culture. And all these, without 
Light, Love, and Will, are but hollow affairs, high-sounding inanities.282
Thus, Khalid pronounces Rihani’s own call for return to the values of 
Enlightenment in their best sense, to rational thinking, instinctive mo-
rality, and genuine humanism which should be reached in a peaceful 
way by individual, conscious effort of everyone, professing his “faith in 
man … as strong as” his “faith in God,”283
Each of you, O my Brothers, can make it light his own hut, warm his own 
heart, guide his own soul. Never before in the history of man did it seem 
as necessary as it does now that each individual should think for himself, 
will for himself, and aspire incessantly for the realisation of his ideals and 
dreams. Yes, we are to-day at a terrible and glorious turning point, and it 
depends upon us whether that one star in the vague and dusky sky of mod-
ern life, shall be the harbinger of Jannat or Juhannam.284
To conclude, the essence of Rihani’s message to humanity might be ex-
pressed in Khalid’s appeal, which appears pertinent in the 21st century 
as well, 
I tell thee then that Man, that is to say Consciousness, vitalised and puri-
fied, in other words Thought – that alone is real and eternal. And Man is 
supreme, only when he is the proper exponent of Nature, and spirit, and 
God: the three divine sources from which he issues, in which he is sus-
tained, and to which he must return.285
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The Position of the Alawites in Islam
Üllar Peterson
Abstract The Alawite religion was born in the 9th century and by 
the 13th century the core of the Alawite religious texts had been 
formed. The Alawite religion differs considerably from Sunnism. 
The Sunni attitude to the Alawites has nowadays been shaped by Ibn 
Taimiyya’s fatwā that has had a palpable influence among Sunnis 
last decades, placing the Alawites outside of the fold of Islam. Since 
the 1970s the Syrian Alawite regime has tried to manipulate the Ala-
wites into Islam via Šīʿah, which has not been acceptable to hardline 
Sunni circles.
Keywords Alawites, Nuṣayrīya, Syria, ġulāt, Sunnism, Ibn Taimiyya
The birth of the Alawite religion
The Alawite (until the 1920-s instead of “Alawite” only the name used 
was “Nusayri”, Ar. Nuṣayrīya, but as it is derogatory throughout the 
article here “Alawite” is used) religion was born in the 9th century in 
the melee of numerous ġulāt1 sects. It evolved over the following centu-
ries and by the 13th century the core of Alawite religious texts (around 
ninety in total, of which more than sixty have survived and are available 
now for researchers) had been formed.2 The sect’s eponymic founder 
was Abū Šuʿ ayb Muḥammad bin Nuṣayr al-ʿAbdī al-Bakrī an-Numayrī 
who lived in the 9th century and is better known in historical sources as 
Muḥammad bin Nuṣayr or Ibn Nuṣayr. The Alawites consider him the 
spiritual successor of the Alīds and the receiver of sacred knowledge of 
the tenth Šīʿah Imām ʿ Alī al-Hādī (d 254/868) and his successor, the elev-
enth Imām Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī (d 873)3. Several of Ibn Nuṣayr’s religious 
writings, or writings attributed to him or imparting his views, have 
1 About ġulāt EI, II: 1093–95 GHULAT. Moosa 1987.
2 Concentrated overview of the main Alawite texts: Friedman 2010: 241–297. 
3 al-Ḫaṣībī 1991: 367.
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been preserved.4 From his time on the Alawites have been known by the 
eponymic name of Nuṣayrīya in Sunni as well as in Šīʿah sources (after 
a brief period of them being called an-Numayrīya)5. In Western sources 
the Alawites became known as nossorites, neceres and other similar 
denominations6, but in the 1920s a new name al-ʿ Alawīyūn (the Alawites) 
was adopted, instigated by the French.
Ibn Nuṣayr’s followers existed as a small, erratic ġulāt group near 
to extinction until the movement was consolidated by Abū Aʿbd-Allāh 
al-Ḥusayn ibn Ḥamdān al-Ḫaṣībī7 (d 969) and spread from Iraq to Syr-
ia under the protection of the Šīʿah Ḥamdanid dynasty in Aleppo. In 
Alawite sources and in contemporary Alawite historiography al-Ḫaṣībī 
is considered the true spiritual founder of the Alawite religion and his 
texts are considered central to the Alawite religion.8 Due to the demise 
of the Ḥamdanids at the beginning of the 11th century, the Alawites be-
gan to spread to other cities and rural areas in Syria, especially to al-
Ǧabal al-ʿAlawī (al-Ǧabal) under the next Alawite spiritual leaders like 
4 Four of them are included in Silsilat, of which up to now 12 volumes have been published: 
Kitāb al-akwār wa al-adwār an-nūrāniyya (Silsilat 1: 33–205); Kitāb al-miṯāl wa as-sūra 
(Silsilat I: 207–34); Kitāb al-maǧālis an-numayrīya (Silsilat 12: 7–76). And synopsis of these 
works and concerning other writings attribute to him: Silsilat 1: 23–25.
5 Only few medieval sources call them an-Numayrī: al-Ašʿarı̄ 1980: 15. al-Baġdadı̄: 252.
6 Their names in the Western sources up to 20th century have different forms. In the 
crusader sources they are Nossorite (Dussaud 1900: 21–27); neceres in the first modern 
account of them (Maundrell1703: 12–143). There is at least dozen different names in the 18th–
19th century European books: in Latin they are Nazaræorum (Assemani 1721, 2: 318–320). 
In English at least half a dozen different spellings are found: Nesseary (Silk Buckingham 
1825: 507), Noceres (Pococke 1745). We also find the name Anseyreeh (Lyde 1853). But in the 
first scientific account about the Alawites the same author Lyde uses two different names as 
Ansaireeh and Nuṣayri alternatively (Lyde 1860). Also you may find names as: Nassairier, 
Ansāriyya, Ansarians, Ainsiaree, Ensyrians, Nassaris, Anzaris; also there are different 
names for the area they inhabit. 
7 Iranica vol.1: 68–70. In more detail: Friedman 2001: 91–112; also Friedman 2010: 17–34. 
The Alawite sources about him: al-Ḫaṣībī 1991: 5–22. Concerning the spread of the movement 
in Syria and Iraq: La diffusion... 2011: 19–52.
8 For his position according to nowadays Alawite scholars see aṭ-Ṭawīl 1979: 257. Al-
Ḫaṣībī’s detailed description of Muḥammad, Aʿlī and 12 imāms is found in al-Ḫaṣībī 
1991 which exhibits Šiʿah canons. Al-Ḫaṣībī’s second work Dīwān al-Ḫaṣībī has not been 
explored until now except by few scholars, it is said to exhibit all the central Alawite dogmas 
– Friedman 2010: 251–3. Al-Ḫaṣībī’s other works as ar-Risāla al-rāstbāšiyya and Fiqh ar-
risāla ar-rāstbāšiyya are found in Silsilat 2: 16–156.
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Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn Aʿlī al-Ǧillī9
 
and Maymūn ibn al-Qāsim 
aṭ-Ṭabarānī10 (d 1034/35).
During the 12th century the Alawites were heavily pressured by the 
Kurds, crusaders and local Ismāʿīlis; internal dissent also spread among 
them. Most of the canonical Alawite texts had been composed by the 
time the movement was revitalized by Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn 
Yūsuf al-Makzūn as-Sinǧārī11 (1164–1240) who came to al-Ǧabal with 
his army, saved the Alawites from the marauding Kurds, and expelled 
the Ismāʿīlis from some of their castles there. From the members of his 
army, some of the main Alawite tribes like Matāwirah, an-Numaylātīya, 
al-Haddādīn, al-Muhāliba, ad-Darāwisa and Banū Aʿlī reckon their 
progeny.12 And as-Sinǧārī is the last noteworthy composer of Alawite 
religious texts.
With the advent of the Mamluks in the 13th century the Alawites were 
confined to al-Ǧabal, living there in solitude and poverty until the end 
of the Ottoman era. Even the neighbouring Christians, Sunnis and other 
locals knew little concerning the Alawites who, similarly to other small-
er Islamic sects, keep their religion secret from the outside world. Al-
though the latest remarkable research on the Alawites argues that the 
Alawites were not outcasts, as generally claimed before, and actually 
participated with other communities in Syrian social life, extensively 
interacting with non-Alawites during the Ottoman era13, socio-cultural 
and religious bias towards the Alawites is clearly felt in Ottoman archi-
val material. Alawites also lived in small numbers outside al-Ǧabal in 
9 Friedman 2010: 35–40; about his texts: Friedman 2010: 254–7. Alawite pseudo-historical 
exaggerations about him: aṭ-Ṭawīl 1979: 259–61.
10 About him: Friedman 2010: 40–42. Overview of his religious texts: Friedman 2010: 
260–264 and Bar-Asher & Kofsky 2005: 43–65. Silsilat 3: 208–412. See also aṭ-Ṭawīl 1979: 
263–264.
11 There are some considerable Western writings concerning him: Nwyia 1974; also 
Friedman 2010: 51–56, 268–269. Mostly Lebanese Šīʿahs and the Alawites there have written 
about him, starting with the popular account Ramadān, Yūnus Ḥasan 1913. Taʾ rīḫ al-Makzūn 
(I was not able to use this works here) that is based on Alawite 17th–19th century sources; 
work of Lebanese researcher Aʿlī 1972 is based largely on aforementioned Taʾ rīḫ al-Makzūn. 
See also PhD thesis: Aʿlī 2007. As-Sinǧārī’s writings are collected in: ʿUṯmān 1972 and in 
aforementioned Aʿlī 1972.
12 Modern synopsis of these tribes’ connection to al-Sinǧārī: Āl Maʿ rūf 2013: 9–18.
13 Winter 2016. This work claims that in fact the Alawites were considerably well integrated 
into local Syrian social life.
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nearby cities14 and in the 19th century their community was formed in the 
Alexandretta area that was separated from Syria in the 1930s and might 
be considered by now to be an inhabitat of distinct group of Alawites.15
Muslim discovery of the Alawites and Sunni ḥukm on them
Both Sunni and Šīʿah Muslims had quite a vague conception of the Ala-
wites during the middle ages. The Alawites are first mentioned in Šīʿah 
sources as a group of ġulāt being expelled from the Šīʿah Iraq commu-
nity due to their extremist ideas and sexual misbehaviour. Later Šīʿte 
sources keep their overtly negative attitude to Ibn Nuṣayr and his circle 
but are not so sharply critical of the Alawites of the next centuries who 
adopted taqiyya and sometimes lived among the Šīʿahs as outstanding 
Šīʿah scholars.16
 
The Alawites remained essentially unknown to the Sunnis for a long 
time. There are only a few medieval works with more than a vague idea 
of them, but all of these works unanimously agree that the Alawites lie 
outside of Islam. The first noteworthy mention of the Alawites in Sunni 
texts is Aʿbd al-Qāhir bin Tāhir al-Baġdādı̄ (d. 1037) al-Farq bayna al-
firaq which clearly puts them outside the fold of Islam17; similar stance 
14 Mainly in Aleppo city and Hama countriside, but also in other parts of Syria. We should 
be careful of their own claims in modern historiography that vast Syrian areas are the native 
prehistoric land of the Alawites which they were forced to leave and retreat to al-Ǧabal when 
Syria was attacked by Tamerlane or the Ottomans. Such ideas, firstly expressed by aṭ-Ṭawīl, 
are elaborated by later Alawite authors as aš-Šarif 1960: 86–106 and Ibrāhı̄m 1999: 13–30, 
167–169.
15 About Hatay Alawites: Procházka-Eisl 2010. Their Turkish ochestrated seccession from 
the Syrian Alawites in the 1930s: Philipp & Schumann 2004: 307–327; also: Jörum 2014: 
144–178.
16 Some of the earliest and main Šīʿah sources from the 10th–12th centuries deploring Ibn 
Nuṣayr’s and his followers’ extremism and sometimes hinting to their sexual misbehaviour 
are as follows:
1) al-Qummī 1963: 100–101, this source is one of the most used arguments against 
extreme Šīʿah sects then and now;
2) an-Nawbaḫtı̄: 1992: 95–96;
3) Ibn ʿUmar Kaššı̄ 2009: 369–370;
4) aṭ-Ṭūsı̄ 1991: 397–399.
Such negative attitude to the Alawites is repeated in the later Šīʿah works as:
5) aṭ-Ṭabarsı̄ 2001: 246 and notes 247–249;
6) al-Ḥillı̄ 2009: 401, 405.
17 al-Baġdadı̄: 252, sect nr 130.
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is found in Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī’s (994–1064) al-Fiṣal f ī al-milal wa 
al-ahwā wa an-niḥal.18
The only essential comprehensive and neutral description of the Ala-
wites written by the Sunnis up to the 20th century is found in the work of 
Muḥammad ibn Aʿbd al-Karı̄m aš-Šahrastānī (1086–1152, who himself 
probably had Šīʿah leanings) Kitāb al-Milal wa an-niḥal, that gives in a 
few pages the description of the main Alawite tenets19. But, apart from 
that, other medieval sources paint a far more sinister picture of the Ala-
wites, stressing their wicked nature and essential difference from the 
Sunni tenets20. We may assume that in most cases when the Sunnis came 
into contact with the Alawites the latter were either con sidered bāṭinīya, 
a general term for Druzes, Ismāʿīlis, Alawites and smaller ġulāt sects 
without making any differences between them, or were even described 
by still vaguer terms such as ahl al-Ǧabal.21
One long fatwā (and two short fatwās) of Ibn Taimiyah from ca 1305–
1315 is the most influential and, up to the 20th century, the most volumi-
nous text on the Alawites produced by the Sunnis22. This Ibn Taimiyya 
18 Ibn Ḥazm 1992, 5: 50.
19 Aš-Šahrastānı̄ 1992: 192–193.
20 1) Ibn Baṭūṭa 1904: 56. 
2) Ibn Kaṯı̄r 2010, 16: 127. 
3) al-Qalqašandı̄ 1913–1919, 13: 249–251. 
4) al-Maqrīzī 1971, 2: 174–175.
21 Good example is found in Ibn Munqiḏ’s Kitāb al-Iʿtibār where in some places baṭīnī and 
ismāʿīlī are used synonymously in the same sentence: Ibn Munqiḏ 2003: 200, 201. But the 
same work when it describes the inhabitants of Wādī ibn al-Aḥmar (the traditional location 
of the Alawites) in their bird-catching business, names them ahl al-Ǧabal, (Ibn Munqiḏ 2003: 
304–305).
22 These three fatwās are found in the compendium of Ibn Taimiyah’s fatwās of which the 
most correctly edited and commented edition is printed and approved by Saudi authorities: 
Ibn Taymiyya 1381–1386 [1961–1967]. Maǧmu‘āt fatāwa šaiḫ al-islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya. 
ed. ʿ Abd ar-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim, Muḥammad ibn ʿ Abd ar-Raḥmān Ibn Qāsim; 
ar-Riyāḍ, 37 vols. I have hereby used its last re-print: Ibn Taymiyya 2004, where the vol. 35 
named Kitāb qitāl ahl al-baġī (Fighting the people of dissent) includes these three fatwās on 
the Alawites. The first and the longest of them is called Mā yaqūla al-sādat f ī an-nuṣaīrīa 
al-qāʼilīn bi-istiḥlāl al-ḫamr wa tanāsiḫ al-arwāḥ wa qadima al-ʿ ālam wa inkār al-bʿaṯ wa 
al-ǧinna wa an-nār, ilaḫ pp. 145–160, the short one pp 161–162; and the shortest – although it 
is against the Duruze its legal prnciples have been used against all baṭīnī’s – is p. 162.
Usually the Arabic text of longest fatwā usually used by the Western scholars is St. 
Guyard 1871: 158–198, but it has some minor lacunae and is around half a page shorter 
compared to the modern Saudi edition.
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fatwā castigates all bāṭinī sects then the Alawites as being a central ele-
ment of vice. Ibn Taimiyah is not more accurate than aš-Šahrastānī in 
his description of the Alawites, but his fatwās are the most detailed de-
scriptions of the Alawites by the Sunnis up to the 20th century. Clearly 
stated accusations in his fatwās became an intrinsic part of later Sunni 
attacks on the Alawites, especially since the rise of world-wide Wah-
habism. His wording especially at the beginning and end of the long 
fatwā is considered a clear ḥukm on the Alawites that is often repeated 
in contemporary Sunni texts (but it should be stressed here that the in-
fluence of this fatwā on the Alawites’ situation in the 14th–19th centuries 
remains open):23
These people who are called an-nuṣayrīya, and the other kind of bāṭinī 
Qarmatians, they are more unbelievers than the Jews or the Christians and 
they are bigger unbelievers than many of the polytheists. Their damage to 
the Muḥammad’s (SAWS) community is greater than the damage from the 
infidels who fight [against the Muslims], such as the heretical Mongols, 
the Crusaders and others, since they [an-nuṣayrīya] claim before the un-
educated Muslims to be Šīʿīs and loyal to the ahl al-bayt, but in reality they 
do not believe in Allāh, in his Messenger, in his Holy Book, in obligation 
or prohibition. /.../ because their aim is to denounce the Islamic faith and its 
law in any possible way while outwardly pretending as if such things are 
truth and come from the prophets. They have well-known struggles as well 
as books against Islam and the Muslims. When they had the opportunity 
they shed the blood of the Muslims. /.../ And we know well that Christians 
got hold over the coastal regions through their [an-nuṣayrī] lands because 
they are always with all the enemies of Islam... .24
… and at the end the fatwā concludes: 
23 Some scholars lately, especially Stefan Winter in his A History of the Alawis, argue that 
this fatwā was virtually unknown until the 20th century, the Mamluk and Ottoman texts 
and documents do not have any reference to it, and the negative references to the Alawites 
found in the Mamluk and Ottoman sources stem from socio-political and not from religious 
grounds. But here it should be stressed that any Mamluk or Ottoman source that delves into 
the Alawite topic is clearly negative about them. And it is a fact that, since the spread of 
Wahhabism in the second half of the 20th century, the Ibn Taimiyah fatwā on the Alawites has 
become a central ideological text bearing direct influence on the Alawites, as is clearly shown 
in the last section here. 
24 Ibn Tamiyya 2004, 35: 149–150; the translation provided here follows the wording given 
by Friedman 2010: 303, with some minor changes.
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There is no doubt that fighting these people and attacking them from the 
borders is one of the greatest obligations of the rightful [caliph], and the rest 
of the Companions began ǧihād against the apostates before the war against 
the heretics from the People of the Book, because fighting them is defend-
ing Muslim land and no-one is authorized to keep secret what he knows 
about them. On the contrary, he should expose it and unveil them until the 
Muslims know the truth concerning them. No-one is authorized to help 
them to remain in the army, or in other kinds of work. No-one has the right 
to prohibit the execution as an order of Allāh and his Messenger concerning 
them, since this is one of the most important issues connected with com-
manding what is good and what is evil and the holy war for Allāh’s sake.25
The central command of this elaborate fatwā – that ǧihād against the 
Alawites is a must – is now considered at least a clearly stated ḥukm and 
part of šarīʿa by Sunni scholars.
After that fatwā, that was probably given just before big Alawite re-
volt in 1317–1318, there were several severe but unsuccessful attempts 
by the Maluks to destroy and/or convert the Alawites at the beginning 
of 14th century26, followed by the Ottomans trying the same when they 
conquered Syria in 1516. In order to eradicate all rāfiḍī’s, the Ottomans 
procured a fatwā from Ottoman grand mufti Nūḥ al-Ḥanāfī ad-Dimašqī. 
This fatwā clearly states at the end:
And these vicious unbelievers must be killed regardless of whether they re-
pented or not. And if they repented and submitted to Islam – then kill them 
according to generally accepted ḥadd notions. And after killing them apply 
to them [who survived] the legal principles of Islamic šarīʿa and if they 
still keep their unbelief and obstinacy – kill those unbelievers, and after 
killing apply to them [who survived] the legal principles of polytheists: it 
is not permissible to keep them [alive as polytheists] on condition that they 
would bring al-ǧizya, neither [it is permissible keep them alive] on amān or 
by the decree of qādī – such decrees do not hold. And their wives must be 
enslaved as it is legally permissible to enslave apostatized women if they 
25 Ibn Tamiyya 2004, 35: 158–159.
26 It is even hard to say if these were attempts to convert them or just to retaliate for their 
rebelliousness and looting: The main sources of Mamuks describing the supression of the 
Alawites in the beginning of the 14th century after their unsucessful revolt are: al-Birzālı̄ 
2006, 4: 298–299 and Ibn Kaṯı̄r 2010, 16: 127; mainly based on Ibn Kaṯir is the account of 
aḏ-Ḏahabı̄ (aḏ-Ḏahabı̄ 1985, 4: 46) and of al-Maqrīzī (al-Maqrīzī 1971, 2: 174–175). In none of 
these sources Ibn Taimiyya’s fatwā is mentioned. Alawite modern historians on these events: 
Ḫayyūn 2012: 72–73; Ismā ı̄ʿl ibn Aʿlı̄ 1997, 2: 392, 428–429. See also Winter 2016: chapter 3.
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become part of the dār al-ḥarb – anything taken out of the command of the 
righteous imām is considered part of dār al-ḥarb; also their children must 
be enslaved ... 27
We may assume that this fatwā was also used ideologically against the 
Alawites in 1516–17 for killing them en masse.28 Still, the Ottomans 
were unable to annihilate them as they migrated from Syrian rural 
areas and cities, hiding in al-Ǧabal and using the principle taqiyya to 
any foreigner, be it Sunni or anyone else who might deal with them. 
Neither were the Ottomans able to include them officially into a mil-
let. The Alawites were considered outside of Islam and the only cure 
against such rāfiḍī’s was to impose additional taxes on them.29 By that 
time the tribal and clan system of the Alawites had been formed, but we 
know too little about when the process of clan-forming began and how 
it proceeded.30 Their contacts with the outside world mainly consisted 
of armed Ottoman tax-collector incursions or Alawite marauding raids 
against their neighbours. In the middle of the 19th century some Ala-
wite leaders became de facto independent due to the ineffectiveness of 
the Ottoman administration; they were however later subdued by the 
27 It is found in the compendium of Ottoman fatwās that has  been printed several times 
since the begnning of the 19th century, mostly under the name ʿUqūd ad-durrı̄ya fı̄ tanqı̄ḥ 
al-Fatāwá al-Ḥāmidı̄ya; I have consulted al-ʿ Uqūd... 1863, the text is available http://www.
alukah.net/manu/files/manuscript_3097/makhtot11.pdf ; the arabic text of the fatwā is also 
available at http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-21687#page-102 
28 The best analysis so far of the events 1516–17 and the establishment of Ottoman rule over 
the Alawites is Winter 2016, chapter 4, and the author has doubts over the notion of “massacre 
of the Alawites” in Aleppo and other parts of Syria after the establishment of Ottoman rule. 
But modern Alawite historiography claims that in Aleppo alone 100 000 of the Alawites were 
killed in 1516 by the Ottomans: aṭ-Ṭawīl 1979: 393–398. See also Talhamy 2010: 181–183; and 
concerning the Alawite nowadays perceptions of these events Worren 2007: 58–61.
29 Concerning these Ottoman fatwās on the Alawites see: Mantran & Sauvaget 1951: 76–77; 
also Winter 2016: chapter 4.
30 Only some works in Arabic have been published that give clearer picture of their tribal 
system, starting with their imaginary history, constructed by aṭ-Ṭawīl 1979: 405–468; esp. 
408–411; in a more systematic way: Āl Maʿ rūf 2013: 5–27. Unfortunately I have not been 
able to consult Ḫawanda, Muḥammad 2004. Ta’rı̄ḫ al-ʿ Alawı̄yı̄n wa-ansābuhum. al-Lāḏiqı̄ya. 
A bit diffrent structure of the tribal system is given by the French administration at the 
begnning of the 1920-s: Choix de documents 1922: 1–51. Winter argues that only during the 
Ottoman time the clear cut tribal system developed: Winter 2016: chapter 4.
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provincial authorities.31 Only once, during the Egyptian occupation of 
Syria 1831–1841, were the Alawites included in “international politics” 
when the Ottomans considered the Alawites de facto half-independent 
allies against the Egyptians.32 Although few of the Alawites attained 
high rank in the Ottoman administration33,
 
only in the 1890s did the Ot-
tomans begin their incorporation into local life.34 Also, since the middle 
of the 19th century Christian powers had been trying, unsuccessfully, to 
convert them.35
In Western/Christian sources the Alawites are mentioned in the cru-
sader annals36 and by Bar Hebraues37. Then, after half a thousand years, 
the West rediscovered the Alawites in the 17th–18th centuries38. They be-
came better known to the Western reader in the 19th century, mostly 
in the two dozen travel books where, due to Sunni influence, they are 
sometimes depicted as sexual perverts who prostitute their wives and 
daughters to strangers39. But the first Western scientific works on the 
Alawites, although mentioning the great freedom of Alawi women, do 
not corroborate such “immoral” behaviour.40
31 Some typical accounts from the the beginning of the 19th century: Stanhope 1845, 3: 
254–257, 333–341. See also Āl Maʿ rūf 2013: 192–201; and Winter 2016: 102–103; Lyde 1860: 
195–196. Description of a typical situation in the 1850-s with a local war lord Ḫayr Bey: 
Talhamy 2008; also: Āl Maʿ rūf 2013: 329–338; and Jessup 1910, 1: 152.
32 Concerning Egyptian occupation of the Alawite territories: Āl Maʿ rūf 2013: 217–230. 
Also: Talhamy 2012. Conscription policies: Talhamy 2011. The Alawites as the allies of the 
Ottomans in the 1830s: Winter 1999. A case study of Alawite – Ottoman cooperation in 1834 
attacking Latakia and Egyptian counter-measures: Barakāt 2012: 121–123.
33 Necati 2012.
34 Arab authors on these processes: Harı̄rı̄ 1980: 217; ad-Dīn 1983: 63–65; Aʿwaḍ 1969: 366, 
369. See also Douwes 1993: 167–168; Necati 2012: 45–46.
35 Necati 2012; Winter 2016: chapter 5; Talhamy 2011; Kennedy 2008: 10–26; Tibawi 1966: 
150–159; Salibi; Khoury 1995: 17–19.
36 Overview of them: Dussaud 1900: 21–27. Some speculate even on possible Alawite-
Crusader cooperation: Ḥarı̄rı̄ 1984: 210; also: Lyde 1860: 64.
37 His description concentrates on the founder of Alawite religion Ibn Nuṣayr, especially 
his miraculous escape from prison in Baghdad: Bar Hebraeus 2003: 150–151.
38 The first of them are: Maundrell 1703: 12–13; Assemani 1721: 318–320; Pococke 1745, 2, 
part I.
39 Depicting the Alawites as sexual perverts started with the work of Volney 1788–89, 2: 
1–8. Following with: Rousseau 1810: 22–33. See also: de Sacy 1838, 2: 559–586, esp. 573–574. 
And such sex-tales were “corroborated” by famous renegade al-Aḏanı̄’s testimonies: al-Aḏanı̄ 
1862: 58–59. Even nowadays some Sunni works cite such accusations as characteristic to the 
Alawites: Ǧalʿūd 1407/1987: 554.
40 Jessup 1883: 35–44 describes the women of the Alawites. Also in Lyde 1860 et passim.
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Until recently little was known about the Alawite religion and society 
by Western Islamologists, although the first remarkable studies appeared 
as early as the first half of the 20th century41. Only by the end of the 20th cen-
tury does the essence of the Alawite religion as presented in half a dozen 
scientific works start to become clear42. A few remarkable studies have 
also appeared in Arabic over the last decades, mostly published in Leba-
non43, but it was only in 2006, when the compendium of the religious 
Alawite texts Silsilat at-turāṯ al-ʿ alawī started to appear in Lebanon, 
that we could really get to grips with the core of religious Alawite tenets.
How does the Alawite religion differ from Sunnism? 
Following the Silsilat at-turāṯ al-ʿ alawī compendium and the few but 
essential studies based on Alawite sources (esp. Friedman 2010), we can 
assume that the Alawite religion is in essence not only a very distant 
offshoot from mainstream Islam, as well from Šīʿah, but even confronts 
several central Sunni tenets so starkly that it might be hard to consider 
the Alawites as part of Islam at all.
The Alawite creed lā ʾilāha ʾillā Aʿlī is a typical ġulāt formula; sev-
eral sources claim that their šahāda is Amīr an-naḥl lā ʾilāha ʾillā huwa 
– “Prince/Emir of the bees – there is no God except to him”44. And 
among the inner circle of the Alawite šayḫs their šahāda reads: “I testify 
that you are my aim and meaning (maʿ nā), that you are me and I am 
you”45. But there are versions even different from that as Sunni medieval 
41 A list of some remarkable researches on the Alawites until the middle of the 20th century:
1) The first coherent research on them is Lyde 1860. 
2) al-Aḏanı̄ 1862. Based on this text the first truly scientifc exposition of the Alawite 
religion in the West is: Salisbury 1864.
3) The first systematic exposition of the Alawite religion is Dussaud 1900. 
42 Most important modern works are:
1) Moosa 1987;
2) Bar-Asher & Kofsky 2002.
3) Friedman 2010.
4) socio-political aspects: Winter 2016. 
43 1) Concentrating on the socio-political history is: ad-Dı̄n 1983
2) The first comprehensive history of the Alawites, but lacking source criticism and written 
in a popular-science style is a copious, more than of 600-pages work of Āl Maʿ rūf 2013.
3) on social history up to 1914: Ǧurayǧ 2004.
44 Silsilat 2: 274; see also: al-Ḫaṣībī 1991: 93 and Friedman 2010: 114.
45 Bar-Asher & Kofsky 2002; 27. Friedman 2010: 133.
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scholars say that the Alawite šahāda consists of the argument that Aʿlī 
is the Lord, Muḥammad is the hiǧāb and Salmān is the Bāb and that 
their šahāda reads: “I testify that there is no god except for Aʿlī – the 
furthermost and the inner –, that there is no hiǧāb besides Muḥammad, 
who is Righteous and True, and that there is no other way except for 
Salmān – strong and substantial – leading to Him.”46 However, this form 
of šahāda, attributed to the Alawites, might also read differently in dif-
ferent medieval Sunni texts.47
These forms of šahāda contrast with the Sunni šahāda: lā ʾ ilāha ʾ illā-
llāh, Muḥammadun rasūlu-llāh – There is no god but God, Muḥammad 
is the messenger of God – or even with the Šīʿah šahāda, adding to the 
Sunni creed central tenet about Aʿlī: lā ʾilāha ʾillā-llāh, Muḥammadun 
rasūlu-llāh wa-ʿ Alī walī Allāh – There is no god but God, Muḥammad is 
the messenger of God and is Aʿlī representative of Allāh.
The central tenet of Islam at-tawḥīd is seen by the Alawites in al-
legorical, Neoplatonic way, consisting of three emanations (maʿ nā, ism 
(sometimes ḥiǧāb is used instead of ism) and bāb) which have their 
earthly personifications in the shape of Aʿlī, Muḥammad and Salmān48. 
Such a construction is unacceptable to both the Sunnis and Šīʿahs. But 
the Alawites support such a conception by free interpretation of certain 
āyahs: seeing in Q 24:35 transcendent light as the essence of God49; con-
sidering Q 4.157–158 as a doctrine of Docetism by which God manifests 
himself to humanity in the form of Aʿlī and his descendants50; thinking 
Q 16.68–69 is a hint to the conception of the “Prince of the bees”51. Such 
46 Ibn Taymiyya 2004, 35: 145, 163. The same šahāda in: Ibn Kaṯı̄r 2010, 16: 127.
47 Al-Maqrīzī 1971, 2: 174–175.
48 Names of maʿ nā: Silsilat 9: 177–178; the essence of ism – Silsilat 9: 76, 175–177; essence 
of bāb and its earthly counter-names: Silsilat 9: 170–172. About their correlation: Silsilat 9: 
173; Strothmann 1946: 23 and Ḥarı̄rı̄ 1984: 38–40. Introducton to the Alawite conception of 
God: Friedman 2010: 72–73.
49 Silsilat 3:181–194; 6: 16–17; also: Silsilat 2: 157–217; 4: 11–179, esp. 179. Some possible 
interpretation of this āyah by the Alawites: Friedman 2010: 80–81; al-Aḏanī 1862: 20–23, 
28–31; Lyde 1860: 50–55; Dussaud 1900: 82–92.
50 Silsilat 4: 157–158; 279. Introduction to this conception: Friedman 2010, pp. 81–85. In 
more detail: Ḥarı̄rı̄ 1984, pp. 38–49; and al-Ḫasibi 1991: 91–93; also Bar Asher & Kofsky 
2002:169–220; Lyde 1860: 237–42.
51 About “Prince of the bees”: Lyde 1860, p. 275. Lammens 1926: 201; Friedman 2010: 
124–126.
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ideas are heretical to mainstream Islam and these named āyahs have no 
central meaning either in Sunni or Šīʿah tafsīrs.
The central element in Sunni religious practice, the prayer (ṣalāt), is 
viewed allegorically by the Alawites and they dedicate each of the five 
daily prayer sessions to the central figures of the Alawite religion such 
as Aʿlī, Muḥammad, Salmān, and the Aʿlīds. The whole prayer ritual 
is totally different from Sunni practice: there is no muʾ aḏḏin calling to 
prayer, and the prayer is personal, not communal, and there is no qibla; 
each Alawite prays in the direction of his imaginary representative of 
God who is perceived in the shape of an earthly triad Aʿlī-Muḥammad-
Salmān; also there are different prayers following  lunar phases and lo-
cal holidays.52
Concerning other pillars of Islam, the Alawites perform them differ-
ently from the Sunnis and Šīʿahs and they have also put into them mean-
ings that are considered heretical by mainstream Islam. For example, 
the Alawites consider zakāt and sadaqa not to be a real tax, as in Sunni 
practice, but to be a ritual by which knowledge is symbolically passed 
from teachers to their initiates53. They consider the haǧǧ to al-Kaʿ aba as 
a violation of tawhīd: their central text about haǧǧ describes it as an al-
legorical process of accruing knowledge about their imams, culminating 
with clear knowledge of tawhīd.54 The Alawite performance of the fast 
(ṣawm) is quite different in its meaning and performance from the Sunni 
practice.55
The Alawite conception of time, creation, cosmology and history re-
volves around the central tenet of a triad Aʿlī-Muḥammad-Salmān that 
appears to humankind in different times and emanations56, an idea that is 
deeply heretical by Sunni religious standards; weird by Sunni standards 
is also the creation of a mankind57. Even more bizarre to the Sunnis is 
the conception of the multi-level migration of souls from people to ani-
mals and even to inanimate bodies (at-tanāsuḫ)58. The Sunni conception 
52 Silsilat 2: 219–279; 9: 184–213. Friedman 2010: 134–138; Bar-Asher; Kofsky 2005: 58–62.
53 Silsilat 4: 172–173.
54 Silsilat 2: 114; Silsilat 4: 173; Friedman 2010: 140–143.
55 Silsilat 1: 262–263; Silsilat 4: 177.
56 Silsilat 4: 275–276; 9: 74, 166–165. Ḥarı̄rı̄ 1984: 79–80; Friedman 2010: 95–126.
57 Silsilat 9: 79–80, 324.
58 Silsilat 4: 11–179 ; 268–269. Some main other sources on that topic: Kofsky 1997: 71–76; 
al-Aḏanī 1862: 10–11, 81–86; Ḥarı̄rı̄ 1984: 54–55; Ǧuʿ fı̄: 1978: 65–66, 143–144.
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of ǧihād as a striving against unbelievers to create, defend and extend 
Islamic statehood stands in stark contrast to the Alawite conception of an 
inner struggle (ǧihād al-bāṭin, ǧihād an-nafs) which they consider to be 
the process of protecting Alawite sacred knowledge and religious practice 
by taqiyya – and “this inner struggle is the hardest kind of ǧihād” 59 . What 
is more, the Alawite texts contain no concept of statehood. And the Sunni 
ḫums taken from the booty means “extracted sacred knowledge” in Alawi 
texts60; and martyrdom is merely an out wardly seeming phenomenon.61
The sacred law šarīʿah which is the main structure of Islam is not an 
everyday guide for the Alawites and its tenets are interpreted esoteri-
cally by the Alawites. Their legal practice does not follow any Sunni or 
Šīʿah maḏhab but is a concoction of broader Šīʿah principles of jurispru-
dence applied by local Alawite customary law.62
Numerous Alawite religious holidays exhibit their anti-Sunni es-
sence. For example, the death of caliph ʿUmar bin al-Ḫaṭṭāb, considered 
by the Sunnis as one of the most revered companions of the prophet 
Muḥammad, is celebrated by the Alawites as the demise of the incarna-
tion of Iblīs and the biggest earthly enemy of Aʿlī. Several other central 
events from the life of the prophet Muḥammad are totally differently 
interpreted in the Alawite tradition compared to that of the Sunnis.63 
Many of these Alawite holiday performances are also considered hereti-
cal by Šīʿah standards. For example, the Alawites celebrate the Āʿšūrā’ 
not as the martyrdom of Imām Ḥusayn but as a joyful event signifying a 
hidden meaning: Ḥusayn’s death was an outward appearance that in its 
inner meaning is God’s manifestation of His omnipotence; there are sev-
eral other Alawite religious holidays that are anti-Sunni in nature which 
also violate central Šīʿah concepts64. Wine is honoured and its drinking 
has inner meaning.65
59 Silsilat 1: 267; 4: 176; 6: 264. Al-Aḏanī 1862: 24–25. See also attitude to non-believers 
Silsilat 3: 85–93. 
60 Silsilat 4: 172.
61 Silsilat 2: 287–302.
62 Friedman 2010: 149–152.
63 Strothmann 1946: 85–87; al-Aḏanī 1862: 34–35; Lyde 1860: 177–178, 189–194; Friedman 
2010: 152–173.
64 Silsilat 3: 289–392. Strothmann 1946: 107–108, 124–125; Friedman 2010: 159; Ǧuʿ fı̄ 
1978: 96–102.
65 Silsilat 4: 137–141; 8: 51; 9: 152
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One of the main Sunni accusations against the Alawites is their 
practice of taqiyya. In its classical Sunni conception taqiyya means hid-
ing one’s religion in the event of grave danger and it has a very limited 
area of use among the Sunnis66. Although it has been amply used by 
the Šīʿahs in previous times67, its importance has waned during the last 
centuries due to the existence of strong and central Šīʿah statehood from 
the Saffavids on. But taqiyya has a central place in Alawite religious 
practices, as has often been used similarly by smaller ġulāt sects, the 
Druzes and the Ismā ı̄ʿlis.68
The Alawites practice an extreme, multi-level form of taqiyya. In 
its overall and outer level it is used against the Sunnis and Šīʿahs, from 
whom the Alawites hid themselves from the beginning, pretending to 
be Šīʿahs. But the Alawite taqiyya also has an intercommunal level by 
which initiated Alawites (al-ḫāṣṣa) hide religious truths from non-initi-
ated (al-ʿ āmma) members of the Alawite community.69
A good example of such use is al-Ḫasībī who is the central Alawite 
religious scholar70
 
but whose main work Kitāb al-hidāya al-kubrā is 
written under the taqiyya, postulating central Šīʿah tenets. 71
66 For the use of taqiyya by Sunnis see tafsīr genre on the āyah’s 3.28 and 6.106 that allow 
use of limited taqiyya: for example Ibn al-ʿ Abbās 1992: 293; Tafsı̄r al-Ǧalālayn 1984: 279; 
Tafsı̄r at-Ṭabarı̄ 2003, 14: 371–76. Or modern tafsīrs: Quṭb 1972–1974, 4: 2196–2197. But 
in medieval legal practice mostly the negative attitude prevailed for the use of taqiyya by 
the Sunnis. See: al-Wanšarīsī 1981, 2: 47–266, where the explicit order is given to muslims 
to leave from under the jurisdiction of kuffār with the prohibition of any kind of taqiyya 
whatsoever. Still, there are traditions that allow use of taqiyya as a decoy in war situations in 
medieval times: al-Kūfı̄ 1986,1: 187; and also in modern times: Ḥawwā 1987: 51.
67 Use of taqiyya by Šīʿahs: Kohlberg 1995: 345–380. Its use by nowadays Šīʿahs: Clarke 
2005.
68 Taqiyya among the Druzes: Firro 1992: 20–23. See also: at-Taqiyya f ī al-islām 2004. On 
Druze prohibition to publish their text: Skovgaard-Petersen 1998.
69 Silsilat 4: 168–169. Some introductions on the Alawite use of taqiyya: Friedman 2010: 
26–28, 143–152. Taqiyya on everday level: Walpole 1851, 3: 354. Situation today according to 
ethnographic field-work: Erdem 2010.
70 On al-Ḫaṣībī: Friedman 2001: 91–112. Also: Friedman 2010: 17–34. Nowadays views of 
the Alawites on him: al-Ḫaṣībī 1991: 5–22; also: Ḥarı̄rı̄ 1984: 25–27.
71 For example see its chapters on prophet Muḥammad which depict all clear Šīʿah concepts: 
al-Ḫasibi 1991: 35–172.
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Central Alawite religious texts consider taqiyya a pivotal tenet of 
their religion.72 The infamous Alawite renegade al-Aḏanı̄ explains it in 
the form of Alawite saying:
Truly, we [The Alawites] are the beings and the rest are the ranks of mere 
clothes – and no kind of human clothes could cause any harm to him; and he 
who does not appear this way, he is a kind of unwise man who walks around 
naked in the market place.73 
Some modern Alawite authors clearly say that taqiyya is mostly used as 
protection from the Sunnis and is not as widely used against other, less 
ill-disposed religious communities.74 
This kind of religious simulation is one of the main reasons not only 
for their excommunication from the core of believers by Sunni leading 
thinkers, but it has also been a strong argument for killing them even if 
they accept Islam because they would keep their unbelief and, in this 
way, are even more sinister enemies than kuffār. As Ibn Taimiyya says:
They are pretending before the uneducated Muslims that they are Šīʿahs 
and loyal to the ahl al-bayt, but in reality they do not believe in Allah, in his 
Messenger, in his Holy Book, in obligation or prohibition.75 
Such argument has been amply repeated in fatwās and works on religion 
by Sunni scholars over the last decades.76
Among the Alawites the use of taqiyya is not only a method of hiding 
but is a way of life; it is the first thing strangers observe about them. The 
first description of the Alawites by a Westerner says:
[They are] Chameleon-like, they put on the colour of that religion, whatever 
it be, which is reflected upon them from the persons with whom they hap-
pen to converse. With Christians they profess themselves to be Christians. 
With Turks they are good Muslims. With Jews they pass for Jews, being 
72 Ǧuʿ fı̄ 1978: 54, 78, 198, 201. Also: Kitāb al-ḥikam... 1957: 68–69.
73 Al-Aḏanī 1862: 82.
74 Aš-Šarīf 1994: 93.
75 Ibn Tamiyya 2004, 35: 156.
76 Most of nowadays Sunni works taking stance against Šīʿah sects quote Ibn Taimiyah 
either overtly or use his argumentation. It is not even possible to give here the names of such 
works as there are hundreds of them.
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such Proteuses in religion that nobody was ever able to discover what shape 
or standard their consciences are really made of.77
In general Western science does not differ in its “ḥukm” on the Alawites 
from the Sunni one and we may conclude with the words of one the best 
contemporary authorities on the Alawites: “The Nuṣayrīya have never 
been considered Muslims. The Šīʿah consider them ġulāt, while the Sun-
nis regard them as complete infidels.” 78
Manipulating the Alawites into Islam via Šīʿah
Due to historical-theological Sunni hostility to the Alawites, the latter 
changed their derogatory appellation Nuṣayrīya to al- Aʿlawīya (Alawism, 
the Alawīte religion – العلوية) and al-ʿ alawīyūn (the Alawites – العلويون) in 
the 1920s during the French Mandate when, in 1920–1936, the entity of 
“Alawite State/Territory” existed under different names.79
It is believed that name change is first manifested in aṭ-Ṭawīl’s pseudo- 
history Taʾ rı̄ḫ al-ʿ Alawı̄yı̄n80. Allegedly it was first published in 1919, 
77 Maundrell 1703: 12–13.
78 Friedmann 2001: 92 and note nr 13.
79 Its official names changed according to French polity either to suppress Syrian 
independece or to appease the nationalists: 1920–1922 it was “Alawite autonomous territory”, 
1922–30 État des Alaouites (State of the Alawites), 1930–36 Territoire de Lattaquié or 
Gouvernement de Lattaquié. But in the Arabic works it has been usually named as Dawla 
Ǧabal al-ʿ Alawīyīn (The Mountain State of the Alawites) or more often just as in English and 
other languages: Dawlat al-ʿ Alawīyīn (State of the Alawites). See: Balanche 2006: 33–38.
This period of is semi-indipendent Alawite state is either ignored or disfigured by 
nowadays Syrian historians, only in Lebanon some noteworthy works have appeared, main 
of is a thorough analysis with copious extracts from administrative documents and local 
newspapers: ʿUṯmān 1997. Neither has it been thoroughy covered by Western historiography. 
Only partly have been preserved and digitized the French Mandate bulletins Bulletin 
mensuel [“puis” officiel] des actes administratifs du Haut Commissariat https://gallica.bnf.
fr/ark:/12148/cb32730505k/date&rk=236052;4 and Journal officiel de l’Etat des Alaouites 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32802034t/date&rk=107296;4, most of the decrees con-
cern ing the entity “Alawite State” are found here – analysis and translation of them in my 
forthcoming PhD Dissertation “Süüria alaviidid: religioon, ajalugu, kultuur (9. sajand – 
1946)” (Syrian Alawites: religion, history, culture (9th century – 1946) , in Estonian).
80 Allegedly the first print appeared in Turkey in 1919 (Friedman 2010: 273), but there is 
no hint anywhere to this work. The first known edition: aṭ-Ṭawīl, Muḥammad Amı̄n Ġālib. 
1924. Taʾ rı̄ḫ al-ʿ Alawı̄yı̄n. al-Lāḏiqı̄ya: Maṭbʿat at-Taraqqı̄. It has been reprinted with a useful 
foreword by Alawi historian ʿ Abd ar-Raḥman al-Ḫayr in the 1960-s, hereby is used its reprint: 
aṭ-Ṭawīl, 1979.
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but still there is no hint of it printed before 1924. That work is still very 
popular among the Alawites and has unfortunately been widely used as 
a source on the Alawites until recent times, even by reputable Western 
scientists. The book is a bizarre concoction of Alawite “holy history” 
and Šīʿte history and theology: the Alawites are seen through Šīʿte prism 
and so we can consider this work to be the first step in incorporating the 
Alawites into Šīʿah.81
 
The book argues that the name Aʿlawīya was the 
original name of the sect, but it was later supplanted by the Ottomans 
with the derogatory name Nuṣayrīya82. This work also tries to diminish 
the eponymic founder Ibn Nuṣayr’s importance, giving wider meaning 
to Aʿlawīya; it is full of uncorroborated or overtly fictitious informa-
tion on the Alawites. But we may assume that in fact the new name 
“Alawites” was generated by French Mandate powers to replace it with 
derogatory Nuṣayrīya: by decree of French Mandate High Commisioner 
the entity of Etat des Alaouites was born June 28, 192283. And this date 
might be considered the birthday of the Alawites as we do not have the 
slightest evidence of the name “Alawites” used before that anywhere, at 
least until the 1919 edition aṭ-Ṭawīl’s Taʾ rı̄ḫ al-ʿ Alawı̄yı̄n will be found 
with the Alawites inside it and even then we are not sure that the French, 
who occupied Syria 1918 had nothing to do with such a name change. 
With the absorption of the “Alawite State” into Greater Syria in 1936 
it was in the interests of both the Alawites and Syrian Sunnis to claim 
that the Alawites belong in the fold of Islam. The first but quite un-
successful step in this regard was taken when Muḥammad ʾAmīn al-
Hussaynī (1897–1974), Mufti of Jerusalem 1921–1937, gave by request 
of the Syrian government in 1936 a fatwā proclaiming the Alawites to 
be Muslims84. This fatwā did not have any palpable influence on Sunni 
81 Such ideologcal bias starts clearly with the work of aṭ-Ṭawīl 1979: 261.
82 Aṭ-Ṭawīl 1979: 446–449. And nowadays the Alawite historians elaborate such claim: 
esp. Ibrāhı̄m in his works: Ibrāhı̄m 1999: 32–33. But it is not true that the name an-Nuṣayrīya 
came with the Ottomans: the earliest Sunni sources describing Ibn Nuṣayr and his followers 
use that name already in the 10th century: Ibn Ḥazm 1992, 5: 50. Widely known became 
this term an-Nuṣayrīya with the work of 12th century scholar Šahrastānı̄: Šahrastānı̄ 1992: 
192–193 and sincen then the an-Nuṣayrīya it is widely used in medieval sources.
83 Bulletin mensuel …, Arrete 1470, Juillet 1922: 206.
84 I have not been able to get the text of the fatwā: Une fatwà du Grand Muftī de Jérusalem 
Muḥammad Aʾmīn al-Ḥusaynī sur les Aʿlawītes. 1940. Revue de l’histoire des religions 122, 
no. 1 (July-August), pp. 42–54; nos. 2–3 (September–December 1940), pp. 134–52; I am 
hereby evaluating it by Talhamy 2010: 185–186.
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attitudes to the Alawites, but since then it has been an argument for the 
Islamic nature of the Alawites for the Syrian regime, for seculars in the 
Islamic world, and for some Western researchers.
The next round of incorporation into Islam for the Alawites was per-
formed through an intricate three-step scheme. Firstly, albeit in vague 
wording, in the 1930s and several times later the Alawites pronounced 
themselves to be “Šīʿah Muslims” and deeper contact with the Šīʿahs 
of Iraq and Iran was established.85 Secondly, following this, in 1952 the 
Syrian government recognized the Šīʿah maḏhab as an official legal 
school in Syria86. Thirdly, in 1958 the Sunni spiritual center al-Azhar 
recognized the Šīʿahs as a fifth maḏhab of Islam, in this way recogniz-
ing them as fully belonging to Islam87. As a result of these three steps 
the Alawites were seemingly incorporated into Islam via Šīʿism: the 
Syrian state incorporated Šīʿahs, and among them the Alawites; by the 
declaration al-Azhar the Sunnis incorporated Šīʿahs, including the Ala-
wites, and from that time on the Alawites often use the term “Alawite-
Šīʿahs”88. The only but essential problem here is that, except for the Jeru-
salem Mufti’s fatwā, no other Sunni authority has ever directly accepted 
the Alawites, without Šīʿah as a medium, into the fold of Islam!
After the secular Baʿ aṯist coup of 1963 and the Alawite-Baʿ aṯist coup 
of 1966, and especially after 1970 when the power in predominantly 
Sunnite Syria went to al-Assad’s secular-Alawite circle, it became essen-
tial for the Syrian regime, for ideological reasons, to deny the existence 
of the Alawites in Syria because it was not possible to acknowledge that 
the Alawites, historical enemies of Islam by Sunni measures, rule at the 
heart of the Islamic World89. From here on, if mentioning the existence 
of the Alawites was unavoidable then they were presented as integrally 
belonging to Islam.
85 On such instances in the 1930-s: aš-Šarif 1960: 106–108. In more detail about it: al-Ḫayr 
1996: 19–35 and Ibrāhı̄m 1999: 83–94.
86 Detailed account of such documents: Nabhā 2013: 278–279. See also: al-Ḫayr 1996: 
90–92.
87 Text of this fatwā al-Ḫayr 1996: 94.
88 E.g: al-ʿ Alawīyūn Ši’at ...1392/1972.
89 Balanche 2006 b: 76. Also: Seale 1989: 9. See also Pipes’ witty remark that an Alawite 
ruling over predominantly Sunnite Syria is the same bizarre as Jewish Tzar reign in orthodox 
Russia: Pipes 1992: 175.
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In everyday polity it meant that al-Assad’s secular-Alawite ruling 
clique (where many secular Sunnis and religious minorities also have 
an important place) orchestrated a purge of any mention of the Alawites 
and other smaller sects from official media and books, and a notion of 
“monolithic Islam without sectarian differences” was developed.
References to the Alawites have been purged from the official lan-
guage: the historical name of the central Alawite area Ǧabal al-ʿ Alawī, 
or Ǧibāl al-ʿ Alawīyīn90 (Alawite Mountain/s) has borne the name al-
Ǧibāl as-Sāḥilīya or al-Ǧibāl as-Sāḥil91 (Coastal Mountains) since 1976. 
It is also sometimes called Ǧibāl al-Lāḏiqīya92 (Mountains of Latakia). 
In order to erase all memory of the semi-independent Alawite state of 
1922–1936, which from 1930–1936 was called Territoire de Lattaquié 
or Gouvernement de Lattaquié, since 1970 Latakia has officially been 
called Lāḏiqīya al-ʿ arab (The Arab Latakia)93 in the press. So the Ala-
wites were subdued to the official ideology of ʿurūba – “Arabness”, an 
ideology that in Syria suppresses religious and national individuality, 
replacing it with the idea of a friendly and monolithic nation of Arab-
Syrians.94
Following the ideology of “Arabness”, it has been forbidden to use 
the name “Alawites/Alawite” in the press since the 1970s95. In textbooks 
the Alawites are not mentioned.96 Even in schools where Alawites con-
stitute 100% of the students, teachers cannot admit their existence97. To 
Syrian science, Alawites do not exist, and it is hard to find any scientific 
90 Ḥannā 2015:15.
91 van Dam 1996: 7.
92 Hannā 2015, 15.
93 Kedar 1999: 141–146.
94 About ideologized conception of ‘urūba in Syria: Farrukh 1964. Also: Al-Faruqi 1962; 
Van Dam 1996: 146–151. Examples of distorting history by such applicaton of ideologized 
‘urūba are clearly seen in books published in Syria that are dedicated on Syrian ancient 
history. For example see the official works of the Syrian regime: ʿ Alı̄ 1994, esp. pp 4–16. Even 
better example is a work on general history Taʾ rı̄ḫ Sūrı̄ya al-qadı̄m, where pseudo-scientific 
ravings on “arab-sumerians”, “arab-phoinicians” are found (Dāwūd 2003, 1: 149–286), or 
arabness as the base of Ancient Greek and Western culture is argued (Dāwūd 2003, 2: 336–
361, 393). Critique of such pseudo-scientific approach: Ḥulw 1999: 21–29, 327.
95 Mordechai 1999: 141–146; Schaebler 1999: 17–44, esp. 30.
96 The are only few studies on the ideologized Syrian school program: Landis 2003. Also: 
Cardinal 2009 and; Szanto Ali-Dib 2008, esp. 99–100.
97 Worren 2007.
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articles about them in Syrian journals. Indeed, until the 1990s no Ala-
wite religious texts were published in Syria and research on them was 
virtually impossible98. To silence the few Western researchers who tried 
to raise their voices on the Alawite topic in Syria, it was announced by 
the Syrian establishment that publishing Alawite texts might offend the 
Alawites’ religious feelings!99 
Where mentioning the Alawites in Syria has been unavoidable the 
term “Alawite-Šīʿahs” is used, or it has been just blankly stated that 
the Alawites are an integral part of the Twelver Šīʿahs100; such a notion 
is used especially in popular science works101. It also seems that main-
stream Šīʿah children’s books are used for schooling Alawite children 
in Syria.102
Famous ethnic Alawites have been referred to by the Syrian regime 
as “national Arab heroes” without mentioning their Alawite back-
ground. One good example of such policy is the case of Badawī al-Ǧabal 
98 Kazimi 2010: 50–51.
99 Van Dam 1996: 109–111.
100 As mentioned before it started with the work of aṭ-Ṭawīl’s Taʾ rı̄ḫ al-ʿ Alawı̄yı̄n (aṭ-Ṭawīl 
1979). After that at least dozen works appeared, mostly in Syria or Lebanon trying to 
incorporate by manipulations the Alawites into Šīʿah:
1) al-ʿ Alawı̄yūn... 1972;
2) al-ʿ Alawīyūn šīʾah... 1972;




7) Nabhā 2013, esp. 15–21 where it is stressed that the Alawites belong to mainstream Šīʿah.
This is not a complete list, I have not been able to consult al-Ḥusayn, Aʿbdallāh. 1980. al-
Ǧuḏūr at-tārīḫīya lil-Nuṣayrīya al-ʿ alawīya. Al-Qāhira, which should include some modern 
reseaches form Alawite authors and also touching upon the topic the Alawites being Šīʿah.
101 Central place in this genre have the popular-scicence works of an ethnical Qardāḥa 
Alawite: Ḫayyir, Aʿbd ar-Raḥman (1904–1986), whose bibliography includes works that put 






102 Several Alawite Internet resources list as “books for children” Lebanese Šīʿah publisher’s 
Mu aʾssasat al-Aʿ lamı̄ lil-Maṭbūʿāt children’s books series Al-silisat as-sīrat al-ʿ alawīyat 
aš-šarīfa.
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(b. 1898–1907, d. 1981) whose Alawite background and wholehearted 
support for the “Alawite state” and the French in the 1930s have been 
erased from historiography, stressing instead his later message of “Syrian 
unity” and making him a “national poet”.103 And of course nowhere in 
the Syrian official press is there to be found the vaguest hint of al-As-
sads being Alawites, or anything at all that might publicly foster Alawite 
self-reliance.
In spite of such total denial, however, the decades since 1970 might 
not be considered all bad for the Alawites, at least from a socio-economic 
point of view. Opinions differ but it could be said that their living stand-
ards have risen sharply in al-Ǧabal over the last decades and even Ala-
wite traditions seem to be gaining in strength, despite the state’s hypo-
critical denial of any Alawites being there or anywhere else in Syria104. 
One good example is al-Assad’s birthplace Qardāḥa which went from a 
muddy village in the 1950s to now being a symbol of Alawite prosperity. 
Although it is still prohibited to show any sign of Alawite tradition there 
and even death ceremonies are conducted by Sunni ritual, under such 
external cover strong Alawite traditions still live.105
103 There are several works published in Syria starting from 1960-s that in the process 
of making him a national hero are silent of his pro-French and pro-independence feelings. 
Central works of such myth-making are:
1) Ḫaṭı̄b 1962;
2) Qinṭār 2000;
3) central and most popular and ideologically most twisted is: Nassār 2013.
Similar are other works or articles written in Syria or by Syrian ideological allies in 
Lebanon, for example: Malzūm 2006: 3; or Dı̄wān Badāwı̄ al-Ǧabal 1978: 2–5.
In the 1990-s some Western scholars started to point out that al-Badawī was in the 1930-s 
a stout supporter of the French (Yaffe-Schatzmann: 1995: 37; also Seale 1989: 19) and the 
scathing expositon came with the work of ʿUdayma 1995. And by now tens of articles in the 
Arab countries are presenting Badawī differently from the official Syrian narrative.
104 There are conflicting opinions among leading Syrian experts: general and overall quick 
economic development among the Alawites is seen by Bar 2006: 393; also Faksh 1984: 
147–148.
Others say that the growth is mainly seen in Latakia and in other places in the coast, but 
not so much in al-Ǧabal: Nisan 2002: 124–125. Also: van Dam 1996: 9; Pipes 1992: 177. It 
seems true that al-Ǧabal does not show so quick economic progress, but if compared with 
the pre-Assad era then the positive changes are clear: Balanche 2000: esp pp. 185–216. Also: 
Drysdale 1981: 93–111. Also: Drysdale 1981 b.
105 Pinto 2011 esp 190–191. See also: Seale 1989: 9.
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Contemporary Sunni attitude on Alawites
The artificial nature of the Alawite merger with Islam via Šīʿah has nev-
er been accepted by radical Sunnis. Contemporary Sunni hatred against 
the Alawites is fomented by modern works on religion, written since the 
1970s, that are based on classical Sunni texts. This is especially true for 
Ibn Taimiyah’s fatwā which has a central place in almost any modern 
Sunni book concerning religious Muslim minorities. The Islamist upris-
ing in Syria 1978–1982 at least partly revolved ideologically around the 
notion of a “kuffār Alawite” regime.106
Since the 1970s Alawites have exhibited their subconscious fear for 
the future because of their “hereticness”, as a few field studies that were 
allowed to conduct among them over the last decades clearly show107. 
Such fears for the future among the Alawites are understandable as Ibn 
Taimiyah’s ruling has had a central place since the 1970s not only among 
the Wahhabis but also in wider Sunni circles, with dozens of studies de-
nouncing the Alawites as un-Islamic kuffār, citing Ibn Taimiyya’s ḥukm 
on them, and usually using the derogative term Nuṣayrīya.108
Only a few general studies on Islam from the semi-secular, semi- 
socialist period in the Arab world in the 1960–80s evince a neutral atti-
tude to the Alawites, e.g., the section on the Alawites in such old-school 
106 Muslim Brotherhood Syrian branch issued 1980–1982 its magazine an-Nad̲īr, where 
several statements against the Alawites, that are based on Ibn Taimiya views, may be found; 
the Alawites are considered an obstacle on the way of creating Islamic State in Syria that was 
the main aim of the uprising, as it was declared in the Bayān aṯ-Ṯawra al-Islamīya f ī Sūriyā 
wa minhāǧuhā (The Islamic Revolution of Syria and its Chart), see: Aʿbd-Allah 1983: 264.
107 Their feeling in the 1980-s: Drysdale 1982: 4; the situation 2005–2006 in a detailed 
analysis of Worren 2007: 59–90; also Kazimi 2010: 51–60.
108 Here are some of them (with pages indicated of the Ibn Taimiyya ḥukm on the Alawites): 
1) Aʿwāǧı̄ 2001, 2: 530–587;
2) Ḥalabı̄ 1979;
3) Ṭuʿ ayma 1981: 37–71.
4) Aʿbd al-Ḥakı̄m 2000/1421; 
5) an-Nuṣayrīya – taġāt Sūrīya ...;
6) Māḏā taʿ rif ʿan al-ṭāʼifa an-Nuṣayrīya 2012/1433;
7) al-ʿ Unqurī 2012;
8) Aʿlī; Maḥmūd 2013.
But not allways name Nuṣayrīya on the cover of a book means an outright attack against 
the Alawites as there are some works with such a title that are not openly hostile to them 
(but still critical): Ḫayyūn 2012; or Ḥarı̄rı̄ 1980. Even in some neutral Šīʿah works apellation 
Nuṣayrīya might be used: Dandašı̄ 2000.
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central works as Islām bi-lā maḏāhib109 or Maḏāhib al-islāmı̄yı̄n110
 
which 
might mention the Ibn Taimiyah fatwā or even cite them at lenght, but 
consider the Alawites as Muslims without any palpable negative feeling 
about them.
The prevailing attitude in modern Sunni works is, however, based on 
Ibn Taimiyah’s fatwā and the theo-political grudge generated by it that 
has been growing over the last decades. Such anti-Alawite literature is 
so copious that it might even be divided into subcategories.
Firstly, there are scientific studies with such dispassionate state-
ments as the Alawites do not belong to Islam.111 Secondly, there exist 
outright attacks, often by leading Saudi scholars, against the Alawites in 
research where Ibn Taimiyyah is either clearly cited or his ḥukm on the 
Alawites is clearly discernible112. Thirdly, we have Ibn Taymiyya fatwā’s 
modern amplifications, explanations and commentaries with an Alawite 
context113. Fourthly, there are modern fatwās based on Ibn Taymiyya’s 
fatwā114. Some pieces of this anti-Alawite avalanche have also been pub-
109 aš-Šakʿa, Muṣṭafā Muḥammad. 1961. Islām bilā maḏāhib. ed. Mahmūd Šaltūt. al-Qāhira: 
Dār al-qalam, this work has at least 15 editions; I have used its 11. edition: aš-Šakʿa 1996/1416, 
pp 321–373 about the Alawites.
110 Badawı̄ 1997: 1167–1250.
111 For example: Abū Zahra: 53–55. Ḫatı̄b 1984/1404: 319–434.
112 1) al-Ḥamd; 
 2) Ġālib ibn ʿAlī. 2001, 2: 530–587;
 3) al-Ḥarbı̄ 2011: 210–239;
 4) Halabı̄ 1979;
 5) Aʿbd al-Ḥakı̄m 2000/1421;
 6) at-Tawīǧrī 2012/1434.
 Even during short presidency of Muḥammad Mursi such lampoons started to appear in 
Egypt:
 7) ‘Alī; Maḥmūd 2013.
 And several have been published under the islamic rebels in Syria since 2011:
 8) Risāla f ī ḥukm ad-durūz....
 9) al-ʿ Unqurī 2012.
113 1) Ǧalı̄ 1986/1406: 243–60; this book has at least three reprints;
2) Māḏā taʿ rif ... 2012/1433, where half of the text is Ibn Taimiyas fatwā (pp. 28–44), 
another half is its explanation;
3) Atā Sūfı̄ 2005/1426: 129–158
4) Ṭuʿ aymah 1981: 37–71, it has at least three reprints.
114 1) Saudi Arabia’s official fatwā institution Dār al-iftā s̓ release named an-Nuṣayrīya – 
taġāh Sūrīya..;
The Position of the Alawites in Islam 186
lished in English115 and even some modern Alawite criticisms by Eastern 
Christians have found resonance in Sunni circles.116
In total we might name hundreds of such works that generate anti-
Alawite theo-political momentum and thus have a direct influence on 
the future of around 1.8–2.9 million117
 
Alawites in Syria today.
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aṭ-Ṭawīl, Muḥammad Amı̄n Ġālib (1979) Taʾ rı̄ḫ al-ʿ alawı̄yı̄n. Bayrūt: 
Dār al-Andalūs lil-tibāʿa wa an-našr wa at-tawzīʿa.
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difāʾ an al-aqīda ahl as-sunna. 
Mantran, Robert; Sauvaget, Jean (1951) Règlements fiscaux ottomans: 
Les provinces syriens. Paris: Librairie d’Amerique et d’Orient.
Maundrell, Henry (1703) A journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem at Easter 
A.D. 1697. Oxford: Printed at the Theater, an. Dom.
Moosa, Matti (1987) Extremist Šiites: the Ghulat sects. Syracuse, N.Y.: 
Syracuse University Press.
Nabhā, Ḫiḍr Muḥammad (2013) Ǧabal al-ʿ alawı̄yı̄n wa-ǧabal ʿāmil. ar-
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Syrian Alawite Youth Values and Identity 
During the Civil War in 2011–2015
Tanja Dibou
Abstract The main objective of this article is to study the main 
values of the young Alawites which distinguish them from other 
young Muslims in current Syrian society. Field work was conducted 
among the Alawites from 2011–2015 that consisted of ethnographic 
observations of Alawite weddings, interviews and questionnaires. 
Accord ing to the results of the field work it might be concluded that 
the identity of the Alawites is multi-layered and is composed of Ala-
wite, Syrian, and Arab values but priority is given to the Alawite 
religion and Syrian nationalism.
Keywords Alawites, Syrian youth identity, young Alawi
Introduction
Adolescence is important as it is a crucial period for the construction of 
values and identities. Considering the turbulence, the Syrian civil war 
is witnessing, the challenge for the Syrian youth is the construction of 
a national identity that supports acceptance and warmth toward various 
sectarian identities and their values. For centuries Syria was known for 
its ethnic and religious pluralism. That was broken down in the current 
Syrian crisis. Thus, it becomes necessary to investigate various youth 
identities and values in order to have a better understanding of their fu-
ture in Syria. One of the most controversial themes is the identity of the 
Alawites whose image is very often associated with strong protection 
of the Assad regime and a fight against Sunni hegemony. The crisis has 
made a certain impact on the formation of the young Alawites’ identity, 
but there is more. Alawite theology has its origins in the ancient times, 
but they as a religious minority keep secret their true religious beliefs 
which have many contradictions with respect to true Islamic teaching. 
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This article goals to shed light on Alawite youth identity as responses 
to political events in Syria in the period 2011–2015 and to explore the 
main values of Alawite identity that distinguish them from other Mus-
lims in Syrian society. In other words, it is an analysis of what it means 
for young people to be Alawi in Syria today, and what values young 
Alawi share. Religious diversity in Syria now faces new challenges, the 
biggest of which is ensuring the peaceful coexistence of people of dif-
ferent faiths. Thus, the young generation’s shared identities, values and 
openness to other groups could be one predisposing factor to peace in 
Syria. This study explores the identity of late adolescent Syrian Alawites 
(aged 16–30). It should be stressed here that only a few empirical stud-
ies on Alawite identity have been done so far, and especially that Syrian 
Alawite youth identity has not been studied before.
This paper answers the following questions: What are Syrian Alawite 
youth values and identity, and what are the main factors for the construc-
tion of their identity? What are the main dimensions of Alawite identity? 
Which codes, traditions, rituals and symbols are used to indicate mem-
bership of the Alawite community? The study examines whether and to 
what extent Alawite youngsters share Arab, Islamic, Syrian and Alawite 
values, what it means to be Alawite in modern Syrian society, and how 
the Alawites differ from other Muslims in Syria. The paper analyzes the 
openness of the Syrian Alawite youth to other religions and to examine 
whether and to what extent sharing certain values (Arab, Islamic, Syr-
ian, Alawite) favours such openness.
The study of Alawi identity is controversial because of the current 
crisis in Syria that began in March 2011. Many researchers such as 
Worren1, Goldsmith2, Tokmajyan3, Nakkash4 and Rousseau 20145, etc., 
confirm that during the crisis various identities encounter different val-
ues, attitudes, lifestyles, etc., that are particularly emergent issues on 
the similarities and differences between people. In a politically unstable 
situation these differences begin to exert more influence on the resolu-
tion of the conflict. In today’s context the issues of sectarian identities 
1 Worren 2007.
2 Goldsmith 2011: 33–60.
3 Tokmajyan 2013.
4 Nakkash 2013.
5 Rousseau. 2014. 
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in Syria and throughout the Middle East play a major role in solving 
political matters.6
Human values and identities are changing very quickly nowadays, 
and it is not possible to define an identity in any single category. It be-
comes more layered, and there is a need to examine what kinds of lay-
ers the identity is composed of and whether the various layers of the 
value systems of one’s identity conflict. The Syrian civil war provided 
the basis for changes in the value and attitude systems that increased 
the fragmentation of society into different groups. The aggregation of 
groups provided protection of their members’ identity during the crisis, 
but outside of the group criticism was construed very aggressively and 
people were easily manipulated to fight for their identity. The construc-
tion of identity is not a process that just develops itself. Individuals and 
the external environment play a particularly active role. Many factors 
contribute to the construction of identity: family, tribe, sect, religion, 
race, ethnicity, gender, tradition, history, culture, language, political be-
liefs, nationalism, ideology and ethnicity. Some factors, however, play a 
more important role than others.7
This paper explores the following hypotheses:
H1: Syrian Alawi youth identity is closed because of the impact of 
the contemporary political situation and fear of Sunni hegemony.
H2: Syrian Alawi youth identity is multi-layered, incorporating four 
systems of values: Muslim, Alawi, Arab and Syrian.
Researching the identity of minorities in the Middle East
Wider scholarly interest in religious minorities in the Middle East 
developed in the 1980s, triggered by the Iranian revolution and the rise 
of Islamism in the Muslim world. The 1990s was the first decade when 
Middle East minorities really moved to the foreground of academic re-
search. This is partly related to the so-called war on terror, especially to 
the military intervention of the US and its allies into multi-religious Iraq. 
This intervention led to repression against local religious minorities. 
The twentieth century has been described as the century of minorities, 
6 Goldsmith 2011: 37.
7 Tokmajyan 2013.
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the century when concern over the need to provide a legal framework to 
protect minorities gained unprecedented attention.8
A valuable contribution to the study of minority identities in the Mid-
dle East was provided by Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor9. It focuses 
on strategic policy issues and looks at possible scenarios for the future, 
depending on the development of relations among minorities and major-
ities. Also worthy of note is the work of Mordechai Nisan10, who stresses 
that particular minorities in the Middle East can be identified if such 
minority status can be described by the following features:
• Geography. Middle Eastern minorities have generally lived on the 
geographic periphery of the political entities within which they re-
side, or proximate to them. Mountainous regions are the territorial 
heartland for almost all Middle Eastern minorities. Residing in dis-
tant geographic locales may result from, or may alternatively be the 
cause of, a long alienation from the dominant majority in the coun-
try. The role of geography provides an important spatial criterion for 
the Middle Eastern minorities who have kept their distance from the 
dominant Sunni Arabs in particular.11
• History. Middle Eastern minorities have a rich history preserved in 
oral and written form.12
• Ethnicity. Kinship and clan-based separateness provides for endo-
gamous patterns of marriage and family identity. Inbreeding within a 
closer bloodline provides a fundamental division between those who 
are part of the same biological tree and those who are external to it. 
But the absence of any particular ethnic autonomy makes it virtu-
ally impossible for any minority to become a separate people. At the 
opposite pole lies exogamy, leading inevitably towards the stage of 
assimilation within a larger absorptive community.13
• Culture. Each minority has its own cultural attributes. One example 
is language, by which minorities maintain their own differentiated 
8 Longva & Roald 2011: 1.
9 Bengio & Ben-Dor 1999.
10 Nisan 2002.
11 Nisan 2002: 15.
12 Ibid.: 16.
13 Ibid.: 14.
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linguistic universe, confronting the alien majority tongue and pre-
venting a loss of identity.14 Here we can also mention religion which 
remains the most significant aspect in the Middle East in social, le-
gal and political terms, not forgetting such elements of culture as 
employ ment, marriage and family relations. These relations continue 
to be fundamental distinguishable values of Middle Eastern identity.
• Beyond these essential elements that define separate peoplehood 
there are factors that help to arouse a national awakening in a previ-
ously seemingly non-existent or dormant community.
• Social change and Mobilization. The formation of a new social grid 
composed of people from different classes and occupations and set-
tling in an urban environment, and engaging in new and intensive 
communication systems, provide the general impetus for ethnic mo-
bilization.15
• Repression and Conflict. An experience of common despair can 
serve as a catalyst for nationalist consolidation in the face of shared 
enemies or irresolvable problems.16
• Foreign assistance. External intervention on the side of a weak com-
munity may provide the necessary catalytic input for generating a 
national movement.17
Previous research on the Alawite identity 
There are around a dozen Western works on the Alawites we might con-
sider which deal with their identity, as well as Alawite works from the 
19th century onwards. Starting with the first comprehensive description 
of Alawites from the British missionary Samuel Lyde18, followed by the 
French orientalist René Dussaud’s description of the history of the Ala-
wites and a comprehensive overview of the contents of the holy book 
Kitāb al-Maǧmū’19, Meir M. Bar-Asher and Aryeh Kofsky20 conclude 






19 Dussaud 1900. See also: Procházka 2015.
20 Bar-Asher & Kofsky 2002.
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Persian Gnostic teachings and practices with Christianity as the most 
significant element in this mixture.21 The most recent and comprehen-
sive overview is that of Yaron Friedman which examines their identity 
from Šīʿte and Sunni perspectives 22.
The Alawite identity was previously studied by Torstein Schiøtz 
Worren’s Master’s thesis “Fear and Resistance: The Construction of 
Alawi Identity in Syria”23, in which he examines the Alawi identity from 
a historical and political perspective. He tries to answer the question of 
how the Syrian Alawites construct their collective identity. He confirms 
that empirical research of the Syrian Alawi identity is not easy because, 
for Alawites, speaking publicly about their religion is taboo. Worren 
thus studied their identity concealed, using techniques such as observa-
tion and holding informal interviews with local residents. Worren high-
lights two discourses that construct Alawi identity: he first mentions 
Sunni hegemony, and then secondly Islamic discourse. Worren points 
out the impact of politics on the construction of identity and saw this as 
a threat. He wrote that sectarian identities are acceptable as long as they 
are cultural and religious, but when they become politicized, they are 
only allowed to compete for political identity and constitute a threat to 
national unity and stability. A few other works also tackle Alawi identity 
on a smaller scale, especially Kazimi24.
Regarding studies of Alawite youth, then, despite the fact that the 
Syrian youth and children were one of the central themes in the media 
during the Syrian civil war, no academic research has been done specifi-
cally about Syrian Alawite youth identity and values.
Methodology of the present empirical research
The empirical research was based on qualitative research methods. 
Many researchers admit that qualitative studies allow rich descriptions 
of the investigated object.25 The qualitative survey is not intended to 
verify the validity of the hypotheses of a large sample but rather to try 





25 Creswell 2003: 181–183; Geertz 1973: 3–30; Laherand 2008: 24.
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world26 and the structure of its meaning. Moreover, qualitative research 
is characterized by flexibility in a number of research methods by com-
bining and mixing the various stages of the study.27
Data for empirical research of the Alawite identity was collected 
through the triangulation of ethnographic observation, interviews, and 
social media profile analysis. The idea behind triangulation is to mutu-
ally confirm the findings by approaching them from different angles. 
This is not to obtain more data, but to combine different forms of data 
and place them in relation to each other.
The research has a descriptive character and was conducted in the 
social constructivist and interpretivist philosophical tradition. The con-
structivist paradigm helps to construct knowledge about Alawite iden-
tity during the process of learning and through interaction with the 
subject. This constructivist paradigm is combined with an interpretivist 
paradigm as information is gathered and becomes open to new interpre-
tation.
All data was collected from September 2011 to October 2015. The 
first stage of empirical research was observations conducted in Syria 
from September 2011 to December 2011 at a time when the so-called 
Arab Spring protests against the government had just begun in Syria. 
Ethnographic observation provided prior information on everyday Ala-
wi life and on the differences between the Sunnis and the Alawites, thus 
demonstrating the specificity of the Alawite community compared to 
that of other Muslims.
The aim of the ethnographic observation is to uncover the explicit and 
implicit cultural knowledge that guides behaviour in that group. When 
studying identity, observation gives access to the self-understandings of 
the group in a variety of contexts, allowing the researcher to experience 
the reflexivity of group identity as well as what the identity means in 
practical terms. 28
The data on young Alawite people’s lives in a natural environment 
was collected through the following participatory observation:
26 J.Smith 2006: 2.
27 Laherand 2008.
28 Abdelal et al. 2009: 318.
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• Participatory observation I: Observation of rural life of Alawites 
in the village al-Qurayāt. The observation focuses on the Alawite 
community living in a village between Tartous and Homs. It is not 
possible to describe Alawites without describing the life of Alawite 
mountain villages and their area of origin. It is essential to mention 
that in this area Alawites represent a majority compared to other 
parts of Syria. The observation monitored the family relationship, 
the relationship between youth, school life and their leisure activities.
• Participatory observation II: Observation of urban life of Alawites 
in the suburb of Damascus Aš al-Warwar. This suburb represents 
an example where Alawites are living in areas where they consti-
tute a minority and therefore construct their identity in a different 
way from in Mediterranean Sea coast villages where Alawites con-
stitute a majority. The observation focused on an analysis of young 
people’s daily routines and aimed to learn more about young Alawite 
relations with young people from other religions. In a large city like 
Damascus, inhabited by people of different faiths, it is easier to build 
a relationship with individuals from the other strands of Islam, as well 
as with representatives of Christianity, in the workplace, at school 
or elsewhere. Additionally, compared to the countryside where the 
majority of Syrian families are engaged in agriculture, observation 
of urban life gives a better understanding of the distribution of Alawi 
social class and the role of women in the family and modern society 
in Syria.
• Participatory observation III: Observation of the Alawite wedding 
party. The wedding process differs country by country and wed-
dings represent unique material for analysing traditions and culture. 
In Syria, weddings are very important events which gather together 
relatives and friends alike, so the main aim of the wedding obser-
vation was to investigate the relationship between generations and 
cultural and religious traditions.
In all observations the present researcher was a participant and was fully 
engaged with the people and their activities. As collecting data in Syria 
is quite problematic because of its controlled society which poses a range 
of difficulties, the observations were made without the knowledge of the 
people who were observed. Secret observation is perfect for situations 
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where the researcher aims at acquiring the kind of information the sub-
jects of the research would not want to talk about.29
Ethnographic participant observation is understood as a research 
strategy for analyzing concrete contexts and human development in a 
cultural surrounding. Of special interest are clothing, rituals and sym-
bols, which are used for marking social territories.30 The observations 
are used to grasp the complexity of the field as comprehensively as pos-
sible and to develop more focused research questions and perspectives 
for the poll questionnaire and interviewing.
The second step of research consisted of interviews and the question-
naire, which was designed to find answers to research questions, test 
hypotheses, and to provide more detailed information on Syrian youth 
Alawi identity. The questionnaire’s pilot testing took place in August 
2015. The interviewees were not chosen at random, but the selection was 
based on the researcher’s personal contacts in Syria: 28 year-old man 
(Interviewee 1); 20 year-old man (Interviewee 2); 25 year-old woman 
(Interviewee 3) from different places in Syria: Damascus, Latakia and 
al-Qurayāt village. These young Alawites agreed to make longer com-
ments to answers on the electronic questionnaire and provided addi-
tional information on the Alawites.
The electronic questionnaire consisted of multiple choice and open 
questions. The questionnaire was in Arabic and was sent out to the sam-
pled young Alawites via the social network Facebook and via e-mail 
with the help of three interviewees who had sent a questionnaire to 
young people between the ages of 16 and 30 through their contacts. An-
swering the questionnaire took place between September and October 
2015. The questionnaire was answered by 38 respondents of both sexes, 
of various ages and social classes. Although the interviewed sample is 
small and not representative as it does not reflect a broad cross-section 
of Alawite views, it provides some deeper insight into the Alawite com-
munity in Syria.
29 Hirsjärvi et al. 2005: 199–200.
30 Angrosino 2007.
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Results of observations on young Alawites
The observations took place in the village al-Qurayāt and in the suburb 
of Damascus Aʿš al-Warwar. In the village al-Qurayāt, young Alawites 
live in their parents’ houses. The village inhabitants are only Alawites; 
there are no Sunnis or Christians. Thus, the young Alawites only in-
teract socially with other young Alawites and are not used to having 
contact with representatives of other religions. After graduating from 
school, when young people decide to go on to study at university, they 
are exposed to more contact with other faiths but otherwise there is no 
particular contact with other faiths for young Alawi people living in the 
village.
Village Alawites attend small village schools where all the pupils 
are Alawites. Young urban Alawites usually live in Alawite districts, for 
instance the suburb of Damascus Aš al-Warwar, and attend city schools 
where the majority are Alawites. Urban Alawi youth attend universities 
and professional schools and work at places where every faith in Syria 
is represented.
As to their faith, it is not the religion that they have chosen for them-
selves. They are Alawite simply because it is their family tradition and 
the religion passes from one generation to another. Young people do not 
talk much about their religious affiliation not only because it is forbid-
den, but also because they do not know much about their religion. One 
of the reasons for that is the fact that many young men from 16–20 have 
still not read the sacred Alawite texts, and Alawite shaykhs have not yet 
explained the Alawite faith to them. The second reason for their igno-
rance is the oath to their shaykhs that prohibits discussion of the nuances 
of their religion. 
At school, youngsters have religious education in the curricula, but 
the textbooks are based on the Sunni position of Islam. These textbooks 
consist of three parts: the first includes the verses of the Quran that the 
students must learn by heart; the second part contains hadīṯs about the 
life of Muhammad, which the students must also learn by heart; the 
third part introduces the history of Islam which the students must be 
able to retell. In the religious education programmes Alawite theology 
is not included. It is prohibited to discuss religious Alawite texts or their 
theology publicly. Only religious Alawite leaders (shaykhs) are allowed 
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to discuss matters of the Alawite religion among Alawite youths and in 
the Alawi community.
In addition to going to school, working in the fields and helping par-
ents with the housework, there are the main activities of the rural youth. 
In villages the Alawites live in large families (there are usually more 
than three children), and for most of their free time young people sup-
port and assist parents with different kinds of work.
Urban Alawite youth have more opportunities to spend their free 
time in different ways. If young people work or study, they usually get 
home late in the evening as it takes a lot of time in Damascus to drive 
from one place to another, and they spend their free time with their fam-
ily, watching television, or sitting with their friends on balconies.
The village Alawites mostly work in agriculture, in the army or the 
national special service. Women in the villages usually marry at 22 to 26 
and do not go to work. The young urban Alawites mostly study or work 
in the army, or in the public and private sectors. Compared with rural 
women, urban women actively study at university and work in both the 
public and private sectors. Women often work in education and in the 
social and medical fields. Men are often entrepreneurs. Many people 
use their first residential floor as a small shop where they sell a variety 
of things. Young Alawites are engaged in business for economic reasons 
because salaries are low.
Relations between young men and women are family-oriented. Most 
relationships develop within the families and in the villages there are 
many marriages between relatives. Men and women develop relations 
at family gatherings, celebrations, and while visiting friends. The urban 
youth can also find new acquaintances at work and at university. Dur-
ing their observation, the Alawites celebrated national Syrian holidays, 
New Year, Christmas, and Islamic celebrations. Young Alawi people 
also celeb rate birthdays. The majority of Alawites do not follow the 
Ramadan fasting tradition. Alawites do not usually pray during the day, 
nor do they visit mosques. During religious holidays, and sometimes on 
Fridays, Alawites go to the graves of saints and to shrines called maqām 
or mazār.
Young Alawite men and women wear fashionable Western clothes. 
Young women do not wear the hiǧab. Alawite youngsters mostly wear 
jeans and T-shirts. Women do not wear skirts or dresses on weekdays. 
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Young women dye their hair, paint their nails and use make-up. Com-
pared to young Sunni women, Alawite women’s clothing is noticeably 
different in style. Young Alawite women in the countryside dress rather 
similarly to the urban style.
To conclude, observations of the everyday life of the Alawite youth 
demonstrate that Alawite traditions differ from those of Sunni youth. 
When comparing an Alawite with a Sunni, the behaviour and lifestyle 
of Alawite youngsters is different from that of the Sunnis largely due to 
the fact that the former are mostly secular and do not typically adhere to 
the pillars of Islam. The observations also revealed that the Alawites do 
not want to talk about their religion. It also becomes clear that the Alawi 
community is quite closed; the Alawites live in their own communities, 
keeping a distance from others. Family relations are very important for 
young people, and they trust their parents and ask for their agreement on 
many issues, such as marriage, the choice of school, and studies.
Results of observation on an Alawite wedding ceremony
The wedding was celebrated on 15 September 2011 close to the town 
of Miṣyāf. The wedding celebration was held in a special open area 
for such celebrations where all necessary materials were provided: 
tables, chairs, music, the dance floor, etc. The bride (21 years old) and 
the groom (30 years old) were both young Alawites from different re-
gions of Syria. The young man was from the village al-Qurayāt and the 
bride from town of Tartous.
The young couple had met each other in Damascus where the young 
man worked and the woman attended a vocational school. They got 
acquainted with each other through a common acquaintance. Before 
marry ing, they asked for the consent of their parents and they courted 
for one year, but did not live together.
All the guests and relatives gathered for the wedding ceremony and 
they were sitting together, both men and women, both parents and chil-
dren, both the bride and groom’s relatives in one place in order to celeb-
rate this important event together. The number of guests was nearly 120. 
On the right side, close to the couple, sat the groom’s relatives and in-
vited guests, and on the left side sat those of the bride. The couple’s table 
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stood separately from the others in the middle so that all guests could 
see them.
The guests were festively dressed. Young girls wore short skirts or 
dresses and married women wore long dresses. All women were wear-
ing prominent makeup. Young men wore jeans, fashionable T-shirts or 
shirts and jumpers. Elderly men wore suits. The wedding celebration 
was opened by singers and musicians who initially welcomed Syria, the 
Syrian authorities and the president. Then the dancing began.
The couple began dancing, and all the guests and relatives gathered 
around the couple and started clapping their hands. After a while all 
guests started to dance a traditional Syrian Alawi dance Dabkah, all 
men and women dancing together, holding hands. The first dancers 
in the circle are usually middle-aged or young men, the leaders of the 
dance, who performed very complex movements and squatting. Dabkah 
dance music is special, and its stirring pace encourages people to move 
quickly.
During the wedding a ritual took place in which the relatives of the 
groom gave presents of gold to the bride. After this ritual each guest 
moved to hug and congratulate the couple. Throughout the wedding live 
music was played and a singer sang Syrian songs. The guests ate a lot 
of traditional food: vegetables, fruits, lamb kebab, salads, and olives. 
They also drank alcoholic beverages: beer, wine and araq, a strong alco-
holic drink made with aniseed. Alcohol was consumed mostly by men. 
Women drank less, and only mild alcoholic beverages. Young men and 
women smoked a lot of Shisha and sat together and talked to each other. 
They danced Dabkah willingly, both women and men apart as well as 
together.
Sunni weddings differ from Alawi weddings in the following 
respects:
1) The wedding celebration is without alcohol;
2) Men and women celebrate the wedding separately in various rooms 
or sit in different places;
3) Women’s clothing in Sunni weddings is festive, but covered: long 
dresses with long sleeves.
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So the Alawite wedding celebration is based on their traditional dances 
and special wedding rituals that demonstrate how social and cultural 
values and secular traditions are transferred from one generation to an-
other.
Results of the poll
The survey was produced through electronic questionnaire. It involved 
38 people aged 16–30. 26 of them (68%) were male and 12 (32%) were 
female. The youngest respondent was 16 years old and the oldest 30 
years old. The average age of respondents was 23 years old. The larg-
est number of respondents was young people aged 25 (8 people). Young 
people who participated in the survey were relatively equally from vil-
lages and cities: rural youth were 20 respondents (52%) and residents of 
the city 18 (48%). Female respondents were mostly rural residents, and 
the majority of male respondents lived in the cities.
Subjects were asked to define their identity by choosing the three 
most important categories that characterize their identity from a list of 
religion, sex, language and dialect, social class, political ideology, level 
of education, family and clan affiliation.
Most young people rated as important religious affiliation (38 re-
spondents), sex (22 respondents), social class (15 respondents) and politi-
cal ideology (13 respondents) in their identity construction. The answers 
showed that religion was considered important by all respondents. The 
least important was determined to be level of education (6 respondents). 
Three respondents were asked to comment on their choices for this 
question:
Although I am a Muslim, for me it is very important that I am an Alawite. I 
can recognize Alawites among other Muslims by language, behaviour and 
appearance. I was born in a family where everyone is Alawite. I grew up 
in an environment where I was surrounded mostly by the Alawites. I do 
believe that my religion is right, and this is most important in determining 
my identity ... (Interviewee 1)
I think that sex is very important for self-determination. I’m a woman and I 
can see that my main role is to be the mother of the future ... (Interviewee 3)
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In addition to religion, I have chosen the level of education for my self-
determination, because at the moment I am studying at university and I 
know that the value of education is quite important. My friends are stu-
dents, and we have the same views about various issues in Syrian society 
... (Interviewee 2)
Religion is one of most important values for young Alawites. All re-
spondents gave a positive answer to the question “Do you believe in one 
God (Allāh)?” But, compared to Sunni Muslims, the frequency of visits 
to mosques is very rare. The most common answers are: I only visit the 
mosque during religious holidays; I do not visit the mosque at all or visit 
a couple of times a month.
Two respondents commented on their answers:
For Alawites it is customary during religious celebrations and events to 
pray at home. Usually, when there is a religious holiday, relatives within 
one family agree to gather together in one relativé s house and invite a 
shaykh or a couple of shaykhs to speak about the Alawite faith and everyone 
can ask a variety of questions about religion and after the official speech 
start to pray ... (Interviewee 1)
I know how to pray, but in my family there is no tradition of praying and we 
do not go to mosques. There is small, sacred Alawi place in our village that 
we used to visit only on important religious holidays, or when someone dies 
… (Interviewee 3)
As for the main source of faith, men follow the holy Alawite texts and 
women follow the Koran, family traditions and prevailing traditions in 
certain geographical areas. None of the female respondents mentioned 
anything concerning Alawite religious books and texts as the Alawite 
holy texts do not concern women. The Alawite texts are only presented 
to men by the Shaykh. One male respondent commented on this in an 
interview:
The first time I saw the Alawite holy text was when I was 20 years old. I had 
to go to the Shaykh who gave the first insight into religion and explained 
how important it is to practice the Alawi faith traditions. At the first meet-
ing, the Shaykh looked to see whether I am ready or not for religion. In my 
family religious Alawite principles are written in a special notebook which 
my father keeps in a secret place in a cupboard, and women are actually 
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forbidden to look at it. I also have brothers and sisters. All the brothers are 
aware of this book ... (Interviewee 1)
The Alawites responded that they celebrate Muslim religious celebra-
tions and Christian religious holidays too. Respondents most frequently 
answered that they celebrate birthdays, Christmas, Easter, the Chris-
tian New Year and Syrian national holidays such as Mothers’ day (21st 
March) and Syrian Independence Day (17th April). Alawites also celeb-
rate Muslim religious holidays like ʿ Īd al-Fiṭr at the end of Ramadan 
and ʿ Īdu l-Aḍḥā.
On the question of Alawi youth participation in sports and hobby 
groups, 69% replied that they participate in sports and hobby groups 
and the most popular hobbies are singing, music, violin playing, crafts, 
cuisine and food preparation, drawing, archaeology, tourism and travel, 
and literature. The average number of friends of other religions that a 
young Alawite person has is 10.
On Alawite youth attitude towards the role of women in the family, 
the majority of male respondents (85%) consider that a woman should 
decide for herself whether she should work and study while married. The 
women shared two response variants equally: (1) they themselves will 
decide, and (2) it depends on the family and the husband’s opinions. The 
female interviewee adds in her reply:
A year ago I graduated from university with a degree in history and I went 
to work as a teacher in a small village school. I am happy to continue work-
ing even after marriage. I like my job. But I cannot be sure what will be 
more important for me in the future when I have a family and children. But 
right now I choose to answer that after marriage I will continue working. 
I have a sister who has also graduated from university, but after her mar-
riage she did not go to work. She is now a mother of four and prefers to be 
a housewife, because it simply cannot be otherwise, because the kids need 
more commitment from her ... (Interviewee 3)
Respondents were also asked about their attitudes to intersectarian mar-
riage. According to their replies, young Alawite women are more cat-
egorically against marriage with men of other faiths, but young Alawite 
men did not reveal in any of their responses that they would be cat-
egorically opposed to marriage with women of different faiths. Young 
Alawite men’s answers were distributed as follows: 19 young men out of 
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26 were willing to marry women of other faiths, 7 out of 26 were rather 
against marriage to women from other religions. Two respondents com-
mented on their answer as follows:
I’ve heard different stories about love and marriage between an Alawite 
and a Sunni. But I know that there are not so many stories nowadays. I have 
an Alawite friend whose sister got married to a Sunni man. The woman’s 
Alawite family was not against it but the Sunni family had some who were 
not in favor of Sunni and Alawite marriages. Relatives were against this 
marriage because they think that the Alawites are all warriors who de-
fend their dictatorial regime and kill Sunnis. In spite of this pressure, they 
are still married and still living together. In my family there are also men 
who married foreign women who are not Muslims – they are Christians ... 
(Interviewee 2)
I personally do not want to marry a Sunni man. I think my parents do not 
agree with that either, getting married with a non-Alawi man. Parents’ opin-
ions and approval of marriage are very important for me ... (Interviewee 3)
Respondents were asked to evaluate values such as family, friends, job, 
religion, politics, hobbies and free time, education and money accord-
ing to a 4-point scale where 1 is not important at all and 4 is the most 
important. According to respondents, young Alawites’ main values are 
politics, friends and leisure time, family and religion.
Table 1. Alawite youth attitudes towards different values (max = 4 – very 











The interviewees commented on their choices:
My religion and political beliefs actually determine who I am in Syrian 
society. Alawites are usually associated with the al-Assad regime, and I 
admit it, but for me it is more important that Syria remain a religiously 
diverse country where the interests of the Syrian people and also the inter-
ests of Alawites are equally valued. The ruling party stands for the fact that 
Syria would be a good place, where all people of various religions can live 
together ... (Interviewee 1)
I could say that I am not interested in politics in general, not as much as the 
one who is in power in Syria. I am just afraid that if a very religious person 
came to power then, for me as a woman, it would be more difficult to live 
in Syria, and the role of women in society certainly would be worse. Before 
the war I had no problem going anywhere in Syria without a headscarf. 
But now the situation has changed and in some places the attitude towards 
a woman without a headscarf is the same as the attitude to unbelievers. 
(Interviewee 3)
In both interviews it is clear that current politics and religious beliefs 
are important topics for young Alawites. Facebook profiles have politi-
cal themes. Many Facebook profile photographs have as a background 
a military theme, or political iconography like Syrian national symbols 
and images. The most frequently occurring symbols and images are the 
Syrian national flag, the image of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, and 
the image of the previous Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. On Facebook 
most Alawites prefer to belong to Syrian groups.
I prefer Syrian groups because there are issues that call to me, for exam-
ple like Syrian contemporary society and politics. I am not a member of 
any foreign groups because my foreign language skills are not very good. 
Besides, I have no friends outside of Syria. I have not become a member 
of any Alawite FB groups. Alawite FB groups are often very closed and 
include representatives of Alawi society who live outside Syria. Thus they 
are groups with different themes all over the world but, for me, what is 
happening in Syria and ongoing news about Syria offers more interest... 
(Interviewee 2)
Today’s social networks, media and TV have a great impact on the for-
mation of identity and values. Thus, during the survey what kinds of TV 
channels Syrian Alawites prefer to watch was also examined.
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Concerning Alawite youth preferences of TV channels, they watch 
different channels equally, but those from rural areas prefer to watch 
Syrian state TV channels. 37% of respondents stated that they watch 
all channels equally (Arabic, Syrian, Foreign). 32% of respondents pre-
fer to watch public Syrian state channels. The least number of respond-
ents preferred to watch Arabic channels (10%), private Syrian channels 
(16%) and foreign channels (5%). Analyzing rural and urban youth TV-
watching preferences, it turned out that only urban Alawites chose to 
watch foreign channels. Young rural Alawites preferred to watch Syrian 
state-run channels. Most of the respondents use the Internet and visit 
all sources equally (55% of respondents). Only 24% of respondents use 
national Syrian Internet sources, while 18% visit only Arab countries’ 
Internet resources. Nobody answered that he/she would only visit Syria’s 
private Internet sources.
The respondents were also asked about their preferences of self-iden-
tification (Arab, Muslim, Syrian, Alawite). The results are as follows:
a) In the first place I am Alawite, in second place Syrian, then Muslim, 
and Arab last (15 people).
b) In the first place I am Syrian, in second place Alawite, then Muslim, 
and Arab last (11 people).
c) In the first place I am Arab, in second place Syrian, then Muslim, 
and Alawite last (5 people).
d) In the first place I am Alawite, in second place Muslim, then Syrian, 
and Arab last (4 people).
e) In the first place I am Syrian, in second place Alawite, then Arab, 
and Muslim last (3 people).
None of the respondents put Muslim in first place; Alawite or Syrian 
were most often chosen there, with Arab and Muslim coming in as less 
important. Respondents were also asked to explain why Arab identity 
might be less important. This is explained by the interviewees in dif-
ferent ways. Some said that Syria has not much in common with other 
Arab countries except from the Arabic language. Others connected their 
response with modern Syrian military conflict and mentioned that the 
Arab countries have not found consensus on the issue of the Syrian con-
flict. Three people made the choice that to be a Muslim is not at all 
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important for them. They explain this by the fact that Islam is very con-
servative, but they are Alawites who are not, and that Islam is linked to 
terrorism and modern Islamic radicalism.
Table 2. Alawite identity
I. place =  
4 points
II. place = 
3 points
III. place = 
2 points










































So we can assume that Alawite identity is multi-layered and is com-
posed of Alawite, Syrian and Arab values. However, the Alawite faith 
and Syrian nationalism have priority. The history of the Alawites and 
observations of modern life show that the Alawites in Syria have kept 
their distance from the majority of Syrian Sunnis, especially in times of 
crisis when fears drive them together as a group to live in isolation and 
they strengthen their collective religious identity, in flux since 2011, into 
more of a political identity. Sharing the elements and values of Arab, 
Syrian, Muslim, Sunni and Christian identity is a very good basis for 
constructing the open identity of young Alawites. On the other hand, 
modern young Alawites’ openness has been inhibited by territory, reli-
gious secretiveness and fear of Sunni hegemony.
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The Nation State VS. the Failed State and 
the Arab Upheaval in the Middle East
Kobi Michael, Yoel Guzansky1
Abstract The regional upheaval, which began eight years ago, has 
left its mark on the Middle East and has entirely changed the logic 
underlying its structure. Alongside the spillover of intrastate con-
flicts from failed states, we are witnessing the growing phenom-
enon of non-state actors, mostly Jihadi terror organizations, along-
side intervention of external entities that escalates the intrastate 
confrontation and, as a result, the failed state becomes even weak-
er. These two interwoven processes eventually lead to the rapid 
undermining of regional stability and international order and has 
the potential to drag the entire system into a chaotic and bloody fu-
ture. On the other hand, it might also be an opportunity to change 
the political order and system in such a way as to facilitate more 
stabilization of the region based on an alternative political model, 
one more suitable to the local political culture.
Keywords failed states, Middle East, state-building, non-state 
actors, Arab-Upheaval, Jihad, Islam
Introduction 
The tensions and rifts in each state fed into feelings of frustration and 
provided fertile ground for social protest which, in 2011, became a re-
gional phenomenon. This upheaval reinforced existing tensions and, in 
some cases, led to the toppling of a regime or undermined its legitimacy. 
Under these conditions, several of the states in the Arab world became 
caught up in bloody civil wars that in some cases led to the total disinte-
gration of the state structures. In contrast to the Arab republics, the eight 
1 This article is based on the book co-authored by the authors of this article, The Arab World 
on the Road to State Failure, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel-Aviv University, 
2017. 
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monarchies in the region – Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
states – managed to maintain their stability, although most of them are 
also artificial creations that suffer from structural deficiencies and are 
in danger of collapse. 
In order to understand how this Arab upheaval has accelerated the 
deterioration of functioning, although not efficiently, Arab states into 
failed states and the impact of these processes on the regional and inter-
national systems we will begin with a general presentation of the failed 
state phenomenon. We will then examine the general failure of the in-
ternational community’s efforts and strategies in addressing this phe-
nomenon along with the nature of the failed state, the rise of non-state 
entities, and the interconnections between them. We will describe the 
impact of failed states on international order and security and how failed 
states endanger both distant and neighboring states. We will conclude 
with an assessment of the future of the Arab World and discuss some 
options for tackling the huge challenges it faces.
The failed state phenomenon
The phenomenon of the failed state has received increasing attention 
in professional literature in recent decades. Alongside specialized jour-
nals that focus on issues related to the failed state, numerous books and 
research studies have been published on the subject and designated re-
search units have been created within intelligence organizations, such 
as the CIA, and within leading international organizations, such as the 
World Bank.
What is a Failed State anyway? A state is defined as “failed” when 
it demonstrates little to no ability to provide its citizens with human 
security (UN definition).2 A failed state is characterized by a weak cen-
tral government that is unable to govern. William Zartman views it as a 
risk and a challenge to the international community. He states that the 
phenomenon has two dimensions, an institutional-governmental dimen-
sion and a social dimension3, and these two dimensions are inter twined. 
In the social dimension the regime loses its legitimacy, while in the 
2 “Resolution 60/1 adopted by the General Assembly: 2005 World Summit Outcome”, UN 
General Assembly, 24 October, 2005. http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/I520EN.pdf
3 Zartman 1995: 1–11.
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institutional-governmental dimension it loses its ability to function and 
govern. Law and order consequently collapse, resulting in other entities 
(usually competitors and rivals) attempting to take over the regime or 
parts of it. 
A weak government is one whose legitimacy is limited or non-exist-
ent and which does not enjoy a monopoly on the means of violence. A 
state in the process of collapse is characterized by a paralysis of deci-
sion-making and the disintegration of social cohesion; the state is not 
able to maintain sovereignty or security within its territory. Under these 
conditions, the state ceases to be socio-economically relevant in the eyes 
of the population. Thus, residents no longer expect to receive basic ser-
vices from the state which has lost the ability to provide them. Every 
failed state has three prominent characteristics: weak governance and 
a lack of legitimacy, extreme political and societal fragmentation, and 
severe economic weakness. 
One of the important distinctions made by Zartman relates to the state 
failure process. He claims that in most cases the process is a gradual and 
prolonged one, rather than a sudden event such as a coup d’état or re-
volt. He also writes that states which suffer from internal disintegration 
(primarily because of identity politics – religious, ethnic, etc.), and are 
characterized at the same time by weak and sometimes non-functioning 
institutions, are liable to become failed states. In such states this failure 
intensifies in a kind of vicious cycle. Thus, the weakness of the state’s 
institutions reinforces the fragmentation, which in turn further weakens 
the institutions and their legitimacy.
Michael Hudson has examined the stability and strength of states on 
a spectrum from fragile states to stable and dynamic ones on the basis of 
two variables: the degree of political fragmentation (which is reflected 
in identity politics) and the degree of governmental effectiveness. Like 
Zartman, he also comes to the conclusion that when there is a low level 
of effectiveness and a high level of fragmentation there is a substantial 
danger to the stability of the state.4 
The lack of correlation between nation and state is a major cause of 
regional instability and domestic and regional conflict.5 This is particu-
4 Hudson 1977: 391.
5 Miller 2014.
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larly true if the various national or ethnic groups aspire to independ-
ence or view themselves as belonging to a neighboring state. In contrast, 
a country characterized by the existence of a correlation between na-
tion and territory is immediately more stable. The reality of the last two 
decades shows that most of the active conflicts going on today, including 
international terror, are the result of intrastate conflict.6 These typically 
develop in failed states and typically lead to a deterioration in their situ-
ation, undermining regional stability and security. In many cases failed 
states “export” their internal crises by directing violence at their neigh-
bors, aiming to reduce the threat at home (theory of diversion), and react 
aggressively to international pressure put on them because of this pat-
tern of behavior.7 In other words, the crises that develop in failed states 
have a kind of viral effect on their surroundings. The Arab upheaval is a 
clear example of this; it spread from country to country and from West 
to East until it encompassed large parts of the Arab world. 
The escalation of intrastate conflict into regional confrontation ex-
poses the neighbors of weak and failed states to numerous dangers that 
can undermine their stability and security. Thus, for example, we have 
seen how Saudi Arabia has been affected by the spread of internal con-
flict from Yemen; how Mali suffered from the spillover of the civil war 
in Libya onto its territory; how Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon have had to 
absorb millions of refugees from Syria; and how Israel is having to deal 
with terror based in the Sinai Peninsula because of Egypt’s severe dif-
ficulties in controlling most of that territory. 
Alongside the spillover of intrastate conflict from failed states, we 
witness the intervention of external players within the failed states to 
protect their interests. This includes, for example, Saudi Arabia’s war 
in Yemen against the Houthis-Shiites who are supported by Iran, and 
the dispatch of Iranian forces to Syria to assist Assad. This external 
intervention creates a vicious circle: the intervention escalates intrastate 
confrontation and the failed state becomes even weaker, thus “inviting” 
additional foreign intervention, and so on. Expansion in the activity of 
external entities is made possible by the weakness of the central gov-
ernment and the rapid expansion of the ungoverned periphery in those 
6 Coggins 2014.
7 Groff et al. 1983: 359–380.
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countries. At the same time, expansion in the activity of external en-
tities accelerates the processes of state failure. These two interwoven 
processes eventually lead to a rapid undermining of regional stability, a 
growing number of refugees, the collapse of the economic system, and 
stronger ties between terror and crime. 
According to The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, 33 states are 
defined as “fragile” or “in an advanced process of collapse”. Most the 
states in the most advanced stage of failure are those with a Muslim 
majority and those located in sub-Saharan Africa. The same index for 
2015 includes even more Arab states at higher levels of state failure, and 
in the index for 2016 Syria, Yemen and Iraq are at their higher levels 
ever where Yemen is ranked at the 4th place of the entire index and Syria 
at the 6th. The situation gets worst in the index for 2017 where Yemen 
remains at the 4th place but Syria deteriorates to the 5th and in the index 
for 2018, Yemen is at the 3rd place and Syria at the 4th.8 
The weakness of the international community’s 
response – irrelevant paradigm
Since failed states endanger stability and security well beyond their bor-
ders and since almost all past efforts to rehabilitate failed states have 
failed (the relative success in the Balkans is an exception), the time has 
come to develop new and efficient strategies through the adoption of 
more relevant solutions. Thus, for example, instead of clinging to the 
paradigm of united nation-states a new paradigm of federated states 
should perhaps be adopted that would facilitate the expression of reli-
gious, tribal, and ethnic identities. In Bosnia this strategy has been 
implemented relatively successfully through the creation of a federation 
of two autonomous regions. 
The international community only has limited ability to intervene 
in failed states, to suppress the violent rebel forces that operate in them, 
and to support the stabilization of the nation-states and the regional sys-
tem. These limits are the result of a lack of the political will needed to 
intervene in areas of conflict, the conceptual and operational weakness 
of peacekeeping and state-building missions, and the understanding that 
there is a limited lifespan for intervention in these areas. To these should 
8 Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/
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be added problems resulting from competition between aid organiza-
tions and the difficulties in coordinating between the various missions 
operating in regions of conflict, which reduce the chances of success 
even further and in many cases may even exacerbate or escalate the 
situation.9
The international community’s lack of interest in rehabilitating failed 
countries is also the result of experience – most of it negative – that has 
accumulated over the years from such rehabilitation missions. These 
missions are always very expensive and usually also involve combat and 
causalities that are not acceptable to public opinion in the West. Thus, 
public opinion in the West will not tolerate terrorist acts against military 
forces that have been sent to save lives and provide aid, as was the case 
in Somalia in 1993. Thus, the chaos in the Middle East is expected to 
continue for many years to come and the stable countries in the region, 
such as Israel, can expect to face additional tests in the future. 
Early warning signals that were not received
The latest UN Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) published on 
November 29, 2016 is the latest in a series of independent reports writ-
ten by leading scholars, most of whom hail from the Arab world. The 
report, like its predecessors, is highly critical of the Arab regimes and 
emphasized the fundamental problems of the Arab world. Lessons from 
the past 8 years of regional turmoil have not been learned as the Arab 
regimes are ruthlessly tough on dissent, and much less on its causes. 
Previous AHDR reports (2002–2009) raised alarm bells but no-one 
listened.10 
The Arab region has experienced the most rapid increase in war and 
violent conflict among all global regions over the past decade. The report 
continues and determines that the Middle East now encompasses “the 
largest number of countries that have become failed states and is home 
to the largest refugee and internally displaced population worldwide.” 
9 Cooke & Downie 2015.
10 Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development 
in a Changing Reality. United Nations Development Programme, 2016. http://www.arabstates. 
undp.org/content/dam/rbas/report/AHDR%20Reports/AHDR%202016/AHDR%20Final%20
2016/AHDR2016En.pdf
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Despite this important message and the plethora of information included 
in the reports, they received little attention in the West or in the Arab 
world. They did not induce any action or discussion at the state level to 
solve these problems either. The Arab media provided some exposure 
but focused mainly on the criticism of the reports, while researchers 
did not expend any significant intellectual, organizational or operational 
effort to study the reports or monitor the trends and phenomena pre-
sented and analyzed in them.11 
The global implications of failed states
Previous U.S. administrations have identified the threat to America’s na-
tional security in failed states,12 recognizing that the U.S. is increasingly 
threatened by fragile and failed states.13 Failed states export security 
threats and instability to their close and distant vicinities. In the Middle 
East context, they become greenhouses for extremist Jihadi terrorism. 
In 2014 alone the region, home to only 5% of the world’s population, ac-
counted for almost half of all terrorist attacks worldwide.14 They are the 
biggest generator of humanitarian crises, displaced people and refugees; 
they endanger regime stability in their neighboring countries; they en-
able access to sophisticated weapons stolen from the collapsing state 
militaries’ facilities; and they encourage subversive activities among 
Muslim communities in some Western countries in a way that may 
destabilize their internal social order. 
These changes are having a global impact, undermining global 
secur ity and deepening the rifts between the superpowers (such as be-
tween the US and Russia) and between the superpowers and their allies 
in the region (the crises in US-Egyptian and US-Saudi Arabian relations 
during the Obama administration). Failed states therefore become an 
international challenge to be tackled and the response to them cannot 
11 Fattah 2009. 
12 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, Washington, DC: The 
White House, September 2002. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf
13 “Remarks of President Barack Obama – State of the Union Address As Delivered”, The 
White House: Office of the Press Secretary, January 13, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-–-prepared-
delivery-state-union-address
14 Arab Human Development Report 2016.
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remain limited to a military one. To tackle such a complex political, 
societal, economic and security challenge the international community 
should formulate a comprehensive approach based on broad and deep 
cooperation between international actors as well as with local actors, in-
tegrating between political Top-Down and socio-economic Bottom-Up 
processes. Intellectual, operational, and economic efforts and resources 
should be devoted to this effort over a long period, with the understand-
ing that it is going to be a continuing process; there are no magic wands 
or quick fixes.
The failed state phenomenon and the Arab world
The organization of the region into states at the beginning of the previ-
ous century was a new experience for the Arab world which until then 
had been organized along the lines of clans, tribes and ethnic and reli-
gious groups (Egypt being an exception). Each of these groups gener-
ally sought to live within its own defined territory, particularly in the 
case of minority groups (such as the Druze in the Druze mountains, the 
Christians in the mountains of Lebanon, and the Yazidis in the Sinjar 
Mountains). 
The nation-states, and particularly the Arab republics, remained rela-
tively stable because their dictators ruled them with an iron fist. In ad-
dition, they tried to achieve legitimacy by establishing social ideologies 
(such as Nasserite socialism whose central component was the redistri-
bution of wealth in Egypt) and national ideologies (such as pan-Arabism) 
alongside the reinforcement of national sentiment. One of the methods 
used to strengthen national sentiment was the attempt to give it histori-
cal roots. Thus, for example, Saddam Hussein, ruler of Iraq, tried to cre-
ate a myth according to which the Iraqi people were the descendants of 
the Babylonians. However, the sources of legitimacy and mechanisms of 
control that developed over the years were not able to withstand the mass 
protests and regional upheaval, and many “national creations” have now 
fragmented into their constituent parts. 
The trends of rapid globalization, the collapse of the USSR (which 
had been a stabilizing global force), the widening of the Sunni-Shiite rift 
in the Arab world, and the rise of Salafi-Jihadi organizations, including 
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Al Qaeda and ISIS, have all accelerated the disintegration of the Arab 
nation-state.
The phenomenon of the failed state in the Arab world is not a new 
one; it existed even before the current upheaval in the region. How ever, 
because of the upheaval, the situation of states that were already in vari-
ous stages of failure has deteriorated. The Arab upheaval has under-
mined the geopolitical logic that structures the Arab world. This logic 
rests on the organization of states based on the territorial nation-state 
model, which includes an authoritative central government and clear 
borders. Several of these states, such as Yemen, Libya, and Syria, no 
longer exist in the form of a coherent state with a central government 
capable of imposing its authority in most parts of its territory (Syria has 
improved its ruling capacity with the help of Russia and Iran that still 
present on the Syrian soil and support the Syrian regime and without 
their support the Syrian reime is nat capable to control the entire coun-
try). These states have become arenas of violent and bloody conflicts. 
The weakness of their central governments and their loss of control over 
organized violence have led to the expansion of ungoverned peripher-
ies, enabling Jihadi organizations and foreign elements to penetrate into 
these states’ territories and to challenge central governments, systemati-
cally undermining state structures. 
Non-state actors are undermining the logic of the Arab territorial 
nation-state and are seeking to reshape the Arab world. They are erasing 
existing borders and establishing new entities, such as the Sunni Islamic 
Caliphate (the Islamic State) and the independent Shiite enclaves (Hiz-
bollah in Syria and Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen) which are loyal 
to Iran, operating as its proxies and benefiting from Iranian support. 
The expected improvement in Iran’s economy as a result of the nuclear 
agreement signed in July 2015 exploited by Iran in order to undermine 
the stability of Sunni regimes in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia; 
this is in turn expected to undermine the stability of the region even 
further and facilitate its hegemonic aspirations. 
As the nation-states in the Middle East continue to disintegrate, the 
power of non-state actors, e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIS and other radical 
Sunni movements has increased. These non-state actors are exploiting 
the vacuum created by the weakness of the central governments in many 
countries to establish their influence. Some of them like ISIS, Hamas 
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and Hezbollah have even become semi-states that rule territory and pro-
vide inhabitants with at least some of the services that a state provides. 
Although ISIS lost almost its entire territories, it continues fighting and 
challenging the Iraqi and Syrian regimes and inspiring other organiza-
tions affiliated with and many individuals committing terror in the Mid-
dle East and beyond.
The deterioration of many Arab states towards the status of a failed 
state due to regional upheaval proves that the most serious threats were 
never external but rather internal. It was mainly domestic opponents 
which opposed the regimes trying to establish their legitimacy, as was 
the case in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, the Palestinian Authority and, to 
some extent, Egypt. 
The chances of the new regimes (including the existing regime in 
Syria) establishing themselves despite their many opponents were and 
still are influenced by several factors including national unity (lower 
level of fragmentation and a sense of a shared ethos), political and func-
tional stability, the efficiency of the state’s institutions, the state’s eco-
nomic resources, and its military power. A combination of all these fac-
tors determines how the new regimes respond to consolidate their rule. 
In all the cases we are familiar with in the Middle East this combination 
of factors has led to greater violence and the intensification of intrastate 
conflict. These have become an even greater threat to the stability of the 
new regimes and have served as catalysts for regional instability. 
It is reasonable to assume that there will not be any major or rapid 
improvement in the situation of the weak and failed states in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Furthermore, one can predict that in the short 
and medium terms instability will spread to additional states and will 
deepen in states that are already unstable today.15 This trend does not 
bode well for security in the region and could negatively influence in-
ternational order. 
The Arab world after almost nine years of upheaval is not in any way 
like how it was previously. Many Arab republican nation-states, which 
survived and functioned for years only because they were ruled by auto-
cratic regimes that relied on a brutal security apparatus, oppression and 
intimidation, are now in an accelerated process of state failure. Several 
15 Guzansky & Berti 2013.
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of them are in the process of disintegration and it is reasonable to assume 
that this trend will lead in the end to their disappearance as the territo-
rial nation states we used to know. They will be replaced by states or 
other entities functioning at various levels of stability and responsibility, 
which will necessarily influence the stability of the region. 
Despite the geostrategic changes due to this regional upheaval, it 
would be premature to write off the nation-state. Nation-states which to-
day are relatively stable, such as Egypt, will probably continue to exist in 
some familiar form and perhaps new and stable nation-states will arise, 
such as a Kurdish state. In contrast, the chances are slim that Syria, 
Libya, Yemen and possibly even Iraq will manage to return to their for-
mer situations primarily because neither the Iraqi, Syrian, Yemeni, nor 
Libyan people ever existed; all of them suffer from deep political and 
societal fragmentation. Their only chance of survival is most likely in 
the form of a loose federation in which ethnic and religious minorities 
and tribes enjoy broad autonomy. To impose such a model on the Middle 
East two conditions need to be fulfilled which now seem unlikely: mas-
sive intervention and the destruction of the Islamic State. 
There is one additional option which is to build many states upon 
the ruins of today’s failed states along ethnic and religious lines. These 
would be relatively small states but more coherent and stable. Thus, for 
example, Iraq could be split into three states – Shiite, Sunni and Kurd-
ish – and similarly Syria could be split into Alawite, Sunni and Kurdish 
states. 
The rise of non-state actors and their destabilizing impact
The process of state failure in the region and the total collapse of some 
countries into chaos have led to an expansion of ungoverned peripher-
ies. These regions have become incubators for terrorist organizations 
and non-state actors of various types, serving as their “launch sites” to 
the rest of the region. This expansion is accomplished by establishing 
a territorial continuum or by creating a network structure without any 
geographic continuum. ISIS, for example, has created for itself a com-
bination of a territorial continuum (such as in Syria and Iraq) and a net-
work expansion without territorial continuum in Sinai, Libya, Yemen, 
the Gaza Strip and even Nigeria (by means of organizations such as 
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Ansar Bait el Maqdis in Sinai, a.k.a. Willayat Sina, which has sworn al-
legiance to the Islamic State and its leader). 
New semi-state entities have arisen, built on the ruins of failed states 
in the Middle East. On the one hand they are no longer simply organi-
zations but on the other hand they are not states either and can be re-
ferred to as hybrid non-state actors.16 These hybrid actors develop supra-
national identity characteristics and operate in the name of a universal 
ideology. All of these organizations reject the Arab nation-state model 
and do not recognize borders. They undermine regional and global sta-
bility and their political goal is to fundamentally change the existing 
situation, creating an Islamic caliphate in the entire region and, at a later 
stage, even beyond it. They use violence extensively in order to intimi-
date their opponents and make efficient use of social networks. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, despite their universal ideo-
logy, these are organizations that are territorially based, at least at this 
stage. ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Hizbollah 
in South Lebanon and the Beqa Valley control extensive territories and 
large populations whose day-to-day needs must be provided for.
Summary and conclusions 
The regional upheaval, which began eight years ago, has left its mark 
on the Middle East and has entirely changed the logic underlying its 
structure. The escalation of intrastate conflict into regional confronta-
tion exposes neighbors of weak and failed states to numerous dangers 
that can undermine their stability and security. Thus, for example, we 
have seen how Saudi Arabia has been affected by the spread of internal 
conflict from Yemen; how Mali suffered from the spillover of the civil 
war in Libya onto its territory; how Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon have 
had to absorb millions of refugees from Syria; and how Israel is having 
to deal with terror based in the Sinai Peninsula because Egypt no longer 
controls most of that territory. 
Alongside the spillover of intrastate conflicts from failed states, we 
are witnessing the intervention of external entities within the failed 
states in order to protect their interests. This includes, for example, Sau-
di Arabia’s war in Yemen against the Houthis-Shiites supported by Iran, 
16 Valensi 2015. 
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and the dispatch of Russian and Iranian forces to Syria in addition to 
Hezbollah and other Shiite militias in order to assist Assad. This exter-
nal intervention creates a vicious circle: the intervention escalates the 
intrastate confrontation and, as a result, the failed state becomes even 
weaker, thus “inviting” additional foreign intervention, and so on. As 
a result of this process, the intrastate conflict becomes a regional one, 
perhaps even an international one, and should therefore be defined as an 
“interlocked conflict”.17 
These two interwoven processes eventually lead to the rapid under-
mining of regional stability, a growing number refugees, the collapse 
of the economic system, and stronger ties between terror and crime. 
The reconstruction missions usually ignore the link between terror and 
crime and, as a result, reduce the chances of their own success.18 The 
tragic outcome of this reality is reduced security for millions of people 
in the region. 
The international community only has limited ability to intervene 
in failed states, to suppress the violent rebel forces that operate in them, 
and to support the stabilization of the nation-states and the regional sys-
tem. These limits are the result of a lack of the political will needed to 
intervene in areas of conflict, the conceptual and operational weakness 
of peacekeeping and state-building missions, and the understanding that 
there is a limited lifespan for intervention in these areas. To these should 
be added the problems resulting from competition between aid organiza-
tions and the difficulties in coordinating between the various missions 
operating in regions of conflict, reducing the chances of success even 
further and in many cases perhaps even exacerbating or escalating the 
situation.19 
The international community’s lack of interest in reconstructing 
failed states is also the result of experience – most of it negative – that 
has accumulated over the years from such reconstruction missions. 
These missions are always very expensive and usually also involve com-
bat and causalities that are not acceptable to public opinion in the West. 
Thus, public opinion in the West will not tolerate terrorist acts against 
military forces that have been sent to save lives and provide assistance, 
17 Kriesberg 1980: 99–119.
18 Kemp 2015.
19 Pullman 2010; see also Cooke & Downie 2015. 
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as was the case in Somalia in 1993. As a result, chaos in the Middle East 
is expected to continue for many years to come and the stable countries 
in the region, such as Israel, can expect to face additional tests in the 
future. 
By 2020 almost three out of four Arabs, predicts the 2016 AHDR, 
will live in a failed state. The findings of the report led researchers to 
the conclusion that wide-ranging reforms are needed in the Arab world 
– reforms whose main purpose is to realize the regime’s responsibility 
to its citizens and strengthen the rule of law. These reforms therefore 
need to include, among others, a formal separation of powers; lessened 
use of emergency decrees that provide the regime with almost unlim-
ited power to prevent opposition activity; and judicial oversight of se-
curity mechanisms. In addition, 2016 AHDR researchers recommended 
reforms that would strengthen civil society and provide equal rights to 
all citizens, women and various minority groups that are generally dis-
criminated against and excluded from the political process. According 
to the researchers, these reforms – alongside essential economic reforms 
– would help stabilize the Arab countries’ economies and would also 
improve pan-Arabic cooperation, something which is needed to improve 
the functioning of regional organizations. The researchers viewed these 
outcomes as essential to achieving regional development. 
At the end of the day and after eight turbulent years the Arab world 
is facing, almost on its own, one of its most difficult periods. Up until 
this point almost all the countries that have experienced regime change 
have been suffering from one level or other of instability. It is a danger 
and a challenge to regional and international order and has the potential 
to drag the entire system into a chaotic and bloody future. On the other 
hand, it might also be an opportunity to change the political order and 
system in such a way as to facilitate more stabilization of the region 
based on an alternative political model, one more suitable to the local 
political culture. Only courageous, determined domestic and inter-
national leadership will stand a chance of converting this threat into an 
opportunity. Unfortunately, we are left to wonder whether such a thing 
exists.
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Saudi Arabia and the New Era 
on the World Oil Market
Yossi Mann
Abstract The 2014 oil crisis which brought about a sharp fall in oil 
prices has caused a severe economic crisis in Saudi Arabia. More 
than anything, however, the oil crisis has engendered the need for 
the Saudi government to reconsider its approach toward the oil mar-
ket and its ability to rely on “black gold” as a long-term major source 
of income. This article aims to present the 2014 oil crisis as a turning 
point in Saudi Arabia’s position on the global oil market and as an 
event that has limited OPEC’s power to determine oil prices. The 
article seeks to analyze the factors that led to the change in the oil 
market, the effects of the crisis on Saudi oil policy, and finally to 
examine the implications of the decline in oil prices on Saudi social, 
political and economic domestic policy.
Keywords 2014 oil crisis, Saudi Arabia, OPEC, global oil market.
2016 was a crucial year for Saudi Arabia. The kingdom faced signifi-
cant challenges from almost every point of view, although it is still too 
early to determine the effects on the country’s character. The war in the 
Yemen, the economic crisis brought about by the collapse of the oil mar-
ket, the changes in the royal household after the death of King Abdallah, 
the measures to curb the Sunni religious establishment via the limitation 
of power within the morality police, the execution of a Shi’ite leader, as 
well as the increasingly aggressive foreign policy against Iran, have all 
created a new reality in the conservative country.1
Saudi Arabia wears two hats in its role as an international player: that 
of its status as guardian of the holy Islamic cities and that of its power 
on the global oil market. From the very beginning, local groups such 
1 Blanchard 2016: 1–16. 
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as the people of Hejaz tried to undermine the legitimacy of the House 
of Saud, and, more recently, Salafi political groups such as the Muslim 
Brothers and Jihadist groups such as El Qaida have openly declared that 
the House of Saud no longer represents the values of Islam and that the 
title held by the King of Saudi Arabia is therefore null and void. How-
ever, despite this disagreement over the role and significance of the man 
who holds the title of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”, insofar as 
oil is concerned, Saudi Arabia has proudly boasted the position of most 
important player on the global oil market. Nonetheless, the oil crisis that 
erupted in 2014 shook the kingdom both domestically and internation-
ally. Domestically, the crisis caused a change in economic priorities and 
brought about an enterprising plan called “2030”, the aim of which is 
to reduce dependence on oil, whereas on the international sphere Saudi 
Arabia’s image as the power that can shape the oil market and continue 
to hold the unofficial position of most important player was severely 
damaged. In that respect, the recent oil crisis has changed Saudi Arabia’s 
perception of the oil market, and, worse, has affected how Saudi Arabia 
is perceived in terms of its role in the industry.2
Oil prices decreased sharply from 115 dollars a barrel in 2014 to 27 
dollars a barrel in August 2015. It is not the first time that oil prices have 
fallen by almost 80 percent in a very short period of time. It happened 
in 2008 as a result of the subprime crisis when prices dropped from al-
most 150 dollars to 33 dollars a barrel. There are many reasons for the 
decrease in oil price in 2014 such as the end of the embargo on Iran, the 
shale oil revolution, including new technologies that improved produc-
tion rates in U.S oil wells, lower demand for oil from Eastern markets 
– mainly from China, and the Iraqi oil industry which, despite local 
threats from terror organizations, increased production from 1.2 million 
barrels a day in 2005 to almost 3.5 million barrels a day. Furthermore, 
in April 2014 global banks such as Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Credit 
Suisse and others decided to reduce their investments in commodities, 
particularly oil, and invest in US dollars or equities instead.3
This crisis has had much more impact on Middle Eastern oil-produc-
ing countries than other oil crises. For decades, traders and researchers 
2 Ibid.; Vision 2030, 2016: 1–6. 
3 Spot Prices 2016: 1.
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believed that the big oil producers, and mainly Saudi Arabia, had a sig-
nificant influence on the price of oil. They claimed that the price of 
crude oil was based mainly on the needs and interests of the oil-pro-
ducing states, in particular OPEC member states, and not on production 
cost.4 The fact that the oil market makes up 99% of the total Iraqi export 
market, 83% of that of Saudi Arabia and 63% of that of Iran, 5shaped the 
assumption that countries that rely on oil would try to influence prices 
in order to meet their budget requirements. As a result, those involved in 
the oil market assumed that minimum oil prices would change accord-
ing to the budgetary objectives of the leading oil-producing countries.6 
According to this assumption, a decline in oil prices below the target 
according to which those countries established their budgets could dam-
age their ability to implement the economic policies they had decided 
upon when setting those annual budgets. Many therefore believed that 
the common interest of the countries that relied on oil, and in particu-
lar those who were members of OPEC, was to strive for agreement and 
effective cooperation in order to reduce production and raise prices in 
such a way that they could satisfy the needs of all of the oil-producing 
countries. Indeed, a lack of correlation between oil prices and budgetary 
needs could, in extreme cases, undermine a country’s stability due to the 
fact that substantial amounts of money that come from oil profits are al-
located to welfare in order to buy political stability. That assumption was 
put to the test in several cases where oil prices collapsed, such as during 
the sub-prime crisis in 2008 when WTI oil prices slumped from 147 
dollars per barrel in August 2008 to 33 dollars per barrel in November 
20087. As a result, the OPEC states decided to coordinate their extrac-
tion rates in order to minimize damage to their economies. That same 
policy was enforced in 1998 when the OPEC countries underwent a deep 
financial crisis following the economic crash in East Asia; oil prices 
then decreased from 20.5 dollars per barrel in November 1997 to 10.5 
dollars in December 1998. As a result, the OPEC states worked together 
4 Adelman 2004: 16.
5 Saudi Arabia Country Analysis Brief 2014: 1; Iraq Country Analysis Brief 2016: 1; Iran 
country Analysis Brief 2015: 1. 
6 Bassam Fattouh 2007: 6.
7 Adelman 2004: 16.
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to adjust production rates in order to ensure that prices not dip below the 
10 dollar line for very long.8 
The 2015 oil crisis brought about a re-examination of old assump-
tions as to how the oil industry is run. Based on expectations that those 
assumptions were valid, many researchers, traders and oil-producing 
countries sustained heavy financial losses together with an understand-
ing that market conditions have changed and that the old assumptions 
were no longer valid. 9More than anything, people now realized that 
OPEC but more precisely Saudi Arabia is no longer able to run the pro-
duction rate effectively and thereby influence the price of oil. Even be-
fore the crisis, many realized that the declarations of intention of OPEC 
leaders after summit conferences were ineffective and impossible to im-
plement and this caused the financial markets to lose interest in the oil 
ministers’ decisions. 10For example, there were a number of OPEC con-
ferences in different world capitals in 2015 and 2016 during which they 
sought a formula that would be acceptable to all the members of the or-
ganization and which would ensure effective coordination and produc-
tion cutbacks to bring about a target price that might reflect the needs of 
all OPEC member countries. Despite high expectations that a common 
policy could be established, each conference has ended with a decision 
not to decide, except for the one that took place in Algeria in September 
2016 when it was decided that, by the end of November 2016,11 members 
would cut production, even though it was not stipulated who would cut 
and by how much. In addition, on November 17th 2016, Saudi oil minis-
ter Al-Falih urged OPEC members to accept any agreement that would 
enforce production cuts even though he does not have the ability to im-
pose the proposal on them.12
The energy crisis in 2015 exposed all of OPEC’s problems and 
those of the Saudi leadership in particular. By now, the organization 
had earned itself the problematic nickname “the clumsy cartel”.13 In-
deed, a number of problems that had arisen throughout the years turned 
8 Mabro 1998: 1–3. 
9 Foxman 2015: 1.
10 Attasi 2016: 1.
11 Sheppard, 2016: 1.
12 Shamseddine 2016: 2.
13 Adelman 2004: 16.
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the tables and changed assumptions about the organization’s ability to 
survive the current crisis. For example, the sanctions imposed on Iran 
by the West in order to make it suspend its uranium enrichment program 
caused, in the short term, great damage to Iranian oil production but also 
had a severe impact on OPEC. 14 According to estimates, the economic 
sanctions caused Iran to reduce oil production from three million barrels 
a day to one million barrels between 2011 and 2013. The market share 
that Iran lost in China, Japan and South Korea due to these sanctions 
was taken up by others such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Iraq, and now that the sanctions have been lifted the Islamic 
Republic is demanding back its share of the Asian market. 15 Iran also 
lost significant business in Southern Europe when a number of OPEC 
members – mainly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, together with Russia 
which has oil of a similar quality to that of the Islamic Republic – took 
over its business in Greece, Spain and Italy. Here, too, Iran is battling to 
regain the market it has lost.16 
OPEC’s inability to reach an agreement on who should make cuts in 
order to give Iran its share back is a mere reflection of the fact that, as far 
back as the 1980s, the organization was unable to impose organizational 
discipline and divide up the quotas in a way that satisfied all members; 
nor was it able to ensure that all members stick to the production rates 
to which they had committed. Unstable political relations and the eth-
nic tensions between the Shi’ite rulers in Iran and the Saudi Wahhabis, 
which increased with the execution of a major Shi’ite preacher in the 
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 2016, have made it even more dif-
ficult to reach an agreement. Moreover, every country that was asked to 
cut production when Iran came back onto the market has its own prob-
lems, which has made it hard to reach an agreement on the distribution 
of quotas. 17 
The Iraqi government, for example, claimed that reducing production 
for the sake of Iran is not possible after years of security problems, the 
severe economic damage caused by the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, and the domestic conflict taking place in Iraq between different 
14 Iran country Analysis Brief 2015: 1.
15 Saudi Arabia maintained crude oil market share in Asia in the first half of 2015: 1.
16 Iran country Analysis Brief 2015: 1.
17 Zhdannikov 2016: 1.
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sects.18 Libya, which has also undergone years of political crisis, gradu-
ally re-entered the oil market in 2016 after years of unprecedented de-
cline in production, thereby causing an additional flooding of the market 
without having coordinated production quantities with the other OPEC 
members. Like Iraq, Libyan leaders claimed that the country’s bleak 
economic situation has forced them to look after their own national in-
terest before any commitment to the OPEC states. As a result, OPEC oil 
production rose to 32.73 million barrels a day in August 2016 and 33.54 
million barrels a day in October 2016, well above the target of 30 million 
barrels that the organization had set in order to reduce production so as 
to ensure a target price that might reflect the aspirations of all member 
countries of the cartel.19
Internal conflict in OPEC has made the Saudi situation even worse 
due to the strengthening of the American oil industry. According to the 
Baker Hughes energy agency, there were about 1600 active oil rigs in 
the United States at the beginning of 2015, while there were only 150 in 
January 2009.20 As a result of technological changes, production across 
the United States rose sharply and in July 2015 the Americans were pro-
ducing 9.6 million barrels a day, while they had been producing 5.844 
million in January 2012.21 This sharp increase in American production 
caused a decrease of imports from OPEC states and increased competi-
tion for the world’s largest oil market. Moreover, increased production 
brought about yet another flooding of the market at a time when coun-
tries such as Iran, Iraq and, to a certain extent, Libya were making a 
comeback. But, more than anything else, the oil price drop was a warn-
ing signal for OPEC. Although it severely affected the oil industry in 
the United States and brought about the closure of about one thousand 
oil rigs, the price drop also exposed the relatively low production costs 
and America’s ability to recover quickly and return to full operation 
once prices rise. This means that, even if Saudi Arabia managed to get 
OPEC members to agree upon production rates in order to adapt prices 
to a target budget acceptable to all, a price increase would mainly assist 
the United States in reopening their oil rig activity, at the expense of the 
18 OPEC production estimates 2015: 1.
19 OPEC Crude oil output 2016.
20 Rig Count Overview and Summary Count 2016: 1.
21 Weekly U.S Field Production of Crude Oil 2016: 1.
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OPEC states. Indeed, innovative American technology has resulted in 
the ability to have oil wells that are flexible to being opened and closed 
according to prices, and returning to full operation is now much more 
rapid than it was in the past.22 The great revolution, therefore, is in the 
fact that it is now much harder for OPEC to set target prices than in the 
past, and the cartel now understands that this is not only due to internal 
problems within the organization but also to the new structure of the 
American market.23
The new situation on the oil market has compelled OPEC states to 
change their policies. Rather than striving to seek a target price, they 
have begun to compete against one another over market share, and in 
particular over the Asian market. The quest for a price that would suit 
their needs has given way to trying to conquer the market by offering 
discounts. 24The main struggle is between the three most important 
players in the Middle Eastern oil market, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, 
who have been competing over markets in China, South Korea, Japan 
and another rising power, India. Indeed, in October 2016 the Reuters 
News Agency announced that Iran had taken back the title of leading oil 
supplier to India after years of Saudi dominance in the Indian market. 
Moreover, since August 2016 Iran has intensified its efforts to take the 
Polish market away from Russia and Saudi Arabia in order to enter new 
markets in East-Central Europe. The struggle intensified due to the fact 
that Iran, which had been out of the game during the embargo, sought 
to procure the market at any cost by offering discounts once the sanc-
tions were lifted and the prices crashed. The oil-producing countries are 
therefore no longer thinking in terms of cooperation but seeking their 
share of the market, which will impact the way Middle Eastern countries 
use oil as a main source of their economy. 25
As a result of this new situation, it seems that people are beginning 
to think differently about the most tradable commodity in the world 100 
years after oil became an important international asset. For the first time 
the leaders of the Middle East feel that their power to determine oil prices 
is very limited and, as a result, that they now have to make significant 
22 Drilling Productivity Report 2016: 1.
23 Carrole, 2016: 2–7.
24 Russell 2016: 1; Wilkin 2016: 1.
25 Zhdannikov 2016: 1.
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changes to their economic policies. Indeed, the new assumptions are that 
the oil-producing countries in the Middle East will have to rethink their 
domestic policies and, in view of the difficulty in determining oil price, 
they will need to create a diversified economy that is not dependent on 
oil.26 
The implication of the new situation in the oil market is that the lead-
ers of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East, and mainly Saudi 
Arabia, will need to reassess their domestic policies. The Saudis will 
have to create a diversified economy that is not dependent only on oil. 
Indeed, the Saudi leadership claimed that they are about to raise taxes, 
cut subsidies on fuel, water and food, and even decrease their expenses 
on education and welfare. They have also made declarations regarding 
ARAMCO, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, whereby they will 
consider raising money on the stock exchange in return for equities. In 
April 2016, Muhammad bin Salman, son of the current king and the 
most popular prince with the young population in Saudi Arabia, gave an 
interview to the Bloomberg News Agency in which he spent six hours 
presenting his vision and plans for the steps the Saudi royal family will 
take in order to diversify the economy. He said, for example, that the 
government would invest 2 trillion dollars in leading Western compa-
nies such as Google, Facebook and Twitter. Moreover, the Saudi leader-
ship has even called for a new era whereby, instead of investing in oil 
and gas reserves, they would focus on the local automobile manufactur-
ing industry and invest in renewable energy such as wind farms and 
solar energy.27 
The desire to diversify the economy at a time when oil prices are low, 
however, requires structural changes and ideological flexibility if they 
wish to compete with the emerging Asian and Western markets. While 
there was once mere talk of the need for economic diversification, it has 
now become a necessity, and economic and social change will have to 
be imposed in the very near future. At this stage it is too early to assess 
the Saudi economic revolution but the fact that a new generation is now 
leading the kingdom towards a new future cannot be ignored. That gen-
eration, unlike the past one, believes that it can change things and indeed 
26 Saudi Arabia beyond Oil 2015: 1–15. 
27 Waldman 2016: 1–2.
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they will have to lead their people towards a new future and give them 
hope for a better economy.28
Summary and conclusion
A few years after the “Arab Spring” crisis that erupted in the Middle 
East in the winter of 2010, the oil market underwent a crisis no less 
severe. A sequence of events, which has included technological changes 
and unsurmountable rifts between OPEC states, has shifted Saudi Ara-
bia into a new position on the global oil market. The Saudi reaction in-
dicates that, unlike previous ones, this is not just another passing crisis 
but an occurrence that has changed the market as we have previously 
known it. It seems that Saudi Arabia realizes the extent of this change 
and is trying to minimize damage via a new oil policy aiming to conquer 
markets particularly in East Asia but also in Central Europe. It has also 
made the strategic decision to diversify its economy at all costs because 
it realizes that time is running out. In that respect, the Saudi royal fam-
ily will be under scrutiny in the coming years, especially with regard to 
its ability to diversify its country’s economy and, at all costs, reduce its 
dependence on oil prices. This will have to happen before the impact of 
the revolution can be fully felt.
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The Roots of Israeli Strategic Culture1
Itamar Rickover
Abstract This article offers to discuss the culturalist approach in se-
curity studies and to focus on strategic culture. The aim is to exam-
ine the roots of Israeli strategic culture and characterize it. “Strategic 
culture” can be defined as an integrated system of values, symbols 
and practices (norms, procedures and traditions) that shape political-
security behavior over a prolonged period of time. The examination 
of the characterization of a country’s strategic culture is carried out 
by comparing changes between current strategic culture and early 
strategic culture. In order to define strategic culture several factors 
are thoroughly tested: the role of war in the eyes of society; how that 
society sees its relationship with the enemy; the perception of the 
effectiveness of using force; and practices (norms, procedures and 
traditions) which accumulate over the years and regulate the rela-
tionship between the various elites. Three indicators are considered 
as reflecting a strategic culture: (1) Symbols and images (2) Milita-
rism (3) A system of norms, traditions and procedures that regulate 
the rules of conduct between the military and political echelons. A 
synergy of all factors taken together creates the “strategic culture of 
a state” which is greater than the sum of its parts. In this article I will 
describe how Israel’s strategic culture has developed and how Israeli 
strategic culture gradually developed into an activist-offensive stra-
tegic culture.
Keywords strategic culture, culturalist approach in security stud-
ies, symbols and images, militarism, norms, traditions, procedures, 
military and political echelons, Israel
1 I wish to thank Professor Yagil Levy from the Open University in Israel, for his helpful 
advice, guidance and comments on an earlier draft.
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Introduction
There is a consensus that security has been a fundamental element of 
society from the independence of the State of Israel until today. How-
ever, according to the values of the Yishuv (the Jewish community or 
settlement in Palestine during the 19th century and until the formation of 
the state of Israel in 1948), guard duty was regarded not just as an insig-
nificant assignment but was also perceived as an evasion from manual 
labor. In security studies there are two main approaches that explain the 
creation of operational strategy: the “Materialistic Approach” and the 
“Cultural Approach”. Friedrich Hegel, a German philosopher who sup-
ported the Materialistic Approach, believed that thoughts originate from 
the tangible world, are understood according to a determinate logic, and 
provide the world with structure and form.2 
In contrast to the Materialistic Approach, the Cultural Approach is 
inter-subjective, non-materialistic and non-rational. The latter focuses 
on ideas, identities and values as the pillars of the material world.3 In 
strategy and security studies the Cultural Approach can be examined 
through four main approaches: organizational culture, political culture, 
global culture, and strategic culture.
This article proposes to explore the Cultural Approach while focus-
ing on the strategic culture technique as the method of examination. 
According to  Iain Johnston the currently acceptable definition of the 
term “strategic culture”  is an integrative system of values, symbols, 
images, and practices that to a large extent determine the long-lasting 
grand strategic preferences of political-security behavior.4 The influence 
of the elements of the strategic culture is not measured in days but rather 
over a long period of time and is usually the result of several events. 
Strategic culture is of great significance as society embraces its values 
and, after internalization, as these values become an integral part of the 
state’s procedures in security events. A society that has internalized the 
values of strategic culture may respond to various events in a manner 
that can be assessed and predicted.
2 Hegel 2010.
3 Copeland 2000: 187–212; Wendt 1992: 391–425.
4 Johnston 1995: 33–64. 
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In cases where the values of the strategic culture are internalized 
within the state, it is quite easy to assess the state’s response to differ-
ent events.5 The cultural aspect is of great importance, especially in a 
modern state, wherein there is a need for the existence of an army that 
emerges from the people. Strategic culture affects social structure and 
paves the way for the formation of operational strategy, especially when 
related to a new country.
This article aims to emphasize the importance and contribution of 
the term “strategic culture” in security studies. This field has become 
increasingly more important in academic research around the world 
in recent years. The strategic culture of several countries such as the 
European countries, the European Union and NATO, and Asian coun-
tries like Russia, India, China and Japan in particular, is a topic that has 
been extensively explored.6 Studies dealing in depth with Israeli strate-
gic culture, in general, and its impact on a step-by-step decision-making 
process, in particular, are lacking. This article attempts, if only in some 
small way, to shed light on this topic.
The purpose of this article is twofold: firstly it is intended to examine 
the formation of Israeli strategic culture. The second purpose is to ex-
amine the impact of Strategic Culture on the formulation of a defensive 
or offensive strategy. To accomplish these two purposes I will describe 
and illustrate several related events. In particular, I will refer only to key 
elements and not to the whole scenario as my purpose here is to describe 
how these key elements have helped to characterize and establish Israeli 
strategic culture. 
This article includes several chapters. In the Theoretical Chapter I 
will conduct a short literature review, define the term “strategic culture”, 
and then describe how to analyze the Strategic Culture of a country. 
The Analysis Chapter will begin with an historical summary of a Pre-
state. In that discussion I will combine “theory” and “practice” and illus-
trate how all the elements of the Strategic Culture have formed into one 
Israeli Strategic Culture. The last chapter will be reserved for a summa-
ry and conclusions. The theoretical and empirical literature used herein 
5 Galin 1996: 209–211.
6 Paul and Geoffrey 2001: 587–603; Paul and Geoffrey 2005: 801–820; Dellios 1997; 
Rynning 2003: 479–496; Glenn at al. 2004.
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includes diverse sources such as books, articles, research papers and re-
ports of commissioned inquiries.
Literature dealing with a definition of the term “Strategic Culture”
Research in the field of the Strategic Culture of countries is relatively 
new. Literature discussing this topic can be divided into three main cat-
egories: (1) literature dealing with the theoretical definition of the term 
“Strategic Culture”; (2) literature dealing with the question of whether a 
Cultural approach, in general, and Strategic Culture, in particular, can 
replace a Materialistic approach in political science; and (3) literature 
that analyzes the strategic culture of countries and its influence on the 
decision-making process. This article will focus mainly on the third 
category.
The first generation of researchers appeared in the late 1970s. Jack 
Snyder was the first researcher to use the term “Strategic Culture” and 
he defined it as “a set of visions, emotional responses and behavioral 
patterns of decision-makers that have developed over the years, and are 
shared with each other in the context of forming the nuclear strategy of 
a country.”7 In spite of innovation in the development of the concept, 
this definition has several disadvantages such as being cumbersome and 
having many variables that can each be independent. Moreover, Snyder 
has not addressed some essential issues in the definition such as what 
the starting point of a Strategic Culture is and whether and how Strategic 
Culture changes over time.8
In the mid-1980s Strategic Culture was perceived as an element of 
superiority in strategic decision-making; this perception established the 
idea that a state can legitimately use violence against its enemies. Klein9 
argues that Strategic Culture is a product of historical experience. Since 
there is a great difference between a Strategic Culture and behavior in 
practice, actual behavior is a reflection of how much interest a state has 
in making a strategic decision. The second generation of researchers 
7 Snyder 1977: 8–9.
8 Johnston 1995.
9 Klein 1991: 3–23.
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faces the major problem of defining the relationship between Strategic 
Culture and the actual action in practice.10
The third generation of researchers appeared in the 1990s. This gen-
eration of scholars maintained diversity in the definition of culture as an 
independent variable and paid less attention to strategic decisions as a 
dependent variable such as we see in military culture, political culture 
and organizational culture. However, these researchers’ definitions are 
not significantly different from those of other cultural models such as 
organizational culture, political, etc., and according to their unclear defi-
nition it seems that the term “Strategic Culture” is not unique. 
Controversy among theoretical approaches
Many researchers believe that the dominant paradigm is materialistic.11 
In the foundation of the materialistic approach there is an assumption 
that the independent material world directly influences reality. The 
materialistic approach emphasizes materialistic abilities and under-
estimates the influence and importance of cultural factors. The cultural 
approach emphasizes and considers ideas, identities and values as shap-
ers of the material world. 
This extensive literature discusses the question of whether the cultur-
al approach, in general, and strategic culture, in particular, can replace 
materialistic explanations and provide methodological tools for formu-
lating an operational strategy. Similarly, there is a debate between neo-
realism and strategic culture (supported by John Glenn, Darryl Howlett 
and Stuart Poore) and between the realistic approach and cultural ap-
proach (supported by John S. Duffield, Theo Farrell, Richard Price and 
Michael C. Desch).
Literature that analyzes the strategic culture of countries
Literature in this field can be divided into subcategories: literature dis-
cussing research methodologies for understanding the impact of Stra-
tegic Culture on the decision-making process and the formulation of a 
10 Johnston, 1995.
11 King et al. 1994; Desch 1998: 141–171; Huntington and Weiner 1987; Hintze 1984: 
178–22.
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country’s operational strategy12; and literature analyzing the strategic 
culture of various countries and the influence of Strategic Culture on the 
use of weapons of mass destruction.13 The Strategic Culture of countries 
such as the European countries, the European Union and NATO, and 
Asian countries like Russia, India, China and Japan14 in particular is a 
field that is investigated extensively.
In recent years several studies have been carried out on Israeli stra-
tegic culture, for example, studies related to state security and the pro-
cess and changes in Israeli strategic culture.15 Adamsky’s16 excellent 
book examines the impact of Israeli Strategic Culture on the RMA17 in 
Israel, the US and Russia, and discusses the impact of Strategic Culture 
on changes in the formation of an operational strategy. However, like 
the rest of the researchers, Adamsky does not discuss the formation of 
Israeli Strategic Culture. This article seeks to shed light on this topic.
What Is Strategic Culture? 
Iain Johnston18 defined “Strategic Culture” as an integrated system of 
values, symbols, images and practices that largely shape political-se-
curity behavior over a prolonged period of time. These factors can be 
expressed in different and diverse forms such as songs, images, cults, 
rituals, etc. The purpose of these factors is to include a wide variety of 
participants in an event, thereby changing an entire society’s awareness 
of that event. This is achieved by adding layers of excitement, charm, 
transcendence and inspiration to the event in question. Moreover, John-
ston adds that in order to examine a country’s strategic culture it is nec-
essary to examine whether there have been changes over the years; this 
is done by examining the starting point at which the strategic culture 
began and comparing the point in time examined to that starting point. 
12 Johnson 2006; Farrell 2002: 49–72; Johnston 1995.
13 Kartchner 2006: 149–166; Payne 2005: 235–151.
14 such as: Glenn et al. 2004; Rynning 2003; Cornish & Edwards 2001, 2005; Dellios 1997; 
Johnston 1995. 
15 Giles 2002. 
16 Adamsky 2010.
17 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a military-theoretical hypothesis connected to 
technological and organizational recommendations for changing Militaries.
18 Johnston 1995.
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In order to characterize a country’s strategic culture Johnston proposes 
taking several factors into account: 
1. The role of war in the eyes of society (whether war is conceived as 
an acceptable thing or as deviation from the norm).
2. How society sees its relationship with the enemy (zero-sum game 
vs. willingness to compromise).
3. The perception of the effectiveness of using force (whether it is 
possible to use force in order to gain control over the results of a 
crisis and to eliminate threats, or whether military force should be 
used to overcome the crisis).
4. Practices (norms, procedures and traditions) which accumulate 
over the years and regulate the relationship between the various 
elites.
Indicators for characterizing the strategic culture of a country
The nature of a country’s strategic culture can be described according to 
the following illustration:




Three indicators can be considered as reflecting a strategic culture: (1) 
Symbols and images (2) Militarism (3) A system of norms, traditions 
and procedures that regulate the rules of conduct between the echelons.19 
By examining these three indicators in the period under review we can 
define the position of the state within each of the four factors and char-
acterize the strategic culture of the examined country. A synergy of all 
of the factors together creates the “strategic culture of a state” which is 
greater than the sum of its parts.
Symbols and images
Symbols and images according to which the society views the security 
field, in general, and the army, in particular, are an important component 
19 Johnston 1995; Johnson 2006.
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in the formulation of a country’s strategic culture. A myth consists of a 
true story to which legends, messages and symbols have been added, 
making the story meaningful. The messages and symbols that a myth 
conveys to society are more important than the facts of the true story for 
there is greater interest in emotional and public needs than in the usual 
flow of events as they occurred in reality. The forms of expression of 
a myth are many and varied and can appear in songs, images, legends, 
gestures and rituals. Visual representation features in monuments, post-
ers, caricatures, sculptures and paintings.
In order to evoke the spirit of a certain period we must take the myths 
that accompanied the main events seriously and not recount them as 
tales or fabrications.20 Decision-makers use myths as a means of per-
petuating their interests by conveying them to society, thereby legitimiz-
ing themselves in the eyes of the public. Myths can shape individual and 
group choices and direct their behaviour.21
Militarism
This article is one of a large group of studies22 dealing with militarism. 
However, this article refers to militarism merely as one of the compo-
nents of strategic culture. Michael Mann23 defines militarism as a set of 
viewpoints and patterns of social activity in which wars and preparations 
for them are perceived as desirable and normal social activity. Harkabi 
Yehoshafat24 describes militarism as a framework of values and customs 
that emphasize the values of discipline and patriotism in which the state 
is above the citizen and public welfare is more important than the free-
dom of any individual in that state. Baruch Kimmerling25 believes that 
civil militarism exists when there is an institutional and cultural infiltra-
tion into the collective mindset. The development and consolidation of 
military-security doctrine is a means of institutionalizing civilian mili-
tarism, especially considering the overt and covert social significance 
20 Shapira 2002: 143–148.
21 Loerch 1992.
22 Levy 2007; Ben-Eliezer 1998; Maoz 2003; Mann 1987.
23 Mann 1987.
24 Harkabi 1990.
25 Kimmerling 2001: 208–229.
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that is given to military service or the way in which an entire society can 
be directed towards constant preparation for war.
Uri Ben-Eliezer26 added that when the assumption that national prob-
lems must be solved in military ways is established and disseminated we 
can then discuss cultural militarism. When this assumption is translated 
into political decision-making it can be referred to as “militaristic poli-
tics” in which the military echelon sees itself as a partner in the process 
of formulating a political strategy, and not simply confining itself to 
handling military matters.
Norms, Traditions and Procedures
The last element in formulating the strategic culture of a state is that 
of the practical component. This relates to norms, traditions and pro-
cedures that have evolved over the years into a pattern that regulates 
interaction between the different elites.27 Literature on the subject28 re-
lates to the reality that security decisions are more difficult to handle 
for non-military personnel compared to military personnel as the latter 
has access to a body of military assessment and planning in terms of 
knowledge, economic and human resources, experience, prestige, sta-
tus, trust, and more. Avi Kober29 adds that the practical axis establishes 
the structure of the relationship and affinity between the political and 
the military echelons and that, at base, the army takes supremacy over 
the political echelon even when political directives contradict its opin-
ion. In addition, norms and organizational traditions have a significant 
impact on the operational behavior of the armed forces, and hence on the 
formation of the strategic culture and the choice of operational strategy.30
Historical background
Several legitimate and illegitimate security organizations emerged in 
Israel at the beginning of the 20th century, such as “Ha-Magen” (the 
26 Ben-Eliezer 1998.
27 Lissak & Horowitz 1989: 98–151.




Shield) and “Bar Giora”. “Bar Giora”31 was established in September 
1907 as a secret military organization with the goal of transferring the 
protection of the Jewish settlements into Jewish hands. Its founders con-
sidered it not only as a guard organization but also as a starting point for 
a conceptual change for Palestine’s Jews.32 In 1909 the “Ha-Shomer” or-
ganization (“Guild of Watchmen”) was founded as a legitimate and vis-
ible arm of “Bar Giora”. “Ha-Shomer” members considered themselves 
to be an origin group of the future Jewish army, however at its peak the 
organization counted no more than 100 members.
In 1920 the “Ha-shomer” organization merged with “Haganah”. The 
unification of the majority of the security organizations under one roof 
served as a catalyst that led to the development of “Haganah” as the 
main military force of the Jewish settlements in Palestine.33 “Haganah” 
was established to restrain the Arab rebellion and protect an oil pipe-
line that passed between Iraq and Haifa. The organization reported to a 
national headquarters and served as a basis for the formation of the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) upon the establishment of the State of Israel. 
In May 1941 “Haganah” established “Palmach”34 as a regular, illegal 
military force mainly for carrying out strategic missions and function-
ing as its main operational arm.35
After the UN resolution of 29 November 1947 relating to the parti-
tion of Palestine into two states, the War of Independence began. This 
war can be divided into three stages. The first stage was the civil war 
which started one day after the UN resolution. This stage is charac-
terized mainly by repeated attacks on the Jewish settlements and main 
roads by Arab gangs. The Jewish community adopted a defensive ap-
proach for four months, and then in April 1948 changed its strategy to 
offense with a counterattack, temporarily opening the road to Jerusalem 
31 Named after Simeon Bar Giora, Jewish military leader in the war against Rome, (66–70 
C.E).
32 Palestine was Israel’s name under the British Mandate.
33 Lev 1985.
34 “Palmach” – an acronym for “Pelugot Hamahatz” meaning striking force. Palmach was 
a broad spectrum left-wing nationalist organization associated with socialist parties. Its 
members trained and lived in kibbutzim. The political tendencies of its leaders such as Yigal 
Allon and Yitzhak Sadeh were towards Mapam, a left-wing party in opposition to David Ben-
Gurion and the Mapai ruling party.
35 Ben-Yehuda 2009.
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and as a result defeating the Arabs in Tiberius, Jaffa and Haifa. The 
second stage, and the most risky to the Jewish settlement, began with 
The Declaration of Independence in May 1948. At this stage, the Arab 
armies began to invade the newly established state.
Figure 1. The formation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Ha-Shomer 1909–1920
1941–1948 Palmach Hganah 1920–1948
IDF 1948–
Bar Giora 1907–1909
The establishment of the IDF several weeks after the Declaration of In-
dependence was a long and complex process. As an inexperienced army, 
the IDF had to acquire its expertise in combat.36 After the first truce 
declared in June 1948 the third stage of the war began. This stage was 
the longest and included several cycles of warfare and truce. In this third 
stage the IDF seized the central region from the Arab gangs, defeated 
the Arab armies in the north, and defeated the Egyptian army in the 
south. The IDF also invaded the Sinai Peninsula.37
Discussion
This chapter will examine the three indicators of Israeli strategic culture 
(symbols and images, militarism, norms procedures and organizational 
36 Ostfeld 1994: 70–74; Oren 2005.
37 Cohen 2002.
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traditions) and the impact of the strategic culture on the transition from 
a defensive approach to an offensive one. As will be elaborated later in 
this chapter, the strategic culture was initially defensive and became an 
offensive strategic culture over a number of years. The influence of the 
indicators of the strategic culture is not measured in days but rather over 
a longer period of time and is usually not the result of one event but is 
based on several events.38 Therefore, this process will be explained as a 
gradual process that over the years led to a change in the approach of the 
Jewish Settlement to the use of force.
Symbols and images
The security ethos is discussed at length in the books of Moshe Lissak 
and Dan Horowitz, Uri Ben-Eliezer, Anita Shapira39 and many others. 
I do not claim in this article to describe all the events that led to the con-
struction of the Jewish warrior ethos and the transition from the defen-
sive to the offensive approach. My goal is to describe how myth forma-
tion, which constitutes one of the components of a strategic culture, has 
helped to form an offensive militant strategic culture. In order to do so I 
will describe and illustrate numerous events that helped the Jewish com-
munity to build and establish the ethos of the new Jewish warrior. I will 
begin by describing the construction of the character of the new Jewish 
warrior, then I will present the difference between two generations, i.e., 
the sons and the parents, and finally I will discuss the contribution of the 
myth “few vs. many”.
The character of the new warrior
During the Ottoman period the Turks were determined not to allow the 
Jews’ hold on the lands of Israel to expand, forbidding the display of 
symbols related to Jewish nationalism. In view of the Balfour Declara-
tion and British occupation of Palestine 1917–1920, Zionism became a 
movement that was recognized by the great nations and as such also 
gained recognition in international law. The transition to life under the 
38 Unless it is a formative event such as the surrender of Japan and Germany in World War 
II, an event that led to a radical and immediate change in the strategic culture.
39 Lissak & Horowitz 1989; Ben-Eliezer 1998; Shapira 2002.
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British regime transformed the Jewish Yishuv overnight into a popu-
lation with legal rights and a recognized political status with national 
rights granted under the British Mandate.40 
Symbols and images ranging from the settlement to the first years 
of the state are characterized by a transformation in the conception of 
the Jewish warrior. Members of the security organizations were widely 
criticized by farmers and were considered to be evading hard manual 
labor. Most of the Jewish community emphasized agriculture and the 
cultivation of the wilderness in the Land of Israel as a primary national 
mission. “Labor occupations” took precedence over “security occupa-
tions” and members of the “Ha-Shomer” organization had to contend 
with this approach. This change in the perception of the “Ha-Shomer” 
organization by the Jewish Yishuv from being an esoteric organization 
into a significant organization in the life of the Jews in the Land of Is-
rael following the “Balfour Declaration” was reflected in the attitude 
towards warriors who were killed defending the land. In order to renew 
and encourage these motifs and improve their reputation Jewish warri-
ors used Jewish heroes as a link to the new Jewish warrior. For example, 
the book “Yizkor” (in commemoration of) was written in 1911 in mem-
ory of a number of fighters and workers killed by Arab gangs. This book 
was the first attempt to glorify those who had fallen in battle41 with the 
Arabs (as opposed to the deaths of farmers). In memory of three guards 
who fell in Galilee there was written: “The sons of the Maccabees, de-
scendants of Bar Giora and Bar Kokhba, come to inherit the place of the 
fallen heroes who fell in war to gain their freedom.”42 The need the Zi-
onist movement had for national saints and heroes, symbols of heroism 
and the development of myths was consistent with their desire to impart 
to the new Jew the image of a continuation of the rebellious, heroic and 
powerful ancient Jew, as the antithesis of the image of the Diaspora Jew.43 
The Great Revolt (66–73 CE) and the Bar Kokhba revolt (132–135 
CE) were emphasized as sources of national pride and their heroes were 
40 Ben-Eliezer 1998.
41 Although the fallen were not killed in an heroic battle but were hit by fire from the 
ambush, there was an attempt to attribute their fall to an act of heroism.
42 A declaration of mourning, published by Poalei Zion, about the deaths of three young men 
in the spring of 1909. Quoted in: Jonathan, Frenkel. (1988), “The Book of Remembrance”, 
1911 – Commentary on National Myths during the Second Aliyah, Contemporary Jewry: 4.
43 Shapira 1997: 155–175.
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presented as models for the brave and heroic Jew.44 For this reason, the 
Jewish secret military organization “Bar Giora”45 was named after a 
Jewish hero from the time of the Great Revolt of the Jews in the Land 
of Israel in the Roman Empire. Most members of the Jewish commu-
nity objected to this perspective and even rejected the image of the new 
Jewish warrior.
One of the tools used to encourage love of the “homeland” and cause 
a transformation of the warrior’s image was the Bible. Young members 
of the Jewish community traveled throughout Israel with the Bible as a 
geographical guide, identifying the historical sites of the Jewish people 
that were mentioned there. They had a strong sense of the need to return 
to the days of the heroism of the ancient Jews in which the Jews fought 
bravely against various invaders. In order to achieve this they were as-
sisted by well-known biblical heroes, and even religious holidays took on 
a different interpretation from what we know from religious tradition in 
order to elevate the glory of the Jewish warrior once more and compare 
him to the familiar heroes of the past. For example, Lag Ba’Omer has 
become an heroic holiday that symbolized the heroism of Bar Kokhba 
in the revolt against the Roman Empire46, instead of a religious holiday 
whose importance according to Jewish tradition is the end of the laws of 
mourning for the death of Rabbi Akiva’s scholar. Similarly, Hanukkah, 
characterized by religious tradition as the holiday in which the central 
motif is the miracle wherein one oil tin was used to light eight candles, 
became a holiday in which the Maccabean wars were highlighted as a 
symbol of glorious heroism. 
The Jewish community gradually changed its perception of the Jew-
ish warrior, and the blood of the guard became equivalent to the sweat of 
the worker. The Jewish settlements began to feel a real sense of owner-
ship of the land and the Jewish warrior became a cultural and social 
model and part of reality during the Arab Revolt. The difference be-
tween the image of the parents’ generation (the early Zionists) and the 
44 Shapira 1988: 26–27.
45 Shimon Bar Giora was one of the leaders of the revolt, winning many victories against 
the Roman conqueror until his defeat.
46 New customs were introduced – Archery, bonfires were lit and hymns were written to 
commemorate the heroism of Bar Kokhba.
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image of the sons’ generation (descendants of the early Zionists) also 
made an important contribution to the image of the new Jewish warrior.
The generation of the parents and the generation of the sons
The generation of the sons saw themselves as a strong and significant 
factor in the region, which allowed them to free themselves from the 
defensive ethos of their parents and form an offensive alternative.47 In 
the 1930s and 1940s the difference between the two generations with 
respect to the Land of Israel became more pronounced. The generation 
of the parents was raised on the writings of the Jewish philosophers 
Tchernichovsky and Berdichevsky who characterized the Land of Israel 
as a place where one must cling to and seek the strength of the soul. 
The generation of the parents rarely traveled the country’s paths and the 
heroic sites of Jewish heritage never became sites of pilgrimage (such 
as Masada, Modi’in, etc.). In comparison, the generation of the sons re-
garded the Land of Israel as their inheritance as they had been born and 
raised there, and they had no doubt that this was their country. They saw 
the Land of Israel as a tangible property and identified themselves with 
the country’s landscapes; their childhood experiences were an insepara-
ble part of the Land. While the generation of the parents expressed the 
wish and hope that the land would be theirs, in the generation of the sons 
there was a sense of real ownership of the land of Israel. As a result of 
this approach, the emerging national ethos did not regard the Jews as a 
weak but as a significant factor in the struggle for control of the Land 
of Israel.48
It might appear that the situation described above could lead to the 
conclusion that the generation of the sons would become a leading force 
in the decision-making process and that their influence on the political 
echelon would be vast. However, despite the rise in status of the military 
echelon, their views have not yet been reflected politically (compared to 
their status and influence during the Sinai War, Six-Day War, and Yom 
Kippur War) since the political leadership felt that the military echelon 




From defensive myth to offensive myth
A national ethos is characterized by how it is gradually formed. In com-
parison, national myths are built subsequent to an event that serves as 
a factual basis for an evolving legend that is being developed around 
it.49 In order to strengthen the ethos of the Jewish warrior, Ha-Haganah 
members emphasized security events that occurred between Arabs and 
Jews in the Land of Israel. 
This can be illustrated by the heroic myth attributed to Tel-Hai 
defenders led by Yosef Trumpeldor. During the Tel-Hai event scant de-
tails of the incident, as they occurred in reality, were published.50 The 
emphasis in publications on that topic was on the deaths of workers who 
had fallen in defense of Tel-Hai. In the book Yizkor and in an article in 
memory of the fallen published by Berl Katznelson (one of the senior 
Zionist leaders) there was written: “... fell on the Homeland Guard ...”. 
The term “homeland” was not commonly used by the people, yet after 
the Tel-Hai event this term was used frequently. The uniqueness of the 
Tel-Hai events was that the Jews preferred the terminology “falling in 
battle” rather than using “retreat” or “surrender”. It was in this series of 
events that the myth of defensive heroism was conceived.51 
This defensive trend did not last long and was replaced with an of-
fensive one by creating myths from other events. The daily routine of 
the Arab attacks forced Haganah to switch from a strategy of static 
defense to one of dynamic defense, and finally to an offensive approach. 
The most prominent event highlighting this tactical transition was the 
myth formed around events during the establishment of the settlement 
Hanita. Hanita, located in Western Galilee, was exceptional compared 
to other settlements built prior to the establishment of the State of Israel 
because it was built in the heart of an Arab region. The defense of Hanita 
demanded a large number of volunteers from among those who helped 
to establish it. They were joined by infantry troops who came to defend 
the place from an expected attack by the Arabs which indeed took place. 
One day after the Arab attack the command for a counterattack was 
49 Shapira 1988.
50 Even though the event itself was a failure. No reinforcements arrived in time and Tel Hai 
and Kfar Giladi were abandoned following the incident.
51 Shapira 2002: 143–148.
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issued for the first time. In the narrative of the establishment of Hanita 
the role of the infantry was given prominence; in contrast to other places 
for which the process of settlement was emphasized, this time it was 
the fighting force that was given significant attention. This was the first 
time that the role and function of the “Jewish warrior” changed into 
those of offensive fighter and initiator. His character began to form as a 
national Zionist mission whose importance was no lesser than the image 
of the Jewish worker.52 After the events of Hanita there was a recognition 
that the establishment of the State of Israel should be planned not only by 
diplomacy but also by the use of offensive military forces. This event is 
an important marker in the process of turning the components of Israeli 
strategic culture from defensive to offensive.
Few against many
The War of Independence is commonly known and conceived by the 
public as a war of the few against the many. Ben-Gurion wrote in his di-
ary “World history does not contain as many examples of war in which 
there were few against many as young Israel does.”53 This emphasis on 
Israel’s quantitative inferiority vis-à-vis the Arab states during the War 
of Independence became a national ethos that justified the claim that 
the Jewish community was in real danger of physical extermination. 
The leaders of the State of Israel have repeatedly emphasized this mo-
tif over many years when referring to the War of Independence. In his 
speeches Ben-Gurion compared the period of the War of Independence 
and the IDF’s victory in this war with motifs from biblical heroes such 
as David’s victory over Goliath, Yehoshua Ben-Nun’s victory over the 31 
kings, and the Maccabean wars.54
Although the phenomenon of few against many does not always have 
much basis in the reality of the battles of the War of Independence,55 the 
feeling of the few was dominant among the people of the Jewish com-
munity in Palestine. The feeling of the few was against the rule of the 
British Mandate, against Arabs in Palestine, and especially against the 
52 Shapira 2002: 345–350.
53 Ben-Gurion 195: 351
54 Kaddish & Kedar 1996: 87–89.
55 Amitzur 2005.
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five invading Arab armies (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon). 
The source of this sense of minority can be explained by Arab opposi-
tion to any compromise between Jews and Arabs over the division of the 
state, the depressed situation of the European Jewish community after 
the Holocaust, the numerical difference in army size between Jews and 
Arabs in the Middle East, and the multiple Arab threats to destroy the 
new Israeli state even before it had been established.
Militarism
Another component of the characterization of a country’s strategic cul-
ture is the level and type of militarism in the society. The premise of this 
study is the existence of civilian militarism in Israel, which varies from 
one period to another. The present study sees militarism as just another 
component of strategic culture. Militarism and its characteristics were 
based on the system of images and symbols described above which ena-
bles a connection between culture, worldview on the security field, and 
the formation of a security doctrine. According to Baruch Kimmerling,56 
the militarism that developed in the Jewish community was “civilian 
militarism”.
Uri Ben-Eliezer, Baruch Kimmerling and many others57 believe 
that the new state was interested in connecting society to the army and 
turning the army into a school for the nation which places power at the 
center of the new Jewish identity. Accordingly, the leadership advanced 
a broad concept of security that encompassed almost all areas of society. 
This approach  reached its peak mainly after the establishment of the 
state (reference to this period is not found in this article), but its origin 
began with an argument about the way the Zionist movement operated 
at the beginning of the Yishuv. In this chapter I will divide the influence 
of militarism on the nature of strategic culture into two different periods 
which are distinct in nature. The first period runs from the establish-
ment of Bar Giora until World War II; the influence of militarism here 
led to the development of a defensive approach. The second period runs 
from the end of World War II until the end of the War of Independence; 
in this period there was a transition towards an offensive approach.
56 Kimmerling 2001: 208–229.
57 Harkabi 1990; Kimmerling 2001: 208–229; Rapoport 1962: 71–101; Ben-Eliezer 1998.
The Roots of Israeli Strategic Culture 264
The defensive approach: from the establishment 
of Bar Giora until World War II
In order to characterize the level of militarism prior to the establishment 
of the State of Israel one must first examine the origins of this milita-
rism. The debate over the Zionist movement’s course of action began at 
the beginning of the Yishuv period. Volunteering to settle and work the 
land was one of the issues that split members of the Zionist movement. 
Supporters of the volunteers were called “activists” and opponents were 
called “conservatives”. Most of the activists belonged to the workers’ 
movement, and this activity found expression mainly in the willingness 
to settle and cultivate the land. At the center of the first controversy was 
the question of whether Jews could protect Jewish settlements. The first 
Zionist settlers were assisted by Bedouin guards in order to protect their 
lives and property and they remained at the mercy of the Arab guard 
who often exploited the situation by extorting them and steadily rais-
ing their fees. Bar Giora and Ha-Somer suggested that such guard duty 
should be transferred to Jewish hands, a suggestion that was frequently 
rejected by the farmers. The farmers’ fear was that the Bedouin guard 
would exact revenge on them for losing their jobs. Moreover, on a social-
religious level, they objected to the nature of Hashomer members who 
were not religious. Gradually Ha-Somer began to gain momentum and 
changed the security concept of the Jewish community. As well as pas-
sive guarding they also initiated security activities such as small-scale 
pursuits, using limited means of retaliation, and deterrent activities.58
The identification of the younger generation with militarism as a 
legit imate way of solving problems increased towards the end of the 
First World War. During this period there was a strong desire and will-
ingness among the younger generation to enlist into the British army 
to assist in the conquest of Israel. Allenby, commander of the British 
forces, chose however not to include Jewish volunteers in the battles 
and his decision caused great disappointment among them. A messianic 
sense was replaced by the sad reality that there was a new conqueror (this 
time a British one) and it was better for the Jews to defend themselves 
by establishing a militia under the control of the Jews.59 This defensive 
58 Lev 1985.
59 Shapira 2002: 135–141.
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ethos fit well with the decline in the militarism of the Yishuv in view of 
their disappointment in not being included in the conquest of the land.
After the Yishuv settlers accepted the reality that they had to defend 
themselves the collective identity of the youth in the Land of Israel was 
formulated and shaped throughout the 1930s and 1940s. This was char-
acterized on two different levels: indigenous mentality and militant 
activism. They were exposed to a generation of struggle: the struggle 
against the British, the struggle against the Arabs, and the struggle 
against the Jewish image in the Diaspora period. The establishment of 
purely Jewish military units led the younger generation to feel that it 
was possible and even desirable to solve the Arab-Jewish-British con-
flict through organized violence. The military concept of Haganah has 
a direct connection with the gradual rise in the image of the warrior 
and the transition to the understanding that there will also be a need 
to fight for the Land of Israel. Initially, the military concept was based 
on the static defense principle that there was a need to defend against 
Arab gang attacks on Jewish settlements, transport routes, and workers 
in the fields – a perception that gave a clear advantage to the attackers. 
This approach began to change with the outbreak of the Great Revolt of 
1936–1939 when the Arab riots turned into planned and organized inci-
dents against the Jewish Yishuv; in the light of these riots, the opinion 
emerged that the method of action needed to be changed.
Uri Ben-Eliezer60 and Stuart Cohen61 argue that this idea started 
to coalesce in 1936 among a group of the Zionist elite who served in 
Haganah, demanding that the Yishuv leaders adopt an aggressive/ 
offensive approach and cease acting defensively. The Yishuv leadership 
feared losing its status and proposed a compromise whereby members of 
the younger generation would be subject to its senior leadership, and in 
return the leaders would spread the idea that the “Arab problem” could 
and should be resolved in a military and aggressive way. The military 
solution gradually became synonymous with the values and ideology of 
the Jewish community.62 During these years a new worldview with re-
spect to the attitude towards Arabs and the use of force began to emerge, 
60 Ben-Eliezer 1998.
61 Cohen 2001: 4–5.
62 For further details on the demand and response of the Yishuv leadership, see: Barzilai 
1996; Shapira, 2002: 135–141; Kimmerling 2001: 208–229.
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an understanding which was a decisive factor in the formation of an of-
fensive ethos, the ethos of the warrior.63
The offensive approach: The end of World War II 
until the end of the War of Independence
At the end of World War II the main question was whether to continue 
to struggle against the regulations of the White Paper64 or whether to 
suspend activity until the end of the war. The moderates believed that 
the policy of the White Paper was a temporary necessity and that it was 
necessary to wait until the end of the war. In contrast, the activists saw 
the White Paper as a result of the British assessment that Jews had no 
choice but to accept an anti-Zionist policy. The right way to change Brit-
ish policy was, in their opinion, demonstrating strength and a willing-
ness to fight against the British. The days of the resistance movement 
(a union of several Jewish militias) symbolized a turning point in the 
nature of action against the British Mandate. In November 1945 the first 
military operation took place, an operation with a clear political nature: 
the explosion of railways in 153 different locations throughout Israel. 
This operation would lead to a series of additional actions against the 
British that would put an end to the debate between moderates and activ-
ists, in which the latter had the upper hand.65
One of the practical implications66 of this need to solve the Arab 
problem (i.e., to solve the repeated attacks of Arabs against Jews) by 
military means, and not only by political ones, was “Plan D”. “Plan D” 
was a military operation with the aim of taking over territories, conquer-
ing Arab villages and towns, and creating territorial contiguity between 
Jewish settlements. This plan was not only designed as an operational 
plan, but also as a command to forces in the field. “Plan D” turned the 
offensive strategy of the Jewish Yishuv into a normatively acceptable 
strategy in the eyes of the same. The political echelon was the main 
group promoting the idea of expanding borders, as can be seen from 
63 Shapira 2002: 135–141; Ben-Eliezer 1998.
64 The White Paper is a term for the British government’s report on decisions relating to 
Jewish settlement in Palestine and the restriction on Jewish immigration into Palestine during 
the British Mandate (1920–1948). The report had a white cover, hence its name.
65 Ben-Eliezer 1998.
66 The Israeli Information Center 1973.
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the meeting held one week before the declaration of the establishment 
of the state on 7/5/1948. At this meeting, the political echelon decided 
not to include state borders in the Declaration of Independence since 
they believed that these borders would not be determined by diplomatic 
agreements but rather by force.67
It should be noted that the heads of state had other alternatives to 
prevent the Arab invasion, such as the US proposal to postpone the dec-
laration of statehood for several months in order to prevent the Arab 
armies’ planned invasion. At the historic meeting held on May 12 1948 
the question was whether to declare the establishment of the Jewish state 
immediately after the British Mandate terminated or to accept the US 
proposal for a three-month truce. Ben-Gurion preferred a military solu-
tion to a political one and summarized this meeting by saying “it is time 
we stop believing in witchcraft. Witchcraft is a belief in words; one who 
does not believe in magic and words understands that it will be a matter 
of deciding by force ...”68 The members of the provisional government 
preferred the military path until a decision on the establishment of the 
state was not brought to a vote at all.69
Ben-Gurion was more moderate than the military echelon when it 
came to expanding the country’s borders. It is useful to note here that 
Ben-Gurion referred to war as a destructive phenomenon and because of 
that he feared militarism which, in his opinion, constituted a danger to 
the public at large and to the emerging Israeli democracy.70 Because he 
feared the negative effects of militarism, Ben-Gurion demanded civilian 
control over the army and the subordination of the army to the authority 
of the political echelon; he did not allow the military leadership to dic-
tate political and military moves. However, at the same time Ben-Gurion 
understood that preparations for war had to be made in order to avoid 
annihilation.
67 Pail 1990: 40–49.
68 State Archives 1948: 70.
69 Pail and Azriel 1991: 180.
70 Ostfeld 1994 :70–74.
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Norms, traditions and procedures
There was a practical side that contributed to the formation of a stra-
tegic culture which turned from defensive to offensive but, as with the 
phenomenon of militarism, this was also not the main factor. The main 
reason for this change was that the political echelons had gained a lot of 
experience, whereas in comparison the military echelon had no experi-
ence either in the political or in the military spheres. In this chapter I 
will mainly refer to the period of 1946–1949 in which Ben-Gurion was 
appointed as head of the Defense Ministry and the War of Independ-
ence, and refer less to the first years of the Yishuv. At the beginning 
of the Yishuv there were procedures, norms and traditions in the secu-
rity organizations that had a certain effect on the formation of a defen-
sive strategic culture, but their influence was not significant. This is 
because these military organizations were relatively new and traditions 
and organizational norms were not yet sufficiently coherent to the point 
of being able to significantly influence defensive strategic culture (i.e., 
during the period of the Yishuv the other variables/factors that affected 
strategic culture like symbols, images and militarism were more domi-
nant in this period).
During the period of the Yishuv, the norms, procedures and tradi-
tions of Haganah were the ones that dictated the interaction between the 
military and political echelons. Just before the establishment of the state 
of Israel Ben-Gurion tried and succeeded in establishing his way in the 
security field. In order to do so he appointed people who were loyal to 
him personally as the heads of the military echelon, instead of Haga-
nah veterans. He therefore aspired to establish a regular army, like ar-
mies in the Western World, and not a militia like Haganah. Ben-Gurion 
preferred that senior commanders be commanders who had previously 
served in regular armies so that they could quickly establish a disci-
plined and trained army themselves. It was no longer to be a defensive 
army as was the case with Haganah, but an offensive army that would 
push fighting beyond the borders of the country. In order to realize this 
vision there was a need to change the existing chain of command, an ac-
tion which would lead to changes in organizational tradition. 71Ben-Gu-
rion saw the existence of a single source of inspiration as a national 
71 Pail & Azriel 1991; Ostfeld 1994.
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mission that was required to realize the objective of the new state. This 
new state was a place where immigrants and settlers from different cul-
tures would be united under one single governmental apparatus. Ben-
Gurion was interested in shaping the army in his own image and now 
there was the golden opportunity to do so since the new army (the IDF) 
was devoid of tradition, having allegedly been created from nothing.72
The nature of the future army – a new army or an old-new army?
Controversy over the nature of the new army began at the time when 
the IDF was established. The question was whether to allow the norms, 
procedures and traditions of Haganah to remain in the IDF or alterna-
tively to establish an army with a new organizational tradition and new 
interactions between ranks. In Haganah loyalty was first to the party 
and according to Haganah’s wishes, so a gradual change was required to 
transition to a regular army. However Ben-Gurion believed that such a 
transition should be quick and immediate.73
Ben-Gurion opposed the relationship between Haganah and the Na-
tional Headquarters. He therefore tested the status of the National Head-
quarters and was interested in dismissing its leader Israel Galili. There 
were several reasons for Ben-Gurion’s desire to dismiss Galili from the 
position of head of the National Headquarters. First, Ben-Gurion re-
garded Galili as a representative of a rival party (MAPAM – the United 
Workers Party) whose political and strategic views did not match his 
own. Galili was also a competitor with considerable political influence 
over society and the Zionist movement. The second reason, more closely 
related to this discussion on norms, procedures and organizational tra-
ditions, was differences of opinion regarding the character of the new 
Israeli army. Galili was the most senior leader to emerge from Haganah 
who wanted the IDF to rely on Haganah’s legacy concerning the nature 
of the organization, its fighting spirit, combat doctrine, human rela-
tions and its popular character, etc. The main reason for this controversy 
stemmed from the difficulties Haganah had, as an organization want-
ing to preserve its organizational traditions, in adapting to such chang-
es. It was resistant to the transition to the framework of a state which, 
72 Shapira 2002: 58–65.
73 Ostfeld 1994: 78.
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according to Ben-Gurion, was committed to the principle of statehood. 
Galili’s view is suitably illustrated in his speech to the Mapam Council 
on July 2, 1948: “We need not a blind army, but an army that continues 
the traditions and values of Haganah ... an army whose loyalty does not 
contradict the party’s affiliation and does not make robots of soldiers ...”74
After the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel there 
began to take shape a recognition of the need to appoint permanent front 
commanders to serve as an intermediate level of command between the 
General Staff and the brigades. In June 1948 Deputy Chief of Staff Zvi 
Ayalon and Head of Operations Branch Yigael Yadin submitted their 
proposal for the construction of four fronts. Ben-Gurion was interested 
in conducting a round of appointments both in the new fronts and in 
the General Staff divisions. In his opinion the front commanders should 
be professional officers who had graduated from the British army; he 
therefore opposed the recommended list. Yadin and Ayalon criticized 
Ben-Gurion’s expected series of appointments. This round of appoint-
ments led to the resignations of several important military personnel. 
At a cabinet meeting held on July 2nd Prime Minister Ben-Gurion an-
nounced the resignations of four members of the General Staff. The gov-
ernment decided to establish a committee including five ministers to 
investigate the matter. The purpose of this committee, was to be able to 
make recommendations quickly. The committee’s conclusions justified 
the presence of the military personnel, rejecting Ben-Gurion’s positions. 
The committee members then sought to establish a new forum of secu-
rity decision-makers, thereby creating new working patterns between 
the government and the military echelon. Ben-Gurion, who opposed this 
idea, oversaw the establishment of this new forum but excluded it from 
any security decision-making processes. The convening of this forum 
was usually without any substantive content or meaning.75
74 Zerubavel and Megged 1955: 74–76.
75 Pail & Azriel 1991: 190–194; Ostfeld 1994: 600–624.
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A regular army or a militia – the dismantling 
of the Palmach76 headquarters
The Palmach77 (“strike forces”) was the elite fighting force of Haganah 
which refused to accept the authority of Ben-Gurion and was an organ-
ization that claimed to serve as a source of inspiration for the youth 
and the emerging new army.78 Ben-Gurion referred to the Palmach with 
mixed feelings of appreciation and suspicion. His appreciation was for 
its contribution to the Haʿ apala79 project and to the successful battles of 
the War of Independence, however Ben-Gurion was suspicious of this 
heritage which seemed to be an old-fashioned and unsuitable legacy for 
a regular state army. The Palmach legacy included an informal relation-
ship and equality between soldiers and commanders. 
Perhaps Ben-Gurion’s fear was that a special intra-organizational re-
lationship and the organizational culture of the Palmach would affect 
relations between the two echelons. Ben-Gurion firmly opposed these 
principles since, in his opinion, any army should be a professional, for-
malistic, hierarchical establishment through professional development 
rather than being the product of the organic growth of society and cir-
cumstance.80 Zehava Ostfeld81 adds that the patterns of transition from 
the underground, in which the Palmach operated during the period of the 
Yishuv, did not conform to the requirements of a regular state military 
organization. One year after the discussion on dismantling the Palmach 
headquarters its brigades were also dismantled to the point where they 
had no traces left in the new IDF army.
76 The Palmach was a broad spectrum left-wing nationalist organization associated with 
socialist parties. Its members trained and lived in kibbutzim. The political tendencies of its 
leaders such as Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Sadeh were towards Mapam, a left-wing party in 
opposition to David Ben-Gurion and the Mapai ruling party.
77 Ben-Eliezer 1998: 54–57.
78 Shapira 2002; Ostfeld 1994: 624.
79 Haʿ apala – illegal immigration by Jews to Mandatory Palestine in violation of the British 
White Paper.
80 Another factor to be noted is his view of the Palmach as the tool of a rival party since 
the Palmach was identified with the kibbutz and its senior commanders were members of the 
parent parties.
81 Ostfeld 1994: 720.
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Summary and conclusions
Bar Giora and Hashomer changed the concept of security as perceived 
by the Jewish community. In addition to passive guarding, security or-
ganizations initiated targeted security activities such as small-scale pur-
suits and also used retaliatory measures against attackers. Through their 
actions these organizations expressed the new path of the Jewish warrior 
in the Land of Israel. The military perception of security organizations 
has a direct connection to the gradual increase in the importance and 
prestige of the warrior, and to the understanding that not only by work-
ing the land and utilizing a political arrangement can a state be estab-
lished; there is also a need to fight. This transition from a defensive to an 
offensive approach was accompanied by psychological changes as this 
was the first time that the Jews had not settled for passive protection of 
their settlements but rather initiated actions in the Arab territories. The 
nature of this activity created a feeling of real ownership among the peo-
ple of the Yishuv on the land, and the Jewish warrior became a cultural 
and social model.
The theoretical chapter presented four characteristics that allow us to 
determine what the strategic culture of a certain country is: (1) the role 
of war in the eyes of society; (2) how society sees its relationship with 
the enemy; (3) the perception of the effectiveness of employing force; 
(4) practices (norms, procedures and traditions) that accumulate over the 
years and regulate the relationship between the various elites.
To characterize the origin of the Strategic Culture in Israel, three 
indicators were examined: (1) Symbols and images (2) Militarism (3) 
A system of norms, traditions and procedures that regulate the rules of 
conduct between the military and political echelons. A synergy of all 
these factors together creates the “strategic culture of a state” which is 
greater than the sum of its parts.
In order to examine the first two characteristics a system of symbols 
and images of the Jews in the Land of Israel was described in this article 
from the time of the Yishuv until the War of Independence. The cultiva-
tion of symbols of heroism and myths began with the establishment of 
the Bar Giora organization. Most of their security activity was based on 
a defensive approach, but in some cases for which the latter approach 
could not achieve its objective the organization resorted to targeted repris-
als. These actions laid the foundations for broader operational activities 
273 Itamar Rickover
that would come to characterize Haganah and the IDF in the future. 
With the establishment of the “Bar Giora” organization the area of secu-
rity became significant and the Jewish community began to change its 
perception towards the Jewish warrior.
The generation of the sons saw themselves as a strong and significant 
factor in the region, a conception which allowed them to be freed from 
the defensive ethos of their parents and assisted them in finding an of-
fensive alternative in the formation of the army. Emphasis on Israel’s 
inferiority vis-à-vis the Arab states during the War of Independence be-
came a national ethos justifying the claim that the state should nurture 
its army, also serving as an important factor in creating a militant ethos.
Another component of the characterization of a country’s strategic 
culture is the level  and type of militarism of its society. The issue of 
militarism addresses the second and third characteristics. The premise 
of this article is that civilian militarism exists in Israel, and that its extent 
changes over various periods of time. The present article views milita-
rism only as part of a broader strategic culture; since the level and nature 
of militarism is based on a system of images and symbols, militarism en-
ables a connection between culture and worldview in the security field. 
The roots of militarism began with the establishment of the Bar Giora 
organization and its conception was enhanced through the consolidation 
of the concept of Haganah within the Israeli military. In the beginning 
strategy was based on the static defense principle, but as the threat in-
tensified strategy was changed to one of active defense and finally to 
an offensive approach. The generation of the sons, a generation that had 
grown up in Israel, developed an aggressive ethos in which the life of the 
warrior constituted a formative and character-shaping experience, also 
developing an approach whereby the Arab-Jewish-British conflict could 
be resolved by activating military units. One practical implication was 
“Plan D” which turned this offensive approach into a normative strategy.
 Finally, a practical element (a system of norms, traditions and organ-
izational procedures) also contributed to the formation of an aggressive 
strategic culture. The influence of this factor mainly saw its expression 
in the 1940s because the military system was developed then, gaining 
experience, forming new norms and organizational traditions. Building 
an organizational tradition was the final stage in formulating an activist-
offensive Israeli strategic culture.
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In conclusion, the purpose of this article was to examine the pro-
cess of formulating and characterizing Israeli strategic culture. Israeli 
strategic culture gradually developed into an activist-offensive strategic 
culture. This process started at the beginning of the Jewish Yishuv with 
a conceptual change regarding the image of the new Jewish warrior. 
After the establishment of a system of images and symbols in the secu-
rity field and the formulation of the “new Jewish warrior” myth the Jew-
ish community became militaristic, characterized by “civil militarism”. 
Towards the establishment of the State of Israel there began the estab-
lishment of norms and organizational traditions in the field of security, 
leading to the final formulation of Israeli strategic culture as offensive.
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Is Terrorism Effective? Examining Terrorism 
Strategy in Achieving Political Goals
Limor Nobel-Konig
Abstract This study analyses the success and failure of terror or-
ganizations, placing special emphasis on the role of five key stra-
tegic components: recruiting activists/supporters; creating pro-
vocation; eliminating opponents; instilling fear; media activity. 
Based on case-study analysis of eight terror organizations world-
wide, findings indicate that the support of the population the terror 
organization claims to represent, or the lack of it, is crucial for 
success. Creating provocation has been effective in maintaining 
conflict without resolution and in achieving tactical goals. Media 
activity and instilling fear have been effective in achieving the 
tactical goals of publicity and intimidation. However, this tacti-
cal success failed to be translated into strategic success. In most 
cases, it hardened public opinion and strengthened support for 
tough counter-terrorism measures. Finally, eliminating opponents 
was not effective. This study indicates that some strategic compo-
nents, such as provocation, recruiting support and media activity, 
were effective in achieving tactical political goals. However, terror 
organizations that used these components effectively could have 
translated their tactical success into a (partial) strategic success 
only by consciously engaging in some kind of legitimate political 
activity or by transforming into some form of political entity.
Keywords terrorism strategy, terror organizations, counter-terror-
ism, strategic goals
Introduction
Academic literature dealing with the political effectiveness of terror-
ism is diverse. On the one hand, some scholars argue that the practi-
cal and objective achievements of terrorism are short-term, limited and 
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that terrorist campaigns rarely end up achieving of the group’s strategic 
goals.1 The claim here is that terror organizations rarely achieve their 
policy objectives and that the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic 
of terrorism that targets civilians.2 The use of terrorism against civil-
ian targets was found to be significantly less effective than guerrilla 
campaigns against military targets at gaining political concessions. Fur-
thermore, liberal countries have been less likely to make concessions to 
terror organizations. On the other hand, other scholars argue that ter-
rorism can be used as an effective coercive strategy and does achieve 
political concessions successfully. Some of these scholars also rely on 
the assumption that the electorate shows a growing sensitivity to terror-
ism and thus influences political leaders to grant political concessions to 
terror organizations.3 
Historically, the clear cases of terrorist organizations that were 
successful in gaining strategic goals are the expulsion of British and 
French colonial rule from Cyprus, Israel, Aden and Algeria.4 Research 
conducted at the beginning of the 1990s found that 90% of the sample 
of terror organizations were defeated during the first year of activity.5 
However, liberal democracies are not immune to threats of terrorism. 
On the contrary, the basic freedoms of a democratic society (freedom 
of speech, movement, etc.) allow terror organizations to recruit activ-
ists and to communicate and publicize their message more easily. Terror 
organizations can strike any place, any time. The message delivered to 
the public is that no one is safe and that the authorities are incapable of 
protecting their citizens or maintaining public order. Terrorism is not a 
goal in itself; it is used as a means to achieve political goals. 
Thus, after four decades of terrorist attacks on many societies all 
over the world, it is important to examine and evaluate the effectiveness 
of terrorism strategy. Does terrorism have the power to effect political 
1 Abrahms & Gottfried 2016: 72–89; Fortna 2015: 519–556; Crenshaw 2001: 405–420; 
Laqueur 2003: 12–15; Wilkinson 2011: 16; Cordes et al. 1984: 35–48; Cronin 2009: 10–15; 
Jones & Libicki 2008: 65–74; Moghadam 2006: 707–729; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008: 7–44.
2 Abrahms 2006: 42–78; Abrahms 2007: 223–253 Abrahms 2012: 366–393; Abrahms 
2013: 660–671.
3 Rose & Murphy 2007: 185–192; Kydd & Walter 2006: 49–57; Pape 2005: 124–135; Pape 
2003: 343–61; Dershowitz 2002: 10. 
4 Wilkinson 2011: 16.
5 Rapoport 2013: 3–6. 
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change? Do terror organizations succeed in achieving political goals? 
Can the strategy of terror organizations predict their success or failure in 
achieving political goals? This study attempts to answer these questions 
through analysis of the success or failure of terror organizations by the 
strategies used by these organizations.
As for definitional issues of terrorism, this study is based on the defi-
nition of Ganor (2011): “Terrorism is a violent struggle, during which 
there is a deliberate use of violence against civilians, in order to gain po-
litical goals”.6 This definition covers three fundamental elements. First, 
the nature of the activity: a violent struggle; second the aim of the activ-
ity: a political goal; and third, the target: civilians. The next section will 
review academic literature concerning the strategy of terrorism, placing 
special emphasis on the role of five key components in terrorism strat-
egy: recruiting activists/supporters; creating provocation; eliminating 
opponents; instilling fear; and media activity.
Terrorism strategy
Theoretical literature in the field of terrorism identifies several cen-
tral components in the strategies of terror organizations. They can be 
divided into five key components: recruitment of activists, supporters 
and resources; provocation; elimination of political opponents; instilling 
fear; and media activity.7
Recruitment of activists, supporters and resources
The recruitment of activists, supporters and resources is one of the basic 
existential foundations of any terror organization. The activities of terror 
organizations entail the intensive loss of activists due to incarceration by 
law agencies and to operational activities. Thus, the continuous search 
for activists, ideological supporters and resources characterizes the 
activity of terror organizations. The relationship between a terror organ-
ization and its activists can be described as a pyramid, with the terror 
organization as the head of the pyramid and the activists as its founda-
tion. The survival of a terror organization depends on this relationship 
6 Ganor 2011: 16.
7 Wilkinson 2011: 8–125; Merari 1999: 52–65; Wardlaw 1989: 42–76; Crenshaw 2001: 
410–420; Jenkins 2001: 321–327.
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with activists and supporters and on its ability to recruit new members.8 
Most of the terror organizations in the world are small, with several tens 
to hundreds of activists, while a minority of them (about a quarter) have 
several thousand activists.9 
Research identifies three factors that facilitate the recruitment of new 
terrorists: The first, is a lack of state capacity, particularly in the areas of 
police, intelligence, and law enforcement; the second, is a “mobilizing 
belief,” such as Salafist/jihadist extremism; and the third is “appropriate 
agitators” who can propagate these ideas and create an effective terrorist 
force.10 
As the recruitment component is essential for the survival of the 
organization, the methods of recruitment from nonviolent methods to 
coercive or violent methods. Nonviolent methods include the use of 
social and family relations, operating social and welfare aid systems, 
estab lishing relations with other extremist groups, offering material 
incentives and propaganda.11 The Islamic State (ISIS) has even imple-
mented a distinct online recruitment strategy, which follows potential 
supporters from an introduction to the organization’s message, through 
careful pruning of their social networks, and then to the final stage: the 
call to action.12 Violent and coercive recruitment methods include the 
use of beating, kidnapping, threatening, torture and even murder against 
the same population the organization claims to represent.13 
In most cases, terror organizations depend on the support of the 
population they claim to represent. This support can be attitudinal sup-
port, which is passive support of the activity of the organization and 
its goals, or behavioral support, which is active support of the activity 
of the organization (supplying food and shelter for activists, supplying 
information, donations, and non-cooperation with governmental agen-
cies/police).14
8 Sinai 2007: 173–180.
9 Wilkinson 2011: 8
10 Rosenau 2005: 5–10; Mair 2003: 107–108.
11 Sageman 2004: 175; Rosenau 2005: 6; Fair 2010: 494–499.
12 Berger 2015: 1.
13 Lilja 2009: 306–315.
14 Ibid.
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Terror organizations finance their activity in legitimate as well as 
illegitimate ways, which often commingle with each other. On the one 
hand, funds may derive from legitimate charitable organizations but, 
on the other hand, funds may come from credit card fraud, smuggling, 
protection payments, extortion, violation of intellectual property rights, 
and front businesses.15
Provocation
The idea of provocation is a central component in the strategies of 
terror organizations and it was mentioned in the writings of several 
theorists of modern terrorism, such as Carlos Marighella. Back in 1969 
Marighella16 refers to acts of provocation as a crucial strategic element 
since these acts force the government to react in coercive ways (e.g., 
house searches, arrests of innocent civilians, political persecution, street 
blocking). Consequently, the organization gains the support of the op-
pressed population. Terror organizations are usually less powerful than 
the security forces or the military of the state. Therefore, terror organi-
zations deliberately provoke the target state authorities with ostentatious 
attacks on symbolic targets in order to coerce them into overreaction 
and misjudgment. The state’s counter-reaction might result in domes-
tic and international criticism, political instability, political controversy 
and might damage the national as well as the international image of the 
country. These results are expected to lead to growing support for the 
terrorist cause on the one hand, and to political and economic destabili-
zation on the other hand. 
Contrary to terror organizations that violate civil rights during their 
continuous struggle, a democratic state that fights terrorism is vulner-
able in this regard. This is due to the need to develop mechanisms that 
block the political expression of racist, violent or inciter groups, while 
ensuring that these mechanisms do not infringe on the basic civil liber-
ties of its citizens. This challenge is most prominent in the legal arena. 
Nowadays, the willingness of many democratic states to use severe 
measures against terrorism is on the increase. States’ counter-reactions 
can now include legislation of orders and regulations that significantly 
15 Raphaeli 2003:60–75.
16 Marighella 1969: 111.
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limit civil liberties. After 9/11 the British parliament approved the “Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001” and four years later it was 
replaced with the “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005” after the British 
court decided that this act was discriminatory against foreign citizens. 
In the USA, the main legislation after 9/11 was the “USA Patriot Act” of 
2001 which provoked legal disputes that eventually led to the “Military 
Commissions Act of 2006”. In response to such legislation, many civil 
rights activists took steps to minimize what they considered damage 
to democracy and civil rights. Additionally, this legislation provoked 
strong social controversy between those who demand extreme counter-
terrorism measures in the fight against terrorism and those who claim 
that such measures are unnecessary and sacrifice legal rights on the altar 
of national security.17 
The elimination of political opponents
The elimination of political opponents is one of the typical modi operan-
di of terror organizations. Assassinations of political leaders and politi-
cal figures are used as symbolic acts with the purpose of undermining 
political stability removing rivals in the political arena. The chosen vic-
tims are usually prominent political figures in government whose killing 
will result in strong social and political turmoil.
Political opponents of terror organizations may be internal as well as 
external. External opponents are political leaders, government officials 
and public figures belonging to the target state, which the terror organ-
ization considers enemies. Internal opponents are prominent political 
rivals belonging to groups and organizations among the population the 
terror organization claims to represent. These internal opponents usu-
ally have similar national, ethnical or ideological characteristics to those 
of the terror organization. 
In 1881, during the international congress of the Anarchist move-
ment in London, the policy of “propaganda by deed” emerged. Con-
sequently, it led to acts of revolutionary terror against political leaders 
such as kings, presidents and prime ministers. The twentieth century 
is considered the deadliest in terms of political assassinations. Among 
them were terror attacks against the Italian prime minister Aldo Moro 
17 Chang 2011: 19–21; Sidel 2007: 187.
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by the Red Brigades organization in 1978; the former Indian prime 
minister Rajib Gandi by the LTTE organization in 1991; the British 
ambassador to Ireland Christopher Ewart-Biggs by the IRA organiza-
tion in 1976; the Egyptian prime minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi 
by the Muslim Brotherhood organization in 1948; the Spanish prime 
minister Luis Carrero Blanco by the ETA organization in 1973; and the 
Egyptian president Anwar El Sadat by the Egyptian Jihad organization 
in 1981. Additionally, there have been numerous cases of failed assas-
sination attempts against many political leaders.
The use of the component of eliminating political opponents may be 
counterproductive since it may lead to the opposite of untended conse-
quences, as well as jeopardizing the organization’s chances of aceiving 
political goals in the long term. Instead of gaining public support, the 
public may be outraged by the killing of its admired political leaders and 
express demands of revenge and force against the terror organization. 
For example, in the case of the murder of the former Italian Prime Minis-
ter Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, the Italian public considered this act 
to be savage and cowardly. Furthermore, it led to the alienation of many 
members of the revolutionary movement diminishing cooperation with 
other organizations and resulting in fierce internal disputes that split the 
organization and led to its eventual demise.18
Instilling fear
The psychological element in the strategy of terrorism is a central one. 
Terrorists can strike at any time, any place. The message delivered to the 
public is that no-one is safe and that the military and economic power 
of the government does not guarantee public order or personal safety. 
Acts of violence are intended to intimidate the public in order to influ-
ence their attitudes and insert conflict into the political arena. Terrorists 
expect this intimidation to result in public pressure on decision makers 
to make concessions or to change policies in favor of the terrorist cause. 
Undermining state authority and breaking public trust may affect 
the functioning of society as a whole by reducing the political involve-
ment of the people. Personal security is emphasized at the expense of 
18 Whittaker 2012: 225.
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the greater good.19 Terror organizations invest great efforts in tracking 
the target state’s media in order to locate weak spots in society, to iden-
tify social cleavages and internal disputes so they can intensify them. 
This psychological warfare may become more intense as the struggle 
goes on. In fact, terror organizations could instill fear using methods of 
psychological warfare without carrying out actual attacks.20 Thus, the 
effective use of this component will result in disproportionate anxiety 
compared to the actual threat among the target audience. Public opinion 
plays a key role in translating the terrorist messages into anxiety, as well 
as channeling it into political pressure on decision-makers.
Research findings suggest that exposure to terrorism and the threat 
of terrorism does have negative psychological effects like elevated de-
pression and stress levels, as well as post-traumatic stress disorder.21 
However, the findings of a study conducted in the year following 9/11 
suggest that most Americans did not report feelings of fear or terror. One 
of its conclusions was that the terror attack of 9/11 had very limited suc-
cess in instilling fear in the American public.22 
Liberal democracies have proven their resilience in the face of ter-
rorist attempts to coerce them into changing their policies or making 
concessions to their demands. Democracies have the advantage of broad 
legitimacy in the public eye, allowing them to rely on continuous sup-
port in their attempts to repress terrorism.23 In some cases, support rate 
of the elected American president has even increased during and after 
terror attacks, and during counter terrorism operations.24 
Publicity
The media activity of terror organizations may contribute to their suc-
cess in achieving tactical political goals in four central ways. First, terror 
organizations use their acts of violence as a means of publicizing their 
message. The idea of “Propaganda by the dead”25 is a key element in 
19 Huddy et al. 2005: 593–608.
20 Ganor 2011: 229.
21 Galea et al. 2002: 982–987; Silver et al. 2002: 1235–1244.
22 Huddy et al. 2005: 560.
23 Wilkinson 2011: 49.
24 Nacos et al. 2008: 1–25.
25 Bakunin 1990: 14–20.
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terrorism strategy and it is designed, through acts of terror, to raise the 
awareness of the public and decision-makers in the target state of their 
strategic goals and demands. Second, terror organizations use their acts 
of violence as a means of instilling fear in the public. Third, media activ-
ity is designed to assist in the recruitment of new activists, supporters 
and funding worldwide, and reflects the aspiration to gain legitimacy 
and support, both externally and internally. These last two ways illus-
trate how different components in the strategy of terror organizations 
interact with one another. Fourth, media activity is designed to have an 
indirect effect on public opinion in the target state since the media is 
considered one of the elements that influences and shapes public opin-
ion. Thus, terror organizations expect the media to grant them access to 
the political communication triangle, which is composed of the media, 
the public and decision-makers in the government.26 
The relationship between terrorism and the media has even been de-
scribed by the term “terror theatre”,27 as the terror attack is considered 
to be like the production of a play for the audience. The 9/11 attack illus-
trated how the international news media cut across distances, national 
boundaries and time differences. Developments in communication tech-
nology, such as digital satellite broadcasting, cellular communications 
and the internet, have turned terrorism into a live show which can be 
seen unfolding stage by stage, much like a prepared script.28 Technologi-
cal development in the past decade has transformed the world of media, 
allowing terror organizations to use media platforms as a means of shap-
ing policy and influencing public opinion. Thus, the new media allows 
terror organizations to rely on soft power29 as well, rather than only on 
coercive measures, and to use public diplomacy30 in order to challenge 
governments. Many terror organizations operate public relations wings, 
negotiate through the media and use the internet for propaganda and the 
transfer of information, to raise funds and launder money, for internal 
communication and recruitment purposes. Furthermore, many of them 
26 Nacos 2016: 27–49.
27 Jenkins 2006: 11.
28 Shpiro 2002: 76–85.
29 Nye 2008: 95.
30 Gilboa 2006: 716–720.
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have their own websites.31 Without digital technology the Islamic State 
(ISIS) may never even have existed, nor would it be able to survive or 
expand. The Islamic State used the internet and digital communication 
with inventiveness and employed cyberspace as a new battle arena.32 
This study analyzes the strategy of eight case studies of terror organ-
izations through the lens of the strategic components that were briefly 
reviewed above. The next section describes the research methodology. 
Methodology
Research methodology was based on case study analysis. The case stud-
ies in this study represent different categories of political goals, follow-
ing Wilkinson’s typology of terror organization political motivation:33
• Ethno-National goals (national liberation, self-determination, auton-
omy, independence)
• Ideological goals (revolution in the name of extreme left/right ideolo-
gies)
• Religious-Political goals (eliminate societies and states in order to 
create a new world order through holy war)
• Single-issue goals (a demand for a specific change in social/political 
policy)
The case studies in this study were therefore chosen mainly based on 
an effort to represent Wilkinson’s classification of political motives, 
and on an effort to include organizations that were active (or currently 
active) for long periods of time worldwide. Organizations with single-
issue goals were not included in the sample due to their short periods of 
activity and there being fewer cases worldwide. 
Thus, the research sample includes eight case studies of key terror 
organizations worldwide: Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), Al-Fatah, Hizballah, Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), Red Army Faction (RAF), and the Egyptian Muslim 
31 Weimann 2008: 69–72.
32 Atwan 2015: 15–31.
33 Wilkinson 2011: 78.
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Brotherhood. The time frame of the analysis of active organizations is 
from the establishment of the organization until 2013. 
Effectiveness of terrorism: The dependent variable of effectiveness 
was evaluated on a scale composed of several degrees representing the 
extent of political goals achieved, beginning with lack of achievement 
(failure), through tactical goals achieved, and ending with the full or 
partial achievement of strategic goals. This research distinguishes be-
tween tactical and strategic political goals of terror organizations. This 
distinction is based on the time dimension and is necessary since terror-
ist campaigns tend to be prolonged affairs.
Tactical goals are defined as short-term and middle-term goals used 
to create a cumulative effect as a means of achieving long-term strategic 
goals. Terror organizations use the strategy of ‘war of attrition’ against 
the state and this type of war is a prolonged one. Tactical goals may 
be releasing prisoners, ransom money, increasing local support, exten-
sive media coverage, partial political concessions, gaining international 
legitimacy and creating a more comfortable basis for future negotiations. 
Strategic goals are defined in this study as the declared goals of the 
terror organization, as described by its leaders. Strategic political goals 
derive from the basic motivation that led to the establishment and exist-
ence of the terror organization. Generally, the declared political goals of 
terror organizations are considered stable and reliable indicator of their 
actual intentions.34 
Generally, the data sources used to evaluate the independent vari-
able of the strategy of terror organizations included the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD), The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
(START), the terror organization’s original materials and publications, 
media and academic publications, and official reports issued by govern-
ments. 
Recruitment of activists and supporters: Data is based on “The Ter-
rorist Organization Profiles” (START: National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) and academic publica-
tions.
34 Abrahms 2006: 46.
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Elimination of opponents: Data includes the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD), official reports issued by security forces or investiga-
tion committees when available, media and academic publications. 
Instilling fear: Quantitative data regarding the amount of terror 
attacks and fatalities per year was retrieved from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD). The GTD includes information on terrorist events 
around the world from 1970, which is currently available until 2015. The 
analysis only includes attacks targeting civilians, but not security forces 
(military or police). Additionally, the evaluation of the effects of this 
component in the target country includes public opinion polls. 
The component of instilling fear was a challenging component to 
measure. Terror organizations use terror attacks as a means to instill 
fear that would ultimately influence public opinion and political at-
titudes. The assumption is that there is a positive correlation between 
the frequency and the lethality of terror attacks (the frequencies of the 
occurrence of terror attacks and the amount of victims) and the levels of 
fear and anxiety inflicted on the public. The more frequent and lethal the 
attacks, the higher levels of fear become. Hence, public opinion polls in 
the target country may serve as a reliable source of information when 
these polls include subjects such as the level of fear, anxiety and per-
sonal insecurity resulting from exposure to actual terror attacks or to 
the threat thereof. 
Publicity: Data includes content analysis of newspaper articles in 
local and international printed and online newspapers, of 15–20 terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by each organization during the years of operation: 
Beirut Times (Online), The Jerusalem Post, Asian Tribune (Online), 
Colombo Times (Online), Al-Ahram Weekly (Online), Barcelona Re-
porter (Online), The Guardian (Printed and Online), An Phoblacht (On-
line), Colombia Reports (Online), and The New York Times. The articles 
were selected according to the dates of major terror attacks against civil 
targets.
Provocations: Data includes the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
newspaper articles in local and international newspapers (as detailed in 
the last section on the publicity component) and official reports issued 
by governments. 
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Findings
This study analyzes the strategies of eight case studies on terror organi-
zations over long periods of time and takes into account the govern-
ment’s counter-reactions to the terrorist activity in the target state, as 
well as public opinion and the media. The findings section presents the 
results of the analysis regarding the terror organization strategies that 
failed, strategies that achieved tactical goals, and strategies that achieved 
partial strategic goals.
RAF and LTTE: The terror organization strategies that failed
Two case studies of organizations that failed and were dismantled: RAF 
had ideological goals and LTTE had ethno-national goals. The RAF’s 
declared ideological strategic goals included a leftist revolution and the 
creation of a free society in Germany. In 1998, the RAF released a state-
ment announcing the end of its struggle without having realized any 
substantial goals: “The urban guerrillas in the form of the RAF are now 
history, the end of this project shows that we cannot succeed that way”.35 
The LTTE’s declared ethno-national strategic goals included the estab-
lishment of an independent Tamil state in northeast Sri Lanka. In 2009, 
after a prolonged counterterrorism campaign by the Sri Lanka military, 
the LTTE was defeated and announced its dismantlement. 
Analysis of these organizations’ strategies shows that, concerning 
the recruitment component, in 2009 the LTTE counted approximately 
8,000–10,000 activists.36 The LTTE had lost the support of the Tamil 
people as the struggle continued. The fact that it had to use coercive 
recruitment methods implies a loss of legitimacy among the Tamil 
people.37 The RAF counted between 20–300 activists throughout the 
years of its activity and it also failed to win the support of the German 
public.38
As for the use of the provocation component, in the RAF’s case the 
German authorities’ aggressive treatment of the arrested activists por-
trayed them as martyrs in the German public’s eye. With the LTTE, the 
35 Aust 2008: 437.
36 The Terrorist Organization Profiles: http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/
37 Sweig 2002: 122–141
38 Becker 1978: 1–57.
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continuous harassment of the families and relatives of LTTE activists 
by security forces in the first stages of the struggle contributed to the 
voluntary recruitment of new activists. 
Regarding the elimination of opponents, the RAF targeted promi-
nent German political and public figures and succeeded in assassinating 
one federal judge, two bank managers, the head of the German industri-
als association, an army general, a diplomat, the head of a government 
agency, and several industrials. Additionally, it carried out several failed 
assassination attempts.39 The LTTE is the organization that made the 
most extensive use of this component out of all eight case studies. The 
LTTE assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajib Gandi and a for-
mer Sri Lankan president. Between 1989 and 1994, the LTTE succeeded 
in eliminating all of its prominent rivals within the Tamil community. 
It assassinated dozens of senior politicians and public figures in India 
and Sri Lanka.40 
Similarly, the LTTE made extensive use of the component of instill-
ing fear by consistently carrying out frequent and lethal terror attacks 
against civilians. According to data from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) the LTTE was responsible for an average of 211.44 civilian fatali-
ties per year during the period of its activities 1979–2009 (see figure 1). 
The LTTE has been known for its cruel methods that were used to instill 
fear: public executions, ethnic cleansing, kidnapping of women and chil-
dren, captivity, torture, and murder. Furthermore, the LTTE managed to 
exterminate all of its rival Tamil groups within the Tamil population by 
the mid 1980s.41
39 Rojahn 1998: 7–63.
40 Battle 2010: 43; Lilja 2009: 308–309.
41 Lilja 2009: 312–315; START Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved from http://www.
start.umd.edu/gtd
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The RAF is exceptional in this regard since this organization only tar-
geted German security forces and governmental symbols in its violent 
activity, but not the German public. Thus, the motives underlying its 
terror attacks were, on the one hand, to instill fear in the German gov-
ernment and, on the other hand, to spark the fire of revolution awaken 
the revolutionary consciousness of the German public. Therefore, the 
pattern of the RAF’s use of the component of instilling fear does not 
include deliberate lethal and frequent attacks against citizens.42 
As for the influence of the component of instilling fear on the public 
in the target state, public opinion polls conducted in Germany showed 
that in the first years of RAF activity the German public expressed fear, 
42 Becker 1978: 1–57; Rojahn 1998: 7–63.
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a sense of helplessness and deep concern about the terror attacks. How-
ever, in 1976 the majority of the German public supported the death 
penalty for terrorists and showed a willingness to sacrifice personal 
freedoms in the fight against terrorism.43
ETA and FARC: The strategies of terror 
organizations that achieved tactical goals 
Two terror organizations have achieved only tactical goals: ETA and 
FARC. ETA’s declared ethno-national strategic goals included the 
establishment of an independent Basque state. In 2011, the ETA organi-
zation declared a permanent ceasefire and the cessation of armed ac-
tivity before it had realized its strategic goal through violent struggle. 
FARC’s declared ideological strategic goals included a Marxist-Leninist 
revolution in Colombia and the establishment of a new government that 
would represent the rural population. By 2011, FARC had gained control 
of approximately 30% of Colombia. However, between 2012 and 2016 
the organization suffered an intensive military offensive. In 2016, the 
FARC signed a ceasefire accord with the President of Colombia, Juan 
Manuel Santos, after four years of negotiations. The peace agreement 
was approved by the Colombian Congress and is termed “territorial 
peace”, one that decentralizes the political and economic dominance 
of the Bogota-centred political and economic structures and empowers 
municipal and departmental leaders and rural communities.44 In 2017, 
FARC rebels moved into transition zones and began the process of dis-
armament.
FARC, which achieved only tactical goals, has suffered a decline in 
recent years and counts approximately 10,000 activists, while in 2002 
the Colombian intelligence services estimated that FARC had between 
15,000–18,000 activists. The FARC organization had a coercive element 
to their recruitment tactics since it had control over the territory and 
used it to employ dependent people as a source of income. The Colom-
bian people’s support of the organization has declined in recent years 
and the Colombian public takes part in mass protests against FARC.45
43 Pridham 1981: 18–52; De Boer 1979: 410–418.
44 Fagen 2015: 10.
45 Sweig 2002: 124–130.
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ETA, which achieved only tactical goals, counted between several 
tens to approximately 300 members throughout the years of its activ ity.46 
The ETA organization also lost the support of the Basque people as the 
struggle went on. Under the Franco regime, the organization enjoyed the 
support of the Basque people. However, once the democratic govern-
ment was established in Spain in 1979 and granted the Basque people 
autonomy, Basque support in ETA substantially declined.47 
Concerning the provocation component, FARC’s provocations in-
cluded kidnapping, terror attacks and gaining control of Colombian 
territories, which helped the organization to improve its position in ne-
gotiations with the Colombian authorities. In ETA’s case, the Spanish au-
thorities’ aggressive treatment of arrested ETA activists painted them as 
martyrs in Spanish public opinion during the early years of its activity.
According to data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), ETA 
was responsible had for an average of 7.85 civilian fatalities per year be-
tween t 1970 and 2009 (see figure 2). During the rule of Franco in Spain 
until 1975, Basque public opinion was supportive of ETA activity. In 
1978, almost half of the adult Basque population considered ETA activ-
ists idealistic and patriotic. However, as the struggle continued, public 
opinion polls showed a steady decline in support. In 1989, less than 25% 
of the adult Basque population considered ETA activists to be patriots. 
In 2004, 69% of the adult Basque population considered ETA activists to 
be terrorists.48 In 2007, two million people participated in a mass dem-
onstration held in Madrid against the ETA. 
FARC made extensive use of the component of instilling fear by con-
sistently perpetrating frequent and lethal terror attacks against civilians. 
According to the GTD, FARC had an average of 71.00 civilian fatalities 
per year between 1975 and 2011 (see figure 3). In 2008, there were sever-
al mass demonstrations against the FARC organization, in Colombia and 
around the world. In 2016, peace deal with FARC was put to a vote in a 
national referendum. The referendum failed with 50.24% voting against, 
forcing the Colombian government and FARC to formulate a revised 
peace deal that was finally approved by the Colombian Congress. 
46 The Terrorist Organization Profiles.
47 Alexander et al. 2001: 32. 
48 Alonso & Reinares 2005: 266–270.
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In ETA’s case, this organization made extensive use of the component 
of eliminating opponents. The ETA targeted prominent Spanish politi-
cal and public figures and succeeded in assassinating several dozens 
of senior officials including the Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero 
Blanco, military officials, parliament members, political party mem-
bers, judges, lawyers, intellectuals, university professors, journalists, 
businessmen and governmental employees.49 FARC made extensive use 
of this component as well. FARC assassinated several tens of Colom-
bian public representatives and political figures (advisors, party lead-
ers, mayors, senators and presidential candidates), a state governor and 
a former president’s sister.50
IRA, Fatah, Hezbollah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: 
Terror organization strategies that achieved partial strategic goals
Research findings indicate that only four terror organizations have 
achieved partial strategic goals: the PIRA (Provisional IRA), Fatah, 
Hezbollah and, to some degree, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (MB). 
Both Fatah and the PIRA had ethno-national political goals. The PIRA’s 
declared strategic goals included the withdrawal of British forces from 
Northern Ireland, the independence of Northern Ireland, and the reun-
ion of the Irish nation under an Irish government. Eventually, in 1997, 
the PIRA signed the “Good Friday agreement” with the British govern-
ment, which granted the Catholic public in North Ireland representation 
and participation in the government, improving their social and political 
position. 
Al-Fatah’s declared strategic goals included Palestinian self-determi-
nation, national liberation and the establishment of a Palestinian state. 
Eventually, in 1993, the Fatah signed “The Oslo I accord” with the Israe-
li government, which allowed it to establish an independent Palestinian 
authority alongside the state of Israel. 
Hezbollah’s declared religious-political strategic goals include the 
establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon, the elimination of 
Israel, as well as expelling the USA from the Middle East. Currently, the 
49 Alexander et al. 2001: 45–53.
50 Feldman & Hinojosa: 42–61.
297 Limor Nobel-Konig
Hezbollah organization has managed to achieve representation in the 
Lebanon parliament and territorial control over some parts of Lebanon. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s declared religious-political strategic 
goals include the building of an Islamic society and state in Egypt and 
the establishment of a constitution based on the Islamic Qur’an. In 2011, 
for the first time in the history of the movement, it achieved a substan-
tial accomplishment: the establishment of a political party “The Free-
dom and Justice Party”. In 2012, the MB won 47% of the votes in the 
first democratic elections after the fall of President Mubarak, advancing 
the movement closer than ever before to achieving its strategic political 
goals. However, once in power the MB faced a new political reality in 
Egypt and had to adjust its political agenda to the wishes of the Egyptian 
people. When it failed to do so, the MB movement found itself once 
again outlawed and excluded. In July 2013 the elected MB President 
Mohamed Morsi was ousted by a military coup and the MB movement 
suffered a substantial overthrow. 
Findings regarding the recruitment component revealed that the 
PIRA counted between several hundred to approximately 1,000 mem-
bers throughout the years of its activity. It had enjoyed extensive support 
among the Catholic public in Ireland throughout the years of its strug-
gle.51 The MB’s “Freedom and Justice Party” won 47.2% of the seats 
in Egypt’s lower house of parliament in the 2011–2012 elections. These 
results indicate that the MB has extensive support among the Muslim 
population in Egypt.52 Hezbollah has approximately 1,000 members and 
has extensive support among the Shi’ite population in Lebanon. Fatah 
counted between several hundred to several thousand members through-
out the years of its activity53 and had extensive support among the Pal-
estinian population throughout the years of the activity analyzed in this 
study. All four organizations mentioned above achieved partial strategic 
goals. 
Regarding the provocation component, in the PIRA’s case, provo-
cations included terror attacks, hunger strikes and highly publicized 
protests in Maze prison. There was a repeated pattern of counterpro-
ductive over-reactions from the British government in response to the 
51 English 2004: 132, 344.
52 Aknur 2013: 3
53 The Terrorist Organization Profiles
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PIRA’s provocations throughout the years of the struggle, which eventu-
ally served the recruitment and propaganda purposes of the PIRA. The 
British government took actions that were meant to weaken the sup-
port of the Catholic public in the IRA but ended up strengthening it 
instead.54 The most prominent examples are “Operation Demetrius” and 
the intern ment procedure (arrest without a trial),55 the events of “Bloody 
Sunday”,56 “Operation Motorman”57 and the prisoner protests in Maze 
prison. This prison that was used by the British government as a means 
of neutralizing violence turned into the center of an international crisis 
as PIRA prisoners portrayed as victims in the international media. Thus, 
these provocations assisted the PIRA in gaining the tactical goals of sup-
port, recruitment of activists, and media coverage. 
With the MB in Egypt, provocations included religious propagan-
da and massive demonstrations. The counter-reactions of the Egyptian 
governments included banning the MB movement and prohibiting of 
the establishment of its political party. However, supporters of the MB 
considered these acts to be repressive and unjust and the MB gained the 
tactical goals of public legitimacy and support.
The Fatah organization’s provocations included terror attacks and 
the armed “Intifada”58.58 The counter-reactions of the Israeli government 
included military operations against the organization’s bases in Jor-
dan and Lebanon. These provocations and counter-reactions helped the 
54 English 2004: 187–227.
55 Operation Demetrius was an operation carried out by the British army in Northern 
Ireland in 1971. During the operation, 324 people suspected of being activists of the PIRA 
were arrested without a trial. It turned out that many of those arrested were Catholics or Irish 
nationalists who had no ties to the PIRA. The procedure of internment, the violent arrests, 
and the abuse of those arrested, led to mass protests of Catholic public and increased the 
sympathy and the support in the PIRA.
56 During the events of Bloody Sunday, the British Army in Northern Ireland shot 
(30.1.1072) 26 unarmed civil-rights protesters and bystanders. Two investigations by the 
British government supported the version of the British army and cleared the British soldiers 
and British authorities of blame. This was one of the most significant events, which affected 
the course of the struggle, and increased the support of the Catholic public in the PIRA.
57 The British Army in Northern Ireland carried out operation Motorman in 1972. The 
purpose of the operation was to regain control of the “no-go areas” (areas controlled by PIRA) 
that had been established in Belfast, Londonderry and other towns. During the operation, the 
British Army shot four people in Derry, killing a civilian and an unarmed PIRA member.
58 “Intifada” refers to the Palestinian uprising against Israel between the years 1987 to 1993.
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Fatah organization shape Palestinian as well as the international public 
opinion and gain the recognition that Fatah is the leading and central 
organization that represents the cause of Palestinian national identity. 
Additionally, it helped Fatah to improve its position in the negotiations 
that preceded the Oslo I Accord.
In Hezbollah’s case, provocations included a military presence near 
the Israeli border, parades and military exercises in Lebanon, psycho-
logical warfare through the media, guerrilla attacks and firing missiles. 
The counter-reactions of the Israeli government included military op-
erations against the organization in Lebanon. These provocations and 
counter-reactions helped the Hezbollah organization to gain interna-
tional recognition and the growing support of the Shi’ite population in 
Lebanon.
Concerning the elimination of political opponents, in Fatah’s case, 
to the best of our knowledge, this organization did not assassinate any 
prominent Israeli public or political figures. The MB did not made ex-
tensive use of this component either, although it did succeed in assas-
sinating one Egyptian judge and the Egyptian prime minister Mahmud 
Fahmi al-Nuqrashi. Additionally, the MB was accused of assassinating 
a police commander as well, and a fraction of the MB assassinated the 
Egyptian president Anwar El Sadat.59 
As for Hezbollah, it did not make extensive use of this component 
either. Hezbollah kidnapped and killed an American CIA representative, 
a UN colonel, a senior IDF commander and a senior commander of the 
South Lebanon army (SLA) .60 
The PIRA’s targets included prominent British and Irish public and 
political figures, and they succeeded in assassinating four senior offi-
cials in the British and Irish governments. Additionally, it carried out 
several failed assassination attempts against the British prime minister 
Margaret Thatcher.61
The PIRA, Hezbollah, Fatah, and the MB organizations used the 
component of instilling fear along a relatively similar trend. As illus-
trated in figures 4–6, this trend may be described as a more utilitarian 
application of the component of instilling fear. It shows that, since the 
59 Aboul-Eneim 2013: 36–31; Mitchelle 1993: 124–146.
60 Berkovich 2007: 20–52.
61 English 2004: 95–148.
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establishment of the organization or the beginning of its violent activ-
ity, the terror organization in question had perpertrated frequent and 
lethal terror attacks according to a certain pattern. It can be noticed that 
this pattern of activity includes some peak points of lethal and frequent 
attacks (between 1–4 peaks) during the years of activity. However, be-
tween these peaks there were periods of decline, especially in the lethal-
ity of the attacks. Consequently, in comparison with LTTE and FARC, 
theses organizations had a much lower fatality rate per year of activity. 
According to the GTD, the PIRA was responsible for an average of 26.89 
civilian fatalities per year between 1970 and 1997. Hezbollah had an 
average of 18.28 civilian fatalities per year between 1983 and 2015, and 
Fatah had an average of 9.31 civilian fatalities per year between 1976 
and 1994. 











































































As the MB had been creating militant sectors within the movement 
since 1931, by the mid-1940s it was operating a secret military wing 
which performed terrorist attacks against the Egyptian government and 
the civilian population. Its violent activity continued until the 1950s and 
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included the assassinations of at least five political figures in Egypt.62 
In the decades following the 1950s, the MB was not involved in violent 
activity at least until the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014, follow-
ing the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi. However, since 2015 Egypt 
has been witness to renewed waves of terror attacks, of which at least 
a proportion were perpetrated by former MB activists who established 
small terror cells in the Nile valley area. Although data from the GTD is 
available only from the 1970s onwards and therefore does not cover the 
1940s–1950s, it can be assumed that MB activity fits the aforementioned 
utilitarian trend as well since there are only two peak points of frequent 
and lethal terror attacks throughout the organization’s history.
In relation to the influence of the component of instilling fear in the 
public in the target state, examination of public opinion polls in the tar-
get states suggests that, generally, the public did express fear and con-
cern in response to terror attacks. However, the public simultaneously 
expressed support of severe measures of counter terrorism and denun-
ciation of the terror organization.
In the case of the Israeli public, this is relevant for the Hezbollah and 
Fatah case studies. Public opinion polls that examined the influence of 
terrorist attacks on militant attitudes indicated that as people become 
more frightened, they express views that become more militant. These 
people were more willing to use force in the fight against terrorism in 
comparison with people who did not express fear. From the 1967 war 
until 1993, with the signing of the Oslo I Accord, the Israeli public de-
manded tough measures against terrorism and did not express any desire 
for negotiations. From 1993–2001, the Israeli public expressed militant 
views against terrorism and simultaneously expressed a willingness for 
peace negotiations. However, after the 2001 armed Palestinian resist-
ance (known as the Al-Akza Intifada), the Israeli public expressed mili-
tant views and rejected any possible compromises.63 During the period 
2001–2003, that characterized by substantial increase in terror attacks 
in Israel, the Israeli public expressed rational fear, proportional to the 
threat level and the likelihood of its occurrence, while this fear did not 
prevent a routine life of work and even leisure activities.64 
62 Al-Husaini 1981: 19.
63 Pedahzur & Canetti-Nisim 2004: 2–6.
64 Ganor 2011: 238.
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As for PIRA, in 1973 after four years of activity on Irish land 
PIRA’s leaders came to the conclusion that the influence on British pub-
lic opinion through terror attacks against British forces in Northern Ire-
land was limited. The organization therefore made strategic decision to 
migrate their terrorist activities to Britain.65 Before PIRA terror attacks 
occur in Britain, only 30% of the British public had considered terror-
ism to be a major problem in their country. However, public opinion 
polls that were conducted in 1977–1978 indicated that the majority of the 
British public was very concerned about the increase in terror attacks.66 
Although public opinion polls were not available for the MB, the re-
sults of the 2011 elections in Egypt suggest that the MB has a very wide 
support base among the Egyptian public, winning 36.6% of the votes. 
Following the rise of the Abdel Fattah el-Sisi regime, MB leaders worry 
about losing the allegiance of the youth, but the MB still constitutes a a 
heavyweight opposition in Egypt.67 
Findings regarding the publicity component in general suggest that in 
all cases the terror attacks gained media coverage. In the printed press, 
the terror attacks were covered in the first published edition following 
the attack and in online journals, while articles were already available 
on the day of the attack. One of the interesting findings of the media 
coverage content analysis relates to the mentions of the terror organiza-
tions’ motives. The analysis found that only 33 out of 130 articles (about 
one quarter) did mention motives. The LTTE had the largest percentage 
of articles mentioning its motives, followed by ETA, MB, Hezbollah, 
PIRA, RAF, Fatah, and the lowest percentage the FARC.
Another interesting finding relates to the words used to describe the 
organization in the articles. In most cases, the articles used the organiza-
tion’s name and the second most common word was “guerrillas”. Only 
twenty percent of the articles used the word “terrorists”. However, find-
ings indicate that, apart from the MB, the organizations did not succeed 
in garnering sympathy in the media for their struggle. Most articles had 
neutral content and about forty percent had content that was critical of 
the terror organization. The RAF had the largest percentage of articles 
65 English 2004: 205–248.
66 De Boer 1979: 410–418.
67 Brown & Dunne 2015: 1–3.
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with critical content, followed by ETA, LTTE, FARC, PIRA, Fatah, Hez-
bollah and, the lowest percentage for the MB.
The analysis also examined whether the articles focused on the vic-
tims of the attack or on the terror organization since when the article 
places the victims at the center of the article rather than the terror or-
ganization the focus is on the outcomes of the attacks and not the reasons 
for their occurrence. Approximately one third of the articles focused on 
the terror organization, with another third focusing on the victims, and 
the rest focused on both sides equally. The MB had the largest percent-
age of articles focusing on the organization, followed by ETA, PIRA, 
RAF, Fatah, Hezbollah, FARC, and the lowest percentage for the LTTE. 
Discussion
Research findings indicate that four out of the eight case studies of terror 
organizations examined in this study achieved partial strategic goals: 
The Fatah, Hezbollah, the PIRA and the Egyptian MB. Two organiza-
tions only achieved tactical goals: ETA and FARC; and two organiza-
tions failed: LTTE and the RAF. Analysis of these terror organizations’ 
strategies through the lens of their central strategic components has 
raised several insights. 
Regarding the component of recruiting activists and supporters, find-
ings suggest that the amount of activists does not have a distinct pattern 
of influence on the extent of the political goals achieved. These findings 
indicate that a large number of activists were no guarantee for success 
since the largest organizations, FARC and LTTE, failed to achieve their 
strategic political goals. FARC’s critical decision to privilege criminality 
for the generation of financial means destroyed the execution of a viable 
people’s war strategy. Criminality, although it made FARC perhaps the 
richest insurgent group in the world during its heyday, laid the founda-
tions for its defeat by ceding legitimacy, and thus mass mobilization, to 
the democratic state.68 However, findings indicate that all four organiza-
tions that achieved partial strategic goals managed to win broad support 
for their activities and goals among the populations they claimed to rep-
resent. The use of social aid services for the purpose of gaining support 
68 Marks 2017: 489.
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among the population helped the MB and the Hezbollah organizations to 
strengthen support in their activities. 
Thus, the amount of activists was found to be less important than the 
rate of support the organization gained among the population it claimed 
to represent. In most cases, terror organizations continue to exist as long 
as they do not alienate their actual and potential supporters. Moreover, 
the ability to recruit public support may sometimes even subdue the 
struggle. There are known cases of terror organizations that ceased to 
exist due to severe criticism and objections from the public the terror 
organization claimed to represent, as in the case the Basque public and 
ETA, the Armenian public, and the Italian public.69 Respectively, coer-
cive methods of recruitment were found to be ineffective. 
Terror organizations use provocation as a means to force the govern-
ment to react in coercive ways. The findings of this study reveal that all 
eight case studies used provocation, which consequently helped them 
gain tactical goals to some degree. The findings suggest that when the 
terror organization enticed the government into overreacting and using 
extensive force, it did gain tactical goals such as media coverage, im-
proved position in negotiations, and the sympathy and support of the 
public. In some cases, the repressive counter-reactions of the govern-
ment helped the terror organization by increasing the voluntary recruit-
ment of activists. Consequently, the component of provocation proved 
to be effective as an asymmetric strategy of attrition and in helping the 
terror organization to maintain conflict without resolution. 
It is a fine line that separates the governments’ image as weak and 
helpless and their image as repressive in the way they respond to ter-
rorism. A government that is incapable of taking action in response to 
terror attacks would probably lose public support and diminish its confi-
dence and ability to win the battle against terrorism in the future. There-
fore, governments should achieve wide public support for anti-terrorism 
policies and should strengthen their citizens in the face of upcoming 
difficulties and limitations on personal freedoms, if necessary.70 
The component of eliminating opponents was found to be ineffec-
tive. Findings regarding this component suggest that not all of the case 
69 Weinberg et al. 2009: 129; Lilja 2009: 315–318.
70 Huddy et al. 2005: 602–605.
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studies used it, and when terror organizations did use this component it 
was at different levels of intensity. However, findings suggest that, in 
fact, those organizations that made the most extensive use of this com-
ponent (LTTE, FARC and ETA) did not achieve their strategic goals or 
even failed, while those organizations that made less frequent use of this 
component in fact achieved partial strategic goals (Fatah, MB and Hez-
bollah). Furthermore, in some cases the assassinations of admired politi-
cal figures might even backfire and lead to devastating outcomes for the 
organization, as in ETA’s case. The assassination of the popular Span-
ish Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco in 1973 had dire consequences 
for ETA. The Spanish security forces used strict measures against the 
organization and the internal disputes regarding the assassination ulti-
mately resulted in ETA’s final and most significant split of in 1974. Two 
decades later, the kidnapping and killing of another popular politician 
in 1997, Miguel Angel Blanco, resulted in furious public responses and 
massive public demonstrations against ETA. 
The component of media activity was found to be effective in achiev-
ing the tactical goal of publicity. However, findings suggest that when 
a terror organization exists for many years, unsuccessful in achieving 
its strategic goals, the media does indeed publicize the occurrence of its 
terror attacks but in most cases it does not publicize the organization’s 
motives or political goals. In this regard, it appears that the organization 
misses an important part of the intended influence on news content. Fur-
thermore, most of the news articles did not put the terror organization 
at the center of the article and terror organizations did not succeed in 
garnering sympathy for their struggle in the media. 
Findings regarding component of instilling fear suggest that the 
case studies of terror organizations examined in this research used it at 
different levels of intensity. Two of the case studies, the LTTE and the 
FARC, made extensive use of this component by consistently orchestrat-
ing frequent and lethal terror attacks against civilians. The utilitarian 
application of the component of instilling fear was proved effective as 
well. A utilitarian application of instilling fear relates to the way that the 
terrorist organization moderates the levels of frequent and lethal terror 
attacks, adjusting the extent of their use as the terrorist campaign goes 
on. The four terror organizations that used this component in this man-
ner achieved partial strategic goals (the PIRA, Hezbollah, Fatah and the 
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MB). However, instilling fear internally on the population the organiza-
tion claims to represent, proved to be ineffective, as in the cases of LTTE 
and ETA. 
Influence public opinion through media activity and intimidation of 
the public was shown to be desirable. In this manner, the tactical suc-
cess failed to be translated into a strategic success. The basic terrorist 
assumption is that creating an anarchic atmosphere, anxiety, and uncer-
tainty, serves as a means of putting pressure on policy-makers. However, 
the present analysis suggests that, in most cases, terror organizations 
do not succeed in influencing public opinion in the desired direction 
of putting public pressure on governments to make concessions, or to 
give in to the organization’s demands. On the contrary, in most cases it 
hardens public opinion and strengthens support for tough and militant 
counter terrorism measures, even at the price of limiting personal free-
doms. Similar findings were reported in studies conducted regarding 
Israel. One of the conclusions was that fearful individuals wish to use 
more force in the struggle against terrorism; they show greater a willing-
ness to take risks and are more likely to present aggressive and militant 
reactions.71 Additionally, terror fatalities had a significant influence on 
the Israeli electorate by causing an increase in support for the right-wing 
bloc of political parties. These parties hold a more intransigent position 
towards terrorism and territorial concessions, and thus undermine the 
terror organization’s strategic goals.72
In this regard, the phenomenon of “rallying around the flag”73 is 
well-known in the literature of public opinion. It proposes that in times 
of major international events or crises the public set aside its disagree-
ments with the incumbent president’s policies or performance in order 
to present a united front to the international community. The public will 
most likely support its president because they fear hurting the nation’s 
chances of success by opposing him and at such times there is an oppor-
tunity to evoke patriotic reactions among the public. 
Finally, analysis of these eight case studies indicates that terror or-
ganizations that did gain partial strategic goals were the ones which 
transformed themselves into some kind of political entity (political party, 
71 Pedahzur & Canetti-Nisim 2004: 4–7.
72 Berrebi & Klor 2008: 279–301.
73 Muller 1970: 18–33.
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political wing) like the PIRA, Fatah, MB and Hezbollah. The history 
of party politics and modern terrorism suggests that there have been 
frequent points of convergence between the activities of political par-
ties around the world and the use of violence to achieve political goals. 
Political parties may turn to terror, but terrorist groups may themselves 
turn to the electoral arena to pursue their goals. An investigation into 
the relationships between 203 terror organizations and political parties 
in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century showed that 
in most cases (66%) terror organizations emerged out of a political party. 
In 12.8% of the cases, terror organizations became a political party and 
in 11.3% of the cases, they established a political wing.74 These findings 
indicate that the transformation of a terror organization into a political 
party is not a rare phenomenon. 
Conclusion
Support from the population the organizations claim to represent, or the 
lack of it, is a crucial element in the success of the terror organization in 
achieving its long-term strategic goals. This component was found to be 
one of the most influential on the success of the organization in achiev-
ing partial strategic goals and on its survival. Creating provocation was 
found to be effective in maintaining conflict without resolution and in 
achieving tactical goals. When the organization managed to entice the 
government into overreacting and using extensive force it did gain tac-
tical goals such as media coverage and public support. By their media 
activity, terror organizations might succeed in gaining publicity but in 
most cases, they do not succeed in influencing public opinion in the de-
sired direction. Similarly, the kind of influence on public opinion instill-
ing fear had not been in the desired direction either. The elimination of 
political opponents is not an effective method since it did not contribute 
to the extent of political goals achieved by the organization.
This study shows that some components in the strategies of terror 
organizations, such as provocation, recruiting support and media activ-
ity, were effective in achieving tactical political goals. However, the 
terror organizations that used these components effectively could have 
translated their tactical successes into (partial) strategic successes only 
74 Weinberg et al. 2009: 25–35.
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on the condition that they consciously engage in some kind of legitimate 
political activity, or that they transform themselves into some kind of 
political entity. Is the strategic transformation of terror organizations 
into political entities a model for success? This question remains to be 
answered. Recent dramatic events in Egypt indicate that even though 
the MB had historical political success, they were unable to capitalize 
on this achievement and the movement is once again outlawed and ex-
cluded. The limitations of this analysis derive from the extent to which 
terrorism can be isolated as a factor influencing political developments 
or events, as well as public reactions, the media and governments. Ana-
lyzing the strategies of several terror organizations over long periods 
and focusing on political goals as perceived by the terror organizations 
themselves helped to minimize this limitation. 
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The Islamic State, Clash of Civilizations 
and Their Impact on the Development of 
Contemporary International Relations
Holger Mölder
Abstract This paper makes the claim that the current spread of 
Islamic extremism which caused the emergence of the Islamic 
State (IS) is not so much a result of Western-Islamic civilizational 
enmity as the outcome of local ethnic and religious rivalries in 
which external powers intervened. Political developments in the 
Middle East over the last 35–40 years which have sometimes been 
followed by external interventions have reinforced religiously mo-
tivated political rivalries (i.e., between Saudi Arabia and Iran) and 
facilitated the spread of Islamic extremism based on the politiciza-
tion of Islam. The emergence of the Islamic State has had a signifi-
cant impact not only on the Middle Eastern regional security envi-
ronment but also on the global international system. The IS, a new 
type of international actor, manifests neither a traditional model 
of the modern state nor a typical terrorist network with restricted 
political goals. Based on the historical narrative of the Caliphate, it 
claims to have authority over the entire Islamic world and intends 
to establish its supranational authority through affiliated organiza-
tions. As the IS is not capable of any kind of mutual relations other 
than war, other states will hardly recognize them as a part of the 
international system. 
Keywords Islamic State, Middle East, clash of civilizations, Islam-
ism, Salafism, regional security
Introduction
On 29th June 2014 the Salafist rebel group ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah 
f ī ‘l-ʿ Irāq wa-sh-Shām (Islamic State in Iraq and Levant) proclaimed 
a worldwide Islamic Caliphate, a self-declared successor of Prophet 
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Muhammad’s Caliphate from the 7th century. The leader of the Caliphate 
Abu Bakr al-Bagdhadi declared himself world leader of Muslims as 
Caliph Ibrahim. The Islamic State (IS) represents a new type of interna-
tional actor which manifests neither a traditional model of the modern 
state nor a typical terrorist network with restricted political goals. Based 
on the historical narrative of the Caliphate (632–1258),1 it claimed to 
have authority over the whole Muslim world and, through its affiliated 
organizations, IS controlled territories in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Since 2017 the Islamic State lost ground following success-
ful offensives against its capital cities of Raqqa and Mosul, however 
the phenomenon of IS requires particular attention in order to exam-
ine why such a relatively small extremist group was able to success-
fully enter into the local power games and once controlled large areas in 
Syria, Iraq and Libya. The powerful advent of the Islamic State in 2014, 
after their successful offensive in Iraq during which they occupied most 
of the Sunni territories there including the second largest city of Mo-
sul, demonstrated that any challenger with a proper strategic plan may 
have an advantage in an unstable security environment. They were sud-
denly able to conquer and control territories despite their disadvanta-
geous position with respect to the number of fighters and their military 
capabilities.
The regional security environment in the Middle East is full of vari-
ous long-term rivalries and hostilities of different origins which can be 
easily used for the sake of extremist ideologies. The Islamic State is not 
committed to following any generally recognized norms of international 
law and is not capable of entering into relations with any other state of 
the international community, making this case exceptional. The excep-
tionality of this new actor, not recognized by the international com-
munity of states or any other internationally recognized body, makes 
the problem for other actors difficult to handle. Furthermore, the inter-
national community cannot punish it with sanctions or other relevant 
measures widely used against norm-breakers. This therefore presents a 
1 The historical Caliphate was formed after the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632. The 
Rashidun Caliphate (al-Khilāfaṫur-Rāshidah) was ruled by his four successors elected by 
Shura (a consultative body of Muslim community) and followed by dynastic Umayyad (661–
750) and Abbasid Caliphates (750–1258). In 1362, after the conquest of Edirne by Sultan 
Murad I, the Ottoman Empire claimed to be a Caliphate.
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political dilemma as any action other than war against the Islamic State 
could be interpreted as unofficial recognition of this political entity, a 
limitation which ties the hands of the international community of states.
This paper argues that the current spread of Islamic extremism is not 
so much the result of Western-Islamic civilizational enmity as it is the 
outcome of local ethnic and religious rivalries and enmities in which 
external powers have intervened. The West has not always interfered in 
these conflicts as a traditional peacemaker but has often sided with one 
or other of the local actors in these numerous conflicts. The powerful 
emergence of extremist movements can be seen as a direct result of un-
successful interventions, the influence of conservative Islamist regional 
powers, and the lack of any regional peace plan. Military interventions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively did not bring 
peace but forced a long-term conflict producing instability and violence, 
a phenomenon which has characterized the regional security environ-
ment throughout the last two decades. The popular narrative of civiliza-
tional enmity does not seem very convincing anymore when emanating 
from the hegemonic requests and ambitions of actors like Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Qatar or Turkey. The West supports the Sunni powers in the re-
gional Sunni-Shia rivalry politically led by Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 
the shadow of the popular narrative of a clash between Western and 
Islamic civilizations, power games between regional powers, an ideo-
logical clash between Islamism and Arab nationalism, and contrasting 
cultural narratives between Israel and Arab countries continue to play a 
major role in the Middle East. 
The myth of the clash of civilizations
The clash of civilizations has become a powerful narrative often used 
by politicians for populist purposes in the so-called post-truth world 
by “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are 
less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and 
personal belief.”2 The current conflicts tend to be long-standing and 
multipolar with multiple mutually fighting actors involved. During the 
last decade and going by evidence from Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, 
2 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
post-truth (accessed on 04.01.2017). 
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among others, no considerable effort has been made by the international 
community of states to bringing peace any closer. This may indicate that 
the “war of all against all” (Bellum omnium contra omnes) introduced 
by English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his 17th century books “De 
Cive” and “Leviathan” may be successfully re-introduced four centuries 
later. The Hobbesian concept of perpetual war was in many ways born 
again after the Cold War’s bipolarity between ideologically opposing 
systems came to an end in the 1990s.
In the generally hopeful decade of the 1990s, when the international 
community of states was probably more united than ever, Samuel P. 
Huntington created the narrative of the clash of civilizations in order 
to characterize the international environment of the post-Cold War era, 
declaring: 
In this new world the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts 
will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically 
defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. 
Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence 
between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries 
with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these 
civilizations rally to their support of their kin countries.3
Huntington was simultaneously right and wrong. He correctly foresaw 
the enhanced use of cultural slogans for promoting ideological goals. At 
the same time, this distinction of cultural differences may effectively 
cover many economic and social disadvantages that the more globalized 
world faces but is not able to solve. Another of Huntington’s mispercep-
tions is related to how civilizational identities rising as internal con-
flicts within civilizations may become even more violent than easily 
explained mythological war between civilizations. Huntington argued 
for the exist ence of a civilizational clash primarily between Islamic 
and Western civilizations because, in his view, both Islam and Chris-
tianity are missionary religions seeking the conversion of others and 
their mission is related to the goals of existence and purpose of human 
existence.4
3 Huntington 1997: 28.
4 Ibid.
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The West has dominated the rhythm of the international system since 
the age of discoveries followed by the era of colonization. As a result, 
the West has often interfered in regional power games, which helped to 
empower the image of inter-civilizational conflict. The increasing influ-
ence of non-Western cultures on the patterns of the international system 
is indisputable. The influential international forum G-20, which consists 
of twenty major world economies, includes twelve rising powers classi-
fied as non-Western according to the Huntingtonian map of civilizations: 
China and South Korea (Sinic); Japan (Japanese); India (Hindu); Indone-
sia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Islamic); Russia (Orthodox); Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico (Latin American); and South Africa (African). Just 
a minority of eight powers represents Western civilization: the United 
States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, 
and the European Union. The rising influence of non-Western powers 
confirms that the West is probably no longer as much of a leading power 
of world civilization as it used to be over the last four-five centuries.
Hobbesian culture describes conflict as natural and unavoidable, often 
brought to a head by the powerful incentives of honour and fear. Zbig-
niew Brzezinski has noted that a culture of fear “obscures reason, inten-
sifies emotions and makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize 
the public on behalf of the policies they want to pursue.”5 The myth of 
the clash of civilizations serves reinvented Hobbesian principles of a 
post-truth world as it can justify fear and hatred of other cultures.6 Ever 
since September 11 2001 the image of the Muslim has been successfully 
merged with that of the terrorist. The media industry actively promoted 
Hollywoodian images of good guys and bad guys, similar to images 
of Batman and his archenemy the Joker, which were easily consumed 
by the masses. This Hollywoodian bipolarity offered by the media was 
gratefully accepted in political circles because fear-based hatred allows 
one to ignore real problems and may easily and inexpensively enhance 
their popularity. This also explains the progressive enhancement of ex-
tremist influences that started at the dawn of the 21st century.
The image produced by political circles and widely spread by the me-
dia is extremely powerful and sets up a distorted mirror which convinces 
5 Brzezinski 2007. 
6 Edward Said (2004, 293) called the concept pursued by Huntington “the purest invidious 
racism, a sort of parody of Hitlerian science directed today against Arabs and Muslims.” 
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the audience that a clash between contrasting civilizations really exists. 
This refers to a process called Hollywoodization by which the rules of 
movie industry are transferred to the media industry. The Hollywoodian 
image of Islam tells us that Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
are trusted representatives of Islamic values. The actual number of ac-
tive Islamic extremists pales in comparison to the Muslim population of 
the world, has been estimated at 85 000 to 106 000 out of a total num-
ber of 1.6 billion followers of the religion, and the number of terror-
ist attacks carried out by Islamic terrorists is similarly comparatively 
small.7 However, the narrative empowered by the media makes them 
“large hordes of true believers” who represent the core values of the 
Islamic world. Powerful images produced by the media can augment 
their influence. Even a strong negative image may engage followers who 
are disappointed with the prevailing trends of their way of life and anti- 
heroes like bin Laden or al-Baghdadi could become heroes to them. 
They may be anti-heroes to the Western audience, but for those who feel 
themselves disgraced by the West they may easily become heroes who 
are followed blindly.
Robert Kagan has introduced the narrative of the return of history 
which in many ways follows the guidelines of the Huntingtonian con-
cept of the clash of civilizations. However, he claims that “struggles for 
honour and status and influence in the world” have become key features 
of ideological line-ups in the competition between liberalism and abso-
lutism.8 Kagan emphasizes the natural rivalry between the United States 
as the only superpower and its main challengers Russia, China, Europe, 
Japan, India and Iran which pursue regional predominance. He identi-
fies Islamic fundamentalists as being among the main challengers to the 
liberal world order, representing a fault line between modernity and tra-
dition; they would struggle against modern powers and secular cultures 
which in their view could endanger the values of the Islamic world.
These narratives of the confrontational structure of the world or-
der were accepted by neoconservative9 politicians in Russia (e.g., Pu-
7 Bergen & Schneider 2014.
8 Kagan 2007.
9 Neoconservativism as an ideology that follows principles stated by the godfather of US 
neoconservatives Irving Kristol: patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be 
encouraged by both private and public institutions; world government is a terrible idea since 
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tin, Rogozin) and the United States (e.g., Bush, Cheney, McCain, Gra-
ham, Lieberman, Wolfowitz) and were later endorsed by the current 
US administration of Donald Trump and far-right politicians in Europe. 
According to Christopher Hill, Trump has no peace plan for the Middle 
East; he has allied with Saudi Arabia and strengthened its rhetoric 
against Iran. In these discourses, Iran has caused all regional problems 
in the Middle East.10
The westernized world map sees the clash of civilizations from a 
perspective in which the West and its allies are identified as the “good 
guys” and all opponents, despite the values they actually represent, are 
defined as the “bad guys”. Relying on examples from the Afghanistan 
Civil War and the Vietnam War, the narrative of the return of history 
claims that there have always been “good and bad sides” throughout the 
history of mankind, where the good has been fighting the bad. In the 
Middle East this construction relies on a simplified representation of the 
public images of the Syrian government (Assad) and Iran (“bad guys”) 
versus Sunni Islamist opposition in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Turkey (“good guys”). 
The direct transference of the Huntingtonian concept of the clash of 
civilizations to the Middle Eastern security environment may produce 
an improper understanding of the sources of the conflict. Regional rival-
ries that appear in the Middle East do not support the popular narrative 
of a fight for global dominance. The Islamic civilization is fragmented 
into groups that often fight with each other, lacking unity and the capa-
city for global claims. It is more likely that the conflict in the Middle 
East stems from local problems which the West has proclaimed inter-
civilizational. These numerous local rivalries exist between the Sunni 
and Shia communities, between the Muslim and Christian populations, 
between religious and secular citizens, between Jews and Arabs, and be-
tween Kurds and nation states, but this conflict cannot be identified by 
solely cultural affiliations. The recent clash between Saudi Arabia and 
it can lead to world tyranny, and international institutions should be regarded with the deepest 
suspicion; statesmen should have the ability to distinguish friends from enemies; protection 
of self-defined national interests above all; the necessity of a strong military – Irving Kristol 




Qatar divides the Sunni community, in which Turkey offered support to 
Qatar while Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates sup-
ported the claims of Saudi Arabia. 
Another obstacle for peace in the contemporary Middle East is the 
result of limited democratic experience in its constituent societies. Nota-
bly, Israel and Tunisia, and to some extent Turkey, Kuwait, Lebanon and 
Morocco, qualify as free countries practising political rights and civil 
liberties according to the US-based non-governmental study Freedom 
in the World.11 The divine rights perpetuated by contrasting religions, 
ideologies and rules still play an important role in its political landscape. 
Contemporary Islamist movements promote conflict between the legacy 
of fundamentalist Sharia law and secular states that rely on Western 
models of statehood. Moreover, secular states in the Middle East have 
only rarely been democratic states; autocratic traditions have maintained 
their prominence in the region similarly to practices from thousands of 
years ago, despite the existence of various forms of government. 
The West has used the undemocratic nature of the Middle East to in-
crease its influence in the region and for that purpose has often support-
ed a strategy borrowed from the world of a Game of Thrones.12 For the 
West, direct political gains have always downplayed value-based policy 
in the region. Many states in the region are under internal pressure from 
weak economies, a high birth rate and the resulting boom in the young 
population, deficient education, and repressive authoritarian regimes, 
while the United States is busy making friends with hated and uncom-
promising Israel, autocratic and fundamentalist Saudi Arabia, and cor-
rupt and undemocratic Egypt.13 After interventions in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, the West has been confronted with a number of internal conflicts 
that had not been immediately apparent under the previous dictatorships 
led by Saddam Hussein and the Taliban regime. There was no signifi-
cant public pressure to invade Iraq in 2003 but the United States chose to 
act decisively in order to send a clear message to diverse Middle Eastern 
audiences and also to portray itself as sole hegemon of the world.14 We 
11 Freedom House 2015.
12 A Game of Thrones is the first novel in the fantasy series of George R. R. Martin “A Song 
of Ice and Fire”.
13 Buzan & Waever 2003: 202–3.
14 Lebow 2008: 441. 
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therefore face today permanent instability in the Middle East, which can 
be easily transferred into the framework of the clash of civilizations in 
order to justify the Hobbesian concepts of the state of war. 
Contrasting curves of the historical legacy in the 
Middle Eastern security environment
The rise of the Islamic State in the Middle East is the result of multiple 
unsolved lemmas which bring in actors with contrasting interests, and 
just few of them agree with any solution other than victory. The con-
flict in Syria describes the best colour rendering of conflicting loyalties: 
Russia fights for Assad15; Iraq, Iran and Hezbollah fight for Shias (and 
Alawites); Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey fight for Sunni Islamists, 
sometimes for different ones; the United States and the European Union 
fight for Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey; and finally, Israel fights for its 
own interests as prolonged conflict could ensure its security guarantees 
while its traditional opponents are involved in fighting. In such a stage 
of the Hobbesian state of war where everyone is fighting, regional peace 
may become an unreal phantasm. There are just a few states like Kuwait 
and Oman which practice a more or less neutral stance in regional power 
games and are willing to mediate with the conflicting parties. The rising 
trend of Islamism concerns the last secular regimes of the region Egypt 
and Algeria which have similar security concerns to those of Assad. Fol-
lowing the Arab Spring movement, only Tunisia was able to introduce 
the democratic formation of government and successfully survive two 
elections, which resulted in the peaceful transition of power from one 
political party to another.
The Middle Eastern political environment is facing some difficult 
issues stemming from its historical legacy. The state system dates back 
to the twentieth century, marked off by Western powers during a short 
period of colonization after World War I, and does not fit with ethnic 
and religious boundaries. Scholars often measure the impact of changes 
through the status of the elites who hold power in a particular society.16 
15 The Al-Assad clan is an Alawite family from the Latakia region which ruled Syria since 
1970. Assadism is a neo-Baathist movement based rather on the cult of personality than 
nationalist and socialist slogans traditionally used by the Baath party.
16 Caryl 2014: 289.
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Extremism can easily spread if different ethnic and religious groups start 
to intervene in power struggles for dominant positions in multinational 
societies. Therefore, clashes between Sunni and Shia communities in 
Syria, Iraq and Yemen, but to some extent also in Bahrain, led to barely 
manageable civil wars and massive unrest where extremist movements, 
including those who represent the IS and al-Qaeda networks, can eas-
ily become major actors. If the society is involved in a total war of all 
against all, such groups can more easily make significant gains on the 
battlegrounds.
Past experiences have had an influence on the shape of the present-
day political landscape and without studying the multiple ideologies that 
have emerged in the region throughout its time-proof history it would 
be impossible to establish reliable models that stimulate intercultural 
dialogue between the Middle Eastern nations. Clement M. Henry claims 
that, although the Middle East is predominantly Muslim and predomi-
nantly Arab, its most distinctive characteristic is neither religion, lan-
guage nor culture, but rather its peculiar colonial legacy.17 After World 
War I the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire had a tremendous im-
pact on the region. The Middle East became a subject of Western colo-
nialism in which the religious and ethnic composition of the countries 
and the patterns of former governance were ignored. At the same time, a 
revival of Arab nationalism had been gathering strength since 1916 after 
Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, declared the Arab revolt against the 
Ottoman Empire and accused the Turkish authorities of abandoning the 
core values of Islam.
The Arab revolt was not just an ethnic insurgency against Ottoman 
rulers but also a challenge for leadership of the Islamic world. Since 
1362, the Ottoman Empire has borne the title of the Caliph of Islam. 
The last Ottoman Caliph after the Sultanate was abolished (1922–24) 
was head of Ottoman Imperial House Abdülmecid II (1868–1944). 
After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the Caliphate was ter-
minated by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 3 1924 and 
Abdülmecid was expelled from Turkey. Afterwards, Hussein bin Ali18 
17 Henry 2005: 108.
18 On October 30, 1916, Hussein bin Ali was proclaimed King of the Hejaz and the Arab 
lands, Malik bilad-al-Arab. His claim was based on his prophetic ancestry and control of 
Islam’s two holiest mosques, the Masjid al-Haram and Al-Masjid al-Nabawi. On 3 October 
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declared himself a new Caliph but was ousted from the throne of Hejaz 
by the Saudis, continuing to use the title while in exile. After his death 
in 1931 his sons did not take on his title. The vacant title was picked up 
in 2014 by Iraqi cleric Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri (also known by 
his nom de guerre Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), who claims to be the leader 
of the Islamic State.19 
Unresolved problems can easily feed the emergence of new conflicts. 
The recent phenomenon in the Middle Eastern security environment is a 
contest for power and hegemony between two potential regional powers 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, most powerfully impacting successful conflict 
management in the culturally divided societies of Syria, Yemen and Iraq. 
Saudi Arabia holds the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina, which gives 
legitimacy to the claim of being a leading nation of Sunni community. 
The theocratic regime of Iran claims to be a protector of the Shia com-
munity. The Sunni-Shia conflict manifests itself in the form of struggles 
in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen, but also in Saudi Arabia which has 
a large Shia minority in its Eastern Province, and Lebanon, home to the 
powerful militant Shia movement Hezbollah. In Yemen, Iran cooper-
ates with the Houthi insurgency of Shia-dominated North Yemen, while 
Saudi Arabia supports the government of President Hadi which relies on 
the support of South Yemen with a majority Sunni population.
One frequently promoted but misleading interpretation claims that 
the Assad clan has a strong and religiously motivated Shia identity and 
that they are struggling for Shia hegemony in Syria. This narrative cir-
culates among the Sunni opposition in Syria in order to strengthen the 
religious character of the fighting, supporting anti-Iranian stances in 
Western societies. The Assad family20 is indeed an Alawite clan from 
the Latakia area as Saddam Hussein in Iraq represented a Sunni clan 
from Tikrit. Alawite identity is more about the cultural background of 
the ruling clan than its fight for Shia power in Syria. The Alawites hold 
1924, after the Saudi invasion, Hussein fled Hejaz and passed the kingship to his son Ali, but 
retained the title of Caliph.
19 He belongs to al-Bu Badri tribe which in the 18th century moved from Medina to Samar-
ra, Iraq and descended from Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and grandson 
Hussain.
20 Not all members of the Assad family are Alawites. President Bashar al-Assad is married 
to Asma al-Assad who was born and grown up in London and her parents are Sunni Muslims 
from Homs.
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some leading positions in the armed forces and security forces, but in 
general Syria is a secular and Arab nationalist regime with most of its 
government being Sunnis. Laki al-Arsuzi, a leader of the Ba’ath branch 
from Latakia where the rulers of Syria Said Jaddad and Hafiz al-Assad 
came from, called himself an atheist. 
Since the 20th century the Israeli-Palestine conflict has significantly 
destabilized the Middle Eastern security environment and also tangled 
Western powers up in local rivalries. The Aliyah process, which started 
at the end of 19th century, brought waves of Jewish immigration into the 
Palestine area. This process resulted in Israeli statehood in 1948, but si-
multaneously launched the most complicated Israeli-Palestine conflict. 
Initially it was mostly an Arab nationalist insurgency which took on 
an ideological character from the Cold War environment insofar as the 
United States supported Israel, so in order to provide a counterweight 
to such American influence the Soviet Union supported secular Arab 
regimes, particularly Egypt (before the Camp David peace deal), Syria, 
Algeria, Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation. 
Emmanuel Adler suggests that a complete process of regional iden-
tity-building could have a chance of establishing regional peace in the 
Middle East. Such an initiative would produce new narratives and myths 
supported by voluntary civil-society networks and civic beliefs instead 
of by blood or religion.21 One of a few positive examples of national 
reconciliation in the Middle-Eastern peace process can be found in the 
upheaval of the Israel-Palestine relationship of the 1990s which estab-
lished the preconditions for a long-term peace settlement in the region. 
However, Salafist Hamas won the parliamentary elections in Palestine 
in 2006 and Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel adopted a more 
fundamentalist stance towards Arab statehood in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, bringing the Oslo Peace Process22 between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority to a dead end. 
Growing social division in Israel may increase tensions in the re-
gion as Orthodox Judaism enjoys more support in Israeli society. Jewish 
nationalism is extending its impact among the descendants of Eastern 
21 Adler 2005: 236–7.
22 The Oslo Peace Process includes a set of agreements signed by the government of Israel 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993 and 1995 (Oslo II).
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European Jews, which consolidates the positions of fundamentalist po-
litical parties for the future. The more nationalistic and religious Israel 
is making little progress in the Oslo Peace process and its recognition of 
a sovereign Palestinian State. Additionally, Israel sees Iran, a potential 
nuclear power, as a major threat to its national sovereignty and tends to 
express silent support to Saudi Arabia in regional power games. The 
fighting between secular Fatah and Salafist Hamas in the Palestinian 
Authority does not only undermine the unity of the Palestinian society, 
but also decreases its ability to enter into international negotiations.
The birth of the State of Palestine, recognised both internationally 
and by the State of Israel, would be an inevitable result for any Middle-
Eastern peace process, a result which will have a deep impact on peace-
building in the region and could decrease the growing influence of re-
ligious extremism. Besides, the status of Jewish settlers in Palestinian 
territory and the status of the holy city of Jerusalem require a compre-
hensive agreement between both parties of the conflict. The implemen-
tation of UN resolution 181(II) of 1947,23 adopted on November 29 1947, 
is a good roadmap for a two-state solution that also confers special status 
upon Jerusalem, the key issue in the Israel-Palestine peace process. 
Besides the Israeli-Palestine conflict, the problem of Kurdish nation-
hood represents an old dilemma which has remained unresolved for cen-
turies. The Kurds comprise an ethnic minority in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, but their identity rights are often rejected by Turkish, Persian and 
Arab rulers, provoking ethnic confrontations in their native countries. 
Paradoxically, the Kurdish armed groups Peshmerga in Iraq and YPG 
(People’s Protection Units) in Syria have probably been the most effec-
tive forces in balancing the rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism. 
The Kurdish dilemma, in which the West identified them as friends 
and Turkey and the Islamist opposition identified them as enemies or 
rivals, does not fit with simplified scenarios of conflict management in 
the Middle East. There are two possible solutions: the eliminating path 
of secession and the establishment of a Kurdish state, or the managing 
path of broad autonomy for Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and 
Syria. The involvement of the Kurdish people through comprehensive 
23 The resolution established a partition plan for Palestine and recommended the creation of 
independent Arab and Jewish States along with a Special International Regime for the City of 
Jerusalem. The UN General Assembly adopted it on 29 November 1947. 
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discussion and a subsequent period of transition must however be fol-
lowed by some concrete political decisions.
The Kurdish movements have been mostly secular, which have come 
to be a rare exception in the Middle East; there have been some Islamic 
fundamentalist Kurdish movements with only minor influence on Kurd-
ish society. In 2015 the moderate Kurdistan Islamic Union (founded in 
1994) which has 10 seats in the parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan joined 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The Salafist movement Ansar al-Islam was 
established in 2001 and controlled territories around cities of Biyara and 
Halabja. On 29 August 2014 Ansar al-Islam merged with the Islamic 
State, though some factions of the movement opposed this act. 
So far, local rivalries continue to flourish and the region is falling 
short of the agenda for peace that could bring all countries of the region 
together. Henry notes that “countries lack the domestic political space 
in which to negotiate compromises between the putative globalisers and 
the reluctant moralisers, whether Islamist or nationalist, within their 
respect ive communities.”24 The social revolutions of the Arab Spring did 
not produce the expected “Westernisation” of the Middle East. Moreo-
ver, the Arab Spring increased Islamic consolidation in different Arab 
societies, particularly in Egypt and Syria. After challenges to secular 
dictatorships, Jihadism25 strengthened its positions in Syria, Libya, Iraq 
and Yemen which were caught up in endless civil wars. 
The Islamic State effectively used the Arab Spring movement to fur-
ther its emerging ambitions and grabbed power over several parts of 
Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. The Arab Spring was not instigated in 
mosques, although Islamist revivalism did receive a boost in popularity 
from the process. Many groups exploit religion to achieve their political 
aims. The Western intervention in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011, 
even if forced for humanitarian reasons, opened the door to Jihadist in-
surgency in both countries and the situation has not improved since; the 
secular authoritarian regimes were simply replaced by civil war between 
24 Henry 2005:105–129. 
25 Jihadism is a term that has been used in order to describe the extremist ideologies of 
Sunni Islamism (like Qutbism) or Islamic militancy. The term was commonly adopted by 
the Western media after the September 11 attacks. Jihadist movements include the Taliban, 
al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Islam, and the Islamic State among others.
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sectarian movements.26 The West overestimated the attract iveness of 
liberal democracy, which may be the main reason why the West tends to 
fail in the Middle East. The process of the Arab Spring has been a good 
example of misperceptions that have overwhelmingly spread in Western 
countries. Tunisia may be the only positive outcome of the Arab Spring 
where democratic procedures have been successfully introduced, but the 
regime that had been governing the country since the 1950s was prob-
ably the mildest of the lot and Tunisia was probably already more inte-
grated into the Western system than the other Arab countries involved.
In Syria, the revolt against the secular regime of the clan of Assad 
turned into a multi-ethnic and multi-religious conflict where Shias/Ala-
wites and the majority of Christians and many seculars sided with Assad 
because the Sunni Islamist opposition turned out to be no less repressive 
or violent than the regime led by Bashar al-Assad. In Yemen the regime 
led by a Shia president from the North, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was replaced 
by his Sunni Vice President from the South, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, 
a move which in fact did not result in regime change. In Egypt, demo-
cratic elections brought representatives of the Islamist movement the 
Muslim Brotherhood to power. Their attempts to increase the influence 
of Islamism on state structures led to a military coup and the establish-
ment of a regime similar to departed President Mubarak’s one. In Libya 
disagreements between Islamist and secular rebels led to civil war and 
the division of the country into two separate parts, the western parts 
being controlled by the Islamist government in Tripoli and the secular 
Tobruk government controlling the Eastern part of Libya.
The revival of Islamism
Paul Danahar (2015) has noted that in recent years “God has returned 
to the Middle East”27, which means that Islamist movements have been 
strengthened in the region and increased their impact over secular move-
ments which were dominant there in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Old socialist and nationalist ideologies (e.g., Pan-Arabism, Ba’athism, 
Nasserism, Zionism) have been left behind and regional powers are 
more strongly divided along sectarian lines. This includes the struggle 
26 Stern, Berger 2016: 286.
27 Danahar 2015.
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between Sunni and Shia Islam manifested in the regional ambitions of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Christians and other non-Islamic minorities must 
struggle for their place in new religiously affiliated societies. The Mid-
dle Eastern societies have always been multicultural with different eth-
nicities and religions sharing the same space. 
Religious narratives have often been attributed to the Middle East 
which can be used to bolster the myth of the clash of civilizations. Even 
Western countries may often bring up religious motives that might jus-
tify their actions. For instance, former foreign minister of the Palestinian 
authority Nabil Shaath told “The Guardian” newspaper about one meet-
ing between Palestinian representatives and President George W. Bush:
President Bush said to all of us: “I am driven with a mission from God. God 
would tell me, ‘George go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan.’ And I 
did. And then God would tell me, ‘George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq.’ 
And I did…. And now, again, I feel God’s words coming to me, ‘Go get the 
Palestinian their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the 
Middle East.’ And, by God, I’m gonna do it.”28
The frequent inclusion of God in Middle Eastern issues has made these 
conflicts long-lasting and barely manageable. The powerful emergence 
of Islamism at the end of the 20th century was accompanied by the in-
creasing regional ambitions of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran which prac-
tice less secular policies than post-colonial states after World War II.
The new wave of Islamic revivalism emerged at the end of the 1970s. 
In 1979 the Islamic revolution in Iran led to rising Shia political activity 
in several parts of the region, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at 
the end of that year helped to consolidate supporters of Sunni extremism.29 
Many radical extremist movements were born during the civil war in 
Afghanistan when Western-supported Islamists fought with the Soviet- 
backed secular government. Later, the first Sunni-based theo cratic re-
gime in the Middle-East was established by the Taliban movement that 
also contributed to the spread of religious extremism in and around the 
whole region. The 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington brought 
the focus onto the civilizational clash between Islamism and the West. 
28 MacAskill 2005.
29 Mölder 2011: 241–264.
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The Iraqi intervention of 2003 and the Arab Spring revolutionary wave, 
which started in 2010/2011, also contributed to the further spread of Is-
lamic extremism in the region. 
Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Islamic revolution at the 
time, focused on two particular areas above all, Palestine and Lebanon, 
and regarded the Arab-Israeli conflict as being primarily religious de-
spite the fact that only a few Palestinians were Shiites.30 Iran used the 
Hezbollah movement in Lebanon and SCIRI and the Dawa’a Party in 
Iraq in its regional ambitions to extend its influence in Middle Eastern 
societies, especially in those with a significant Shia population (includ-
ing Bahrain with a Shia majority and eastern parts of Saudi Arabia). 
There have been some Shia Islamist movements which have been called 
extremist: first Hezbollah in Lebanon, and recently the Houthi move-
ment in Yemen fighting for the restoration of Zaidi Caliphate which 
ended in 1962. 
However, the spread of Islamic radicalism is largely a Sunni Arab 
phenomenon which is not a consequence of abusive Shia or Alawite re-
gimes in specific countries, and it will not suddenly disappear if those 
regimes do.31 Besides Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, Salafi ideological po-
sitions tend to be stronger in Maghreb countries in North Africa. Follow-
ing the war in Afghanistan, Jihadist movements became more visible in 
Islamic societies. The Sunni-led resistance in Afghanistan has brought 
many Islamist movements into the arena of international politics, but 
has also forced multinational cooperation among Sunni extremists. The 
widely-known Afghanistan-born Sunni icons of the Jihadist movements 
have been the Taliban, the al-Qaeda network, and finally the Islamic 
State. The latter two have created multinational frameworks with the 
more moderate Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest Islamist creature.
The Salafi movement itself is not homogeneous and is certainly not 
necessarily always an extremist ideology; different kinds of political 
act iv ism may manifest within it with various goals and ambitions. The 
one obvious precondition for the revival of Islamism is related to the 
strengthening of the positions of Salafi monarchies in the Middle East. 
Countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates get 
30 Caryl 2014: 297.
31 Hill 2017.
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rich due to their enormous oil reserves and thereby acquire more power 
to strengthen their status in the region. They propagate the slogan that 
oil is a gift from God, which confirms their position as leaders of the 
Islamic community. Often leadership of the Gulf states in the Islamic 
community has entailed the introduction of Sharia norms enforced by 
donor countries in order to get access to funding.32 Political experience 
and the failure of many past peace processes indicate that the reforma-
tion of such societies must begin at a grass-roots level. The examples of 
the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, won by Hamas, and the 
parliamentary and presidential elections in Egypt in 2011–2012, won by 
Mohammed Morsi and the Freedom and Justice Party, a political off-
shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, prove that Salafi movements can in-
deed be successful in democratic elections. 
The Taliban movement was probably one of earliest significant signs 
of a revival of Islamist fundamentalism; it emerged in 1994 under the 
spiritual leadership of former mujahideen fighter Mullah Mohammed 
Omar Mujahed (1960–2013) and ruled the country from 1996 until 2001. 
The Taliban practises militant insurgency and intends to restore a theo-
cratic regime in Afghanistan – and perhaps in Pakistan – but so far it 
has not expressed any global ambitions. According to the narrative pro-
moted by the Taliban, its leader is designated as amir-ul-mumanin (the 
leader of believers) or the khalifah (Caliph) who rules the territory under 
his control in accordance with Islamic law. A khalifah is respectable 
among all Muslims in the world, with all Muslims and non-Muslims 
who live in the territory under his rule (khelafat) being obligated to obey 
him, and is appointed by a small council with religious capacity and 
communal trust.33
The oldest Salafi political icon, the Muslim Brotherhood (the Society 
of Muslim Brothers), was founded in 1928 by Islamic scholar Sheikh 
Hassan Ahmed Abdel Rahman Muhammed al-Banna in Egypt and 
stands for the political manifestation of Salafism and Islamic revival-
ism, aspiring to milder forms of Islamic statehood while maintaining 
a parliamentary democracy. Al-Banna set the goal to drive Islamic so-
cieties out from Western influence and saw Islam as a credible source 
32 Peterson 2016: 2214–2219.
33 Nojumi 2002: 152–157.
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for overcoming this colonial legacy.34 The Muslim Brotherhood was 
legalized in Egypt during the Arab Spring in 2011 and their political 
offspring the Freedom and Justice Party won presidential and legisla-
tive elections in 2011–12, but in 2013 they were ousted from power by 
a military coup; supreme leader of the Brotherhood Mohammed Badie 
and the President of Egypt Mohamed Morsi were arrested, among other 
leaders of the movement. Despite its ideological similarity to the lead-
ership of the Gulf states, since 2014 the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
officially declared a terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and 
the United Arab Emirates. Before that they were designated as a terrorist 
organization in Russia (2003), Syria (2013) and Egypt (2013).
There is competition in the moderate factions of Salafi Islamism 
between the Wahhabi faction, led by Saudi Arabia, and the Muslim 
Brother hood, supported by Qatar and Turkey. The hegemonic ambitions 
of potential regional powers caused the current rift in Saudi Arabia, sup-
ported by Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates with Qatar. 
Qatar has traditionally supported the Muslim Brotherhood, but not 
without controversy. One spiritual leader of the Brotherhood, Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi, has lived in Qatar since 1961 and is close to the ruling 
dynasty of al-Thani. He is a staunch critic of Saudi-led Wahhabism.35 
Consequently, Qatar has become a prominent donor country to Salafi 
movements and competes for influence on Islamist movements with 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which continually view the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement as the backbone of Qatar. They accuse 
Qatar of promoting cooperation with contesting power Iran, enhancing 
its influence through the al-Jazeera network, and of supporting Islamism.
Hamas is the Palestinian offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood; it was 
born during the revival of Islamism in 1987 after the first intifada began 
against Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2006 
Hamas won the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council after 
those clashes with the secular movement Fatah ruined the reliability of 
the Palestinian Authority. The following year Fatah was ousted from the 
Gaza Strip, which became a Hamas stronghold. In 2017 Hamas declared 
its willingness to accept an interim Palestinian state within pre-1967 
34 Davidson 1998: 97–98.
35 Trager 2017.
333 Holger Mölder
boundaries without recognising the State of Israel. In its new political 
agenda Hamas also accepted non-violent struggle, though it did not re-
nounce armed insurgency. Hamas also declared its independence from 
the Muslim Brotherhood.36
Since 2001 symbiosis between Islamism and terrorism has reached 
a new level. The powerful image of al-Qaeda and its charismatic leader 
Osama bin Laden increased in power, supported by the media which 
diligently spread the image. Al-Qaeda became the primary icon of 
Islamic fundamentalism, successfully attributed to the image of a clash 
of civilizations. The organization was founded by Osama bin Laden 
(1957–2011) and his mentor, Palestinian Islamic scholar Abdullah Yusuf 
Azzam (1941–1989) who promoted the concept of Jihadism during the 
war in Afghanistan in the 1980s while both were involved in funding 
mujahedeen fighters against the Soviet invasion. Jessica Stern explains 
the rise of al-Qaeda, how the movement aimed to restore the dignity of 
humiliated Muslim’s youth. Violence would become a means of obtain-
ing support and sympathy as the goal is “boosting Islamic morale and 
lowering that of the enemy.” Al-Qaeda is therefore following the Holly-
woodian action movie strategy by which violence should attract the au-
dience.37 They adapted a structure of a virtual network called “leaderless 
resistance”, popularized by American right-wing extremists, in which 
“individuals and groups operate independently of each other, and never 
report to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruc-
tion, as would those who belong to a typical pyramid organization.”38 
This strategy was further developed and expanded by the Islamic State.
Since 2014 the image of the Islamic State has begun to replace the 
previous dominance of al-Qaeda as enemy number one of the Western 
world. The Islamic State, with the powerful help of the Western media 
which spread the narrative, soon started to claim leadership of the Is-
lamic world. In 2004 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi affiliated his movement 
Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad with the al-Qaeda network and it became 
commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (officially called Tanzim Qaidat 
al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn or the Organization of Jihad’s Base in 
Mesopotamia). Despite having similar goals and close ties between the 
36 Khoury 2017.
37 Stern 2003: 30.
38 Ibid.: 33–34.
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organizations, rifts between Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden soon ap-
peared. The strong anti-Shia stances of Zarqawi and the massacres of 
civilian victims conducted in Iraq allegedly caused tension between al-
Qaeda and its Iraqi branch.39 Later, the current leader of the al-Qaeda 
network Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed that al-Baghdadi had come to 
power “by force and with explosions and car bombs,” rather than by “the 
choice of the people.”40
Since October 2006 the organization created by Zarqawi has started 
to use the brands of Islamic State, first Islamic State in Iraq, then the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, and finally since 2014 the Islamic State 
with claims of a worldwide Caliphate. In comparison with two major 
networks, al-Qaeda is oriented towards fighting against Western civi-
lization along the lines of the Huntingtonian concept, although some 
its offshoots are actively involved in local conflicts in Yemen (AQAP), 
Somalia (al-Shabaab) and Syria (Jabhat Fateh al Sham, previously 
Jabhat al Nusra). The Islamic State calls for interventionism and the 
implementation of the idea of an Islamic caliphate along the lines of the 
early Arab conquests, keeping the focus on regional dominance. In con-
trast to many other similar networks (e.g., al-Qaeda) the Islamic State 
has multifaceted goals and often operates in the same way as traditional 
actors. Moreover, IS simultaneously continues to act as an outlaw terror-
ist network in order to achieve its international goals worldwide.
39 Stern & Berger 2016: 95.
40 Atyani 2015.
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Table 1. Rivalry between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
Al-Qaeda Islamic State
Organization Network State
Goals Mostly ideological Mostly structural, tends to be 
more focused on establishing 
its own rule on conquered 
territory
Main target Traditional enemies: US, West Islamic rule, anti-Shia
Strategy Does not have clear ambitions 
of changing existing nation-
state system 
Expansionist, interested in 
creation of the worldwide 
Islamic Caliphate 
Syria Al-Qaeda branch Jabhat Fateh 
al-Sham (Jabhat al Nusra) can 
cooperate with other oppos-
ing forces, actively calling for 
the overthrow of the Assad 
government. 
IS is fighting in Syria mostly 
on its own, though it can 
sometimes cooperate with 
other insurgency movements 
in Iraq (siege of Mosul) or in 
Syria.
The narrative of the Islamic State 
The Islamic State has brought a new quality to Islamic fundamentalist 
extremism as the Islamic State motto of “remaining and expanding” sig-
nals widening ambitions in comparison to any other terrorist network.41 
Al-Qaeda has shown little interest in controlling territories or in chang-
ing the existing nation-state system. The Islamic State rules territories, 
collects taxes, administers justice and establishes educational systems in 
its territories. According to his testimony in the US Senate, US special 
envoy of that time Brett McGurk explains that the IS’s ambitions for ter-
ritorial control are because this would allow it to extract resources for 
funding operations, for establishing a violent and genocidal system of 
control over millions of people, for promoting the narrative of historical 
succession to the Caliphate, and for creating a safe haven for the imple-
mentation of external operations.42
41 Blanchard & Humud 2018.
42 McGuirk 2016: 3.
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The Islamic State is first and foremost a political-ideological move-
ment, similar to Communist/Nazi regimes, where ideology serves the 
interests of new elites and uses a popular and politicized narrative of Is-
lam. Their goals are purely political but their propaganda has developed 
a strong influence on popular images of Islam powered by the media. 
For the IS, religion is a tool for propagating their ideology and enhanc-
ing support for their goals. The narrative built around the Islamic State 
is shaped by “religious fervour, strategic calculation, and apocalyptic 
prophesy.”43 Their ideology corresponds well to the myth of the clash of 
civilizations and can therefore be easily accepted by international soci-
ety if they want to promote the Hobbesian concept of a permanent state 
of war. While al-Qaeda was committed to the organization of weak ties 
and a decentralized, leaderless resistance, the structure of the Islamic 
State can be regarded as similar to any strongly ideological state like 
the Communist or Nazi regimes of the 20th century. This does not mean, 
however, that leaderless resistance is not used at all in operations outside 
their area of control. 
The Islamic State has turned to the extensive use of historical nar-
ratives but uses them as political slogans for mobilizing followers on 
behalf of its strategic goals. 
It is a dream that lives in the depths of every Muslim believer. It is a hope 
that flutters in the heart of every mujahid monotheist. It is the caliphate. It 
is the caliphate – the abandoned obligation of the era … Now the caliphate 
has returned. We ask God the exalted to make it in accordance with the 
prophetic method.44
The Sunni branch of Islam stipulates that a caliph should be elected by 
Muslims (Ummah) or their representatives. Shia Islam, however, be-
lieves that a caliph should be an Imam chosen by God from Muham-
mad’s direct line of descendants. Muhammad died without nominating 
any heir, a circumstance which has already been a source of conflict 
among his followers. The majority recognized the first four caliphs as 
his successors – becoming Sunnis – and the minority recognized that 
God had chosen Ali, cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad – becoming 
43 Jones et al. 2017: 15.
44 al-Adnani 2014.
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Shias. The final rift between the two branches took place in 680 when 
the supporters of the Sunni Caliph Yazid killed Karbala Hussein, grand-
son of Muhammad and son of Ali, who then became a martyr for the 
Shias. It is also worth noting that in the years 796–809 the capital of the 
Caliphate was Raqqa, the city which became the capital of the Islamic 
State in 2014. 
Fred Donner argues that standard Arabian practice at the time was 
to gather together after a leader’s death and elect a new leader from 
amongst the most prominent men.45 Capable men who could lead well 
were preferred over ineffectual heirs. It is notable that religious extrem-
ist movements in the Middle East, with the only exception of Iran, are 
not led by a theocratic hierarchy. In some cases they may be clerics by 
profession or education, like caliph Ibrahim in the case of the Islamic 
State, but for the most part they are often just politically motivated reli-
gious seculars without any connection to the Islamic clergy. Saudi Grand 
Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh said in August 2014: “The ideas of 
extremism, radicalism, and terrorism do not belong to Islam in any way, 
but are the first enemy of Islam, and Muslims are their first victims, as 
seen in the crimes of the so-called Islamic State and al-Qaeda.”46
The ideology followed by the Islamic State follows a popular nar-
rative of Islam which is to be directed to the masses. They do not seek 
the support of the Islamic clergy but claim themselves to be the true 
followers of the Prophet. Although they propagate Salafi ideas and turn 
in their narratives to the original sources of Islam, they carry out an 
active media policy using all modern means (Internet) for this purpose. 
One target group they intend to attract is second and third generation 
Islamic youths in Western countries. The Islamic State does not just of-
fer a popular ideology, but also manifests a power that offers alternatives 
to the Western system which has failed to satisfy the needs of many IS 
followers.47 Somehow, the Islamic State corresponds to the expectations 
of the so-called post-truth world in which everyone can build their own 
world and live inside it. The Islamic State skilfully uses the advantages 
of contemporary media and powerful images which are spread by social 
media. 
45 Donner 1981: 251.
46 Obaid; al-Sarhan 2014.
47 Stern 2016: 281.
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Jihadist movements are not relics from the Middle Ages but are mod-
ernized insurgent movements that use narratives from the Middle Ages 
to justify their political goals in the modern security environment. They 
use social media and online applications (Youtube, Twitter, various cha-
trooms) in order to promote and spread their ideology among the frus-
trated youth who have already grown up in a secular environment. In 
his interview with “The Guardian” newspaper Thomas Hegghammer 
claims that Jihadist movements have become more pragmatic and act in 
ways that often run counter to their stated interests. Islamic militancy is 
more than just bombs and doctrines; it also appears in rituals, customs, 
dress codes, music, films, storytelling, sports, jokes, and food. In the 
Jihadist subculture, the youth will start to listen to Jihadi music and 
watch Jihadi videos before getting acquainted with doctrines.48
The Islamic State has secularized and politicized the notion of Is-
lam by using popular images and placing Islamic symbols into a context 
which is easily accepted by potential consumers of its ideology. This 
tactic is reminiscent of sensationalism designated to “a yellow press”. 
As Craig Whiteside writes:
This selective attention to the sectarian element of the war, by taking inci-
dents and rhetoric and embracing victimhood, helps IS media officials cre-
ate what Haroro Ingram terms “the crisis”, which only IS can solve thanks 
to their superior ideology and shared identity. IS portrays all aspects of the 
war – whether it be the presence of foreign advisors (Western or Iranian), 
bombing raids, or the acts of sectarian militias – in the framework of this 
existential crisis.49
This might indeed confirm that the Islamic State, despite its Salafi slo-
gans, practises a Westernized model of Islamism which uses the image 
of the clash of civilizations in order to attract its followers; and members 
of Western origin play an important role in the structures of IS. They use 
holy texts including the Quran to support their secular goals, i.e., getting 
power and justifying terror against those who are suspected of being 
disloyal to the regime, quite a common practice from authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes.
48 Anthon 2017.
49 Whiteside 2017. 
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The Islamic State and the Gordian knot in the Middle East
Now, after decades of civil war in the Middle East, US policy analysts 
are willing to concede that invading Iraq back in 2003 was a mistake 
that radicalized Iraqi society, exacerbated sectarian divisions, and gave 
birth to an unrelenting Sunni insurgency against the heavy-handed 
and discriminatory policies of the Shia-dominated Iraqi government.50 
Jürgen Todenhöfer, a German journalist who visited areas controlled by 
IS in 2014, claimed that IS is “a reaction to violent actions taken by west-
ern countries in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya” and “the baby of George 
W. Bush and the violence that we face now is the fallout or boomerang 
effect of our own wars.”51 The legacy of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
Iraq in its Islamic form has been successfully incorporated into the nar-
rative as many former high-ranking militaries of the Iraqi armed forces 
joined the movement during the insurgency which started in 2003. The 
Bucca detention camp became a meeting point where the Islamist mili-
tancy was able to find new allies from the ranks of Saddam Hussein’s 
army.52
The political landscape in the region is more redolent of a Game of 
Thrones fantasy than the principles of international security govern-
ance. The success of the Islamic State in introducing itself as a power-
ful player in regional games has also produced voices keen to wield it 
against competitive powers and lend mild recognition to it as a political 
entity. The Hollywoodized image of the Middle East presents Iran as 
a bigger threat than the Islamic State, a concept once defended in the 
United States by Senator Lindsey Graham, Tom Friedman and David 
Petraeus. Iran, whose potential nuclear capability may threaten Israel, is 
making Israeli-related strategists seek out strategic alliances with Sunni 
fundamentalists. Friedman asks: “Why are we (the United States), for 
the third time since 9/11, fighting a war on behalf of Iran?”53 Efraim 
50 Nauman 2017.
51 Todenhöfer 2016.
52 Former Iraqi officers in the IS leadership were Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, Haji Bakr, 
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, Abu Ayman al-Iraqi, Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi, Abu Ahmad al-
Alwani, Ayad al-Jumaili; Abu Omar al-Shishani served in the Georgian army and fought in 
the Russia-Georgia war of 2008; Gulmurod Khalilov was a commander of the police special 
forces of Tajkistan, but defected to the IS in 2015, etc.
53 Drezner 2015.
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Inbar claims: “A weak but functioning IS can undermine the appeal of 
the caliphate among radical Muslims; keep bad actors focused on one 
another rather than on Western targets; and hamper Iran’s quest for 
regional hegemony.”54 This may provide an answer to why the move-
ment, without political support or firm allies, has managed to success- 
fully establish itself as a serious actor in the Middle Eastern security 
environment.
In 2014 proclamations that the Islamic State was winning became 
very popular stances in many Western analyses.55 The Middle Eastern 
battlefield of the Hobbesian war of “all against all” might be summed up 
by the concept of tactical bipolarity in which the team of “good guys” 
is represented by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, the United Arab Emir-
ates, Sunni Salafists, and the Islamic State all supported by the United 
States, Israel and the Western countries. The team of “bad guys” would 
include Iran, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, Assad’s regime in Syria, 
Hezbollah and other Shia movements, all supported by Russia, China 
and Turkey. In the “good guys versus bad guys” dichotomy, the Islamic 
State might find a backdoor for survival by which it could be used as an 
effective force in fighting against the Assad regime. Such a construc-
tion may easily illustrate the Western-Sunni alliance supported by Is-
rael, useful for diminishing the influence of Iran. However, Syria led by 
Sunni Islamists may easily take the role of Afghanistan led by the Tali-
ban movement where Jihadists from all over the world could establish 
a stronghold in fighting against the influence of Western civilization.
The elimination of political extremism from Middle Eastern socie-
ties is one important requirement for regional peace. The main obstacle 
to that is the inability to build coalitions that are focused on the Islamic 
State as a primary target, including all interested powers in the region 
and globally that are able to provide support for anti-IS insurgency. The 
Iraqi armed forces (together with the Kurdish Peshmerga) and the Syr-
ian Democratic Forces have been the main actors in offensives against 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. On September 10 2014 US President 
Obama made a statement about the formation of a global coalition of 66 
states which should “degrade and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State.56 
54 Inbar 2016.
55 Al-Tamimi 2017.
56 McInnis 2016: 1.
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The coalition organized air-strikes against the Islamic State and sup-
ported the Syrian Democratic Forces, a multi-ethnic alliance of local 
militias, in their offensive against Raqqa the capital of the Islamic State 
in Syria, and supported the Iraqi armed forces in their offensive against 
Mosul in Northern Iraq. In 2017 the Iraqi armed forces recaptured Mo-
sul and the successful finish of the Raqqa offensive made significant 
progress in destroying the Islamic State. By 2019, IS lost its last territo-
ries in Syria and Iraq. Does this bring us any closer to regional peace? 
The Islamic State has been involved in the insurgency of around a 
dozen countries and performed or inspired terrorist acts in the United 
States, Belgium, France, Germany, Denmark, Canada, Turkey, Australia, 
and Indonesia, among others. IS established a number of provinces 
(wilayats) in Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, the Caucasus, 
Afghanistan, and Nigeria. An escalating number of jihadist networks 
have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.57 This demonstrates the sig-
nificant and widespread influence of the organization on contemporary 
international relations that exceeds the real capability of IS. Maintaining 
controlled areas in Syria and Iraq allows them more easily to recruit, 
fund and organize attacks in other countries, including the West; but, if 
necessary, they may move to other more suitable areas for establishing 
strongholds. In this respect, their strategy reminds one of that of Che 
Guevara in Latin America in the 1950s–60s. 
The failure of the Islamic State in Raqqa, Mosul and Libya does not 
necessarily mean failure for its organization and ideology. Unemployed 
Islamic fighters may still look for new battlegrounds and terrorist activi-
ties. The now deceased Islamic State’s official spokesman, Abu Muham-
mad al-Adnani, claimed in May 2016 that the loss of territories does not 
mean the end of the fighting.58 The real problem could be IS’s image 
as a brand of Islamist and jihadi action and thought. It has “real power 
because it is rooted in the numinous and because it is also tethered in the 
language and aura of political revolution.”59 Even if IS were to lose its 
territories in Syria and Iraq the response of the international commu-
nity should be strong enough to prevent the return of the Islamic State 
or any other organization with similar goals. The unstable security 
57 Jones et al. 2017: 3–4.
58 Al-Tamimi 2017. 
59 Fernandez 2017.
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environments in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan 
offer such opportunities for extremist forces. The most dangerous way 
forward is to keep IS alive with its purpose of influencing local rivalries 
intact.
Conclusion
The conflict in the Middle East is not so much a result of a civiliza-
tional clash between the West and Islam, but rather one produced by 
local rivalries in the region in which Western powers have intervened. 
The Islamic State effectively uses the lemmas of Middle-Eastern con-
flicts by challenging major sides as a “third alternative”. Strategic games 
are being played by regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, 
Iran, and Israel decisively supported the emergence of the Islamic State. 
However, the Western alliance with rich Salafi powers has strengthened 
conservative movements within Islamism supported by other poten-
tial regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The West has often 
seen Saudi Arabia as its primary ally in the region while demonizing 
its main adversaries Assad and Iran and ignoring the threat of Islamic 
extremism. 
The phenomenon of the Islamic State is the result of inconsistency 
from the international community of states in the management of re-
gional peace. The US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq lacked 
any long-term strategy which might normalize the situation and com-
plete the peace-building and state-building processes in fragile states. 
Islamic extremism, despite its religious slogans, behaves like a typical 
revolutionary guerrilla movement with politicized goals and ambitions. 
The West underestimated their influence and instead of strengthen-
ing local authorities, which could introduce grassroots-level measures 
in fighting the causes of Islamic extremism, it entered into a Game of 
Thrones approach involving local rivalries. The most dangerous result of 
the Islamic State is its revolutionary image that could attract the masses, 
similarly to Che Guevara who became an icon of leftist guerrilla move-
ments after his death. The image of the Islamic State as a revolutionary 
movement may survive the real construction of an Islamic Caliphate.
Western policy in the Middle East has been inconsistent, not al-
ways peace-oriented, and often influenced by local rivalries between 
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contrasting interest groups. The continuation of the Oslo peace process 
in Israel/Palestine and cooperation with moderate forces in Iran, al-
lowing the inclusion of Iran in the international community, would of-
fer some mitigation of these Middle Eastern lemmas and help to avoid 
further enlargement of Islamic extremism. However, the current trends 
of international politics do not support traditional methods of conflict 
management. Building bridges between cultures and stimulating inter-
cultural dialogue for national reconciliation may reduce the influence of 
these extremist movements within their societies. 
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The War of Rhetorics: The strategic 
narratives adopted by Āyatollā Ḫomeynī 
and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn in the Iran-Iraq War
Sandra Peets
Abstract This paper will look at the Iran-Iraq War through the lens 
of Political Communication and International Relations. This paper 
analyses the different strategic narratives adopted by two heads of 
state, or in this case securitising actors: the Supreme Leader of 
Iran, Sayyı̄d Rūḥollah Mūsavī Ḫomeynī, and the President of Iraq, 
Ṣaddām Ḥusayn. The main question asked is, which strategic narra-
tives were used to create a sense of urgency and to characterise the 
opponent?
This analysis is grounded in Securitisation Theory. The research 
utilises the framework of levels of analysis introduced by Balzacq. 
In order to look deeply into the symbols, pre-existing religious 
feel ings, myths and the historical/political context applied by the 
securitising actors, this paper examines the speeches of Rūḥollah 
Ḫomeynī and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn delivered between the end of 1980 
and the beginning of 1982. 
Keywords Ayatollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, Strategic Narrat- 
ives, Iran-Iraq War, Securitisation Theory. 
Introduction
The Iran-Iraq war was one of the pivotal moments in the history of the 
Middle-East. Due to its importance, much has been written about the 
different social, economic and political factors that influenced and were 
caused by this long military conflict1. The war was an all-out military 
conflict that dragged on for eight years, produced numerous casualties 
and impacted regional politics for years to come. However, wars are not 
1 Donovan 2010; Karsh 1989; Takeyh 2010; Razoux 2015.
347 Sandra Peets
only fought on the battlefield. To go to war leaders have to convince the 
audience of an immediate threat to their nation. To be convincing they 
have to employ frames, myths and narratives that illustrate the horrors 
that could happen if forceful steps are not taken. In other words, the 
state has to securitise the issue as a strategic threat to the country and 
use strategic narratives to condemn the opponent. Thus, it could be said 
that the war between Iran and Iraq was also a confrontation between 
two distinct yet intertwined rhetorics: the rhetorics of two revolutionary 
leaders, the Supreme Leader of Iran Āyatollā Ḫomeynī, and the President 
of Iraq Ṣaddām Ḥusayn. 
This article is a case study of the confrontation between these 
two securitising actors, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn and Āyatollā Ḫomeynī, on a 
rhetorical level. The aim is to focus on the strategic narratives2 that the 
two leaders used in their securitising acts to create a sense of urgency 
and characterise the opponent to the audience. The study is built upon the 
theoretical framework of Securitisation Theory, a theory of International 
Relations born out of the Copenhagen School. This approach has been 
criticised for being too centred on Europe and democratic states3. Thus, 
the case of the Iran-Iraq war offers a view of securitisation in the context 
of the Middle-East. 
Buzan and Hansen have described securitisation as “the process of 
presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as an existential 
threat”4. It is the act of making something seem like an imminent threat 
to state security; a danger that requires an immediate response. Balzacq 
has given a more comprehensive explanation of what securitization 
entails by stating that it is “an articulated assemblage of practices” 
where tools like metaphors, analogies, stereotypes, etc., are applied by 
a securitising actor in a way to motivate the audience to adopt certain 
associations towards a “referent object”.5 
I rely on Balzacq’s framework of levels and units of analysis6. It divides 
the analysis of the securitisation act into three conceivable categories 
or levels: agent, act and context. ‘Agent’ refers to the securitising actor, 
2 See also Miskimmon, O’Loughlin&Roselle 2017.
3 Behnke 2007; Walker 2007.
4 Buzan & Hansen 2009: 214. 
5 Balzacq 2011: 3.
6 Ibid.: 35–37.
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his position in the political landscape and the characteristics of the 
power institutions. ‘Act’ refers to the specific methods that are used to 
create security. ‘Context’ is the proximate and distal information that 
is connected to the securitisation act. This article aims to concentrate 
on the second level and locate the strategic narratives used by both 
securitising actors; what were the reasons for those specific narratives 
and what implications were these supposed to prompt in the intended 
audiences?
This article analyses approximately the first year of the Iran-Iraq war 
(from the end of 1980 until the beginning of 1982). This time frame was 
chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the corpus of speeches delivered during 
the eight years of war is extensive. Therefore, separating the period into 
smaller blocks allowed an in-depth analysis of the data to be carried 
out. Secondly, this period covers two important moments in the war: 
when the Iraqi army invaded Iranian territory; and when the Iranian 
army gained the upper hand and managed to enter Iraqi lands. This topic 
would certainly benefit from further analysis that would look at the 
development of strategic narratives as the war drags on. Nevertheless, 
the following analysis gives a glimpse into the complex confrontation on 
a rhetorical level that often carried practical consequences. The article 
will first give a brief overview of the context and then take a closer look 
at each of the strategic narratives that were revealed.
First I will make a few remarks about the speeches and their trans- 
lations. All speeches were read and analysed in their original language 
(Arabic/Farsi). Since Āyatollā Ḫomeynī’s speeches have been officially 
translated in an anthology called “Sahifeh-ye Imam”, the quotes offered 
in this article are cited from that work. Ṣaddām Ḥusayn’s quotes I trans- 
lated myself from video materials and have cited them accordingly. In 
a few instances I was not able to access the original source; thus, in 
those cases I had to rely on Ofra Bengio’s translation and citation. I 
am grateful to Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed for assisting me with the correct 
translations from Arabic to English. 
349 Sandra Peets
Ḫomeynī’s Karbala7 and Ṣaddām’s Qadisiyya8
Iran and Iraq share a long and often tumultuous history. The clash be- 
tween the two territories goes back at least to the seventh century when 
the Sassanid Empire was overturned by the Arab Caliphate.9 Their 
differences were mostly about boundaries between the two entities 
and meddling in domestic affairs through the ”ethnic and sectarian 
minorities”10. In 1908 the British discovered oil near Masǧed-e Soleymān 
in Khuzestan which added a new factor to the already tense relations11. 
After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved and power 
in Iran was seized by Rezā Ḫān Pahlavī. From then we can talk about the 
relationship between two independent countries. 
The first treaty between Iran and Iraq, to solve disputes over the 
border regions, was signed on July 4, 1937 under the tutelage of Great 
Britain who had considerable interest in the dispute12. From there the 
relations between the two countries were reasonably good and were 
raised even to the ambassadorial level13. That came to a halt with the 
1958 coup in Iraq which established the Iraqi Republic. Nevertheless, 
Baghdad was an unstable and militarily weak country until the situation 
stabilised after another coup, the Ba‛aṯ led coup in 196814. Since then 
its economy did well, it was militarily strong and enjoyed reasonably 
friendly relations with the Arab countries. 
Both Iran and Iraq shared the ambition of becoming the dominant 
power in the Gulf and maintaining a firm hold over their countries. 
The first of these became a possibility after the retreat of the British 
from the region in the 1970s15. Over the decades many political issues 
accumulated between the two; among these issues were the Kurdish 
7 A battle held in 680 between the Umaiyyad army and Ḥusayn ibn ‛Alī, grandson of 
Prophet Muḥammad. The battle was an easy victory for the caliphate that helped them 
secure their political position, but it became a symbol of martyrdom and injustice for the Šīʼa 
Muslims. 
8 A battle fought in 636 between the Muslim army and the Sassanid Empire. The Muslim 
victory marked the beginning of Islamic rule in Iran. 
9 Karsh 2010: 7
10 Hiro 1991: 7.
11 Ibid.: 9.
12 Razoux 2015: 47.
13 Hiro 1991: 11.
14 Ibid.: 12.
15 Razoux 2015: 52–53.
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question16, the alleged oppression of the Arabs in Khuzistan, and access 
to the river Šaṭ al-‛Arab17. The signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975 
brought relief to the Kurdish question but opened up another wound in 
the history of Iran-Iraq relations: the Šī a̓ majority that had no place in 
the Iraqi regime18. That culminated with anti-government riots in 197719. 
The Shah controlled one of the most able and advanced armies in 
the region, but the military capabilities of Iran decreased significantly 
following the suppressions of the Islamic regime20. Iran became em- 
battled and Iraq decided to seize the moment of Iran‘s weakness. 
Furthermore, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn was worried about the success of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran and the possibility of it motivating the Iraqi 
Šī a̓ to rise against Ṣaddām’s regime21. There were several border clashes 
from 1979 until the beginning of September 1980 which caused Ṣaddām 
Ḥusayn to nullify the Algiers Agreement on September 17, 198022. On 
September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. 
In 1979 both Ḫomeynī and Ṣaddām had recently stepped into office. 
This meant that the two leaders were also in the stages of consolidating 
their power domestically. Ṣaddām’s Ba‛aṯ ideology was already rooted 
in the institutions but he needed to secure his own position. For him, 
the Algiers Accord of 1975 was his greatest political humiliation that 
caused some discontent inside the Ba‛aṯ Party who felt Ṣaddām had sold 
off Iraq cheaply23. Furthermore, the upheavals in Kurdistan and the Šī a̓ 
demonstrations were a political irritation for Iraq. Ṣaddām did not wish 
to cave in to the secessionist desires of Kurds; on the contrary, he wished 
to unite the Arab lands under the banner of his leadership, especially 
following Camp David that threw Egypt off its position as the leader of 
the Arab world. 
16 Both Iran and Iraq have considerable Kurdish minorities. In 1970s Iran meddled in 
the domestic affairs of Iraq by supporting the Iraqi Kurdistan revolts. This was a delicate 
balancing act because, although the aim was to internally destabilise Iraq, Iran had its own 
unresolved issues with the Iranian Kurdistan that could have backfired.
17 Hiro 1991: 10. 
18 Ibid.: 17, 21. 
19 Ibid.: 287; Mölder et al. 2014: 215. 
20 Karsh 2002: 19. 
21 Razoux 2015: 64. 
22 Ḥusayn 1980.
23 Katouzian 2010: 343.
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Āyatollā Ḫomeynī was building up his regime in an environment 
filled with opposing ideas and voices. The Islamic Revolution was not 
really Islamic per se insofar as it was not only religious forces that 
protested against the monarchy and brought about its demise. The 
revolution was a heterogeneous movement that included people from 
all sides of the political spectrum. Yet, these different forces formed a 
coalition to support Āyatollā Ḫomeynī. Now, when the main enemy had 
gone, Ḫomeynī needed a chance to unify the population and push out 
those political forces whose ideas did not match his vision24. Ḫomeyn‘īs 
camp needed to embed his political ideology into the system. 
It is unlikely that Ḫomeynī wanted the war. After all, it was a major 
calamity for Iran both politically and economically. Nevertheless, 
Ḫomeyn‘īs regime certainly benefitted from the attack. The Iran-Iraq 
war had significant policy outcomes for Iran25. First of all, although 
there was a lot of factionalism and differences of opinion in Iran 
after the Islamic Revolution, the common threat from outside helped 
Ḫomeynī and his camp to consolidate their power in the country and 
institutionalise clerical rule26. Secondly, Iran failed to project its 
Islamist revolution beyond its borders and in the end deviated from its 
revolutionary doctrine. Iran, devastated by the long war, had to focus 
on national issues like economic development and relations with other 
countries27. Last but not least, the war paved the way for a new political 
faction to emerge, the radical fundamentalists, who had taken part in 
the battles and now as politicians advocated for nationalist policies and 
limited relations with the West28. There are various political opinions in 
Iran today, including many interpretations and opinions about the war, 
but the Iran-Iraq war is rooted in the collective and political identity of 
Iran29. 
24 For more see Mohammad 2019: 480–506.
25 For more see Kaveh 2017: 5–24.
26 Menashri 1989: 42; Rieffer-Flanagan 2013: 152.
27 Katouzian 2010: 362. 
28 Takeyh 2006: 132.
29 Takeyh 2009: 106.
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Political traumas, myths and ambitions
Each country has historical events, memories, myths and traditions 
that have shaped how particular situations in international relations are 
interpreted and analysed. That goes just as well for security debates 
which are to a great extent “the product of a historical, cultural, and 
deeply political legacy”30. This also means that each leader has a limited 
choice of narratives to use when addressing a certain foreign policy 
matter. Ellul has explained that, although rulers have considerable 
flexibility when it comes to state identity, it is still limited by myths and 
ideologies that already exist, rooted in the minds of the nation31. Galtung 
calls it a syndrome named Chosenness-Myth-Trauma or CMT32. 
Galtung distinguishes three layers of culture or collective subcon- 
sciousness that explain the interests and ambitions of states33. Firstly, 
‘chosenness’ is the belief that the nation is chosen from among all others 
and therefore has the responsibility to lead and guide the others. Iraq 
interprets this as Arab exceptionalism: the historic right and might to be 
the new leader of the Arab world. Iran believes that they have attained 
the true version of the Islamic government and, thus, have the moral 
right to lead the Islamic world. Both believe that God’s favour is on their 
side. 
Secondly, we have the historical traumas of being wrongfully hurt 
and humiliated. Iraq is a country that had been part of other empires 
for most of its existence, e.g., from times of victory when the Muslim 
armies won the Sassanid Empire in the battle in Qadisiyya to times of 
breakdown when the Ottoman Empire was cut to pieces by the Great 
Powers, or from times of prosperity like in the era of the Abbasids when 
Baghdad was the most flourishing city in the region to dramatic losses 
like the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258. Iran has had a similar 
destiny. It once stood as the greatest Empire in the whole world under 
the Achaemenids until its momentous defeat to the Muslim armies in the 
7th century. The history of Šī a̓ Islam is one of betrayal and loss in the 
30 Williams 2007: 17.
31 Ellul 1973: 33, 116–117.
32 Galtung 1996: 254.
33 Ibid.: 253–254. 
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shadow of the majority Sunni sect until the Safavids established the first 
kingdom guided by a Šī a̓ ʿulamāʾ. 
These historic moments give way to national myths that tell the 
stories of defeats and victories illustrating feelings of trauma and excep- 
tionalism. This so-called syndrome shapes the nation which has been 
chosen from others for being exceptional: a country that has suffered 
traumas and is encouraged by myths of glory. This gives a state an 
understanding of its rights and duties in the international arena34. 
Both Ṣaddām and Ḫomeynī had regional goals that they were hoping 
to manifest through success in military conflict, goals that emerge from 
historic feelings of exceptionalism, i.e., Iraq as leader of the Arab ’umma 
and Iran as leader of the Islamic ‘umma. However, these worlds overlap 
and are tinged with challenging history.
The War of Strategic Narratives 
Islamic ’umma vs Arab ’umma 
Ḫomeynī compares the “bravery of the army” with the boldness of the 
early Muslims35. Ḫomeynī provides the example of the Rome battle36 in 
the 7th century when Ḫālid ibn al-Walīd led the Muslim army, which was 
considerably smaller in numbers, against the Byzantine Empire. 
Khalid ibn Walid, who was one of the Muslim commanders, suggested that 
they deal a hard blow to Rome’s army in order to weaken their morale/…/37
This is a reassurance to Iranian forces that, despite the military strength 
of Iraq, Iran can defeat the intruding army because, just as the early 
Muslims, the Iranian army has the support of God38. Ḫomeynī is tying 
the events of the Iran-Iraq war to Islamic history. It is an attempt to make 
Iran part of early Muslim history even if the Iranians did not take part in 
the battle against the Byzantines as a country. Nevertheless, the actions 
34 Galtung 1996: 255.
35 Ibid.
36 Battle of Yarmouk 20 August 636. Muslim Arab Forces (the Rashidun Caliphate) under 
the commander Ḫālid ibn al-Walīd fought the Byzantine Empire at Yarmouk.
37 Imam Khomeini 1980: 204.
38 Ibid.: 205.
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of the Iranian army in the war against Iraq show that Iranians have been 
rooted in Islamic history since the very beginning. 
Ḫomeynī also emphasizes the narrative of martyrdom39 for the 
cause of Islam in several of his speeches40. He argues that the Iranian 
army is fighting for the higher moral cause and sacrificing themselves 
for God, therefore they are not afraid to die and that is their greatest 
strategic strength. Iranian soldiers are certain that when they die on the 
battlefield they will go to heaven for defending Islam41. On the opposing 
side is the Iraqi army who are fighting for the cause of Saddam, not 
for the cause of Islam, and therefore not even having superior artillery 
will protect them42. It is a battle between the world of Islam against the 
unbelievers and Iran is standing on the front lines. Therefore, this war 
is also legitimate in Islamic terms. Islam does not allow war between 
Muslims, but since the opponent is not acting on behalf of Islam Iran’s 
attack is justified in Islamic Law43.
Ṣaddām claims that Islam is an Arab religion and therefore Iran 
cannot represent the Islamic ‘umma. Ṣaddām talks to the nation and the 
community, but he has chosen to use words with several meanings. In 
his 1980 speech he talks about cases that are important to “the nation 
(waṭan) and the community (‘umma)”. 
We have called you to this emergency meeting to introduce you to urgent 
case that is important to the nation [waṭan] and the community [’umma]/…/ 
members of the party and the revolution pursue the national [waṭan] will 
and protect the community [’umma]… 44
Waṭan refers to the Iraqi nation, but it could also symbolize the greater 
Arab homeland al-waṭan al-‘Arabī al-kabīr45. However, Bengio has 
explained that the Ba‛aṯ party used the word ‘umma for the Arab nation 
as a whole46. After the failure of the unification with Syria and Egypt 
39 See also Peets 2018: 150–173.
40 Ibid.: 205, 227.
41 Ibid.: 205.
42 Ibid.: 204. 
43 Rezamand 2010: 86.
44 Ḥusayn 1980.
45 Bengio 1998: 92.
46 Ibid.: 36. 
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Ṣaddām talked about the Arab community as being 22 ’awṭān47. He 
would compare that situation in the Syrian daily newspaper al–Ṭawra 
to the bedouin camp of individual tents, but over those is a larger tent 
that symbolises cooperation and unity among the Arab nations48. Just as 
in a Bedouin society, the bond keeping the families together is a strong 
sense of loyalty and fraternity. In Ṣaddām’s vision he was the head of 
this community held together by loyalty and fraternity rooted in their 
common Arab identity. 
Ṣaddām uses the narrative of Arab unity against Iran’s Islamic unity. 
He positions himself as the leading voice of Iraq, but also as the whole 
Arab community. As mentioned above, Egypt was losing its position as 
head of the Arab world. Thus, Ṣaddām carefully chose words to represent 
himself as a suitable replacement, a replacement that is already taking 
tangible steps to ensure the stability and security of the Arab states.
Iranian nationalism vs Persians are the occupiers of nations
Ḫomeynī reminds the Iranians that the unity of their nation was proved 
when they took part in the Islamic Revolution and overthrew the Shah’s 
regime. Ḫomeynī reassures them that the successful Islamic Revolution 
is proof that the Iranian nation is capable of uniting against superior 
military forces. He emphasises that the Shah’s army was the strongest 
in the Middle East and still the Iranian people were capable of defeating 
it49. It was the Iranians’ quest for freedom from their oppressors that 
enflamed the population then, and it is this narrative that carries them in 
the fight against Iraq. 
Thank God that the people of our country, though few in number while 
that of the inimical superpowers was large, were able to pass the test in that 
they defeated the large armies and the great number of enemies because of 
their unity of expression and reliance on the Exalted Holy Being/…/ At that 
time, there were, and still are, a limited number of people in a garrison in 
Kurdistan who withstood the attack of the large number of enemies because 
they had faith in God while the enemy did not.50
47 Plural of waṭan, nations.
48 As cited Bengio 1998: 47. 
49 Imam Khomeini 1980: 204–205.
50 Ibid.
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Ḫomeynī emphasises national unity by mentioning the Kurds of Iran 
who were caught on the front line51. Ḫomeynī shapes the narrative as the 
whole Iranian nation being united in a higher moral cause, protecting the 
will of God. Yet for the Iranian people it was an endeavour to protect their 
nation and country from the interference of foreign powers. This is an 
integral part of Iran’s political identity which is a result of Iran’s distinct 
political history. It is an example of the national unity that Iranians have 
always maintained in the face of foreign intruders, no matter the regime 
in power or its religious inclinations. Just recently, at the beginning of 
2020, Iranian Revolutionary Guard head Qassem Suleimani was killed 
by the USA while on a mission. Many of us remember the scenes of huge 
crowds gathering to mourn the General52, scenes that left many baffled 
because just a few months previously the Iranians had been protesting in 
very large numbers against the regime that Suleimani was serving. Yet, 
just as in the 1891–92 Tobacco Protests53 or the Iran-Iraq War, the people 
of Iran were demonstrating that a threat from outside can unify them 
despite any grievances they might hold against the regime in power. 
That is something which has guaranteed the longevity of the Islamic 
Regime and probably will for years to come. 
In Ṣaddām’s narrative, there is no such thing as Iranian nationalism. 
There is only Persian nationalism characterised by expansionist desires 
to bring all nations in the region under their rule.
/…/ The rulers of Iran interfered in this agreement [the Algiers Accord] 
since the beginning by their blatant intrusion in Iraqi internal affairs and 
supporting terrorism/…/54
Ṣaddām rarely calls Iran “Iran”; he uses the word Persia/Persians to 
show that there is only one ethnic group—Persians—and the rest are 
people usurped by the Persians. To delegitimize the Iranian government, 
Ṣaddām emphasises the Persian narrative as invaders and occupiers who 
have always taken over the territories of other nations. When Ṣaddām 
51 Ibid.: 205. 
52 McKernan 2020.




sent a letter to congratulate the Iranian regime for the Revolution he 
chose to address the Iranian nations, not nation55.
We bless the Iranian nations’ aspirations to freedom.56
He started to use the derogatory term Persia months before the war 57 
to create the image of cruel occupiers who are ready to expand their 
borders. The only way to stop them was to attack. In 1982 the Iranian 
army gained the upper hand in the war and started to invade Iraqi lands. 
Ṣaddām then started using this as proof that he had been correct from 
the beginning; Iran wanted to march into Iraqi lands.
The enemy is a slave of America vs Persians 
are destroyers of civilizations 
The Iranian nation was already inflamed by anti-American sentiment. 
Since the 1953 coup d'état against Mohammed Mossadeq mistrust 
against the USA had been growing. It culminated on November 4, 1979 
with the siege of the American Embassy in Tehran. Ḫomeynī was rely-
ing on these attitudes on the streets when he framed his strategic narra-
tives. Just as Ḫomeynī had accused the Shah of Iran of being a puppet of 
the USA, Ṣaddām was the “slave of America”58. 
I will, at the proper time, order the people to fight and prove to Saddam 
Husayn and the likes of him that these slaves of America are nothing to 
talk about.59
Therefore, the war with Iraq is not merely a defence of Iranian inde- 
pendence, it is the continuation of the Islamic Revolution and it has to 
go on until all the slaves of America in the region have been defeated. 
Takeyh found that initially exporting the Revolution across borders was 
one of the central ideas of the continuation of the conflict60. Ḫomeynī 
55 Ḥusayn 1979.
56 Ḥusayn 1979
57 Bengio 1998: 140. 
58 Imam Khomeini 1980: 193. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Takeyh 2010: 373. 
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was counting on the Šī a̓ population of Iraq to assist him in this cause, a 
grave miscalculation that will be discussed briefly. 
Ṣaddām frames Iran as the initiator of the conflict by stating:
You know we have had to bear this damned neighbour for 5000 years/…/ 
Babel civilization they destroyed, Mesopotamia they destroyed and now 
they want to destroy this new renaissance.61
The new renaissance is the Ba‛aṯ ideology in Iraq that has brought the 
new enlightenment to the Arab world. The Ḥizb al-Ba‛aṯ al-‛Arabī al-
Ištirākī—or Ba‛aṯ Party for short—came to power in Iraq in 1968. The 
party had been founded over 20 years earlier by Syrians Mīšīl ‛Aflaq 
and Ṣalāh ad-Dīn al-Bīṭār in Damascus, but the Syrian and Iraqi 
branches were always at odds. The main ideology of the Ba‛aṯ Party is 
anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism. Ba‛aṯ stands for the rebirth, or as 
Ṣaddām himself also says “renaissance”62, of the Iraqi nation. The Ba‛aṯ 
Party became so entrenched in the everyday lives of Iraqis that ‘Iraqi’ 
and ‘Ba‛aṯi’ became synonyms63. It was a new and modern Iraqi ideology 
that was meant to rebuild and re-establish its standing as a beacon of 
modernity and national pride in the Arab world. 
Ṣaddām sees the Islamic Republic with its popular revolution as a 
threat to Arab nationalism. To counter this, Ṣaddām uses a historic 
narrative of Iran as a conqueror and destroyer of flourishing civilizations. 
Iranian empires were a considerable military power for centuries in the 
region. At times they occupied a considerable amount of territories 
inhabited by Arab tribes. Iraq, as the borderland between the Ottoman 
and Safavid Empires, often saw the bloodiest battles with the Persians. 
Ṣaddām emphasises this historic feeling of trauma to promise that 
Iraq stands as the last line of defence between Iran and the Arabs. In 
Ṣaddām’s narrative, this is the final battle of the Arab homelands and 
he will prevail. 
61 Ḥusayn 1982.
62 Husain 1982.
63 Bengio 1998: 50. 
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Muslims have betrayed Iran vs the Kurds have betrayed the Arabs 
Ḫomeynī plays on historic feelings of betrayal and victimisation when 
he states that the Islamic countries have abandoned Iran. 
On which Muslim Country has the fact been lost that Saddam rose against 
us, oppressed us and attacked us? Why don’t the Islamic Countries act 
according to the noble verse? “... Fight ye that which doeth wrong till it 
return unto the ordinance of Allah…”64
Just as in the 7th century battle of Karbala when the Umayyad caliphate 
wiped out the Šī a̓ army led by Ḥusayn, the Islamic community has left 
Iran isolated on the battlefield to defend Islam from corrupt rulers alone. 
It is a deeply Šī a̓ narrative that carries a lot of weight among the Šī a̓ 
communities. 
The Kurds play a central role in this securitising act carried out 
by Saddam. The Arab identity proposed by Ṣaddām rejects the Kurds 
who are ethnically and linguistically non-Arab. The Kurds are of 
Indo-European, not Semitic, origin. In this sense they have more in 
common with the Iranians who are mostly Indo-Europeans as well, 
but the Iranian governments have struggled with the Kurdish minority 
too. The Kurds in Iraq aspired to gain some autonomy from the central 
government. When Ṣaddām declares the Algiers Accord invalid in his 
speech in 1980, he validates his subsequent attack by stating that “Iran 
has been supporting the terrorist [irḥābīn] regime”65. He is referring, 
among others, to the Kurdish insurgents. When times are good Ṣaddām 
addresses Kurdistan as the region or the zone, the north or our north. 
When they are in conflict the Kurdish liberation movement is called the 
armed movement, the rebellious movement or those who are agents to 
the enemy66, all terms that signify their enemy status. For Ṣaddām the 
Kurds are worse than the Iranians because they are an internal enemy 
who betrayed the Arabs who let them live on their lands. The Kurds 
collaborated with the enemy and betrayed the Arabs67.
64 Imam Khomeini 1980: 238. 
65 Ḥusayn 1980.
66 Bengio 1988: 115.
67 Ibid.: 160. 
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Ṣaddām diverges from Ḫomeynī’s narrative about the Kurds. 
Ḫomeynī uses the narrative of national unity in Iran, where also the 
people of Kurdistan actively participate in protecting the territory of 
Iran from intruders. Iran has always been a country of many ethnic and 
linguistic groups and so, for them, there is no “Persian unity” as for 
Ṣaddām “Arab unity”. Iran is a very heterogeneous society: it does not 
play well to single out a group inside the country as collaborators with 
Iraq, not even the Arabs on the border with Iraq. This does not mean that 
Iran had no Kurdish insurgency or that there were no divisions, but, as 
Takeyh points out, these differences had to be downplayed in order to 
keep up the united revolutionary facade68.
The opponent is not a Muslim 
Neither of the leaders could overlook religious narratives and both 
attempted to denounce the opponent as un-Islamic. Ḫomeynī states that 
the Iraqi people are ruled by the al-kāfirūn (unbelievers). In his words, 
Ba‛aṯ ideology is against the principles of Islam. Furthermore, Ṣaddām 
Ḥusayn is apparently only pretending to be a Muslim when in reality he is 
an atheist (kāfir). Ḫomeynī distinguishes between the Iraqi government 
and the people in this case. The Iraqi people are not accused of being 
al-kāfirūn, but they are called on by Ḫomeynī to wake up and notice that 
they are fighting for someone who is not even a Muslim69. Ḫomeynī has 
the aim of uniting all Muslims and therefore he could not dispute the 
validity of the Islam that other sects and countries were following. 
They were bad before Islam and continued after Islam, that we even imagine 
that most of them were never truly Muslims by the true meaning of Islam, as 
we understand as Arabs.70 
Ṣaddām takes another tack when he accuses the whole Iranian nation 
(or Persians) of pretending to be Muslims. In his words, the Persians 
are magi or fire-worshippers, a name that has been wrongfully given 
to the Persians in classical Muslim writings since the beginning of the 
68 Takeyh 2010: 368. 
69 Imam Khomeini 1980: 208. 
70 Ḥusayn 1982.
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Zoroastrian religion. Ṣaddām claims that the Ba‛aṯ revolution brought 
Iraq into modernity, whereas Ḫomeynī’s revolution took Iran back to 
the darkness and to ǧāhilyya (pre-Islamic times)71. Ṣaddām aimed to 
delegitimise everything Persian including the Islamic regime that was 
rooted in the distinct cultural and historical context of Iran. 
Ḫomeynī’s failed securitisation act and Ṣaddām’s success
As mentioned above, Ḫomeynī’s strategy was to challenge Ṣaddām’s 
and Ba‛aṯ ideology’s devotion to Islam. The main idea of this narrative is 
that Iraqi Muslims are fighting for the wrong cause, the ambitions of the 
kāfir72. Therefore, Ḫomeynī addresses the Iraqi Muslims73 and tells them 
to join the side of Islam, which means the side of Iran. Here Ḫomeynī is 
trying to play on the conscience of the pious Iraqi Muslim community. 
Ḫomeynī tries to create fear and repentance among Iraqis and tells the 
Iraqis that they are welcome to go to Iran74. Furthermore, he invites the 
Iraqis to rebel against their regime like in the Iranian Revolution. He 
stresses that it is the duty of Muslims to struggle against corrupt and 
oppressive rulers. However, this is a securitising act that fails because it 
does not resonate with the intended audience. 
Balzacq has stated that to determine the success of securitisation we 
have to look at the acceptance of the audience75. In other words, if the 
audience does not feel a connection with the issue, or said audience fails 
to “empower”76 the securitising actor to take steps to confront the danger, 
then there has been no securitisation. Balzacq claims that analysing 
only those cases where securitisation has been successful could cause 
selection bias77. Failed securitisation attempts can also show something 
about security, at least as examples of what securitisation actors must 
avoid. As Balzacq said, “we learn something about security logic”78.
71 Bengio 1988: 29. 
72 Imam Khomeini 1980: 206–208.
73 Although, here one could argue that realistically the message was intended to touch 
Iraqi Šīʼa community, but from Ḫomeyn‘īs words it seems like he is trying to reach all Iraqi 
Muslims (Kalantari 2020: 13)
74 Ibid.,: 208
75 Balzacq 2011: 8–9. 
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.: 34. 
78 Balzacq 2011: 34.
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Ḫomeynī built his arguments on the Islamic identity and framed Iran 
as protector of Islam against the al-kāfirūn of the Iraqi regime. He was 
hoping that the Šī a̓-Islamic identity of the Iraqi Muslim might be stronger 
than their national loyalty. Ḫomeynī spends half of his declaration 
addressing the audience outside of his country, but what is lacking, in 
this case, is the “direct causal connection”79. Kalantari explained in his 
study that one of the main reasons why Ḫomeynī’s narrative of Šī a̓ 
Islamism failed in Iraq is that the communication and the media strategy 
did not reach the intended audiences and Iran misunderstood the cultural 
identity of the Iraqi Šī a̓s.80 
Ḫomeynī based his concept of Islamic government on the Quran, 
but his opinions were not “mainstream” in Šī a̓ Islam81. His aim was 
to remove the restriction on the power of the ulama so that their power 
would correspond to that of the Prophet and the Imams82. It was a step 
away from the traditional Twelver Šī a̓ concepts of power and succession 
after the death of the Prophet. Historically Šī a̓ Islam, as the minority 
sect usually living in majority Sunni states, tended to be rather quietist 
in political debates. Yet the question of who could take the leadership 
remained. 
Unlike the Sunnis, the Šī a̓ recognize the power of the Imams. 
Algar defines imamate in Šī a̓ Islam as “an institution of a succession 
of charismatic figures who dispense true guidance in comprehending 
the esoteric sense of prophetic revelation”83. He adds that until the true 
Imam remains in occultation any government in power was bound to be 
illegitimate84. 
Eliash has argued that it was in fact the Safavid dynasty that 
“fostered the new religious class”, the Imams85. The Safavids needed 
help to spread Šī a̓ Islam in, at that time, majority Sunni Iran; and the 
Imams, in turn, gained a powerful donor under whom they increasingly 
enjoyed independence and influence. After the demise of the Safavids, 
79 Ibid.: 8. 
80 Kalantari 2020: 1–21.
81 Walbridge 2001: 8. 
82 Ibid.: 11
83 Algar 1969: 2.
84 Ibid.
85 Eliash 1979: 24.
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the clergy stood independent but in need of financial support86. With 
the rise to power of the Qajar a new power arrangement was born; the 
new dynasty needed religious legitimacy. In this way, the clergy gained 
“power, autonomy, and, in many cases, great wealth”87, thus making the 
Iranian version of Šī a̓ Islam unique. 
Ṣaddām’s securitization of Arab communities in Iran failed as well88 
mainly because the Arabs living in Khuzestan had been there since the 
time of the Qajars and were reluctant to be ruled by a secular Sunni 
regime89. Nevertheless, Ṣaddām managed to keep the Šī a̓ Iraqis on his 
side in the conflict with Iran. Ṣaddām was in a unique position; he was 
a leader from a minority Sunni sect governing over the Šī a̓ majority. As 
mentioned above, the Šī a̓ community had risen up against the regime 
several times. Thus, it would seem that Ḫomeynī’s narrative should 
have gained more influence at least among the Šī a̓ community in Iraq. 
Nevertheless, the Iranian regime’s miscalculation about its ability to win 
the hearts and minds of the Iraqi Šī a̓ was one of the main reasons Iran 
had to accept the agreement that ended the eight-year war90. 
Ṣaddām’s rule was built around his cult of personality, the continuous 
propaganda asserting his legitimacy to rule Iraq and the Arab nations. 
He went to great lengths to establish connections between himself and 
the Banū Hāšim, a subtribe of the Quraīš tribe from which the Prophet 
descended91. The tradition to prove the lineage of a member of Arab 
tribes goes back to pre-Islamic times when this practice gave a sense of 
belonging and association to members of the desert tribes and clans92. 
Descendence from the Prophet and his tribe has remained a fundamental 
factor in establishing a ruler’s legitimacy93. This is a crucial factor for 
the Šī a̓ community who would not consider anyone legitimate who 
cannot trace their roots back to the Prophet. Moreover, Ṣaddām needed 
to prove to the Šī a̓ majority that he, although part of the Sunni elite, is 
also a champion of the Šī a̓ Iraqis. Therefore, Ṣaddām did not only trace 
86 Walbridge 2001: 9. 
87 Ibid.
88 Massarrat 1993.
89 Rezamand 2010: 94. 
90 Kalantari 2020: 2.
91 As cited Bengio 1998: 80. 
92 Lewis 1988: 102. 
93 Ibid.
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his lineage back to the Prophet Muḥammad but also his son-in-law ‘Alī 
who was the first imam and a symbol of Šī a̓ identity. After the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran Ṣaddām started to use ’Alī as his role model94. 
In addition, Ṣaddām juxtaposed the Iranian and Iraqi Šī a̓ using the 
narrative of the Šu'ūbīyya movement. The Šu'ūbīyya movement arose 
as an answer to the alleged superiority of Arabs over non-Arabs in the 
Islamic caliphate. The movement celebrated the culture and history 
of all non-Arab Muslims, but came to be known as a mostly Persian 
movement. In Ṣaddām’s rhetoric, the Šu'ūbīyya represented those who 
wanted “to suppress the uniqueness of the Arabs”95. The aim of using 
it was to show that the Iraqi Šī a̓ are Arabs and the Iranian Šī a̓ want to 
destroy their homeland and bring an Iranian Šī a̓ government to power. 
The Iranian version of Šī a̓ Islam was foreign to the Iraqi Šī a̓ because of 
the very unique and distinct developments that shaped Iranian Shiism, 
for example, the Aḫbārīān-Uṣūlīān96 discussion or the rise of a Šī a̓ ulama 
to power. Iraqis have been followers of the traditional Šī a̓ doctrine of 
silent opposition to the political regime until the al-Mahdī97 arrives98. 
For them, Iranian political Šī a̓ Islam was a foreign idea. Ṣaddām’s aim 
here was to show that, above all, Iraqi Šī a̓ are Arabs. That makes them 
different from the Persian Šī a̓ who want to destroy the Arab homeland 
by bringing their Iranian Šī a̓ government to power. 
What Ḫomeynī misunderstood about the collective Iraqi identity was 
the specific values of the Iraqi Šī a̓ community. Kalantari has argued 
that it is the Bedouin culture of Šī a̓ Iraqis that have embedded honour, 
loyalty and courage into their consciousness99. These values bond 
them with the Arabs and differentiate them from the Persian identity 
that Iranian Šī a̓ Islam is rooted in. The specific elements of collective 
94 Kalantari 2020: 15. 
95 As cited Bengio 1998: 104. 
96 Uṣūlīān are Twelver Šīʼa Muslims who observe the religious reasoning (iǧtihād) of 
an Islamic Scholar qualified to evaluate Islamic Law (muǧtahīd). This act is called taqlīd. 
Aḫbārīān are Twelver Šīʼa Muslims who do not observe the taqlīd of a muǧtahīd. Both schools 
follow the al-Qurʼān and ḥadīṯ. In the late 18th century there was a so-called Aḫbārīān-Uṣūlīān 
conflict in the Šīʼa clergy. Consequently, most Twelver Šīʼa today are Uṣūlīān. 
97 In Twelver Šīʼa Islam al-Mahdī is the final (twelfth) imam who disappeared in the 10th 
century. Twelver Šīʼa believe that he is in occultation and will reemerge to reestablish peace 
and justice. 
98 Eliash 1979: 22.
99 Kalantari 2020: 15.
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identity which brought success on one side and failure on the other 
could be studied more and would certainly produce interesting research. 
However, what can be taken from this right now is that closeness, both 
physical and cultural, matters a lot in successful securitisation. Culture-
specific narratives carry more weight than purely religious and sectarian 
narratives. 
Conclusion 
Āyatollā Ḫomeynī and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn relied on historical myths and 
traumas to bring forth feelings of a perpetual crisis caused by a deceitful 
enemy and betrayal by those closest to the nation. Both leaders believed 
in the exceptionalism of their cause and therefore saw the opponent as 
acting against the will of God. In rhetorical terms, the war was between 
Iraqi-Arab and Iranian-Islamic exceptionalism. 
First of all, both leaders presented themselves as chosen by God 
to lead their community. Ḫomeynī created the narrative that the Iran-
Iraq war was the salvation of the Islamic community from the rule of 
the al-kāfirūn. Ṣaddām’s narrative portrayed the war as a battle to save 
the Arab homelands from Persian invaders. Secondly, both created a 
sense of crisis by adopting narratives of external threat to the collective 
identity of their community. Ḫomeynī framed it as the continuation of 
the Islamic Revolution to defend a higher moral cause. Ṣaddām framed 
the Persians as perpetual occupiers who have now turned their eyes to 
the Arab brethren. Moreover, a successful securitization needs a strong 
and easily identifiable enemy figure. Both leaders turned to historical 
insecurities and myths of loss to greater powers. Ḫomeynī used the more 
recent narrative of Ṣaddām as the slave of America. Ṣaddām created his 
enemy from the centuries-long trauma of being torn apart by Persian 
Empires. In addition, both leaders narrated stories of being betrayed 
by those who should have been loyal. Ḫomeynī talked about Iranians 
being left on the battlefield to defend Islam alone because other Muslim 
states had turned a blind eye to the mistakes of the Iraqi regime. Ṣaddām 
pointed a finger at the Kurds who had collaborated with the enemy. Also, 
since both Ḫomeynī and Ṣaddām claimed that their cause was supported 
by God, then one of the narratives on both sides was to delegitimise the 
Islamic identity of the opponent. 
The War of Rhetorics: The strategic narratives in the Iran-Iraq War 366
Last but not least, there were misunderstandings on both sides of 
the cultural context and shortsightedness of the impact of revolutionary 
ideology. Ḫomeynī failed to securitise the Iraqi Šī a̓ community because 
he did not understand the unique bonds and traditions that connect the 
Iraqi nation. Furthermore, he falsely hoped that the Iranian version of 
the Islamic Revolution could influence the Arab Šī a̓ in Iraq. Similarly, 
Ṣaddām could not reach the Arab population of Iran because of the 
cultural threads that bond them with the other ethnic groups in Iran. 
However, Ṣaddām succeeded in keeping the Iraqi Šī a̓s on his side by 
emphasising the possibility of an Iranian takeover of the Arab lands and 
traditions.
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Is the European Migration Crisis 
Caused by Russian Hybrid Warfare 
Actions in Syria and Ukraine?
Viljar Veebel, Yurii Punda and Vitalii Shevchuk
Abstract Recent developments in the European security situation, 
starting with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and followed by the 
complications of Brexit and political instability in the Middle East 
and North Africa, have given rise to instability in the European 
Union. Yet, none of the other factors could be compared with the 
risks caused by the massive influx of refugees into the EU that 
challenges both the solidarity and responsibility of member states. 
In this context, it is extremely important to understand the actual 
security threats related to the refugee crisis and the root causes of 
growing refugee flows. This article discusses the roots of large-
scale migration flows in the European Union (EU) over the present 
decade and investigates the potential link between migration 
flows and modern hybrid warfare, referring to the coordination of 
various modes of warfare such as military and non-military means, 
conventional and non-conventional capabilities, state and non-state 
actors, with the aim of causing instability and disarray. It is intriguing 
to investigate whether the increase in migration flows could be 
linked to the present confrontation in the global arena on the Russia-
West axis. Common patterns of migration flows from Syria and 
Ukraine to the EU are discussed, as well as policy recommendations 
given to diminish the negative impact of similar events in the future. 
Keywords migration, hybrid warfare, security, European Union, 
Ukraine, Syria
Introduction
Over the past decade massive migration flows to Europe have seriously 
challenged both the cooperation and solidarity of EU member states. 
Is the European migration crisis caused by Russian hybrid warfare actions ... 370
The first signs of the crisis emerged as early as 2012–2013 when the 
number of first-time asylum applications to EU countries moderately 
increased compared to previous years. The migration flows peaked 
in 2015 and 2016 when more than one million people from non-EU 
countries applied for asylum in the EU each year. Since then the number 
of asylum applications to the EU has slightly decreased to approximately 
600–700 thousand applications annually1, but remains about three times 
higher than the number of asylum applications in the early 2010s. Large-
scale migration flows clearly remain one of the main challenges the EU 
has to deal with in the coming years.
The current article aims to investigate the links between the dynamics 
of recent migration flows and some regional conflicts. One might expect 
regional conflicts to create instability that would lead to a significant 
influx of refugees. Thus, the current analysis focuses on two specific 
cases, referring to military conflict in Syria and Ukraine, and looks to 
establish commonalities between migration patterns originating from 
Syria and Ukraine into EU countries during those conflicts. 
However, the article also goes a step further and tries to explore the 
potential link between the dynamics of recent migration flows from 
Syria and Ukraine to the EU and the actions of the Russian Federation 
in both conflicts. In this way, the authors argue that recent migration 
waves to the EU could potentially be part of Russia’s strategy of non-
linear or hybrid warfare, referring to the coordination of various modes 
of warfare such as military and non-military means, conventional and 
non-conventional capabilities, state and non-state actors, with the aim of 
causing instability and disarray. The application of the concept of hybrid 
warfare in Ukraine and Syria has been previously discussed by several 
authors like Michael Kofman2, Nicu Popescu3 and others; however, to 
the knowledge of the authors, none of them have previously undertaken 
an in-depth analysis of migration flows from the perspective of modern 
hybrid warfare. This article therefore purports to take the first step in 
that direction. Since the aim of hybrid warfare is more or less to cause 
harm and to confuse the opponent with any means available, it cannot be 
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just another form of the present confrontation in the global arena on the 
Russia-West axis. In this respect, it is fully justified to discuss whether 
recent migration flows to EU countries could potentially be part of 
Russia’s strategy of hybrid warfare in creating regional instability and 
weakening the authority, credibility and unity of the European Union in 
the international arena. 
The next section of the article provides a brief overview of the con- 
cept of hybrid warfare and analyses Russia’s understanding of contem- 
porary conflicts from that perspective. The following section outlines 
the dynamics of migration flows from Syria and Ukraine to the EU 
and links it to the periods of Russia’s most active interventions in those 
countries. The authors also acknowledge that, in addition to Russia’s 
influence, recent large-scale migration waves to the EU are also affected 
by other factors such as changes in people’s behavioural patterns, 
political instability, economic reasons, push-and-pull factors, climate 
conditions, and others. However, assuming that Russia was playing 
an active role in both conflicts at various times, Russia might also be 
responsible for at least not stopping the migration flows to the EU when 
it had the chance to do so. The final section of the article discusses the 
hypothetical question of whether large-scale migration flows could be a 
new form of hybrid warfare and then provides a conclusion.
Varying Concepts of Hybrid Warfare 
Conceptualising hybrid warfare is a challenging task for mainly three 
reasons. Firstly, the term’s connotation is ‘the intangible’ and covers 
a wide variety of tools of hybrid warfare as well as the elusive nature 
of associated activities, actors and objectives. The broad and varying 
nature of hybrid warfare is well highlighted in Hoffman, referring to 
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts 
and criminal disorder as some examples of modes of hybrid warfare.4 
Frank G. Hofman also argues that multi-modal activities could be 
conducted by separate units or even by the same unit, but are in general 
operationally and tactically coordinated within the main battlespace to 
achieve synergistic effects5. Thus, the main ‘attractiveness’ of hybridity 
4 Hoffman 2009.
5 Ibid.
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lies especially in its asymmetrical nature and in the opportunity to 
remain just below the legal threshold at which the target state would be 
compelled to respond militarily. Furthermore, the main ‘advantage’ of 
using hybrid modes of warfare lies in the potential to simultaneously 
utilise multiple measures/tools to pursue certain goals, while managing 
to avoid the costs of retaliation from the target6. What is more, Horbulin 
also outlines the absence of clearly-defined time horizons as an inherent 
feature of hybrid war7. Thus, it is clearly very difficult to define what 
specifically constitutes hybrid warfare or where it begins and ends. 
Secondly, the concept of the term hybrid is in essence dynamic 
and, thus, the essence of hybrid warfare constantly changes over time. 
Kofman argues that in 2014–2015 the term hybrid warfare had often 
been associated with various elements of Russia’s activities in Ukraine. 
However, from then on the term itself has been in constant evolution, 
referring to “spawning iterations like ‘multi-vector hybrid warfare’ in 
Europe”, to quote Michael Kofman8. Consequently, in discussions on 
hybrid warfare all of its possible forms should be carefully investigated, 
including migration flows, as potential tools of hybrid warfare with the 
simultaneous aims of pursuing certain goals and avoiding the costs of 
retaliation by opponents.
Thirdly, individual countries and even institutions seem to use the 
term hybrid in a slightly different context. For example, Andersson and 
Tardy argue that the 2015 National Military Strategy of the US refers to 
hybrid conflicts9, while the UN mostly talks about asymmetric threats 
without using the term hybrid10. At the same time, NATO seems to use 
the term hybrid relatively often, referring to hybrid attacks, hybrid 
threats, hybrid challenges, hybrid actions, hybrid campaigns and hybrid 
warfare. For example, the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit Declaration 
stresses the existence of a “dangerous, unpredictable, and fluid security 
6 Śliwa et al. 2018: 86−108.
7 Horbulin 2017: 3−6.
8 Kofman 2016: 1.
9 The strategy states that “such ‘hybrid’ conflicts may consist of military forces assuming 
a non-state identity, as Russia did in the Crimea, or involving a violent extremist organisation 
(VEO) fielding rudimentary combined arms capabilities, as ISIL has demonstrated in Iraq 
and Syria”. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, Washington 
D.C., June 2015.
10 Andersson & Tardy 2015: 2−4.
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environment, with enduring challenges and threats from all strategic 
directions; from state and non-state actors; from military forces; and 
from terrorist, cyber, and hybrid attacks”11. In addition, the declaration 
also points to several specific threats such as Russia’s aggressive 
actions, the instability and continuing crises across the Middle East and 
North Africa, terrorism, irregular migration, human trafficking, the 
crisis in Syria, disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced missile 
technology, and others.12 What is more, NATO has also indicated that, 
in the case of hybrid warfare, it could decide to invoke Article 5 as it 
would in the event of a traditional armed attack13. Furthermore, the 
declaration stresses that the Alliance is ready to assist its member states 
at any stage of a hybrid campaign, although the primary responsibility 
for responding to hybrid threats would remain with the targeted nation. 
From this perspective, hybrid warfare may not be quite the right term 
to accurately portray Russia’s understanding of contemporary conflicts/
warfare. Interestingly, Russians seem to prefer using the term non-linear 
war instead of hybrid war.14 At the same time, both Russia’s political 
and military leaders have clearly stated that external threats to Russia 
are primarily of a hybrid nature, referring, for example, to increased 
global and regional instability, the use of ICT, territorial claims against 
Russia, the violation of international agreements, etc.15 Furthermore, 
Russian leaders seem to constantly reiterate that the West uses hybrid 
warfare in Russia’s near-abroad in the form of promoting and supporting 
‘colour revolutions’ in those countries (e.g., Ukraine). In 2016, to counter 
the potential threat of ‘colour revolutions’, General Gerasimov called 
for the development of a ‘soft power’ strategy, referring to the toolkit 
of soft measures (i.e., political, diplomatic, economic, informational, 
cybernetic, psychological and other non-military means) to complement 
conventional ‘hard power’ measures16. 
11 NATO 2018.
12 Ibid.
13 NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2018.
14 Kaldor & Chinkin 2017: 6.
15 President of Russia 2014.
16 McDermott 2016.
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To conclude, the concept of hybrid warfare has not only changed 
the way we define and understand modern wars and conflicts, but it 
also poses serious threats to modern societies. According to Knipp, 
there is one dangerous trend that is associated with hybrid warfare and 
hybrid conflicts, referring to the undervaluing of democratic values17, 
which could, in turn, result in undesirable consequences. In this respect, 
subjective and targeted ‘advocacy campaigns’ on social media or on 
other so-called ‘free media platforms’ aiming to promote the ideas 
of some political parties, politicians or groupings under the guise of 
‘simply sharing information’ could also be interpreted as a potential 
tool of hybrid warfare. The same applies to the appearance of large 
(uncontrolled) migration flows to democratic countries that could put 
pressure on those countries to abandon those values. Last but not least, 
both the questioning of international law and the initiation of (military) 
conflicts in neighbouring countries—as Russia currently does—clearly 
undermine democratic values and the current rules-based global order 
and should therefore be considered another form of hybrid warfare. 
Is there a Link between Migration from Syria and Ukraine 
to the EU and Russia’s Interventions in those Countries? 
The dynamics of recent migration flows 
from non-EU countries to the EU 
During the recent migration crisis in Europe an unusually large number 
of refugees flowed into the EU. Over the past decade the number of first-
time asylum applications submitted by non-EU citizens has increased 
exponentially, peaking in 2015–2016 when more than one million 
people from non-EU countries applied for asylum in the EU each year 
(Figure 1). For over 70 years European countries have not seen such 
drastic numbers of refugees seeking asylum. To get the situation un-
der control Hungary has closed its main border with Serbia; Germany 
has introduced temporary border controls on the southern border with 
Austria, followed by temporary border controls introduced by Austria, 
Slovakia and the Netherlands; some EU member states have publicly op-
posed the idea of common burden-sharing, and so on. Thus, the refugee 
17 Knipp 2016.
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crisis has clearly revealed the weakness of the European integration 
model, with several countries calling European solidarity and demo-





























Figure 1. The number of first-time asylum applications submitted in 2010–2019 to EU 
countries by non-EU citizens (persons per year)
Source: Eurostat 2020.
A large number of first-time asylum applications, particularly in 
2015–2016, were submitted by people originating from conflict areas 
in the Middle East or in the South Asian region like Syria, Iran, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others (Figure 2). At the peak of the migrant 
crisis migration flow from Syria made up one-third of all asylum 
applications submitted to the EU. Today, the level of migration from all 
those countries is much higher than it was before the crisis. 
Migration flows from non-EU countries which could be linked to past 
and present conflict zones located in Europe, like Kosovo, Albania 
and Ukraine, were somewhat lower, although they also significantly 
increased during the recent migration crisis and remained relatively 
high (see, Figure 3). For example, while in 2010 only about 540 asylum 
applications to the EU were submitted by citizens of Ukraine, today the 
number is still relatively high (approximately 8,500 applications). The peak 
came in 2015 when almost 21,000 Ukrainians applied for asylum in the EU.
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Figure 2. The number of first-time asylum applications submitted in 2010–2019 to EU 
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Figure 3. The number of first-time asylum applications submitted in 2010–2019 to EU 
countries by citizens of Ukraine, Kosovo and Albania (persons per year)
Source: Eurostat 2020.
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The dynamics of the Syrian conflict and the link 
to the migration wave from Syria to the EU 
The conflict that erupted in Syria in 2011 has lasted for almost a decade, 
drawing in many countries like Russia, the United States, Iran, the United 
Kingdom, France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Syrian conflict 
began with pro-democracy demonstrations and a civil uprising in 2011, 
rapidly devolving into full-scale civil war from 2012 to 2013. Although 
Syrian presidential elections took place in June 2014, the situation did 
not normalise and fighting continued. This conflict was further fuelled 
by the rise of the terrorist formation ISIL with its own ambitions of 
ruling the region. The U.S. actively intervened in the Syrian conflict 
from September 2014 to September 2015 by supporting the opposition 
to President al-Assad and targeting ISIL fighters18. In September 2015 
Russia intervened in the conflict at the request of the Syrian government 
headed by President al-Assad, relying on the long-term cooperation there 
had been between the two countries. In the following months Russia 
carried out extensive air strikes in Syria against both ISIL and the anti-
government opposition19. It has been argued that Russia’s air campaigns 
in support of President Bashar al-Assad in 2015 and early 2016 were 
crucial in turning the war in al-Assad s̓ favour20. From February to 
July 2016 a partial ceasefire was introduced under the aegis of the 
UN Security Council; however, after its expiration intensive fighting 
resumed. In 2017 an agreement was signed to establish de-escalation 
zones and to introduce a ceasefire. In 2018 the conflict escalated once 
more after a reported chemical attack, triggering missile strikes from 
Western countries on multiple targets in Syria. In addition to that, ISIL 
attacks have also continued. Currently, the conflict in Syria is still 
ongoing. 
This conflict in Syria has resulted in unprecedented migration flows 
from Syria to other countries. Based on Eurostat data regarding first-time 
asylum applications submitted to EU countries, the situation seemed to 
be mostly under control during the initial phase of the conflict in 2011. 
However, as of May 2012 the number of first-time asylum applications 
18 Bannelier-Christakis 2016: 745–748.
19 Segall 2019: 29.
20 BBC News 2019.
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to the EU started to increase drastically after initial confrontations de-
volved into full-scale civil war. The first peak was reached in Septem-
ber 2014 when more than 16,000 asylum applications from Syria were 
submitted to EU countries in one month (Figure 4). Another peak came 
in September 2015 with the submission of more than 60,000 first-time 
asylum applications. Migration flow from Syria to the EU started to 
significantly decline from October 2016 and has currently dipped back 














































































































Figure 4. The number of first-time asylum applications from Syria submitted in 2010–
2020M1 to EU countries [persons; monthly data]
Source: Eurostat (2020).
The dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine and the link 
to migration flow from Ukraine to the EU
Similarly to the Syrian conflict, the Ukrainian conflict started with 
popular mass protests against the decision of former President of 
Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, to suspend the implementation of the EU 
association agreement in November 2013. The anti-government protests 
basically evolved into a revolution and in February 2014 Yanukovych 
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fled from Ukraine to Russia21. Claiming that President Yanukovych 
had asked Moscow for assistance, Russia sent troops to Ukraine in 
February–March 2014 to justify the annexation of the Crimean peninsula. 
In March 2014 Russia organised a referendum in Crimea which was 
never recognized by the international community. After Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea, violent confrontations broke out in Eastern 
Ukraine between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and separatists backed by 
Russia. The first version of the Minsk Protocols, a ceasefire negotiated 
under the auspices of the OSCE, was signed in September 2014; however, 
in retrospect it is apparent that Russia had no intention of curtailing its 
efforts in Ukraine and stopping the support of separatists in Eastern 
Ukraine22. Consequently, in January 2015 full-scale armed conflict 
broke out in Eastern Ukraine, culminating in the Minsk II agreements, 
the second cease-fire agreement in the Donbass war, in February 2015. 
However, the situation remains complicated to this day with armed 
confrontations still taking place in Eastern Ukraine almost on a daily 
basis between Ukrainian armed forces and Russian-backed separatists.23
As regards the migration waves from Ukraine to the EU, they fully 
reflect the dynamics of the conflict. That is to say, before the outbreak of 
conflict in November 2013 less than 100 first-time asylum applications 
from Ukrainian citizens were submitted to EU countries on a monthly 
basis, whereas the number of applications increased significantly during 
the conflict and peaked from October 2014 to May 2015 with up to 2,100 
first-time asylum applications submitted per month (Figure 5). Granted, 
the scale of migration pressure from Ukraine to the EU is not comparable 
to migration waves originating from Syria; however, they are still quite 
significant in comparison to levels prior to the start of the Donbass War 
in November 2013. 
21 For further information, e.g., European Parliament 2018 as well as Poltorakov 2015 and 
Veebel 2016.
22 Veebel, & Markus 2018: 1−20.
23 For further information, see, e.g., European Parliament 2018 as well as Šlabovitš 2016 
and Mölder & Sazonov 2016 in Russian Information Campaign against the Ukrainian State 
and Defence Forces: Combined Analysis by Sazonov, Müür & Mölder (eds.) 2016.




































































































































Figure 5. The number of first-time asylum applications submitted in 2010–2020M1 to EU 
countries from Ukraine [persons per month]
Source: Eurostat (2020).
Has Russia’s involvement in both conflicts led 
to massive migration flows to the EU?
As the current study indicates, both the Donbass War in Ukraine and 
military interference in Syria are clearly linked to Russia’s activities 
in the international arena, which raises the question whether these 
migration flows to the EU could potentially be part of Russia’s hybrid 
warfare strategy aimed at stirring up regional instability and weakening 
the authority, credibility and unity of the European Union in the inter- 
national arena. The situation in both Ukraine and Syria seems to have 
been fully ‘under the control’ of Russia who played an active role in 
escalating both conflicts.
As many authors have pointed out, Russia has clearly used the 
strategy of hybrid warfare in Ukraine both in terms of military and non-
military measures as well as state and non-state actors24. All throughout 
24 See, e.g. Sazonov et al. 2016; Renz 2016; Chausovsky 2019; Midttun 2019.
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the conflict, and even before its start, various lines of operation were 
utilised in multiple areas such as diplomatic and political relations, 
economy, energy, religion, and the military and informational spheres 
with the aim of enabling Russia to gain control over Ukraine and change 
public opinion both in Ukraine and globally25. In addition, Russia has 
also provided military “aid” to separatists to maintain a foothold in East-
ern Ukraine26; not to mention the massive, comprehensive and syste- 
matic information operation Russia conducted in Ukraine in 201427. 
Considering that Russia escalated the conflict with the annexation of 
Crimea in the first quarter of 2014, this makes Russia directly responsible 
for the increased migration flow from Ukraine to the EU. 
Migration waves from Syria to EU countries started to significantly 
increase from September 2014 after the conflict gained an international 
dimension following US intervention. Although migration to the EU 
peaked in September 2015, overlapping with Russia’s direct intervention 
and air strikes, a clear causal relationship cannot be drawn between Rus-
sia’s actions in Syria and the migration wave from Syria to the EU. On 
the one hand, migration from Syria had already begun in 2011–201228, 
but at that time pressure was mostly on Turkey, not the EU. On the other 
hand, there are many other factors that have contributed to massive mi-
gration from Syria (e.g., high unemployment, corruption, lack of politi-
cal freedom and poor economic conditions)29. It has also been posited 
that in 2015 Syrian refugees discovered a migration route30 through 
the Balkan countries and, by sharing that information on social media, 
probably contributed to the large-scale migration waves of 2015. In addi-
tion, Germany’s generosity has also been mentioned as a potential pull-
factor. Furthermore, Eurostat’s data may not reflect the full picture of 
the migration waves from Syria to the EU, especially considering the 
fact that some refugees from several other countries have been known to 
falsely report that they originate from Syria when applying for asylum 
in the EU. However, despite the reasons mentioned above, it is still a fact 
25 Midttun 2019.
26 Mölder 2016: 112.
27 Sazonov, Müür & Mölder 2016: 6.
28 Kingsley 2015.
29 BBC News 2019.
30 The Guardian 2015.
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that migration wave numbers from Syria exploded particularly after the 
US intervened in the conflict, and that Russia’s support for President 
al-Assad’s regime led to escalation of the conflict. Referring to Russia’s 
support to al-Assad’s regime, Kelly Craft, US Ambassador to the United 
Nations, has stated that: “What we are witnessing is not counterterror-
ism, but an excuse to continue a violent military campaign against those 
who refuse to accept the Assad regime’s authority”31.
However, considering the fact that both in Syria and Ukraine Russia 
had several opportunities to de-escalate these conflicts but never chose 
to do so, Russia still seems to be indirectly responsible for increased 
migration flows to the EU originating from Syria and Ukraine. During 
the Syrian conflict Russia repeatedly used its veto power to block the UN 
Security Council’s resolutions aimed, for example, at investigating and 
imposing sanctions over the use of chemical weapons in Syria, at stopping 
the bombing and achieving a truce in Aleppo, and at condemning the 
actions of the Syrian government against the opposition32. In Ukraine, 
after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Russia escalated military 
conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine, sabotaged the Minsk I ceasefire 
agreements, and conducted information campaigns to tarnish Ukraine’s 
image both domestically as well as internationally33. Conversely, if 
Russia had not blocked Western initiatives to solve the conflict in 
Syria and if Russia had withdrawn from Crimea and stopped arming 
Ukrainian separatists, this would not have led to drastically increased 
migration flows from Syria and Ukraine to EU countries. 
Discussion and conclusion: Are Large-scale Migration 
Flows a New Form of Hybrid Warfare?
Admittedly, increased migration flows, under controlled conditions, 
are perfectly normal in today’s ever-globalising world. However, as 
the Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts have demonstrated, the situation be-
comes critical as soon as controlled migration turns into uncontrolled 
migration. Regardless of whether or not Russia has played a significant 
part in initiating large-scale migration flows to the EU as an element 
31 Nichols 2019. 
32 RTÉ 2018.
33 Veebel & Markus 2016: 128−139.
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of its strategy of non-linear warfare, the overall impact of such massive 
migration flows is overwhelming for the destination countries in several 
ways. 
More specifically, the EU has defined itself as a community that is 
united by universal values rather than fleeting interests. Those universal 
values are liberal values that form the foundation for cooperation between 
EU member states, and they are also very attractive to people of the EU’s 
neighbouring countries, including Ukraine. At the same time, Russia’s 
current ‘operation’ to return Eastern Europe to being under its sphere of 
influence cannot be implemented without destroying the foundations of 
existing strategic alliances, including the foundations of the European 
Union. President Putin s̓ recent statements34 and actions clearly indicate 
that Russia has already started down that road. 
Based on this research, it could be argued that the most recent large-
scale migration flows have occurred primarily after internal conflicts 
have turned into international ones, mainly as a result of interventions 
staged by other countries, particularly Russia. In that respect, Russia is 
clearly implementing its idea of selective multipolarity, meaning that it 
actively participates in international conflicts and carefully selects op-
ponents that might allow Russia to present itself as a global power in the 
world arena, i.e., as the one that sets things in motion35. 
Assuming that Russia has not abandoned its aggressive ambitions 
both in its neighbouring countries as well as globally, it could be ex-
pected that Russia fully intends to conduct conflict interventions in the 
future as well. Thus, according to the analysis of the authors, it would be 
in the best interests of the West to continuously assess the situation on a 
case-by-case basis and to take active countermeasures to prevent mas-
sive migration flows into the EU as soon as it becomes evident that Rus-
sia has targeted a country for such purposes. In more practical terms, it 
would mean the systematic and careful monitoring of political situations 
and potential hybrid scenarios in various countries around the world 
(i.e., not the developments the EU would like to see in those countries, 
but understanding what is actually happening there, on the ground in 
34 Putin 2019.
35 Polyhakova 2018.
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reality). This applies particularly to the countries covered by the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy.
Otherwise, the EU will soon most likely be challenged again with 
similar problems. EU countries could not withstand another massive 
wave of unregistered refugees passing through the EU with the purpose 
of arriving in countries which attract refugees by dint of having better 
financial and social conditions. This would certainly cause the increasing 
fragmentation of EU member states’ national interests in terms of 
refugees and would most likely force them to protect their own interests. 
Even if there are solid grounds for this kind of response (e.g., financial 
considerations arguing that the EU is unable to help everyone in need), 
these views do not reflect the higher normative values that the EU tries 
to promote around the world. Should the EU lose its normative power in 
the world arena36 as a result of undermining its underlying democratic 
values, Russia would once again be one step closer to realising its 
aggressive ambitions in other countries37. 
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and Security Threats from the Baltic Perspective.” Journal of Poli-
tics and Law, 8(4), pp. 254−262.
Veebel, Viljar; Ploom, Illimar (2016) “Estonian perceptions of security: 
Not only about Russia and the refugees.” Journal on Baltic Security, 
2(2), pp. 35–70.
Yenidünya, Ayhan; Atalay, Mustafa (2016) “Comparative Analysis of 
Russian Hybrid Methods in Ukraine and Syria Crisis.” American 
Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sci- 
ences (ASRJETS), December 14, https://asrjetsjournal.org/index.php/
American_Scientific_Journal/article/view/2407 (02.10.2020).
Moscow’s Strategies in the Middle East
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Abstract The current article discusses Russia’s growing ambitions 
and presence in the Middle East, and its strategies and methods. The 
regime of Bashar al-Assad has survived mostly thanks to Russian 
arms, political support and diplomacy. It is known that the regime 
of al-Assad is one of the few long-term partners of Russia. At the 
same time, Russia has been making many new friends in the re-
gion who, if not becoming as close as Syria, at least acknowledge 
Russia’s steadily-achieved power broker status. This article explores 
the background, strategies and methods of Russia’s pursuits in the 
Middle East. 
Keywords Russia, Syria, Middle East, Strategies, Influence
Introduction
Historically, the Middle East has figured prominently among the regions 
of Russia’s primary strategic interests. It is nonetheless only recently 
that after a relatively long pause the region has seen a resurgence of Rus-
sia’s active involvement.1 What the Russian Federation has achieved in 
the region is significant and can thus be considered a success. This suc-
cess has two clear aspects. First, it has conducted a successful rescue op-
eration in support of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and, second, it 
has become an indispensable power broker in the wider Middle Eastern 
region.2 As far as Syria is concerned, by the end of 2019 Assad’s regime 
had effectively been saved by Russian and Iranian political and mili-
tary support in the form of direct intervention in the Syrian Civil War3. 
Russia’s decisive action in this situation enhanced its status throughout 
the Middle East region. The link between Moscow’s success in Syria 
1 Dannreuther 2019: 726–742. 
2 Jones 2019.
3 Bashar al-Assad thanks Putin for ‘saving our country’ as Russian leader prepares for 
talks on ending Syrian war 2017; Russia saved Assad but Syria peace settlement elusive 2017.
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and its impact on enhancing Russia’s regional as well as global status 
has been ascribed by Roy Allison to Putin, implying the existence of 
such a strategy.4 Russia’s presence and military actions in the region 
show the Kremlin’s growing ambitions.5 Indeed, in the Syria crisis Rus-
sia portrays itself as a competitor in great power politics, never missing 
an opportunity to strengthen ties with U.S. allies in the region, and thus 
undermining U.S. influence in the process.6
While the presence of a strategy cannot be overlooked, Moscow is 
hardly a solitary player in the Middle Eastern arena. Thus, its relative 
success can be seen as a mirror image of other great powers’ relative 
failure. Along these lines, the current article aims to ascertain to what 
extent Russia’s conduct has taken advantage of the vacuum left by the 
U.S. and the West, and to what extent it can be considered a premeditat-
ed and carefully considered plan that fits within Russia’s wider strategic 
objectives in the Middle Eastern region.
First, the authors will take a closer look at the strategic assumptions 
that have enabled Moscow to enhance its status in the region, focusing in 
particular on those underlying aspects that have led to the West’s failure 
and comparing them to those that have helped pave the way for Russia to 
succeed. To that end, the authors analyse the strategic assumptions held 
by Russia and the West by comparing their long-term behavioural pat-
terns in the international arena, and as implemented in the Middle East.
Subsequently, the article will focus on Russia’s wider strategic objec-
tive in the Middle Eastern region. It can be argued that, in addition to its 
intervention in Syria, Russia also seems to be pursuing wider regional 
objectives in the Middle East related to becoming a major power broker 
in the region, for example. This article will examine the core elements 
of this strategy in light of Russia’s actual achievements in that regard, 
and will look at the standards Russia relies on to measure its success. 
This section will focus on analysing the strategic concept of Eurasian 
power, as articulated by leading Russia experts and academics, as well 
as Russia’s activities in the Middle East and any results achieved from 
that perspective.
4 Allison 2013: 821.
5 Brockwehl et al. 2018; Sazonov 2015.
6 See, e.g., Brockwehl et al. 2018: 6.
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In order to achieve its strategic objectives the Kremlin has devel-
oped and implemented a sophisticated foreign policy not only towards 
regional powers but also towards Islamist tendencies and radical groups. 
Therefore, the third thread that this article pursues attempts to under-
stand the choice of methods that Russia has used to deal with Muslims 
in general and with Islamist radical groups in particular.7 The authors 
aim to gain a deeper understanding of what lessons Russia has learned 
from its policy towards Muslims and Islamism at home by outlining a 
long history of examples. 
Finally, the article will offer insights into the implications for the 
West with regard to Russia’s new status in the Middle East in order to 
understand the potential consequences of this new situation for Russia 
and the West. To answer that question, the authors outline some poten-
tial trajectories of the relationship between Russia and the West in the 
Middle East and beyond. Additionally, the role of ISIS8 will be analysed 
in the context of the Syrian Civil War as well as in a wider regional 
framework.
Against this backdrop, this article puts forward the following re-
search questions:
• What strategic assumptions underlie the Kremlin’s conduct in the 
Middle East and how should it be understood in the wider context of 
historical Western efforts to stabilise the region? 
• What are the specific considerations that have informed Russia’s 
strategy in the Middle East?
• How has Russia’s past experience with Islam at home influenced its 
current conduct and its preferred methods in the Middle East?
7 Akhmetova 2016; Yemelianova 2002. 
8 ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization 2014. 
Mölder, Sazonov 2016: 208−231; Sazonov, Ploom 2019: 13, 87−115.
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Contextualising Western and Russian Strategic 
Assumptions regarding the Middle East: Outlining the 
Influence of the Historical and Current Context
In order to compare Western and Russian strategic assumptions regard-
ing the Middle East it is necessary to outline the relevant historical con-
text and the resulting implications. This section will mostly focus on 
some critical factors and trends that have shaped the situation in the 
Middle East, starting around the time of the Arab Spring and the Syrian 
Civil War,9 while also covering the relevant historical background. 
It is the controversial nature of the Arab Spring10 that carries in itself 
perhaps the best indication of the hopes and disappointments the West 
has entertained and suffered regarding the Middle East in particular and 
the Islamic world in general. The Arab Spring encompasses two distinct 
pursuits: a quest for more democracy in the respective countries; and a 
quest for revitalising their religious and cultural legacy. This duality is 
also well reflected in the Western reception that hoped for the former 
but was often shaken, if not shocked, by outcomes that favoured the lat-
ter. These hopes reflect Western conviction in the inevitability of demo-
cratic developments throughout the world. However, while considering 
the Arab Spring, one cannot ignore the wider background of democratic 
efforts in the region. The idea of the inevitability of democracy has been 
repeatedly challenged and the history of the Middle East has proved that 
the democratic seed is fragile, needing welcoming soil and appropri-
ate care in order to take root and flourish11, or a specific idiom with its 
own particular supportive arrangements (such as in Turkey, for example, 
where the military assumes a special role as custodian of democracy, 
hardly an idea acceptable to modern Western democracies).12 
In any case, the outcomes of the Arab Spring have been controver-
sial. On the one hand, it saw the fall of autocratic leaders (e.g., in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya) but the ensuing chaos often paved the way not merely 
for a return to traditional roots but also for the rise of Islamists (albeit 
moderate, like the Muslim Brotherhood).13 Thus, from the perspective of 
9 Peterson 2016: 2209–2233.
10 Brownlee, Masoud, Reynolds 2013; Sazonov, Mölder 2014: 134–154. 
11 Shackle 2014.
12 See Matos 2013: 8–27.
13 See Rózsa et.al. 2012. 
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the West, the outcomes of the Arab Spring have been varied. Only the 
Tunisian example supports the argument of democracy being clearly on 
the winning side14, whereas some countries have witnessed the return 
of autocratic regimes (e.g., Egypt, where the army has once again as-
sumed control)15 and many others (e.g., Libya, Yemen, Syria) have even 
devolved into civil war.16 The Arab Spring17 also served as a catalyst for 
the rise of activity of extreme Islamist18 terrorist movements, religious 
fanatics and terrorists19, e.g., radical branches of Salafism20 such as ISIS 
and others.21
Such developments carry an implicitly discouraging message for the 
West. The Western approach entails two different aspects of legitimisa-
tion that both seem to be working against its success in the Middle East. 
First of all, in order to legitimise its activities in the Middle East the West 
needs to justify these actions at home. With some notable exceptions22, 
most Western measures have been geared towards supporting democra-
tisation, e.g., from the direct export of democracy to conditional aid, or 
to the general advocacy of human rights. Thus far, this has been the only 
argument for legitimating these policies in the West in order to secure 
public support as well as financial backing from parliaments. However, 
as the above-mentioned events have demonstrated, this particular goal 
may be both positively and negatively detrimental to Western aspira-
tions in the Middle East: positively detrimental in the sense that the im-
pulse to seek popular legitimacy in the region may lead to unexpected 
consequences as locals may opt to return to their traditional values; and 
negatively detrimental, as democracy is perceived by the locals as part 
and parcel of the Western way of life imposed on the region. 
Now, this latter aspect—the imposition of Western values and its 
way of life—constitutes the second problematic aspect of legitimising 
14 In Tunisia, liberals and the moderate Islamic party cooperated in an emerging multi-
party system. For more, see Natil 2016: 5–6.
15 Abdelsalam 2015: 136–139.
16 For more, see e.g. Mushtaq, Afzal 2017: 7–8.
17 Danahar 2014. 
18 See more on Islamism Martin, Barzegar 2010.
19 Hübsch 2001.
20 See more Mölder, Sazonov 2019: 10–35.
21 Sazonov 2014; Sazonov 2017b.
22 For more, see Cohen-Almagor 2018.
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the West’s actions in the Middle East and has to do with the relatively 
long dominance of Western civilisation over what is presently known 
as the Islamic World (i.e., its colonial past, effects of globalised capital-
ism, legacies of the Cold War, etc.). The consequences of these histori-
cal and a myriad of internal developments paved the way for the rul-
ing regimes—and sometimes, in turn, for the counter-movements that 
emerged as a result, e.g., in post-revolutionary Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
etc.—contributing to traditionalist, if not fundamentalist, urges in the 
countries.23
In this context, it is not surprising that the West has gradually grown 
tired of sustaining its active efforts in the Middle East, especially con-
sidering that its interventions have not managed to bring peace to the 
region. In some cases the outcomes may even seem antithetical and 
counterproductive.
In recent years, the Western response, especially on the part of the 
U.S., not only with regard to the results of these interventions but also 
in response to more urgent calls, has been to turn away from active 
involvement towards gradual withdrawal from the region.24 Although 
President Trump’s policy choices may be seen as more ambivalent, his 
declared policy stance of ‘Make America Great Again’ carries strong 
isolationist connotations and seems to continue the trend ushered in by 
his predecessor, President Obama25, resulting in a power vacuum that 
Russia has been more than eager to occupy. 
Strangely, as will be argued, the same conditions that have hampered 
Western ambitions have been conducive to Russia’s ambitions. Further-
more, it can be argued that Russia has had the upper hand in both as-
pects of legitimisation, if not in moral then at least in practical terms 
because the Kremlin does not have to justify its actions in the Middle 
East to the home audience by reverting to the narrative of contributing 
to the cause of democracy. On the contrary, Russia has itself put forward 
the notion of ‘managed democracy’26, and due to its general opposition 
23 Stern 2003: 27–40; cf. Sazonov 2017a. For a critique of the U.S. decision to launch ’The 
War on Terror’, see also Howard 2000. 
24 Unger 2016: 1–16.
25 Wechsler 2019: 13–38.
26 Liik 2013. 
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to Western values Russia seems to be perceived as much less dangerous 
to the culture of the Middle East countries. 
The second aspect, which is also closely related to the previous one, 
is the fact that as a result of adopting this approach Russia does not have 
to deal with problems related to the introduction of democratic reforms 
in the Middle East. Moreover, the Kremlin appears to be rather satis-
fied when Middle Eastern countries choose to return to traditional (or 
perhaps even to more or less moderate Islamist) ways of life. This gives 
Russia a clear advantage since its reception does not rely on the pursuit 
of democracy but can be satisfied with merely a measured dose of stabil-
ity. Although culpability for colonisation and for developments that un-
folded during the Cold War could easily be attributed to Russia as well, 
it somehow seems that by distancing itself from the West by de facto not 
sharing the same democratic aspirations Russia appears to have freed 
itself of any recriminations as well.
In addition to the vacuum created in the Middle East by the U.S. with-
drawal, Russia has also benefitted from another particular advantage. In 
Syria the West has mostly supported small democratic factions among 
the larger anti-Assad opposition that also comprises radical groups.27 
Thus, it is understandable that, at least for the U.S., such alliances have 
been questionable because some of those opposing radical groups are 
also categorised as enemies just like Assad’s regime28, further hamper-
ing U.S. efforts. Whereas Russia, in comparison, despite its officially 
stated priority of fighting ISIS, has aligned its operations to help Assad. 
According to Polyakova, the fact that Russia counts ISIS among its en-
emies has also worked as a facilitating factor without distracting Russia 
from its main objectives.29Altogether, this has made Russia’s immediate 
strategic objectives much more straightforward and easier to pursue.
Moreover, there is another ISIS-related factor that may be working 
in Russia’s favour and it is also one that has been hampering the West. 
By way of gross simplification, it could be argued that ISIS’s emergence 
is itself partly a consequence of Western interventions in the Middle 
East and beyond. Furthermore, it is possible to draw a link between 
the 2003 Western intervention in Iraq, the consequent dismantling of 
27 Lang, Awad, Sofer, Juul, Katulis 2014. 
28 Ibid.: 3.
29 Polyakova 2018.
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Saddam Hussein’s army, and the rise of ISIS.30 While this does not mean 
that the West should assume responsibility for ISIS’s actions, an indirect 
relationship can hardly be denied.31 In comparison, for Russia no such 
paradoxical relationships exist. Thus, without any moral burden or pos-
sible reservations, it is easier for Russia to fight ISIS, as compared to the 
West.
Despite high hopes, the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime did 
not bring about peace. On the contrary, Iraq descended into a civil war 
(incl. against the U.S. and its allies) that lasted for eight years. When 
the U.S. forces finally left Iraq in 2011 the situation in the country had 
deteriorated, becoming even more unstable and eventually falling prey 
to another civil war. It was within this context that radical Islamists were 
successful in establishing a terrorist quasi-state—in the form of ‘the 
Caliphate’ under the name Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—in the 
territories seized from Syria and Iraq in 2014.32 
Russia’s Conduct in the Middle East in the 
Context of its Strategic Objectives
This chapter will look into the wider significance of Russia’s pursuits in 
Syria and in the Middle East. The main elements and trends of Russia’s 
conduct in the region will be briefly examined against some prominent 
interpretations of Russia’s strategic concepts and goals, such as Russia 
positioning itself as the leading Eurasian power. 
Looking at Russia’s vicissitudes in Syria and in the wider Middle 
East since 2015, one is faced with many paradoxes. Although Russia 
appears to have started out with the relatively modest aim of helping the 
Assad regime hold onto power in Syria, due to the success of that ven-
ture Russia now enjoys the status of a major regional power broker in the 
Middle East. At first glance, this status must seem somewhat surprising 
on at least two levels: regional and global. As for the regional level, given 
the fact that Russia has thus far supported Iran’s interests, this position 
should have posed insurmountable problems for establishing trust with 
30 Natali 2015.
31 See, e.g., Jones, Dobbins, Byman, Chivvis, Connable, Martini, Robinson, Chandler 2017: 
x–xi. Even this otherwise critical account admits that ‘ISIL did grow out of chaos that sprung 
from the US invasion of Iraq’. Hundal 2015. See also Milne 2015. 
32 Bunzel 2015.
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the major Sunni countries in the region, begging the question: how did 
Russia manage to establish a rapport with all major players in the Middle 
East? 33 As for the global level, what could explain Russia’s bold entrance 
into a second conflict (i.e., the Syrian Civil War) in addition to its on-
going confrontation in neighbouring Ukraine? 
As will be argued, Russia has been pursuing this novel pragmatic 
policy for quite some time now, trying to gain the recognition of all 
major powers in the Middle East. In a way, Syria has become a welcome 
stepping stone on the road to achieving that goal. Russia’s pursuits in the 
Middle East do not merely align with its regional goals but also fit into 
the larger picture of its desired status as a global player. However, before 
going into the details of that policy, in order to gain an understanding 
of the complexity of Russia’s past involvements and ties in the Middle 
East it bears first outlining Russia’s vision of world politics and, second, 
some facts about Russia’s history with the region. 
Throughout history, Russia’s biggest rival in the Middle East has 
been the Ottoman Empire with whom Russia has been in fierce compe-
tition, particularly for ownership of the area surrounding the Black Sea 
and the Balkans, as well as with a view to securing access to the Medi-
terranean through the Turkish Straits.34 This bears significance in this 
context despite numerous opportunities for Turkey and Russia to clash 
over their interests in Syria and in the wider region. Despite relations 
between the two countries having frozen after Turkey downed a Russian 
aircraft in Northern Syria in 2015, their relationship was quickly mend-
ed and in 2019 the world witnessed their close cooperation in managing 
the extremely complex situation in Northeast Syria where one central 
question relates to the areas mainly populated by Kurds.
In the beginning of the 1950s, despite having first been a supporter 
of Israel, the Soviet Union established allied or equivalent relations with 
the enemies of Israel and its main supporter the United States. Russia’s 
new allies in the Middle East included Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South 
Yemen and Syria35, fitting nicely into the framework of the international 
33 This applies, for example, to Israel in the context of Russia’s close ties with al-Assad and 
Hezbollah and Iran.
34 Trenin 2016. In addition to Turkey, Russia’s other main competitor in the region has been 
the Persian Empire or modern Iran.
35 Karmon 2018.
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communist revolution, one of the prevalent strands in international rela-
tions during the Cold War. 
Despite the much-heralded Russian–Iranian alliance, the relationship 
between Moscow and the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran has been and 
remains complex (e.g., a clash of business interests, as has been the case 
in Syria).36 Their relationship has also suffered due to the way Russia 
publicised its use of an Iranian air base for its first air strikes in Syria.37 
As Borshchevskaya argues, Russian and Iranian interests have histori-
cally been more on a collision course than in harmony. After the 1979 
Iranian revolution the famous slogan propagated by the newly-anointed 
ruler Ayatollah Homeini was “Neither East nor West but Islamic Repub-
lic”, distancing Iran from both competing superpowers of the Cold War. 
Despite these complexities, Iran and Russia have managed to maintain 
a close relationship rooted mostly in their shared anti-Western political 
objectives, but also based on mutually beneficial economic relations and 
concerns over the rise of Sunni extremism in the region.38 
Perhaps most remarkable is the way Russia has managed to retain 
those Shia connections while at the same time cultivating close relations 
with the Sunni powers. It is not only that success in Syria has played into 
Russia’s hands, but a long-term Kremlin strategy can be observed here 
as well. From 2005 to 2007 President Putin visited Egypt, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, securing 
observer status for Russia in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.39 
In this regard, Russia’s close cooperation with Saudi Arabia is especially 
noteworthy because even if their interests should clash in Syria, accord-
ing to Trenin, there are many more areas where their interests align quite 
well (e.g., support for Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, manipulation of oil 
prices, etc.).40 In that respect, Russia’s policy in the region diverges from 
that of the U.S. According to Trenin, Russia’s strategy in the Middle East 
36 In this case al-Assad can claim some sovereign decision-making authority while trying 
to balance the allocation of profitable deals between Russia and Iran. Kotan 2019.
37 For more, see Borshchevskaya 2016.
38 Ibid.
39 Karmon 2018.
40 Trenin 2016, p. 3.
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has been a careful tightrope act to avoid siding with any single party in 
a conflict, instead constantly manoeuvring and engaging in trade-offs.41 
Nevertheless, Russia’s connection with the Shia–dominated coun-
tries cannot be entirely overlooked.42 In addition to its relations with 
the leading Shia nation Iran, Russia’s cooperation with other regional 
Shia groups includes close partnerships with Syria’s ruling Shia-associ-
ated clan, the Alawites, supporters of Bashar al-Assad43, as well as with 
Azerbaijan where the majority of Muslims are Shia. It is worth noting 
that Russia also has interests in Iraq where the Shia make up more than 
60% of the population, with strong indications that Russia is pursuing 
economic interests there, if not more.44 
As for relations with Syria, it remains Russia’s longest unbroken 
alliance dating back to the Cold War when close cooperation was es-
tablished in 1950 under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad, the father of 
Bashar, with Syria becoming a staunch ally of the Soviet Union.45 Al-
though their relationship seemed to cool during the 1990s and 2000s, 
the 2011 crisis reawakened this relationship in full force. In order to 
secure Assad’s regime the Kremlin has sent him weapons46, military ad-
visers and equipment (incl. aircraft and armoured vehicles)47 while also 
increasing its military presence in the region.48 These weapon shipments 
have reached Assad’s forces through the Syrian port in Tartus, currently 
under Russian control. From a strategic point of view the Tartus naval 
base is of great importance to Moscow, securing Russia’s only access to 
the Mediterranean Sea. Also, this is the only base outside the territory 
of the former USSR which has a favourable location and enables Russia 
41 “... indeed to feel ‘confident that it can navigate between Tehran and Riyadh.” Trenin 
2016: 4.
42 For more, see, e.g., Baker 2016. 
43 Peterson 2019: 163–197.
44 Russian oil companies such as Gazprom, Rosneft and Lukoil have been doing business in 
Iraq for many years; also, the first deliveries of Russian military exports to Iraq date back to 
the 1960s. Ahmadbayl 2018.
45 Trenin 2016: 3.
46 The majority of weapons used by Assad’s forces in Syria originate from the former USSR 
or the Russian Federation. Bennett 1985: 745–774.
47 The Syrian government has purchased weapons from the Russian Federation to the tune 
of several billion dollars. Connolly, Sendstad 2017: 8, 18, 27.
48 Among other things, the Russian forces also use it as a testing ground for their weapons. 
Enders 2018.
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to control the Eastern Mediterranean region.49 Additionally, it was sig-
nificant for Russia from the military point of view. Russia’s military 
presence in Syria was of great importance not only for pursuing Russian 
strategies and ambitions but also for offering the excellent possibility 
of having Syria as “polygon” for testing new Russian weapons. Thus, 
Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict was seen by Moscow and the 
Russian Armed Forces as a very good opportunity to try out their weap-
ons and modernize them, as well as providing necessary combat expe-
rience for its military personnel.50 Gen M. Garejev (1923–2019), who 
was President of Russian Military Academy of Sciences, accentuated 
the importance of science and ideas like testing military personnel and 
weaponry in the Syrian war.51 Officially, Russia was of course fighting 
against ISIS and terrorism which were considered big threats to Russian 
security.52
At this juncture it is appropriate to inquire how this policy approach 
can be understood in terms of Russia’s wider strategic interests. For ex-
ample, it is evident that acquiring wider recognition in the region aligns 
with Russia’s interests. First and foremost, Russia’s widest strategic in-
terests consider the Middle East region as vital to solidifying its strategic 
and political position in the world. According to Gvosdev, Russia does 
not pursue a Middle East policy specific to that region alone but coordi-
nates its actions on a wider scale in accordance with its overall approach 
to international affairs. Gvosdev outlines what he calls the “twin chal-
lenges posed by Russia’s geographic position: extensive and vulnerable 
land borders coupled with choke points.” The significance of the lat-
ter lies in the fact that they could cut Russia off from the wider world. 
Traditionally, Russia’s response to these problems has been to push the 
borders of its spheres of influence as far outward as possible and acquire 
control of the connecting nodes.53 
It is important to recognise that this interpretation of Russia’s in-
terests in the region relies on the good old logic of geopolitics and, in 
49 It is also notable for the fact that it reminds NATO of Russia’s presence in the region as 
the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria is located in close proximity to a NATO member state 
– Turkey is only ca. 150 km from Tartus. Sazonov 2015.
50 The National Interest Staff 2019; Ripley 2018.
51 Гареев 2016: 14.
52 Цыганок 2016: 10–15.
53 Gvosdev 2019: 7.
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this context, it is relevant to highlight how Russia has harkened back to 
this notion while putting forward its new concept of ‘Eurasian power’.54 
According to Karaganov, this term represents novel thinking that has 
emerged from a post-2000s Russia that is trying to distance itself from 
declining Europe while getting closer to rising China, India, Brazil, etc. 
However, despite moving away from what it calls post-European values, 
Russia seems keen on re-establishing its relationship with the West as 
well. Karaganov argues that this is perhaps best explained by the fact 
that Russia’s approach to security encompasses the whole of the Eura-
sian continent, and for the latter “the arc of territories and states from 
Afghanistan to North and Northeast Africa” is key to the security of all, 
including Russia and Europe.55 
In that context, Russia’s intervention in Syria, and especially the 
wider stabilising role that Russia has tried to assume in the Middle East, 
takes on a more serious meaning. This is confirmed by Gvosdev, stress-
ing that Russia aims to influence other key international stakeholders 
(e.g., the EU and China) by “showing that a central Eurasian ‘node’ 
within the international system under Russian management contributes 
to the peace and prosperity of other major powers.”56 
Along with the Eurasian power concept, the Kremlin applies a Hob-
besian-Schmittian zero-sum logic of international relations. Among the 
Russian political elite views on the rules of global politics are dominated 
by geopolitical, neo-imperial, and neorealist concepts. Global power 
competition is seen as a dynamic process in a zero-sum environment 
where for every winner there has to be a loser.57 The importance and 
applicability of international rules is variable: it depends on the status 
of actors (great powers, nation states, and former dependencies), on 
the geopolitical location of the event (neutral competitive ground or 
near abroad), on the cultural context of translation, and on the moti-
vation of actors to follow the rules (current stakeholders versus chal-
lenging powers). As part of its Eurasian power identity, Russia is by no 
means interested in compliance with Western demands and in main-
taining the Western version of international law and security. Russia 
54 Karaganov 2018: 85–93.
55 Karaganov 2015.
56 Gvosdev 2019: 8. 
57 Ponomareva, Frolov 2019: 32–56. 
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has traditionally insisted on the importance of interests rather than the 
promotion of values in international relations. Furthermore, Russia has 
advanced the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
sovereign countries and argued against any unnecessary critiques.58 In 
sum, Russia has in some cases conceptualised the promotion of values 
and norms as empty talk covering for more mundane interests and as 
an instrument for the manipulation and promotion of national interests.59 
While trying to create its own asymmetric multilateral organizations 
and score points in that category, Russia generally opposes the idea of 
international cooperation and integration in multilateral organizations, 
and Russian analysts see many of them as part of an anti-Russian co-
alition with different labels. As such, they would prefer to engage in 
intra-governmental and bilateral diplomacy. This is something that is 
also clearly visible in the Kremlin’s Middle Eastern politics along with, 
as almost goes without saying, the elevation of Russia’s international 
status through its politics in the region. This effort cannot nevertheless 
be seen as acquiescence on Russia’s part with the current Western de-
sign of the prevailing international order. Membership of international 
organizations can be a sign of respect if the organization is powerful, 
selective, and stable.60 Legitimacy requires inclusiveness while respect 
requires that not everyone be accepted. ‘The West’ is often described 
and analyzed as a ‘United Anti-Russia coalition’ led and manipulated by 
the United States, both at legal and institutional levels. Western power 
in general is seen as falling apart, pushing Western actors more towards 
cooperation and multilateralism. In the Middle East Russia can be seen 
to be fighting for its interests but also for its own version of multilateral-
ism.
Gvosdev argues that, in addition to the above-outlined geographi-
cal reality, it is also important to realise that, as successor of the great 
power status enjoyed by the Soviet Union, Russia wants to remain one 
of the “agenda-setting, rather than agenda-taking nations” of the world, 
preventing the U.S., the EU or China from assuming that they could be 
58 Makarychev 2014. 
59 Kuvalin 2016: 341–358.
60 Istomin, Bolgova, Sokolov, Avatkov 2019: 57–85. 
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in any position to dictate Russia’s internal and external affairs.61 Thus, 
when Russia needs to prove its suitability to serve as a trustworthy cus-
todian of the region the Muslim countries, in conflict with former co-
lonial powers or dealing with local radicals, offer suitable theatres for 
Russia to demonstrate its capabilities. These faraway nations can offer 
potentially high gains for Russia when battle-testing its ‘escalate to de-
escalate’ doctrine, while the concomitant social and political risks re-
main low in case its ventures should fail.62 This indicates that for Russia 
the risks involved in opening a second front are lower compared to the 
possible benefits. What is more, as Russia strives to shore up its interna-
tional status and recognition its forces are warmly welcomed by national 
leaders because they can offer a viable counterbalance to the Americas, 
the British and the French whose efforts are often perceived as imperial 
in nature.63 In addition, in the eyes of the locals the Russians are also 
able to provide immediate help and working solutions.64
From Russia’s perspective, all of its more or less peaceful attempts to 
restore its former G8 status from 2015 to 2017 have been rejected, with 
its aggressive behaviour in the past being cited as justification. Interest-
ingly, in those cases where Russia has visibly used military force (e.g., 
in Syria) it seems to have been ‘taken back into the club’ again by the 
international community. This speaks in favour of relying on the ‘esca-
late to de-escalate’ doctrine and, considering that Russia has not been 
admonished for using that tactic,65 it will most likely continue to use it. 
Finally, it is time to take a look at how Russia has managed to achieve 
the status of a major power broker in the Middle East. First of all, it has 
made the most of the opportunities that have come its way, the most 
61 Gvosdev 2019: 8. The sanctions imposed on Russia by the West are just one example of 
such pressure. For some of their effects, see Veebel, Ploom 2020.
62 Adamsky 2018: 33–60. In the case of neighbouring nations, the situation is different. See, 
e.g., Veebel, Ploom 2019: 406–422. In Russia’s case, it is interesting to note the difference 
in thinking between the West and Russia. Russian discourse often uses the term struggle 
(borba) to refer to various forms of strategic interactions. For example, their military diction-
ary includes terms like informational struggle, radio-electronic struggle, diplomatic struggle, 
ideological struggle, economic struggle, or armed struggle. Thus, it seems that for Russians 
a desirable positive situation is a dynamic and agile struggle rather than a static comfort zone 
relying on a peaceful world. 
63 Karaganov, Suslov 2018.
64 Markedonov 2015: 195–206.
65 Veebel 2019: 182–197.
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salient being the vacuum created by the West, and especially the U.S., 
who have almost deserted the region. However, these opportunities 
might have come to naught had Russia not played its cards as boldly as 
it did. 
Leaving aside the moral responsibility for its more than brutal meth-
ods, especially towards civilians,66 Stepanova argues that Russia has 
achieved this status by using its military might clearly beyond its eco-
nomic means or even overall ambition. However, in addition to decisive 
action which seems to be the key to Russia’s success, Stepanova argues 
that, compared to the U.S., Russia has managed better in adjusting to 
new and changing realities. Instead of restricting itself with conditional-
ity, Russia has been relying on the trend of the regionalisation of politics 
and security in the Middle East.67 
This vector has been a relatively long-established policy priority for 
Moscow. As Akhmetova sees it, what contributed to Russia’s new posi-
tion amongst the Muslim-populated countries was the fact that for a long 
period “the Islamic factor was used in the country’s foreign policy ... 
to corroborate the claim about Russia’s special place in global politics, 
about its ‘intermediary’ situation as a Eurasian state which enables it 
to play the part of a bridge between the Muslim world and the West”.68 
In this context, it is quite understandable that in June 2005 Russia was 
granted observer status in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC).
So what has Russia managed to achieve? First of all, it has secured 
Assad’s hold on power in Syria while also bolstering the stability of the 
whole Middle East region. This is a relatively uncontroversial statement 
in the Middle East, but it is one also acknowledged by Western coun-
tries, although not directly. Thus, instead of staying within the confines 
of supporting primarily Iran-related interests, Russia has managed to 
achieve the status of power broker respected by all regional powers (incl. 
prominently Saudi Arabia and Israel), enabling Russia to re-establish 
66 It is also important to note that Russia has used asymmetric methods to achieve its goals. 
Sazonov 2017a; see also Bērziņš 2015: 40–51.
67 According to Stepanova (2019) this trend manifests itself in the growing role of regional 
powers, factors, and dynamics. Laruelle 2019.
68 Akhmetova 2016: 7–8.
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its status as a major power on the global stage.69 Above all, it has also 
unquestionably managed to successfully demonstrate its desired new 
identity as the Eurasian power. 
Russia, Islam and Islamic Fundamentalism: 
Past Methods as Models for the Present
The previous chapter outlined some prominent Russian concepts for 
understanding its strategy in the Middle East from a geopolitical per-
spective, whereas this chapter will focus specifically on Russia’s experi-
ence with Islam and Islamism70 at home, while also looking for parallels 
between Russia’s activities in the Middle East and its past experiences 
with Muslims in Russia and neighbouring countries. Thus, we will look 
into some major factors that have contributed to shaping Russia’s experi-
ence with Islam to discern patterns for understanding Russia’s conduct 
in Syria and beyond.
For many centuries Russia has had a considerable Muslim popula-
tion.71 In addition, it has a long history with Muslims in Russia and Mus-
lims living in neighbouring countries, as well as long-standing historical 
ties with Muslim communities and countries of the Middle East and 
Central Asia72. As a result, Russia has had to develop a distinct policy to-
wards these different groups. Historically, Russia’s first encounters with 
Islam date back to the 7th century, before the time of the founding of the 
Russian state itself,73 and culminate with the Soviet era,74 the reverbera-
tions of which are still present in the post-Soviet world.75 
If there is one facet that demonstrates the pertinence of the Muslim 
question for Russia, it has to do with the demographics of today’s Russia. 
From a Russian nationalist perspective the outlook is quite daunting be-
cause birth rates of the ethnic Russian population are in decline, where-
as the Muslim population, provided that the current trends continue, is 
69 Jones 2019.
70 Yemelianova 2002; Bobrovnikov 1999: 11–19.
71 Малашенко 2007: 69–85.
72 Bacon 1980.
73 Yemelianova 2002: 1–27.
74 As Yemelianova (2002: 134) has correctly highlighted “overall, 70 years of Soviet rule 
had a major impact on the various Muslim people of the USSR”.
75 Ibid.: 99–136.
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expected to make up the majority of the Russian population by 2050.76 
Based on these demographic estimates, no religious group will gain as 
much prominence in Russia in the near future as the Muslims.77 
The first and most general argument this chapter wants to put for-
ward about Russia and Muslims is that, despite some noteworthy tenden-
cies during the Soviet era78 and the exception of Chechnya,79 Russia’s 
Muslim communities have never seriously radicalised (i.e., fallen prey 
to Wahhabism, radical Jihadi Salafism, etc.)80 or pursued political in-
dependence.81 This may seem paradoxical, especially considering that 
Russia has been notoriously heavy-handed in its treatment of Muslim 
communities.82 
For example, during the Soviet era Russia forced the hierarchy of its 
Orthodox Church upon the Muslim community.83 Current circumstanc-
es seem to raise similar questions, especially since the revived Russian 
Orthodox Church has been playing one of the leading roles in the in-
formal system of Russia’s governance.84 However, this new position as-
sumed by the Orthodox Church is not so much religious as it is political, 
and Islam is also recognised as one of the official religions in Russia.85 
Hence, it could be tentatively argued that the Orthodox Church has not 
had much influence on the cultural identities of the Muslim community. 
Additionally, it seems that Russia’s Soviet-era policy was not able to 
affect the widest section of popular Islam that comprised a syncretis-
tic mix of traditional customs and beliefs, where the Islamic element 
existed mostly in the form of rituals.86 This offers one possible explana-
76 The statistics are revealing, i.e., there are 1.7 births per 100 women annually among eth-
nic Russians, which is below the replacement rate, whilst there are 4.5 births per 100 women 
among Muslims. Akhmetova 2016: 6; see also Laruelle 2016.
77 Di Puppo, Schmoller 2018: 84–87.
78 Benningsen, Broxup 1983.
79 Yemelianova 2002: 166–193.
80 Malashko 2001: 137–164.
81 Yemelianova 2002: 177–185.
82 Медведко 2003. 
83 Goble 2005: 167. 
84 Di Puppo, Schmoller 2018: 85.
85 It should be mentioned that Russia is a multi-religious society. In 1997, in addition to 
Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism were also given the status of traditional 
religions in Russia.
86 Goble 2005: 167.
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tion for why a relatively modest and traditional Muslim way of life has 
generally prevailed in Russia and the political aspect has not been able, 
or sometimes even willing, to seriously reshape the religious-cultural 
identities of these people.
This argument is also substantiated by Moscow’s official policy of 
recognising Islam alongside other traditional religions.87 However, this 
should not be interpreted as a sincerely inclusive stance. According to 
Akhmetova, the Russian establishment has been rather reserved towards 
Islam: “The Kremlin wants a conformist Islam and reacts negatively to 
any deviations from conformism”.88 Against this background, we can 
observe the emergence of the notion of a localised Islamic orthodoxy 
that represents, according to Di Puppo and Schmoller, an attempt to el-
evate the theological credentials of Islam in Russia.89
The second argument that this paper puts forward concerns Russia’s 
historical experience with subduing Muslim peoples, both at home and 
abroad. It has been posited that in its political efforts Russia, as a rule, 
has constructively sought cooperation with the more moderate factions 
of Islam or generally moderate political factions. The history of Russian-
Muslim relations is long and could hardly be discussed in this section 
in sufficient detail, let alone in its entirety. Therefore, it must suffice to 
outline some main elements from modern Russian history that can cor-
roborate this hypothesis at a general level.
It could be argued that Russia’s reliance on cooperation with moder-
ate Muslims is a tradition that harks back to Tsarist Russia and the Soviet 
Union in their pursuits to regain control over territories of the Crimean 
Tatars, the Emirate of Bukhara (Uzbek-Tajik state, 1785–1920), and over 
Azerbaijan or northern Afghanistan. In more recent times a similar ap-
proach can be observed in Russia’s relations with Turkey, Syria and the 
Balkan states, especially in cases of mixed populations of Christians and 
Muslims. For example, it can be argued that although the Soviet Union 
helped establish the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) that later staged a coup d’état to overthrow the ruling monarchy, 
87 For example, in a speech delivered by then-President Medvedev during his visit to Ufa in 
November 2011. See Akhmetova 2016: 6.
88 Ibid.
89 As they also point out, the Hanafi legal tradition figures prominently in this idea of ‘or-
thodox traditional Islam’. Di Puppo, Schmoller 2018: 86.
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the Russians would have actually preferred Afghanistan to be ruled by 
more moderate forces.90 Initially the Soviets supported King Moham-
med Zahir Shah but, largely due to the inevitability of a regime change, 
they later switched their loyalties to his cousin Mohammed Daud Khan 
who, backed by the PDPA and the Soviets, declared himself the first 
President of the Republic of Afghanistan in 1973.91 
Thus the Soviet Union supported moderate factions against national-
ist radicals (who would have liked to replace the King themselves) but 
most importantly, as long as possible, even against the PDPA. It could be 
argued that perhaps Moscow and the KGB saw that Afghan society was 
not ready for such transformative change and that moderates would have 
also offered greater stability for the Soviet Union in the effort to control 
the country. Ultimately, it could be argued that the Soviets ended up us-
ing the PDPA mostly as an instrument for exerting influence.92 Afghani-
stan, however, is just one example among many others. For example, in 
Azerbaijan the Kremlin put its support behind moderate Muslim forces 
which opposed rapprochement to either Turkey or Iran.93Similarly, Rus-
sia has historically supported the Kurds whose version of Islam has been 
generally relatively moderate.94 Moreover, in Egypt the Soviet Union 
supported the moderate Nasser.95 However, there are also exceptions 
such as Saddam Hussein, one of the cruellest despots the world has ever 
known,96 but that seems to have been a pragmatic choice on the part of 
Russia: first, to counter U.S.-supported Iran and, later, during the Iran-
Iraq war (1980–1988), against Iran’s religious extremism. However, this 
90 Khristoforov’s research indicates that the 1978 coup d’état staged in Afghanistan by 
the Marxist PDPA was not actually in the direct interests of Moscow. Nevertheless, Com-
munist party ideologists in Moscow (S. A. Suslov, B. N. Ponomaryov) deemed these events 
to be positive developments, offering their support to the new government. For more, see 
Христофоров 2019:188–189.
91 See Synovitz 2003. 
92 For characteristic patterns of the Soviet Union’s conduct in the Middle East see 
Христофоров 2019. However, as regards the current situation, it should be acknowledged 
that Russia’s current support goes to the Taliban. Sazonov 2017a.
93 Shiriyev 2019. 
94 Arraf 2019; Xalid 2015. 
95 Holbik, Drachmann 1971: 137–165.
96 See de Vries 2003.
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did not prevent Russia from approaching Iran later on.97 Today, Russia’s 
pragmatic policy is prominently outlined in the so-called Primakov doc-
trine98, largely drawing on the assumption that ordinary Muslim people 
are not particularly concerned with the purities of Islam. Instead, as long 
as they feel that their traditional way of life is not in danger, they seem to 
welcome modernisation (e.g., infrastructure, hospitals, etc.).
Drawing on the examples above, with a few caveats (e.g., Assad’s 
use of chemical weapons and the despotic elements of his governance), 
Syria can also serve as an example of such reliance on relatively moder-
ate factions, be it the Alawites who support Assad or the Syrian Kurds. 
However, from a historical perspective, Russia has prioritised countries 
that are geographically closer, turning to Afghanistan, Turkey, the Bal-
kans and Syria mostly when they can offer reputational gains for Russia 
in the eyes of the locals and other nations.99 Still, we must be careful in 
relying on the argument that Russia, as a rule, tends to support moderate 
factions because there are also several other aspects to Russia’s policy 
that cannot be ignored (e.g., brutal military and other interventions). 
This last intimation lays the foundation for the third argument that 
this paper wishes to put forward for evaluating Russia’s campaign in 
Syria. Namely, Russia’s military operations to subdue mostly Muslim-
populated countries, dating back to the 17th century, have been extreme-
ly brutal. The prime example of this is the infamous Aleksey Ermolov, 
a Russian imperial general of the 19th century, who commanded Tsarist 
troops in the Caucasian War and was directly responsible for subduing 
the local peoples under Russian rule.100 The list of his gruesome methods 
included punitive raids, scorched earth policies, forced migration and 
exile, massacres of entire villages, etc.,101 taking their cue from methods 
employed by other European empires before.102 It could be argued that 
97 However, this alliance has not improved much even today. See the discussion on Russia-
Iran relations in Chapter 3 above.
98 Tsygankov 2013: 104–105. See also Surovell 2005: 223–247.
99 Istomin et al. 2019. 
100 It was Ermolov who built Groznyi or Groznaia as his first fortress in the Caucasus, which 
literally means “terrible” or “menacing” in Russian and was meant to inflict a feeling of 
terror among the locals. King 2008: 47. King (2008: 48) also notes the examples of targeted 
assassinations, kidnappings and the killing of entire families.
101 Zürcher 2007: 72. On Ermolov’s role in Russia’s relations with Iran and the Ottoman 
Empire, see Keçeci 2016. On his notorious cruelty with Caucasian peoples, see ibid: 188–189.
102 King 2008: 47.
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his actions provided the model of operational and tactical methods that 
Russia has followed to this day. As recently as during the Soviet pe-
riod, Russia has employed mass terror, mass arrests, deportations (e.g., 
Chechens to Central Asia), religious persecution, Sovietisation (e.g., 
forcing people to transfer from Arabic to Cyrillic alphabets), etc.103
The Chechen wars of the 1990s serve as one of the most recent exam-
ples of those methods being applied to subdue a defiant Muslim people. 
It has been estimated that in the course of its two military campaigns 
Russia managed to kill approximately 50,000 civilians of Chechnya’s al-
ready relatively small population (ca. 1 million, with ca. 700,000 of them 
ethnic Chechens).104 In this context it is important to highlight Zürcher’s 
assertion that the image portrayed by Russians of Chechens as Islamist 
fundamentalists using guerrilla warfare and sporadic terrorism is not 
accurate because it originally started as a secular political nation-state 
project.105 However, although the conflict in Chechnya might have be-
gun with a clear political agenda and fairly few religious aspects, over 
time it became a magnet attracting Jihadist fighters from all over the 
Arab world. While it cannot be said that the Chechen nation as a whole 
fell prey to them, they had a significant impact on the nature of this war. 
Zürcher argues that Islamism provided an overarching identity to a tribal 
society, enabling the unification of otherwise quarrelling clans106, with 
victory bringing about a feeling of religious euphoria.107 Thus, while it 
is hard to judge if Islamism was the cause and ensuing terror the effect, 
or if the first war itself could be seen as a direct or indirect reason for 
radicalising Chechen society, it is true that Russia had to deal with the 
consequences of radical Islamism in Chechnya, including numerous ter-
rorist acts committed by Chechen groups.108 It also provided Russia with 
103 Zürcher 2007: 73. As de Waal shows, under the pretext of not trusting the ‘Turkish con-
nected people’ living near the border, many peoples were deported, including Chechens. de 
Waal 2010: 85.
104 Zürcher 2007: 70.
105 As Zürcher claims, Chechnya was one of the Soviet Union’s poorest regions and later 
served as a pool for recruiting rebels. It became a part of the Tsarist Empire after half a cen-
tury of fighting. Chechens consider the beginning of Russian rule as the first of a series of 
genocidal attacks on their people. See ibid.: 71–72.
106 Zürcher 2007: 88–89.
107 See Gammer 2006.
108 According to de Waal, one of the Jihadist centres connecting Chechnya to the outside world 
was Pankisi Gorge in Georgia where terrorist training camps were located. See de Waal 2010: 190.
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an opportunity to portray the whole Chechen cause as one of radical 
Islamist terrorism. What is more, in the context of infighting among dif-
ferent factions, Russia, once again, partnered with the clan representing 
a moderate strand, that of Chief Mufti Ahmat Kadyrov. 
On the whole, drawing on patterns emerging from Russia’s relations 
with its Muslim people, it can be argued that it has largely followed the 
same model in Syria. The chaos of the civil war and the rise of radical 
Islamism gave Russia licence to intervene, even at the price of bringing 
back the much discredited Assad. While it is yet to be seen if Assad will 
maintain his hold on power, or whether Russia and the West can deliver a 
peaceful solution, Russia’s conduct in Syria provides grounds for posit-
ing that Russia’s experience with Muslims at home has had a significant 
influence on its policy in the Middle East. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that Russia seems to have sophisticated 
its policy towards both domestic and foreign Muslims to a considerable 
degree. At the same time, the Donbass War in Ukraine and tensions with 
the West after the imposition of sanctions have pushed Russia to retreat 
from the West’s ‘war on terrorism’. According to Akhmetova, Russia’s 
foreign policy has instead turned towards the Muslim East, particularly 
Turkey, becoming more cautious with regard to Islam and Muslims.109 
The Role of the Middle East, Syria, and ISIS 
in Russia’s Strategy: A Discussion
This chapter will examine Russia’s strategy in Syria and in the wider 
Middle East, while also looking into the role of ISIS and speculating 
about possible future trajectories of Russian-Western relations.
Previous chapters have analysed the basic assumptions informing 
Russian and Western activities in the Middle East. The authors have 
highlighted that despite its relatively limited economic resources, Russia 
has nevertheless managed to achieve considerable military and political 
success. Could this be attributed merely to the effective management of 
its activities in the region? Although that aspect cannot be discounted, 
our analysis has indicated that there are several basic assumptions that 
work against the success of the West while simultaneously favouring 
Russia. The pragmatic objectives associated with Russia’s so-called 
109 Akhmetova 2016: 7.
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regionalist doctrine, in its neutrality, are more acceptable to the regional 
powers as compared to Western conditionality, legitimated by democrat-
ic requirements. However, even if locals see Russia as different from the 
traditional culprits (i.e., former colonial rulers and importers of foreign 
values), this position remains debatable. Thus it could be argued that the 
newly-emergent confrontation between Russia and the West seems to 
have served Russia well. This is perhaps best visible in the fact that all 
regional powers now recognise Russia as a major power broker in the 
Middle East. At the same time, it is quite difficult to imagine that any 
Western power would be able to achieve that status as easily as Russia. 
What is more, we should not discount the important role Russian di-
plomacy has played in acquiring this status. Thus, it can be argued that 
professionalism coupled with a conducive environment has led Russia to 
enjoy its current success in the Middle East. This chapter analyses what 
all this success means with regard to Russia’s strategic goals. Drawing 
on previous chapters, the authors distinguish between three major objec-
tives within Russia’s strategy in the Middle East that align perfectly with 
its Eurasian Power concept. First, Russia will strive to maintain control 
in Syria, if not securing Assad’s rule then at least retaining its king-mak-
er powers, enabling it to build up and sustain its strategic foothold, both 
political and military, in Syria and in the Middle East. Second, Russia 
wants to become and remain a major, if not the primary, power broker 
in the region, requiring it to develop strong relations with major regional 
powers. Third, through its newly acquired status in Syria and in the 
Middle East, Russia is striving to assert its great power status globally. 
According to the concept of ‘Eurasian Power’, Russia sees itself as mov-
ing away from the (once potentially close) partnership with the West, 
instead seeing itself as pushed away by the West (especially by the U.S.). 
At the same time, Russia views itself as making the new strategic choice 
of contributing to a multipolar world instead of the old unipolar one. The 
Middle East has proven to be the best arena in which to demonstrate the 
implications of that choice. Maintaining regional stability is not simply 
vital to Russia’s own geopolitical interests in terms of controlling po-
tentially dangerous choke points, it appears pre-eminently to align with 
the new idea of Eurasia as a single security area whose central relevance 
is understood by all major powers, from the U.S. and Europe to China. 
By being able to control one of the region’s central nations (Syria), as 
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well as being able to convene all major powers and balance their diverse 
interests, Russia has demonstrated both its military and diplomatic ca-
pabilities and, by contributing to the stability of the region, is entitled to 
claim respect and support.110 
This is where relations between Russia and the West come under 
the spotlight and, in that regard, also the special role of ISIS. Russia’s 
role in maintaining (relative) peace and stability in the region makes it a 
valuable partner for the West, especially with regard to countering ISIS. 
While the U.S. may consider reducing its presence in the region and not 
feel the consequences anytime soon, it must be borne in mind that ISIS 
has global power projection ability, particularly towards Europe. If Rus-
sia has proved and continues to prove itself able to keep ISIS under (at 
least territorial) control it will have earned practical support from the 
U.S. and the EU, and perhaps also from China. 
It has become clear that, for Russia, ISIS is the only discernible ad-
versary in the region. Though Russia’s Sunni connections may have inti-
mated otherwise, its clash with the interests of the more or less moderate 
Sunni opposition have not been detrimental in the eyes of the major 
Sunni powers such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Instead, these nations 
have, even if indirectly, also approved Russia’s goal of securing Assad’s 
regime. For the Sunni powers in the Middle East the most important aim 
appears to be enhanced regional stability. However, the West’s recogni-
tion of Russia’s role is also very significant. Even if the methods used by 
Russia, and especially by Assad, have been met with strong disapproval, 
Russia’s own ‘grand mission’ has not come under much scrutiny. 
Controlling ISIS may yet become an ambivalent motive inasmuch 
as it would give Russia the key to poke at one of the West’s biggest vul-
nerabilities, both in terms of migration and terrorism. This ambivalent 
position towards ISIS will make for interesting speculation about the 
possible future trajectories of Russia’s behaviour. However, it is not a 
one-way road, especially considering that ISIS’s role appears to be even 
more pivotal since Russia’s justifications for remaining in the region will 
depend on ISIS’s staying power; at the same time there is also the risk 
that ISIS could take Russia hostage. This is not necessarily the case with 
regional powers, even if some of them may be using ISIS to wage their 
110 Komersant 2015. 
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own proxy wars. For the regional powers it is much more important that 
Russia has assumed the role of arbiter between Shia and Sunni interests. 
Finally, Russia’s status in the Middle East may also impact its role in 
its immediate neighbourhood. Interestingly, it can be posited that, while 
providing Russia with more confidence in pursuing its interests in the 
near abroad, its newly acquired power broker status in the Middle East 
will not allow for too much risk-taking elsewhere. This assertion is rein-
forced by the fact that the regional power broker role assumed by Russia 
is beyond its economic means. This does not mean that Russia’s political 
interests in the ‘near abroad’ will not remain the same, rather they may 
even increase. Russia will not back down from its interests in Ukraine, 
Belarus or Georgia, however the way of handling those interests may be 
pushed from the recently preferred hybrid111 and military grounds to the 
political plane. 
Indeed, on that political plane Russia’s interests may find solid ground 
if the West chooses not to disturb Russia’s position. What is more, it will 
probably push both parties towards negotiating compromises, meaning 
that the relations between Russia and the West (e.g., in Ukraine) may 
acquire a more diplomatic form and they may strike a de facto deal that 
recognises their interests in this ‘near abroad’. Although the West may 
have little inclination to accept such an eventuality, if it is interested in 
a relatively peaceful and stable Russia it may be forced to come to terms 
with the fact that not all former republics of the Soviet Union will have 
the opportunity to integrate with the West. At the same time, this deal 
may still allow for strong economic relations between Ukraine and the 
West. While far from an ideal solution, it may offer Ukraine a chance to 
build up its economy and stabilise its society.
This last thread may be helpful in returning to the wider plane of 
strategic interests and political goals. Namely, in addition to the imme-
diate gains that can be reaped from the Middle East, Russia may see its 
success in the region as a way of accomplishing a long-term peace deal 
with the West. If Russia decides to become the watchdog of ISIS this 
will also entail maintaining balance in the Middle East which, in turn, 
may be a welcome development because that is exactly what the West is 
primarily interested in. If Russia manages to secure and maintain peace 
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in the Middle East the West may, in turn, close its eyes to certain meth-
ods Russia may use on the ground. Also, tasking Russia with policing 
the region may gradually relieve the West of that responsibility. Indeed, 
this may even lead the West to take an interest in the stability of not only 
the Middle East but also of Russia itself. 
Conclusion
Our article analysed the general conditions that made it possible for the 
Russian Federation to reach the enhanced status it currently enjoys in 
the Middle East. The article highlighted some general underlying pre-
suppositions that may be said to have led to failure on the part of the 
West. Among them, democratic legitimation both at home and in the 
region were shown to play out negatively for those pursuits. Similarly, 
problems in defining an enemy straightforwardly and forming a clear 
front were discovered as having hampered the West in its pursuits in the 
Middle East. Finally, due to their colonial legacy and the imputation of 
the effects of globalised capitalism to the West, the overall context for 
any direct intervention by the West has generally been unwelcoming. In 
comparison, those very same circumstances have favoured Russia to a 
remarkable degree. First of all, Russia does not expect Middle Eastern 
nations to become democracies. What is more, there is also no need 
for Russia to legitimise such interventions at home. Secondly, Russia 
has found an ally in Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, giving it the liberty to 
execute a brutal campaign which has given it a morally questionable 
but pragmatically beneficial handicap. Finally, regional powers are not 
intimidated by Russia’s actions in the region, as has been the case with 
the West. 
As to Russia’s strategy, it was established that since its 2015 interven-
tion in Syria Russia has gradually assumed the role of a regional power 
broker, a status which has been recognised by all major stakeholders in 
the region. For a time it was a difficult position to achieve since Russia 
was mainly associated with the Shia axis in the Middle East. However, 
this time it has managed to cast this image aside and become an accept-
able partner also to the Sunni powers, not to mention Israel. Thus, in 
parallel to its activities in Syria, Russia has also been pursuing wider 
regional strategic goals in the Middle East. As a result, it can be argued 
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that Russia has effectuated a carefully planned and comprehensive strat-
egy for the region as part of its wider global strategy. By focusing on the 
Middle East Russia has not only come to the rescue of an old ally but 
also succeeded in securing one of the possible choke points that could 
restrict its access to the world’s seas and markets. It was also established 
that, by Russia’s own standards, its campaigns in Syria and power broker 
position in the Middle East contribute to the notion of Russia being an 
Eurasian power.
The third thread of interest that the article pursued attempted to 
understand the manner in which Russia has approached and dealt with 
Muslim nations and the radical groups among them. Russia can be said 
to have applied a sophisticated policy that, in addition to regional pow-
ers, is also able to address the Islamist tendencies and groups within. 
It was argued that Russia has most probably been applying the lessons 
it has learnt from its earlier policies towards Muslims and Islamism at 
home. While politically it seems to seek cooperation with moderate forc-
es, militarily it employs a kind of brutality characteristic of the heyday 
of the Tsarist Empire. In addition to its own long historical experience, 
of particular importance has been the conflict in Chechnya in the 1990s 
and 2000s. It could be argued that Russia allowed the Chechens to de-
velop internal divisions between radical and moderate Islamists in order 
to legitimise its brutal response and offer its own brand of stability. This 
pattern was found to be similar to the one Russia employed in Syria. 
The fourth research question considered the potential future devel-
opment of Russian-Western relations in the Middle East and beyond, 
focusing on the role of ISIS that has served as the primary justification 
for Russia’s intervention in the eyes of the West. However, there is also 
the wider role of power broker and custodian that Russia has assumed 
in the region which the West has more or less explicitly acknowledged. 
Indeed, as was argued, this role makes the Russian Federation a rather 
useful, if still ambivalent, ally to the West in regional and thereby also 
in global matters. Although the West does not always officially approve 
of Russia’s conduct, it has nevertheless been tolerated. Considering that 
both parties share the aim of stabilising the Middle East, the West seems 
to be willing to turn a somewhat blind eye in some circumstances. In 
addition, it was speculated that it would be in the West’s interests to 
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forge a mutually acceptable peace agreement in Ukraine in order not to 
destabilise Russia. 
In this context, Russia’s regional, as well as global, position and pros-
pects appear to present an interesting paradox. On the one hand, Russia 
has been relying on brutal methods to achieve its goals in Syria while at 
the same time striving to become a power broker and guarantor of peace 
in the region. As such, Russia has been performing a precarious balanc-
ing act on the precipice of its economic means and stature. This role of 
regional power broker, as much as it can be said to have obtained it, may 
also have a civilising effect on Russia. This enhanced status is not some-
thing that Russia would want to endanger carelessly, especially as this 
has finally brought it back into the league of major world powers. On the 
other hand, this new status is also something that Russia is still in danger 
of losing due to its limited economic prowess. What is more, considering 
the vital importance to Russia of this newly acquired status, both region-
ally and globally, it will have to tone down its bravado to avoid losing it 
completely. Therefore, while Russia may still find it expedient to use the 
types of brutal methods it has demonstrated in Syria, the emphasis of its 
activities will presumably shift towards maintaining and bolstering the 
role of custodian of peace in the Middle East. The significance of this 
position for Russia cannot be overestimated, especially considering how 
useful it makes Russia to the West. This, in turn, means that the West 
will become more interested and invested in maintaining a stable Rus-
sia. On the whole, since Russia cannot afford to continue with provoca-
tions as it has been accustomed to before, this new role may encourage 
Russia to become a more stabilising and hence also more civilising force 
in the global arena as well. 
Finally, in the context of Russian-Western relations it was speculat-
ed that Russia, as ISIS’s watchdog, may be tempted to use ISIS to put 
pressure on the West (e.g., by thus fuelling radicalisation in Europe, or 
through continuing instability in the region, thereby indirectly causing 
migration, etc.). However, considering Russia’s enhanced status in the 
eyes of the West by dint of having achieved something that the West 
itself has not been able to, this will mean that while Russia’s position 
will not be challenged, it will not be apt to use ISIS to threaten the West.
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